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Abstrakt 
 
Selbstbewusstsein ist eine der zentralen Grundsätze im Yogācāra. Einige Befürworter 
des Selbstbewusstseins, wie Devendrabuddhi, Kamalaśīla und Mokṣākaragupta, sagen 
sogar, dass die Behauptung, dass das Bewusstsein sich selbst nicht bewusst ist, 
kontraintuitiv ist. Die Aussage impliziert, dass das Selbstbewusstsein weit verbreitet in 
unserem Alltag akzeptiert ist. Doch in philosophischen und akademischen Studien ist 
die Kontroverse über die Existenz des Selbstbewusstseins für mehr als fünfzehn 
Jahrhunderte fortgesetzt. Unter den Gelehrten, die an dieser Debatte beteiligt waren, 
trug Dharmakīrti 147 Verse im dritten Kapitel seines Meisterwerks Pramāṇavārttika 
(im Folgenden PV) zur Erklärung und dem Beweis des Selbstbewusstseins bei. 
Pramāṇavārttika erschien erstmals 1935 auf der Bühne der südasiatischen Studien, als 
Sāṅkṛtyāana seine Editio Princeps von Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya veröffentlichte. 
Seitdem gibt es eine Fülle von Studien über Pramāṇavārttika und ihre Kommentare, 
die von erheblicher Bedeutung sind. Allerdings ist die Übersetzung von 
Pramāṇavārttika, insbesondere die englische Übersetzung, aufgrund des schieren 
Umfangs der Arbeit und der Obskurität des Textes noch lange nicht abgeschlossen. 
Angesichts der grundlegenden Bedeutung von Pramāṇavārttika für die Studien über 
Dharmakīrti, sind erhebliche Anstrengungen erforderlich, um ihre Übersetzung zu 
fördern. Ich habe 60 Verse (d. H. PV 3.425-484) aus der vollen Größe des 539-Vers-
Kapitels Pratyakṣa von Pramāṇavārttika für den Übersetzungsabschnitt in dieser 
Dissertation gewählt, von denen fast 50 Verse zum ersten Mal ins Englische übersetzt 
wurden. Die Übersetzung basiert auf meiner Fassung des Sanskrit-Textes, die nach der 
Zusammenstellung der Sanskritmanuskripte, den früheren Ausgaben, den tibetischen 
Übersetzungen, der Analyse verschiedener indischer und tibetischer Kommentare und 
der bisherigen akademischen Studien erfolgt. Im Zuge der Analyse von indischen und 
tibetischen Kommentaren habe ich auch einige dieser Kommentare übersetzt. 
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Pramāṇavārttika ist bekannt für seine versförmige Schreibweise, die es uns schwer 
macht, die tiefen Gedanken von Dharmakīrti zu verstehen, vor allem, wenn es um das 
Studium des Kapitels Pratjakṣa geht, zu dem kein Autokommentar des Autors gibt. Um 
die Struktur und die allgemeine Strategie der Argumente von Dharmakīrti besser zu 
verstehen, stelle ich in Anhang I einen Vergleich der Übersetzung zweier 
Inhaltsverzeichnisse von PV 3.301-539 vor, die von zwei berühmten tibetischen 
Gelugpa-Gelehrten erstellt wurden: Gyaltsab und Kedrup. In den Anhängen II und III 
habe ich einen Überblick über Pramāṇasamuccaya und Vṛtti [nachstehend PS (V)] 
1.8c-12 von Gyaltsab sowie einen Leitfadenvergleich zwischen PS (V) 1.8c-12 und PV 
3.301- 539 dargestellt. Diese Vergleiche zusammen mit der Einführung der Yogācāra‘s 
Strategie zum Beweis von Selbstbewusstsein in Candrakīrtis 
Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (eine Übersetzung der Einleitung sich im Anhang IV) 
bilden die Grundlage für das Kapitel 2, in dem ich die Theorie von Dignāga und 
Dharmakīrti für das Selbstbewusstsein und ihre Strategie zum Beweis von 
Selbstbewusstsein, vor allem die detaillierte Strategie, die in PV 3.425-484 verwendet 
wurde, erkläre. Die Erläuterung der Strategie, die in PV 3.425-484 verwendet wurde, 
ist auch meine wörtliche Interpretation des Textes, die im Übersetzungsabschnitt 
übersetzt wurde. 
Darüber hinaus stelle ich zwei Argumente für den infiniten Regress des Anderen-
Bewusstseins und die Reflexivität des Selbstbewusstseins in den Kapiteln 3 und 4 dar. 
Der infinite Regress ist ein Argument, das von Dignāga und Dharmakīrti vorgeschlagen 
wurde, um die Ansichten anderer Gegner zu widerlegen, in denen behauptet wird, dass 
die Kognition nicht von sich selbst erlebt wird, sondern von einer anderen Kognition. 
Dieses Argument erhielt die Resonanz von ihren indischen Gegnern, wie Kumārila und 
Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. Ich hatte keine Aufmerksamkeit auf das infinite Regressargument 
gelenkt, bis zwei moderne Gelehrten - Ganeri und Kellner - ihre Herausforderungen an 
die Gültigkeit des Arguments stellten. Nachdem ich das ganze Argument analysiert 
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habe, fasse ich auf, dass der Kernpunkt des infiniten Regressarguments in der Prämisse 
der Yogācāra‘s Theorie des Selbstbewusstseins liegt, d.h. die Erkenntnis eines Objekts 
erfordert die Erfahrung der Objektkognition, und diese Prämisse wird in § 2.2.1 weiter 
erklärt. 
Das in Kapitel 4 gewählte Argument ist ein Kerngedanke der Theorie des 
Selbstbewusstseins, nämlich die Reflexivität, die den Hauptcharakter des 
Selbstbewusstseins ausmacht. In diesem Kapitel stelle ich die Ablehnung der 
Reflexivität von Buddhisten und Nicht-Buddhisten wie Nāgārjuna und Kumārila und 
so weiter vor. Ich stelle auch die Verteidigung der Reflexivität für Selbstbewusstsein 
vor, die hauptsächlich von einem großen Kommentator von Pramāṇavārttika, 
Prajñākaragupta erstellt wurde. Um eine Textbasis für die Argumente in Kapitel 4 zu 
bieten, stelle ich in Anhang VI eine annotierte Übersetzung der Verteidigung von 
Prajñākaragupta vor, die in seinem Kommentar zu PV 3.425 erschien. Durch die 
Einführung des infiniten Regressarguments und Reflexivität in dieser Dissertation 
möchte ich zeigen, dass die Theorie des Selbstbewusstseins in dem epistemischen 
Kontext von Yogācāra in sich widerspruchsfrei ist, falls die oben erwähnte 
Voraussetzung gültig ist und die Reflexivität logisch vertretbar ist. Denn unter der 
Annahme, dass die Prämisse gültig ist, kann die Theorie des Anderen-Bewusstseins den 
Fehler des infiniten Regresses kaum vermeiden. Weiterhin, unter der Annahme, dass 
die Reflexivität für die Kognition festgesetzt werden kann, dann ist es möglich, dass 
die Kognition sich selbst erkennen kann. 
In Kapitel 5, präsentiere und analysiere ich *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika‘s Kritik an der 
Theorie des Selbstbewusstseins. Yogācāras‘ Verteidigung wird schwach, wenn es mit 
solchen Kritiken konfrontiert wird. Obwohl alle Argumente von *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamika in Bezug auf die Methoden zum Beweis des Selbstbewusstseins technisch 
widerlegt werden können, begegnen die Befürworter des Selbstbewusstseins, 
insbesondere die tibetischen Befürworter des Selbstbewusstseins, einer wirklichen 
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Schwierigkeit in Verteidigung des Selbstbewusstseins, als die *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamikas eine ontologische Frage aufwarf, dass, wenn die Kognition selbsterkannt 
ist, würde sie selbstetabliert sein. Angesichts der Mādhyamika‘s Theorie der 
abhängigen Entstehung (pratīyasamutpāda), d.h. wenn eine Sache existiert, indem sie 
sich nicht auf die Existenz einer anderen Sache bezieht, wird sie zur inhärenten Existenz, 
d.h. es führt zu nicht Leerheit. Und das steht im Widerspruch zu dem Grundgesetz der 
Selbstlosigkeit im Buddhismus. Nach Gelugpa ist es auf diesen Formfehler an 
Selbstbewusstsein zurückzuführen, dass *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika das 
Selbstbewusstsein sowohl in der ultimativen als auch in der konventionellen Realität 
widerlegte. Allerdings ist die Frage, ob *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika‘s Widerlegung des 
Selbstbewusstseins auf die ultimative Realität beschränkt werden sollte, zwischen der 
Gelugpa und allen anderen nicht-Gelugpa tibetischen Gelehrten umstritten. Die 
Ansichten der Letzteren werden in einer Monographie von Williams eingeführt. Gegen 
einige Schlussfolgerungen von Williams, Kapitel 5 dieser Dissertation, schließen die 
Argumente zu diesem Thema in Gelugpa‘s Hinsicht ein. Es beinhaltet auch eine 
Einführung in die epistemische Theorie der Kognition der Kognition von *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamika, nämlich die Erinnerung der Kognition. 
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Introduction 
 
PV 3.439c2d: If that manifestation with the nature of cognition is not 
experienced, the whole world would not be experienced.                     
── Dharmakīrti 
 
Self-awareness is one of the central tenets in the Yogācāra tradition.29 In general, self-
awareness means that we know that we know. For example, when we are looking at a 
vase attentively, the experience of “I am aware that I am looking at a vase” is so vivid 
that we almost never question its validity.  Some advocates of self-awareness, such as 
Devendrabuddhi, Kamalaśīla and Mokṣākaragupta, even claim that the assertion that 
awareness is not aware of itself is counterintuitive.30  It implies that self-awareness is 
widely accepted in our everyday life.  However, in philosophical and academic studies, 
the controversy over the existence of self-awareness has continued for over fifteen 
centuries.  Various arguments have been presented, among which Dharmakīrti devotes 
                                                 
29 In this dissertation, the term Yogācāra refers to the Yogācāra founded by Dignāga 
and developed by Dharmakīrti and their followers. It should be noted that as mentioned 
by ’Jam Dbyangs Bzhad Pa in his MABhjy, there is at least another epistemological 
tradition of the Yogācāra, which is represented by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and does not 
accept self-awareness. (Cf. MABhjy 346b5 and 347a6.) 
30 Cf. § 2.2.2.2. 
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147 verses31 in the third chapter of his masterpiece Pramāṇavārttika to explaining and 
proving the existence of self-awareness by reasoning. 
Pramāṇavārttika made its debut on the stage of South Asian studies in 1935 when a 
legendary Indian scholar, Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1893-1963), published his editio 
princeps of Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya.  Since then, there have been an 
abundance of studies on Pramāṇavārttika and its commentaries that are of considerable 
significance.  However, due to the sheer volume of the work and the obscurity in the 
text, the translation of Pramāṇavārttika, especially its English translation, is still far 
from completion.  Given the fundamental importance of Pramāṇavārttika for studies 
on Dharmakīrti, collaborative efforts are needed to promote its translation. I select 60 
verses (i.e., PV 3.425-484) from the 539-verse chapter on Pratyakṣa of the 
Pramāṇavārttika for the translation section in this dissertation, among which nearly 50 
verses are translated into English for the first time.32 The translation is based on my 
edition of the Sanskrit text, which is based on the collation of the Sanskrit manuscripts, 
the previous editions, the Tibetan translations, the analysis of different Indian and 
Tibetan commentaries and previous academic studies. In the course of the analysis of 
Indian and Tibetan commentaries, I also translate some parts of these commentaries. 
Pramāṇavārttika is well known for its terse verse-form writing style which makes it 
difficult for us to understand Dharmakīrti’s profound thoughts, especially in the study 
of Pratyakṣa chapter, which is not accompanied by author’s autocommentary.  
                                                 
31 According to Gyaltsab, PV 3.249-280 are the explanation of the definition and the 
example of self-awareness, while PV 3.425-539 are the explanation as to how to prove 
self-awareness. (Cf. PVVgyal, pp. 15-17 and the appendix I in this dissertation.)  For 
the numbering of the verses of PV, I follow Vetter. (Cf. Vetter 1964: 116-117.) 
32 PV 3.427, 448-450, 455 and 453bcd-459 were separately translated by Dreyfus 
(1997), Moriyama (2010) and Franco (2011). 
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Although there are several Indian commentaries by Dharmakīrti’s followers at my 
disposal (without table of contents), I feel cautiously confident to sketch out the 
structure of Dharmakīrti’s arguments over the establishment of self-awareness, because 
the arguments are just a small component of his entire epistemological and logical 
theory and more time is needed for a thorough study of his entire theory.  To better 
understand the structure and the general strategy of Dharmakīrti’s arguments, in 
appendix I, I present a comparison of the translation of two tables of contents of PV 
3.301-539, which are made by two famous Tibetan Gelugpa scholars: Dar Ma Rin Chen 
(also well-known as Gyal Tshab Rje or Gyaltsab) and Dge Legs Dpal Bzang (also well-
known as Mkhas Grub Rje or Kedrup).  In appendices II and III, I set forth an outline 
of PS(V) 1.8c-12 made by Gyaltsab as well as an outline-comparison between PS(V) 
1.8c-12 and PV 3.301-539.  These comparisons together with the introduction of 
Yogācāra’s strategy of proving self-awareness in Candrakīrti’s 
Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (its translation is presented in appendix IV) form the basis 
for chapter two, in which I explain Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory of self-
awareness and their strategy of proving self-awareness, especially the detailed strategy 
used in PV 3.425-484.  The explanation of the strategy used in PV 3.425-484 can also 
be considered as my interpretation of the text translated in the translation section. 
In addition, I raise two arguments about the infinite regress of other-awareness and the 
reflexivity of self-awareness in chapter three and four, respectively.  The infinite 
regress is an argument proposed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to disprove their 
opponents’ views of other-awareness. This argument received the responses from their 
Indian opponents, such as Kumārila and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta33, but the responses can merely 
                                                 
33 This author seems to be more often referred to as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa by modern scholars, 
but Watson and Kataoka claim that they found in two places in Āgamaḍambara that the 
author referred to himself as Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. Cf. Watson_Kataoka 2010: 285, n. 2. 
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be considered as the defence of the theory of other-awareness.  The infinite regress 
argument was challenged recently by two modern scholars - Ganeri and Kellner.  
Having analyzed the whole argument as it appears in PS(V), PV and PVin, I find that 
the nub of the argument lies in the premise of Yogācāra’s theory of self-awareness, i.e., 
the knowledge of an object requires the experience of the object-cognition, and this 
premise is further explained in § 2.2.1.  The argument selected in chapter four is about 
a core concept of the theory of self-awareness, i.e., the reflexivity, which constitutes the 
main character of self-awareness.  In this chapter, I introduce the rejections of 
reflexivity from Buddhists and non-Buddhists, such as Nāgārjuna and Kumārila.  In 
the same chapter, I also introduce the defence of reflexivity for self-awareness, which 
is mainly advanced by a great commentator of PV, Prajñākaragupta.  To offer a textual 
basis for the arguments in chapter four, I present in appendix VI an annotated translation 
of Prajñākaragupta’s defence, which is included in his commentary of PV 3.425.  In 
all, my aim of selecting these two arguments in this dissertation is to demonstrate that 
if the premise mentioned above is valid and the reflexivity is logically defensible, then 
the theory of self-awareness will be self-consistent in Yogācāra’s epistemic context. 
Assuming that the premise is valid, the theory of other-awareness can hardly avoid the 
fault of infinite regress, and assuming that the reflexivity can be established for the 
cognition, it is possible for the cognition to be the means of knowing itself. 
In chapter five, I introduce and analyse the *Prāsaṅgika34 Mādhyamika’s criticisms on 
                                                 
34 As is well-known, the term *Prāsaṅgika does not exist in the extant Sanskrit texts. It 
is generally agreed that it is a later designation introduced by Tibetan doxography. 
According to Nagashima and Vose, Jayānanda might be the first one to distinguish 
Candrakīrti and Buddhapālita (including Nāgārjuna) from Bhāviveka, even though one 
might argue that Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā may not be regarded as Indian work because 
it was written outside India. (Cf. Nagashima 2004: 1, n. 2 and Vose 2010: 559.) 
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the theory of self-awareness.  Yogācāras’ defence becomes feeble when confronting 
such criticisms.  Although technically all *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s arguments 
relating to the methods of proving self-awareness can be refuted, it appears that the 
advocates of self-awareness, in particular, the Tibetan advocates of self-awareness, 
encounter a real difficulty in defending self-awareness when *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamikas raise an ontological issue that if the cognition is self-cognized, it will be 
self-established. In the light of the Mādhyamika theory of dependent-arising 
(pratītyasamutpāda), if a thing does not exist by referring to the existence of another 
thing, it will not lack the inherent existence, namely, it will not be empty. And this is in 
conflict with the basic law of Selflessness in Buddhism. According to the Gelugpa 
tradition, it is due to this flaw in self-awareness that *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas are able 
to refute self-awareness in both ultimate and conventional realities. However, the issue 
                                                 
Nevertheless, the term Thal ’Gyur Pa (the *Prāsaṅgika) and its definition appear only 
in Tibetan commentaries. According to Tibetan scholars, the main character for a 
Mādhyamika to be considered as the *Prāsaṅgika is whether he refuses autonomous 
inference, as Candrakīrti states in his Prasannapadā: “But because he does not maintain 
any other position (pakṣa), it is not right for the Madhyamika himself to formulate an 
autonomous inference (svatantram anumānam).” (MacDonald 2015: 61.) The reason 
for Candrakīrti holding this view may be that he considers that “As regards inference 
for oneself (svārthānumāna), on the other hand, in all cases just [one’s] own 
acknowledgement (svaprasiddhi) is weightier, not the acknowledgement of both 
[parties].” (MacDonald 2015: 138.) ’Jam Dbyangs Bzhad Pa attributes this view to 
Nāgārjuna who stated in his VV 29: “If I had any proposition (pratijñā), then this defect 
(doṣa) would be mine. I have, however, no proposition (nāsti ca mama pratijñā). 
Therefore, there is no defect that is mine (tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ). 
(Bhattacharya_Johnston_Kunst 1986: 113.) For more details about the definition and 
classification of the *Prāsaṅgika in Gelugpa’s doctrines, cf. DRUTHAjy, pp. 793-794; 
DRUTHAzj, pp. 281-282; DRUTHAjzp, pp. 28-29. 
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whether *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas’ refutation of self-awareness should be limited to 
the realm of ultimate reality is disputed between the Gelugpa and all other non-Gelugpa 
Tibetan scholars.  The views of the latter are introduced in a Williams’ monograph, 
which shows that the author is in favor of the conventional existence of self-awareness.  
Against some conclusions drawn by Williams, chapter five of this dissertation includes 
the arguments on this issue in the Gelugpa view.  It also includes an introduction to 
*Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s epistemic theory of the cognition of cognition, namely, the 
memory of the cognition. 
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Some Remarks on Methodology 
In the studies of Indian epistemology, the philosophical and the philological approaches 
are most commonly used.  Ideally, when the meaning of a basic text can be understood 
without the need for consulting alternative sources or when there is an adequate 
explanation provided by the author, readers can arrive at a consensus about the text 
without much difficulty by relying on philological tools alone.  However, while the 
philological method has many virtues, it has its inherent limitation when actually 
applied in our field.  For instance, there are a few different ways to read PV 1.3ab1 
(pakṣadharmas tadaṃśavyāpto hetuḥ) literally.  As we are fortunate to have the 
detailed instruction from Dharmakīrti himself, we can without a doubt confirm that 
pakṣa in this case means dharmī (i.e., “the subject of a syllogism or conclusion”35), 
which is just a metaphorical use (upacāra) of pakṣa,36 and not its primary meaning 
“the proposition to be proved in a syllogism”37.  We can also ascertain that tadaṃśa 
here is glossed as the property (dharma) of pakṣa38 by virtue of the intention of the 
speaker, but not a part of pakṣa, because the word pakṣa does not express the whole 
proposition. 39  However, what would have been the case if we did not have 
Dharmakīrti’s auto-commentary or what if we did not find how Dharmakīrti defends 
the metaphorical use of pakṣa against his teacher Īśvarasena’s refutation?40 
                                                 
35 Apte, p. 946. 
36 Cf. PVSV: pakṣo dharmī / avayave samudāyopacārāt / (p. 1, l. 12.) 
37 MW, p. 573. 
38 Cf. Ś: phyogs de'i cha ni … / (D 6a6.) 
39  Cf. PVSV: tadaṃśas taddharmaḥ / vaktur abhiprāyavaśāt / na tadekadeśaḥ / 
pakṣaśabdena samudāyāvacanāt / (p. 2, ll. 11-12.) 
40 Cf. Mookerjee_Nagasaki 1964: 6. 
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In my study of the chapter Pratyakṣa of PV, I confront the situation of lacking the 
author’s autocommentary. 41   Therefore, although the philological approach is 
indispensable to my work, I can hardly depend on it as the only determinative method 
and for that I have to resort to the philosophical approach.  Otherwise, in many cases 
I would be left with various literal readings of a text, most of which do not make much 
sense in the philosophical context.  Needless to say, the presumption for taking the 
philosophical approach as the final determinative is that the original text itself is logical 
and contextually coherent.  As commented by Steinkellner in his latest work, since we 
have not reached a general consensus about the understanding of Dharmakīrti’s 
expression and their meanings, “it might have been possible to present a translation that 
was a less direct representation of Dharmakīrti’s words”.42  After much deliberation 
on the manuscripts of Dharmakīrti and the commentaries, Steinkellner summarizes two 
principles for scholars studying the materials of Dharmakīrti, which are “a principle of 
meaningfulness and coherence, and a principle of didactic purpose”43. 
As for using commentaries for the study of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, Kellner (2010) 
notes that scholars may go to two extremes when they read ancient Indian philosophical 
literature.  One extreme is being overly-dependent on the commentary.  This might 
cause some unwitting superimposition on the explanandum because the view of the 
commentator may not coincide with that of the author at all times.  Using 
Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on PS as an example, Kellner considers that 
Jinendrabuddhi is presumably influenced by Dharmakīrti’s views which are considered, 
                                                 
41 For an example of such difficulty, refer to PV 3.454 and 3.467 in the translation 
section. 
42 Steinkellner 2013: xiv. 
43 Steinkellner 2013: xxii. 
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in some cases, to be inconsistent with Dignāga’s position.  The other extreme is the 
unwittingly wrong presupposition of certain differences between the commentary and 
the original.  To stay away from both extremes, Kellner assumes that there is one real 
view of the author’s own context, for instance, the “view of Dignāga’s own context”44, 
and then she suggests that a commentary should be followed if the plausibility of the 
explanations therein is consistent with the real view.45  I would be the last to deny the 
theoretical correctness of Kellner’s suggestion, but its practicality is a bit dubious 
because a pre-condition for using this approach is that the real view, for instance, the 
“view of Dignāga’s own context” in Kellner’s case, should be there in the first place 
for us to evaluate whether the commentary on hand is correct or not.  However, it 
remains unclear, in Kellner’s explanation, as to how to determine the real “view of 
Dignāga’s own context” and what is the criterion for us to distinguish the views of the 
commentators of Dignāga from the “view of Dignāga’s own context”.  It might be a 
fact that with respect to quite a few issues, the views of Dignāga’s own context are not 
always consistent in different commentaries and studies, that is to say, in ancient and 
the modern times, different scholars may have different views regarding what Dignāga 
says exactly. 
To avoid the unwinnable arguments as to what the real “view of Dignāga’s own context” 
is or whether the real views of the author, which are disputable of course, do really exist 
after the lifetime of the authors, I assume “a comprehensible author” rather than “a real 
author”.  Therefore, the principle for using commentaries will no longer be to see 
whether the commentary reflects the viewpoint of the author of the original, but rather 
whether the commentaries can help interpret the original in a comprehensible way.  
                                                 
44 Kellner 2010: 207. 
45 Cf. Kellner 2010: 206-207. 
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That is to say, I would rather treat the view in the commentary as the view of the author 
if it is compatible with the author’s words.  The meaning of “compatible” here is that 
the views in the commentary do no harm to the original text in the light of the 
philosophy as well as the philology—in other word, the original text is philosophically 
and philologically comprehensible in the light of the interpretations of the commentary.  
In general, a work will be comprehensible to readers in the philosophical sense if it is 
(1) not against basic logic, (2) not self-contradictory and (3) not counterintuitive.  
Hence, the application of philosophical approach in my study on Dignāga and 
Dharmakīrti is to find an interpretation (based on a certain commentary or different 
commentaries) which keeps the authors, to the largest extent, away from these three 
faults. 
At last, it must be noteworthy that there will inevitably be gaps between the literal 
reading of a text and its comprehensive meaning when we apply the two methods 
mentioned above in the study of Dharmakīrti—the translation of PV 3.425 and 426 will 
be a good example for this issue.  We should also be aware that all applicable methods 
in this field will not be sufficient to settle all arguments.  For instance, so far I fail to 
see that one can answer the question whether Dharmakīrti knew that seeing an object is 
indeed seeing the light reflected from the object when they use the example of light to 
prove the reflexivity of self-awareness.46  With all these considerations in mind, we 
plead for some tolerance for different interpretations of Pramāṇavārttika.   
  
                                                 
46 For details, cf. § 2.2.1. 
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Abbreviations 
ACIP Asian Classics Input Project. http://www.asianclassics.org/ 
BA Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva. 
D The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Bstan ’gyur, Sde Dge edition). Sources from 
TBRC. 
EIP Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy 
JBORS Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 
JIABS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 
JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy 
M Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin 
P The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition. D.T. Suzuki (Ed.). Tokyo – 
Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1957. 
PEW Philosophy East & West by University of Hawaii’s Press 
PDhS Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda 
PS Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga. 
PS(V) PS and PSV. 
PS(V)t PSt and PSVt. 
PSt Tibetan translation of Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga. 
PSV Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga. 
PSVt Tibetan translation of Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga. 
PV Pramāṇavārttika 
PVD Embedded word of Pramāṇavārttika in Devendrabuddhi’s commentary 
(see De in Bibliography). 
PVeM Embedded word of Pramāṇavārttika in M. 
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PVeM1 Embedded word of Pramāṇavārttika in M1 (see M1 in Bibliography). 
PVeM2 Embedded word of Pramāṇavārttika in M2 (see M2 in Bibliography). 
PVeM3 Embedded word of Pramāṇavārttika in M3 (see M3 in Bibliography). 
PVeMms Embedded word of Pramāṇavārttika in the manuscript of 
Manorathanandin’s commentary (see Mms in Bibliography). 
PVM Pramāṇavārttika added in M1, M2 and M3. 
PVM1 Pramāṇavārttika added in M1. 
PVM2 Pramāṇavārttika added in M2. 
PVM3 Pramāṇavārttika added in M3. 
PVP Pramāṇavārttika contained in PVAms, PVA1 and PVA2. 
PVP1 Pramāṇavārttika contained in PVA1. 
PVP2 Pramāṇavārttika contained in PVA2. 
PVPms Pramāṇavārttika contained in PVAms. 
PVPt Tibetan translation of Pramāṇavārttika contained in PVA. 
PVR Tibetan translation of Pramāṇavārttika contained in R. 
PVA Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya of Prajñākaragupta. 
ŚV Kumārila’s Ślokavārtika 
ŚV(K) ŚV in Sucarita Miśra’s Kāśikā (see ŚVK in Bibliography). 
ŚV(N)  ŚV in Pārthasārathi Miśra’s Nyāyaratnākara (see ŚVN in 
Bibliography). 
ŚV(T) ŚV in Bhaṭṭombeka’s Tātparyaṭikā (see ŚVT in Bibliography). 
sk. Sanskrit 
T Taishō Tripiṭaka.  
Tr. Translator 
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TS Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha. 
t. Tibetan 
TBRC The website of Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center.  
http://www.tbrc.org/#home. 
v. verse 
VÖAW Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
WZKS Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens. 
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A Relative Chronology of Some Figures 
 
As for the time during which our author lived, the subject of these 
dates of the earlier authors is so shrouded in mystery, that there are 
no sufficient data leading to any definite conclusions; and as for 
conjectures, I am led to believe that it is mere waste of time to indulge 
in them; specially as what concerns us most is what the author has 
written for us, and it does not much matter whether he lived a few 
centuries this way or that.           
—G. Jhā47 
 
It is a fact that due to the lack of accurate materials, the dates of historical South Asian 
logicians mentioned in Erich Frauwallner’s “Landmarks in the History of Indian 
Logic”48 (published in 1961 and being one of the most popular academic reference 
sources) are just some presumed round number.  Frauwallner clearly stated that his 
good intentions of giving the dates in such round numbers were to make it easier to 
memorize the chronology of those Indian figures and to establish a basis for further 
improvement as the new materials are discovered after him.49 Since then, more than 
half a century has passed and the basis laid by Frauwallner remains almost unchanged. 
                                                 
47 Jhā 1909: xliv. 
48 Ref. to Frauwallner 1961. 
49 Frauwallner 1961: 128-129. 
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I would not say that the study on this issue stands in its place since 1961. For example, 
at least seven scholars50, to my knowledge, have contributed their studies to the dates 
of Dharmakīrti since 1980.  Their arguments are fruitful in providing the related 
information and the methods for exploring the mystery of the dates of Dharmakīrti.  
However, their attempts did not yield concrete results.  All these remind me of G. Jhā’s 
statement cited above, but I am aware that Jhā’s opinion should not be applied to 
academic study in general.  Therefore, following the convention of the scholarly 
studies, I list below the dates of some important figures, who will be referred to in this 
dissertation.  Most of the dates of the Indian epistemologists on this list are cited from 
Steinkellner and Much’s Texte der erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhimus 
(1995), and the dates of the Tibetan scholars are cited from TBRC.  I set forth in 
footnotes where I consult other sources or when providing more information. 
 
Names Dates 
Dignāga 480-540 
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa  530-60051 
Candrakīrti 600-65052 
Dharmakīrti 600-660 
Devendrabuddhi 630-690 
                                                 
50 Cf. Lindtner 1980 and 1992, Steinkellner 1991, Kimura 1997, Tillemans 2000: xiii-
xv, Funayama 2001, Krasser 2012: 583-587 and Franco (forthcoming). For the preview 
of the studies on the dates of Dharmakīrti in Japan, cf. Miyasaka 1970. 
51 Cf. Taber 2005: 163, n. 2. 
52 As to the dates of Candrakīrti, I accept that proposed by Ruegg, which is based upon 
his critique of the dates (530-600) proposed by Lindtner. (Cf. Ruegg 1981, p. 71.) 
16 
 
Śākyabuddhi 660-720 
Jinendrabuddhi 715-77553 
Śāntarakṣita 725-788 
Kamalaśīla 740-795 
Dharmottara 740-800 
Prajñākaragupta 750-81054 
Ravigupta  First half of 8th century 
Śāntideva Ca. 8th century55 
Bhaṭṭa Jayanta  840-900 
Prajñākaramati 950-103056 
Jayanta The middle of 11th century 
Yamāri The middle of 11th century 
Manorathanandin The second half of 11th century 
Mokṣākaragupta 1050-1292 
Vibhūticandra Ca. 12th – 13th century 
                                                 
53 There are no specific dates suggested for Jinendrabuddhi so far. Funayama and 
Steinkellner agree that he should be older than Śāntarakṣita.  Funayama emphasizes 
that he became active and influential not far before Śāntarakṣita. (Cf. Funayama 1999: 
92 and PSṬcr, p. xlii.) Accordingly, I tentatively place Jinendrabuddhi as above.  
54 Cf. Ono 2000: xi, n. 1.  I would like to thank Franco for he sharing with me some 
of his new findings which reveal that Prajñ a karagupta “lived añy time betweeñ the 
secoñd half of the eighth ceñtury añd the eñd of the ñiñth ceñtury”. (Franco, 
forthcoming.) 
55 Cf. Reugg 1981: 82. 
56 Cf. Hopkins 2008: 384. 
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Blo Bzang Grags Pa 1357-1419 
Dar Ma Rin Chen 1364-1432 
Dge Legs Dpal Bzang 1385-1438 
Bsod Nams Seng Ge 1429-1489 
Bsod Nams Grags Pa 1478-1554 
’Jam Dbyangs Bzhad 
Pa 
1648-1721 
’Jam Dbyangs Rnam 
Rgyal Rgya Mtsho 
1846-1912 
Blo Bzang Dpal Ldan 
Bstan ’Dzin 
Ca. 19th century 
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Part I: Study 
 
1 Introduction to the Source Materials 
The source materials introduced below are limited to those which are relevant to the 
verses translated in Part II of this dissertation, i.e., PV 3.425-484. They are (1) the 
manuscript and different editions of Pramāṇavārttika in Sanskrit and its different 
versions in Tibetan translations, (2) a literal commentary by Devendrabuddhi and its 
sub-commentary by Śākyabuddhi in Tibetan, (3) the manuscript and the edition of an 
extensive commentary by Prajñākaragupta in Sanskrit and its translation in Tibetan as 
well as the translation of two sub-commentaries by Jayanta and Yamāri in Tibetan, (4) 
a translation of the literal commentary by Ravigupta in Tibetan, (5) the manuscript and 
different editions of a literal commentary by Manorathanandin and (6) two Tibetan 
commentaries by Gyaltsab and Kedrup. 
1.1 Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika 
For PV 3.425-484, we have two facsimiles of Sanskrit manuscripts, seven editions, 
three Tibetan translations and an incomplete Tibetan translation which is incorporated 
in Devendrabuddhi’s commentary. 
1.1.1 Sanskrit Manuscripts 
An Independent Manuscript (PVms) 
A facsimile copy of an independent manuscript of PV is presented in “A Palm-leaf 
Manuscript of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika” edited by Kellner and Sferra, which is 
selected in Sanskrit Texts from Giuseppe Tucci’s Collection Part I, edited by Sferra in 
2008.  According to Kellner, this was the main source for Sāṅkṛtyāyana in preparing 
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the first edition of PV, in which this manuscript is marked as PV-H.57 However, the 
condition of PVms is the worst among all materials at my disposal. Less than half a 
folio survives; on folio 38v, PV 3.425 starts from the middle of the third line (upper 
right of the middle string hole) and the end reads yadā saṃvedanā, which is the 
beginning of PV 3.433. Moreover, due to the damage on the edges of the folio, many 
words are missing. Hence, for PV 3.425-484, all we have in PVms now are: 
v. 425. 
v. 426b2cd (from °’nubhavaḥ). 
v. 427-428ab and 428d2 (up to °n matam). 
v. 429-430. 
v. 431b2cd (from °ropaviplavāt) – 432. 
v. 433a1 (yadā saṃvedanā°). 
A Manuscript of Pramāṇavārttika Contained in the Manuscript of 
Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya (PVPms) 
The text of PV is contained in the manuscripts of Prajñākaragupta’s 
Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya. There are five manuscripts for PVA,58 but only two of them 
are published in Sanskrit Manuscript of Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam 
(Facsimile Edition) edited by Watanabe in 1998. Between the two, only one, which was 
possessed by Dānaśīla, contains PV 3.425-484 in pages 214a-225a. Some of these folios 
are in bad condition, namely 216b, 217b, 218b-221a and 222a, which make the 
following PVPms illegible: 429cd, 439cd, 440ab, 443cd, 448, 449ab, 451-453, 455-456, 
                                                 
57 Cf. PVms, p. 423. Note that Sāṅkṛtyāyana uses “PH” to refer to the same text. (Cf. 
PVs, p. viii.) 
58 Cf. PVAms, p. III. 
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462cd, 463 and 464. Moreover, PVPms 3.466cd is omitted in this manuscript. 
1.1.2 Sanskrit Editions 
An Independent Edition by Sāṅkṛtyāyana (PVs) 
Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s edition of Pramāṇavārttika published in an appendix to JBORS (vol. 
XXIV) in 1938 is the first and the only independent edition of the complete PV we have. 
Given the damage to PVms mentioned above, this edition is invaluable for the reading 
of PV 3.425-484. However, it is worth noting that a small portion of PV 3.425-484 in 
PVs is found in square brackets.  According to Sāṅkṛtyāyana, words in square brackets 
are missing from all independent manuscripts of PV at his disposal. They originate from 
a manuscript of Manorathanandin’s Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti and one of the manuscripts 
of Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya, the latter of which is found in Sa skya 
monastery (Gu rim lha khang) but not available now.59 The copy of PVs at my disposal 
is a copy of the one used by Frauwallner. The mass of detailed and valuable notes, 
appearing almost on every page, shows that Frauwallner read through the whole text 
word-by-word, in addition to his comparative reading of other commentaries. He 
corrected words, pādas, verses in this edition and re-counted the total numbers of verses 
at 1452, including 539 verses for the Pratyakṣa chapter. 
Two Editions Contained in PVA (PVP1 and PVP2) 
Sāṅkṛtyāyana published two editions of Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya in 1935 and 1953, 
respectively. (PVA1 and PVA2.) Therefore, we have two editions of PV (PVP1 and 
PVP2) contained in these two editions of PVA.  Since PVP2 is an improved edition 
based on PVP1, I will prioritize PVP2 as the reference for my study.  It is worth noting 
that folios 172b-314b of PVAms are not the main source of PVA2, p. 342, l. 13 – p. 648, 
                                                 
59 Cf. PVs, p. 1, n. 1 and p. ix. Cf. also PVAms, p. iii.  
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l. 16, and Sāṅkṛtyāyana only occasionally makes reference to the readings of this 
manuscript in the footnote of his edition.60 Therefore, I treat PVP2 (PVP1 too) as an 
independent source from PVAms in this dissertation. 
The Editions of Pramāṇavārttika Added to Manorathanandin’s Commentary 
(PVM) and The Words of Pramāṇavārttika Embedded in Manorathanandin’s 
Commentary (PVeM) 
Manorathanandin’s Vṛtti does not include the kārikā of PV. However, this Vṛtti is a 
word-by-word commentary on PV. The words of PV embedded in this commentary 
(PVeM) provide a basis for Sāṅkṛtyāyana to reconstruct an edition of PV (PVM1) which 
is added to his edition of M (M1). We have two further editions of PV, i.e., PVM2 and 
PVM3, which are added to the editions of M by Shastri (M2) and Pandeya (M3), 
respectively. Since these two editions are not based on any manuscript but only on M1, 
they are not used as a primary source in my dissertation, but are occasionally referred 
to when I find some valuable correction to M1 in them. 
Tosaki’s Edition 
In Tosaki’s translation of the Pratyakṣa chapter of PV, he offers a Sanskrit edition of 
PV III. On the basis of the editions of PV and the commentaries at his disposal, 
including the Sanskrit text and the Tibetan translations, Tosaki makes an annotated and 
critical edition, which is of great value. Nevertheless, Tosaki’s edition is not 
manuscript-based. Therefore, some differences between his edition and mine are due to 
my perusal of the manuscripts or our different understanding of the context. 
1.1.3 Tibetan Translations of Pramāṇavārttika 
PVt, PVPt and PVR 
                                                 
60 Cf. PVAms, p. v, n. 14. 
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In the Tibetan Bstan ’Gyur, there are three translations of PV: one independent 
translation (PVt) and two embedded in the commentaries of PVAt and R (PVPt and 
PVR).61 PVR is somehow ignored by the Tibetan commentators, such as Gyaltsab and 
Kedrup, but I believe it deserves a place in the study of PV because in quite a few cases 
the translation in PVR is better than that in PVt. Considering the fact that (1) the two 
translators of PVAt, Skal Ldan Rgyal Po and Blo Ldan Shes Rab, are the revisers of 
PVt and (2) the translation in PVt is generally better than that in PVPt (these two are 
almost the same)62, in this dissertation I will only provide the editions of PVt and PVR, 
which are based on their Sde Dge and Peking versions. Note that in some cases I still 
refer to the variant readings in PVPt when I find them helpful in determining the 
meaning of the text. In some cases, I also find that the words of PV scatteredly 
incorporated in the commentaries of Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Jayanta and 
Yamāri are helpful in making my edition of PV. 
1.2 The Commentaries on Pramāṇavārttika 
Although Manorathanandin’s commentary is criticized for “being inadequate and in 
many cases obviously wrong”63 by Frauwallner, it remains important for the reading 
of the Sanskrit PV because it is the only extant word-by-word commentary on PV in 
Sanskrit and thus provides clarification of the literal meaning of the verse of PV.  The 
two commentaries by Devendrabuddhi (with Śākyabuddhi’s sub-commentary) and 
Ravigupta are also the word-by-word commentaries, but they are not available in 
Sanskrit. Unlike Manorathanandin’s commentary, which “has nothing to do with any 
                                                 
61 A study on the relation among these three translations is provided by Franco (1995). 
62 Cf. Franco 1995: 280. 
63 Mms, p. iv. Cf. “Der Kommentar Manorathanandin’s ist dürftig und in manchen 
Fällen handgreiflich falsch.” (Frauwallner 1982: 843, n. 6.) 
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scholarly discussion to help or criticize in a general manner the theory expounded by 
the author” 64 , Devendrabuddhi’s and Ravigupta’s commentaries include plenty of 
scholarly comments on Dharmakīrti’s theory of epistemology.  Particularly, 
Devendrabuddhi’s commentary is said to be the first commentary on PV, the literal 
explanations contained in it were basically approved by Dharmakīrti. 65  Although 
Devendrabuddhi is strongly criticized by Jayanta and Yamāri, his commentary on the 
Pratyakṣa chapter is widely accepted by Tibetan commentators, such as Gyaltsab and 
Kedrup, for interpreting the basic text. The comprehensibility of the translation of 
Ravigupta’s commentary is the best among all Tibetan commentaries on PV.  When 
commenting on Dharmakīrti’s epistemological arguments, Ravigupta is to a large 
extent influenced by Prajñākaragupta, the author of PVA.  As an extensive 
commentary, the PVA might be less helpful in determining the literal meaning of the 
basic text, but it is the commentary that provides the most extensive and systematic 
explanation as well as defence of Dharmakīrti’s thoughts in both realms of ontology 
and epistemology. 
Two Tibetan commentaries on PV by Gyaltsab and Kedrup are included in the reference 
materials of this dissertation.  It appears that Tibetan commentaries have long been 
overlooked by most scholars in the field.  Admittedly, Tibetan commentators may 
have made mistakes from time to time due to the mistakes in the Tibetan translation of 
PV, which was the only source at their disposal.  However, I would suggest looking at 
the positive contribution of the Tibetan commentaries. Firstly, unlike PVA and M, 
PVVgyal and PVVke are both word-by-word literal commentaries and argumentative 
commentaries so that they can be used as a source for determining the literal meaning 
                                                 
64 M1, pp. i-ii. 
65 Cf. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1970: 238-239. 
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of the basic text as well as apprehending the profound meaning of the thoughts of 
Dharmakīrti.  Secondly, unlike those studies limited to just certain specific portions of 
PV, PVVgyal and PVVke comment on the entire PV.  Therefore, even a small part of 
them presumably takes into account of the overall context of Dharmakīrti’s thought. 
Thirdly, unlike their Indian counterparts, Gyaltsab and Kedrup provide detailed outlines 
of the contents of PV.  Such outlines clearly depict the structure of Dharmakīrti’s 
arguments from two different perspectives and are of great value and convenience for 
their later academic studies. 
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2 On the Existence of Self-awareness in the Light of Pramāṇavārttika 3.425-484 
2.1 The Interpretations of Self-awareness 
2.1.1 English Translations of the Sva- or Ātma- 
Svasaṃvedana has at least four synonyms in PV and its commentaries: svasaṃvid, 
svasaṃvitti, ātmavitti and ātmavid.  And introspective, self and reflexive, among 
others, are often found in previous studies as the alternative translations of sva- or ātma- 
in these compounds.  Among these translations, I would disregard introspective due 
to its inaccuracy in translating svasaṃvedana and the like. Among the rest, reflexive 
awareness is considered as the most precise translation by Williams, Garfield and 
Tillemans.66  While reflexive awareness restrictively means that an awareness has the 
cognitive action toward itself, self-awareness can lead to certain ambiguities in 
interpreting the relation between “sva- (or ātma-)” and “saṃvedana (or saṃvid or 
saṃvitti)”: for the Yogācāra it can mean (1) “a factor of the cognition which cognizes 
the cognition of the object in a non-dual way”; for the Sautrāntika it can mean (2) “the 
awareness which experiences the object which has the nature of the cognition”; for 
Jaina it can mean simply (3) a reflexive awareness which cognizes the cognition itself; 
for some Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas it can mean (4) “the cognition which reveals itself 
to the Self.” 67   Although reflexive awareness is an accurate translation of 
                                                 
66 Cf. Williams 2000: 3, Garfield 2006, Tillemans 2000: 163. Besides, “apperception”, 
“introspection”, “self-revelatory knowledge” and the like were used as the translation 
of svasaṃvedana and so on.  Examples can be searched via the internet with the 
keyword “svasaṃvedana”, for instance:  
http://www.jstor.org/action/doBasicResults?Query=svasamvedana&prq=Dignaga%2C
+Kumarila+and+Dharmakirti+on+the+Potential&group=none&wc=on&so=rel&fc=o
ff&hp=25&acc=on&vf=jo  (Last accessed on 29th March 29, 2015.) 
67 Cf. Matilal 1986: 143.  Indeed, the use of the term svaprakāśa is rather complicated 
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svasaṃvedana (and the like), which is the main topic of this dissertation, I chose to use 
self-awareness as the translation of svasaṃvedana because self-awareness preserves 
other alternative meanings of svasaṃvedana which I need to deal with in different 
contexts. 
2.1.2 Descriptions of Self-awareness 
2.1.2.1 The Theory of Sākārajñānavāda 
Since the explanation of self-awareness by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is based on 
another epistemological theory, sākārajñānavāda, literally the theory of the cognition 
with a form [as its object], to facilitate the understanding of the theory of self-awareness, 
I would briefly introduce sākārajñānavāda first.  It is highly possible that 
sākārajñānavāda originates from Dignāga’s PS(V) 1.9-1168.  According to Gyaltsab 
and Kedrup, these three verses are explained by Dharmakīrti in PV 3.320-424.  (See 
appendix II and cf. PVVke, pp. 281-283 and PVVgyal, p. 23.)  
Among these verses, PS(V) 1.9 is the scriptural basis of sākārajñānavāda and it is also 
a textual basis for the following discussion on the distinction between the 
interpretations of self-awareness in the Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika.  Several 
                                                 
in the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka school; it is sometimes similar to svasaṃvedana when 
it is interpreted by Śālikanātha as the cognition apprehending or revealing the trio - the 
object, the cognition itself and the Self.  For more interpretations of self-awareness in 
Indian philosophical thoughts other than the Buddhist as well as the criticism of it, cf. 
Bhatt 1989, § 2.7; Matilal 1985, chapter 5; Taber 2005: 82; Ram-Prasad 2007: 55-58, 
n. 14; Taber 1990; Watson 2010. 
68 For the previous studies on the literal interpretation of PS(V) 1.9-11, cf. Hattori 1968: 
28-30, Kellner 2010: 209-210, 213 and 220-224, Moriyama 2010: 262-263, among 
which the latter two are based on a Sanskrit reconstruction of PS(V) by Steinkellner. 
My new translation of PS(V) 1.9 will be presented later. 
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translations of this verse have been made by scholars, such as Hattori, Iwata, Kellner, 
Moriyama and Kataoka,69 but I think there may be another way to interpret this verse.  
Therefore, I would offer my tentative translation of this verse before further 
discussions.70 
[PS 1.9a:] svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra 
[PSV:] dvyābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ 
ca / tasyobhayābhāsasya yat svasaṃvedanaṃ tat phalam / kiṃ 
kāraṇam / 
[PS 1.9b:] tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ | 
[PSV:] yadā hi saviṣayaṃ jñānam arthaḥ tadā 
svasaṃvedanānurūpam arthaṃ pratipadyata iṣṭam aniṣṭaṃ vā / yadā 
tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ tadā 
[PS 1.9cd1:] viṣayābhāsataivāsya pramāṇaṃ 
[PSV:] tadā hi jñānasvasaṃvedyam api svarūpam 
anapekṣyārthābhāsataivāsya pramāṇam / yasmāt so ’rthaḥ 
[PS 1.9d2:] tena mīyate || 9 || 
[PSV:] yathā yathā hy arthākāro jñāne pratibhāti śubhāśubhāditvena 
tattadrūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ pramīyate / 
                                                 
69 Cf. Hattori 1968: 28-29; Iwata 1991: 2-3; Kellner 2010: 220-222; Moriyama 2010: 
262 and Kataoka 2014. 
70 For the translation of PS 1.10-11, I prefer the one by Kellner. (Cf. Kellner 2010: 209-
210, 224. PS 1.10 was translated by Watson and Kataoka, too, in Watson_Kataoka 2010: 
323.) 
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[PS 1.9a:] Or self-awareness is the effect in relation to the 
[perception71], 
[PSV:] because the cognition arises with two appearances: the 
appearance of itself and that of the object.72  The self-awareness of 
the [cognition] with both appearances is the effect [of the perception].  
What is the reason [for such assertion]? 
[PS 1.9b:] It is because the determination of an object has the form 
[being existent in the cognition73]. 
[PSV:] [That is to say,] it is because when the cognition along with 
[its] object is the object, one apprehends the objects, as desired or 
undesired (i.e., pleasant or unpleasant), according to the form 
                                                 
71 Cf. PSṬ: atreti pūrvokte pratyakṣe / (p. 69, l. 7.) 
72  Moriyama (2010: 262) glosses the “object (artha)” in PSV 1.9a as “[external] 
object”.  Since this verse is known as principally the tenet of the Yogācāra, which may 
be compatible with the view of the Sautrāntika, to specify the “object” in the sense of 
the “external object” may make the text somewhat difficult to understand on the basis 
of Yogācāra’s theory. 
73 Hattori mentions that Śāntarakṣita has cited PS 1.9b and Kamalaśīla has glossed 
tadrūpa as “the appearance being existent in the cognition” (jñānasthābhāsa), namely, 
the tat in tadrūpa is glossed as “the cognition”.  However, Hattori considers 
svasaṃvittirūpa (= svasaṃvedanānurūpa in PSVs) as the gloss of tadrūpa and insists 
that the tat in tadrūpa should be glossed as “the self-cognition”. (Cf. Hattori 1968: 28-
29 and 103, n. 1.62.).  Kellner follows Hattori. (Cf. Kellner 2010: 221-222.)  
However, I would follow Kamalaśīla and accordingly consider PS 1.9b as a tenet of a 
fundamental premise in Dignāga’s epistemology. (Cf. § 2.2.1.) 
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[appearing] in self-awareness. When, on the other hand, the cognized 
object is [accepted] as merely external, at the time 
[PS 1.9cd1:] the means of knowledge of that [external object] is 
indeed the state of having the appearance of the [external] object.74 
[PSV:] [That is to say,] at the time, the means of knowledge of that 
[external object] is indeed the state of having the appearance of the 
[external] object that does not depend on [cognition’s] own nature, 
even though it is self-experienced by the cognition, because the 
[external] object  
[PS 1.9d2:] is [also] rightly cognized by that [cognition which has its 
appearance], 
[PSV:] namely, it is because the object is rightly cognized as this or 
that in the light of how the object-form (i.e., the perceived form) is 
manifested in the cognition, such as the pure or the impure75.  
Having rejected the external object to be the supporting-object (ālambana) of the 
                                                 
74 PS 1.9c is translated by Hattori, Kellner and Moriyama, respectively as: 
“The means of cognizing it is simply [the cognition’s] having the 
form of the object.” (Hattori 1968: 29.) 
“The means of valid cognition is the fact that the [cognition] has the 
object-appearance.” (Kellner 2010: 222.) 
“The means of valid cognition is exactly its (i.e., cognition’s) having 
the mental from of the [external] object. (Moriyama 2010: 262.) 
75 Kellner (2010: 222, l. 13) interpreted śubhāśubhādi as “white, non-white, etc.” 
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cognition 76 , Dignāga and Dharmakīrti consider the supporting-object as a form 
(viṣayābhāsa) which has the nature of its cognition and the intimate connection with its 
cognition77.  This form and its cognition are essentially one thing.  In Dharmakīrti’s 
writings, two terminologies: grāhyākāra and grāhakākāra, namely, the perceived 
form/aspect and the perceiving form/aspect, are often used to replace the terms 
“viṣayābhāsa” and “svābhāsa” in PS(V) 1.9a, respectively.  Hence, the object and the 
agent in one cognitive process are described as just two forms or two appearances or 
two aspects which are of the same nature, i.e., the nature of the cognition.  Cognition 
can be counted as a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) of an object if it has the form 
of that object.  When the perceiving form perceives the perceived form, an 
illuminating and apprehending part (gsal rig gi cha) of the perceiving form, i.e., of the 
cognition or the pramāṇa, can be aware of (or experience) the perceiving form and its 
perceived form.78  It is noteworthy that the theory of sākārajñānavāda is criticized by 
                                                 
76 Cf. Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣā and PV 3.372b-377. 
77 This object-form was described as an object-formed cognition by some scholars, 
such as Hattori (1968: 105, l. 33), Kataoka (2014: 2, ll. 22-23).  However, I wonder 
whether such expression may potentially cause confusion about Dignāga and 
Dharmakīrti’s theory, for one might argue that this object-formed cognition would be a 
perceiver and have its own object. 
78 The whole description of sākārajñānavāda mentioned above is summarized from 
Kedrup’s Munsel (pp. 195-197).  It is worth noting that in interpreting that a cognition 
is experienced, the cognition was described as the perceived form (sk. grāhyākāra, t. 
gzung rnam) by Williams (2000: 5) and Klein (1985: 74), and the self-awareness was 
described as pramāṇa by Hattori (1968: 150).  However, I fail to understand the 
purpose of such an explanation.  I would agree that the perceiving form is the object 
of its experience, i.e., of the self-awareness.  However, if we name the perceiving form 
“the perceived form” in this case, then what are pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala?  If the 
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the opponents of the doctrine of self-awareness, such as Kumārila.79 Their arguments 
are important components of the debate over self-awareness, but it is impossible to 
include in this dissertation a detailed study on their arguments. 
Now, we have already introduced sākārajñānavāda.  Before moving on to the 
description or the definition of self-awareness, we should bear in mind that according 
to PV 1.9, sākārajñānavāda can be accepted by the Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika, of 
which the former does not accept the existence of the external object while the latter 
does.80  The difference between these two schools of thought in their descriptions of 
sākārajñānavāda is whether the perceived form is projected by the karmic trace (vāsanā) 
laid in our consciousness or produced by a real external object.  This difference will 
also appear in their different interpretations of self-awareness. 
2.1.2.2 Self-awareness (1) in General 
According to the doctrine of sākārajñānavāda, in a cognitive process, the perceiving 
form perceives the perceived form and at the same time, a factor of the perceiving form 
experiences the perceiving form. This very factor of the perceiving form, i.e., the 
experiencing factor of the cognition, is regarded as self-awareness.  This factor is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the accomplishment of the knowledge of the 
object, and therefore it is called the effect of the valid cognition or the effect of the 
                                                 
self-awareness is indeed both pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala, then this statement will 
make no difference between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala, which is contrary to Dignāga 
and Dharmakīrti’s statement on the same issue—the perceived form, the perceiving 
form and the self-awareness are artha, pramāṇa, and pramāṇaphala, respectively. 
79 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 110-175 and the relevant commentaries. (Jhā 1909: 155-168; ŚVT, 
pp. 258-282; ŚVK [Part 2], pp. 131-164; ŚVN, pp. 206-226.) 
80 Cf. also PV 3.367-415 and the appendix I of this dissertation. 
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means of knowledge (pramāṇaphala).81  Because of that, self-awareness is generally 
portrayed as a portion (t. cha, sk. aṃśa) or a characteristic of the cognition which takes 
the cognition as the object while the cognition takes the perceived form as the object. 
82  Following this, Dge ’Dun Grub defines self-awareness in general as: “the definition 
of self-awareness perception (rang rig mngon sum) is the cognition which is directed 
toward itself.”83  This definition can also be documented by PV 3.427cd: “But, the 
cognition which apprehends the cognition is always directed inside.”84 
2.1.2.3 Self-awareness (2): Reflexive Awareness 
From self-awareness (1), it would not be difficult to develop a more specific definition 
of self-awareness as what Kedrup states:  
If following the Yogācāra, the perception which is self-awareness is 
characterized as the non-mistaken awareness which is free from 
conceptual construction and immediately apprehends its own 
perceived object in a non-dual way.85 
                                                 
81 Cf. Munsel, pp. 195-196. 
82 Cf. Munsel: “Therefore, the experience of cognitions, namely, the part (cha) of the 
illuminating and the cognizing, is the experiencing (myong byed); [by contrast,] the 
cognition and the perceived form of that [cognition] are the experienced.  The experts 
make the notion of the self-awareness in relation to this matter.” (Munsel: / des na shes 
pa rnams kyi myong ba gsal rig gi cha ni myong byed dang / shes pa de dang de’i gzung 
rnam ni myong bya yin la / don ’di la mkhas pa rnams rang rig ces smra bar byed do / 
p. 197.) 
83 RG: / rang rig mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid / kha nang kho nar phyogs pa’i shes pa 
/ (p. 80.) 
84 PV 3.427cd: buddheś ca grāhikā buddhir nityam antarmukhātmani // 
85 Munsel: / sems tsam pa ltar na rang rig mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid / rang gi gzung 
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This definition can be documented by PS(V) 1.9 and 1186, PV 3.427cd and specifically 
                                                 
yul gnyis snang dang bral ba’i tshul gyis dngos su rtogs pa’i rtog bral ma ’khrul ba’i 
shes pa / (p. 197.) 
86 Cf. Kellner’s translation of PS(V) 1.11: 
[Argument 1:] PS 1.11ab: There are two forms [in cognition] on 
account of the difference between the cognition of an object and the 
cognition of that [object-cognition]. 
PSV: That is to say, the cognition [that applies] to an object like 
colour and the like certainly (eva) has the appearance of the object 
and of itself (arthasvābhāsa), whereas the [second] cognition [that 
applies] to the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition 
that resembles the object, and [also] its own appearance. Otherwise, 
if the cognition of an object only resembled its object, or had [only] 
its own form, the cognition of the cognition, for its part, would not be 
different from the cognition of the object. 
[Argument 2:] PSV: Furthermore, [if cognition did not have an 
object-form] then individual later cognitions would not have the 
appearance of a [temporally] distant object of an earlier [cognition], 
for the [earlier object] is not the object [of the later cognitions]. 
And therefore it is established that cognition has two forms. 
[Argument 3:] PS 1.11c: Also because of memory at a later time. 
PSV: “[Cognition has] two forms” – this is how [PS 1.11c] is 
syntactically connected. [To explain:] And because memory arises 
after experience, for the cognition just as for the object, cognition has 
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by PV 3.249: “The nature of the pleasure and the like does not depend on other things 
[and] hence its convention is impossible.  Therefore, self-awareness of those [pleasure 
and so on] does not have a connection with speech.”87  Self-awareness (2) is indeed 
the reflexive cognition mentioned above and it is the core issue of most arguments over 
self-awareness.  For instance, when Candrakīrti and Śāntideva reject self-awareness, 
what they reject is clearly self-awareness (2).88  The cognitive action, in this case, is 
considered as non-dual because the object and the agent in such cognitive action are in 
one entity (but not identical89).  Although Kedrup has differentiated self-awareness (2) 
for the Yogācāra from self-awareness (3) (as stated below) for the Sautrāntika, his 
opinion remains open and I will discuss this issue in § 2.1.2.5. 
                                                 
two forms, and it is also brought to awareness by itself 
(svasaṃvedyatā). 
PSV: Why? 
PS 1.11d: Because this [memory] does not apply to what was not 
experienced [before]. 
PSV: [To explain:] Because there is no memory of an object-
awareness (arthavedana) that was not experienced before, just as 
[there is no] memory of colour and the like [when these were not 
experienced before]. (Kellner 2010: 210 and 213.) 
87 PV 3.249: aśakyasamayo hy ātmā sukhādīnām ananyabhāk / teṣām ataḥ svasaṃvittir 
nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī / 
88 Cf. § 2.3. 
89 See detailed discussion in § 2.1.2.4. 
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2.1.2.4 The Distinct Self-awareness (3) for the Sautrāntika 
Besides self-awareness (1) and (2), there is a distinct interpretation of self-awareness 
which may have been implied by the statements of Dignāga and his commentators.  As 
stated above, when Dignāga in PS(V) 1.9 says, yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ 
(“when, on the other hand, the cognized object is [accepted] as merely external…”) and 
Jinendrabuddhi explains that such view is compatible with the schools of thought that 
accept or deny external object,90 self-awareness (3) comes into being.  It is defined 
by Kedrup as: 
If following the Sautrāntikas, the perception that is self-awareness is 
characterized as the cognition which is non-erroneous, free from 
conceptual construction and immediately apprehends the object 
which is its own nature.91 
Gyaltsab, Thub Bstan Chos Kyi Grags Pa, Hattori, Williams and Kataoka are also aware 
of this self-awareness (3) and the latter three raise some arguments about it.92  Self-
awareness (3) can also be inferred from the restatement of self-awareness theory by its 
opponents. For instance, when Kumārila rejects the self-awareness in his ŚV Śūnyavāda, 
specifically when he rejects the view that the object and its cognition are in one entity,93 
his objection is related to self-awareness (3). 
Moreover, self-awareness (3) can be inferred from Dharmakīrti’s PV 3.425, in which 
                                                 
90 PSṬ: saty asati vā bāhye ’rtha ubhayābhāsaṃ jñānaṃ saṃvedyate / (p. 69, ll. 13-
14.) 
91 Munsel: / mdo sde pa ltar na / rang rig mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid / rang gi bdag 
nyid du gyur pa’i yul dngos su rig pa’i rtog bral ma ’khrul ba’i shes pa / (p. 197.) 
92 Cf. Hattori 1968: 104-106, n. 1.64; Williams 2000, chapter 1; Kataoka 2014: 2. 
93 Cf. ŚVT, p. 256. Translation cf. Jha 1909: 154. 
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he states that when the perceived form is proved to be the supporting-object of the 
cognition since the cognition becomes the nature of the perceived form, self-awareness 
is impliedly established.94  Kedrup in his Munsel explains the reason why Dharmakīrti 
states “by [the cognition having] two forms, too, the self-awareness is established”95; 
he says that for those who accept that the cognition has the form of the object, it would 
be easy to establish the self-awareness when they prove the existence of the perceived 
form in relation to its cognition and that the experience, which cognizes the perceived-
form, is nothing but the illuminating and cognizing part (cha) of that very cognition.96  
Among modern scholars, Katsura and Matilal may share this same idea because they 
consider self-awareness (3) to be a bridging notion connecting the theories of the 
Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra.97   
Accordingly, the self-awareness (3) is to explain that the cognition of the object itself 
is the experience of the object.  Different from the object of self-awareness (2), i.e., 
                                                 
94 Cf. PV 3.425: dvairūpyasādhanenāpi prāyaḥ siddhaṃ svavedanam / 
svarūpabhūtābhāsasya tadā saṃvedanekṣaṇāt // (“By means of proving that [the 
cognition] has two forms, the self-awareness is mostly established as well, because at 
that time the appearance (i.e., the perceived form) which is the own nature [of cognition] 
is seen due to the awareness.”) For the details of the translation and the study on this 
verse, cf. § 2.2.3.1 and the translation section of this dissertation.   
95 Munsel, p 196: tshul gnyis pas kyang rang rig grub / This is a close parapharse of 
PVt 3.425ab: / tshul gnyis sgrub par byed pas kyang // rang rig phal cher grub pa yin / 
(dvairūpyasādhanenāpi prāyaḥ siddhaṃ svavedanam /) 
96 Cf. Munsel: / des na shes pa rnam bcas su khas len pa dag gis gzung rnam yod par 
grub cing / de nyid shes pa’i myong ba gsal rig gi cha las don gzhan ma yin par grub 
pa na / rang rig bde blag nyid du ’grub par ’gyur bas / tshul gnyis pas kyang rang rig 
grub / ces gsungs pa yin no / (p. 196.)  
97 Cf. Kellner 2010: 205. 
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the cognition itself, the object of self-awareness (3) is the external object, i.e., the 
perceived form.  To emphasize that the perceived form is one of the main objects of 
the self-awareness, Kedrup argues that “Otherwise, namely, [if the opponent says:] even 
the illuminating and the perceiving part of the cognition is self-awareness, it does not 
necessarily perceive the object, [we object:] it would not be contradictory even if one 
accepts [both] the absence of the perceived form and the existence of self-awareness. 
Further, what would be the relation necessary for the self-awareness established by the 
establishment of perceived form?” 98   Gyaltsab may also accept PV 3.425 as an 
interpretation of the self-awareness (3) because in his commentary on this verse, he 
says: 
Further, if it is established that there are two forms, namely, the 
perceived form and the perceiving form, in one cognition, these two 
are established as the experienced [object] and the experiencing 
[agent]. The very experiencing [agent] is the perception that is self-
awareness. 99 
Nevertheless, Gyaltsab may consider PV 3.425 alone as the interpretation of self-
awareness (3) while Kedrup considers the whole section of PV 3.425-482 as the 
interpretations for both self-awareness (2) and (3).  The details of their argument on 
                                                 
98 Cf. Munsel: / de ltar ma yin par shes pa gsal rig gi cha rang rig yin kyang yul rig mi 
dgos na / gzung rnam med par khas len pa dang rang rig yod par khas len pa la ’gal 
ba med par ’gyur zhing / gzung rnam grub pas rang rig grub dgos pa’i ’brel pa ci yod 
/ (pp. 196-197.) 
99 PVVgyal: / de yang shes pa gcig la gzung rnam dang ’dzin rnam gyi tshul gnyis yod 
par bsgrub pa na / de gnyis myong bya myong byed du grub la / myong byed de nyid 
rang rig mngon sum mo / (p. 317.) 
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this issue will be presented in § 2.2.2.1. 
2.1.2.5 Arguments about Self-awareness (3) 
Hattori and Kataoka argue that if self-awareness, as pramāṇaphala in the cognitive 
process, is applied to the theory of the Sautrāntika, there would be problems for 
Sautrāntikas: (1) they would on one hand accept the existence of the external object as 
the object of the cognition and on the other hand accept merely the form of the object, 
not the real object, as the supporting-object of the cognition; (2) they should not accept 
such self-awareness as the effect of the cognition (pramāṇaphala) because the self-
awareness perceives the form of the object, while the effect of the cognition takes on 
the external thing as its object.100  For this argument, one should first define what the 
Sautrāntika is.  According to R. E. Buswell, in current Buddhist scholarship, the 
Sautrāntika is still too problematic to be clearly identified.101  However, I do find some 
definitions of the Sautrāntika in Tibetan Buddhist exegetical tradition which do not have 
the two problems Hattori and Kataoka raise. 
Among the Tibetan commentators, Ngag Dbang Brtson ’Grus (known as ’Jam Dbyangs 
Bzhad Pa) gives a systematic and critical explication on the theories of the Sautrāntika 
in his DRUTHAjy.  According to him, sākārajñānavāda is commonly accepted by all 
Buddhist philosophical schools except Vaibhāṣika.102  So, it appears what Hattori and 
Kataoka are concerned about is not an issue because (1) sākārajñānavāda is accepted 
by the Sautrāntika, and (2) to the Sautrāntika, the alleged “cognition of an external 
object” in fact means “the cognition of the form that is produced by the external object”.  
                                                 
100 Hattori 1968: 104-105, n. 1.64 and Kataoka 2014: 2. 
101 Cf. Buswell 2004: 177. 
102 Cf. DRUTHAjy, p. 327. Kedrup may share the same view on this issue.  (Cf. 
Munsel, p. 196.) 
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Gyaltsab states the same in his explanation of PS(V) 1.9a.103 
Williams discovers self-awareness (3) in a commentary on BA by Thub Bstan Chos Kyi 
Grags Pa. He considers that self-awareness (3) is just an ambiguous interpretation of 
the self-awareness and it is actually a kind of other-awareness which takes the object to 
be outside the cognition.104  To this issue, Moriyama also argues that it may not be 
necessary for the Sautrāntika to accept the notion of self-awareness.105  It is also 
observed that ’Jam Dbyangs Bzhad Pa may not favor the idea of the self-awareness (3) 
either because in his masterpiece DRUTHAjy, he seems to consider that the meaning 
of the self-awareness is common for both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra.  He says: 
The meaning of the self-awareness is that merely the illuminating and 
the experiencing [part] perceives the cognition which is to be 
experienced by itself and that it is the perceiving-form without the 
dual appearance of “the object and object-possessor”, “portion and 
portion-possessor”, etc.106 
This statement is given in the section entitled “The Explanation of the Views of the 
Sautrāntika”, in which he explains the view of the Sautrāntikas who are the followers 
of reasoning (t. rigs rjes ’brang ba’i mdo sde pa, sk. *Nyāyānusārisautrāntika), namely, 
the followers of Dharmakīrti. And in the section entitled “The Explanation of the View 
of the Yogācāra” he states: 
                                                 
103 Cf. PSVgyal 15a6ff. 
104 Cf. Williams 2000: 4, 7, 11. 
105 Cf. Moriyama 2010: 262. 
106 DRUTHAjy: / rang gi myong bya’i shes pa gsal tsam myong tsam gyis ’dzin cing / 
yul yul can dang cha cha can sogs kyi gnyis snang nub pa’i ’dzin rnam de rang rig gi 
don yin te / (p. 336.) 
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When classifying the perception (for the Yogācāra), it has been 
previously stated that those who are the followers of the reasoning 
accept four types of perceptions, namely, the sense, the mental, the 
self-awareness and the yogi.107 
However, for those who do not accept that the Sautrāntika has a distinct self-awareness 
(3), it would be necessary to (i) interpret all descriptions and explanations of the self-
awareness as self-awareness (2), as reflected in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s works; and 
(ii) respond to the question Kedrup raises for the interpretation of PV 3.425 as 
mentioned above. My discussion on this issue is presented in § 2.2.1 in this dissertation. 
2.1.2.6 Arguments about the Meaning of Self-awareness (2) 
According to some plain readings of the Indian texts, such as PS 1.7ab and PV 3.443ab 
(see below), one can literally paraphrase self-awareness as “the cognition cognizes the 
cognition itself” or precisely “the cognition cognizes its own entity”108 .  However, 
Tibetan commentators, such as Gyaltsab, Kedrup, Dge ’Dun Grub, Rol Pa’i Rdo Rje 
(known as Lcang Skya), 109  warn that it would be problematic to consider such 
description as an accurate description or expression of self-awareness.  They argue 
that, if the self-awareness means that the cognition cognizes the cognition itself, then 
the inferences or even erroneous inferences, such as the inferences about “sound is 
                                                 
107 DRUTHAjy: / mngon sum la dbye na / rigs pa’i rjes ’brang dag dbang yid rang rig 
rnal ’byor mngon sum bzhi ’dod de sngar bshad pa lta bu … / (p. 475.) Also note that 
Rol Pa’i Rdo Rje has the same opinion on this issue. (Cf. DRUTHAzj, p. 84.) 
108 Cf. Munsel: rang gi ngo bo la rang rig mngon sum yin te / (p. 189.) 
109  Cf. PVVgyal, p. 190, 212-213; Munsel, pp. 189-190; RG, pp. 78-79 and 
DRUTHAzj, p. 136.  Gyaltsab’s compelling argument on this issue is partially 
introduced by Dreyfus (1991: 602-603, ll. 17-17.) 
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impermanent” or “sound is permanent”, would become valid perception (pratyakṣa) 
because it is self-awareness – the valid perception of itself.  And if so, it would be 
difficult to define the inference, which is supposed to be the cognition that takes the 
universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) alone as its supporting-object whereas it now takes itself, 
the particular (svalakṣaṇa) too, as its supporting-object.  It would also be difficult to 
differentiate the erroneous cognition from the valid cognition because every erroneous 
cognition can be valid in terms of it being self-awareness.  Therefore, according to 
Tibetan commentators, the cognition has two parts:  the part of perceiving the 
perceived-form, and the part of experiencing the perceiving-form, of which the latter 
should be considered as the accurate description of the self-awareness.  Taking the 
inference of “sound is impermanent” as an example, the inference is the cognition, 
namely, the pramāṇa, of “sound is impermanent” and the experiencing part of the 
inference, namely, the pramāṇaphala, is the self-awareness of the inference which has 
its object “sound is impermanent”. 
To this, one might argue that the inference which is a conceptual construction can be 
considered to be both the conceptual cognition (vikalpa) in terms of being the cognition 
of the object, such as “sound is impermanent”, and the perception (pratyakṣa) in terms 
of being internal awareness.  And this opinion can be documented by PS 1.7ab: 
kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt / Hattori translates this hemistich as:  
Even conceptual construction, when it is brought to internal 
awareness, is admitted [as a type of perception].  However, with 
regard to the [external] object, [the conceptual construction is] not 
[admissible as perception] because it conceptualizes [the object].110   
To a certain extent, this translation can be testified by the Tibetan translation of PSt 
                                                 
110 Hattori 1968: 27. 
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1.7ab: / →rtog← (PSVk : rtag PSVv) pa’ang rang rig nyid du ’dod // don la ma yin 
→der← (PSVk : de PSVv) rtog phyir /.  In these two translations, the Sanskrit negative 
particle na is related to the sentence after it. However, it is observed that PS 1.7ab is 
cited by Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta (Hattori mentions the citation in PVA111).  
In De and PVAt, the Tibetan translation of this hemistich appears as / rang rig la yang 
rtog mi ’dod // don la rnam par rtog phyir ro /112 and / rtog pa’ang rang rig la mi ’dod 
// don la rnam par rtog pa’i phyir /113, respectively.  In these two translations, the 
Sanskrit negative particle na is obviously related to the preceding sentence.  
Accordingly, PS 1.7ab can be translated as “the conceptual construction too is not 
accepted [as an object] in the self-awareness because [its] object is conceptualized.”  
It is also observed that Dharmakīrti says in PV 3.287:  
Where the cognition perceives the object of the word, there is 
conceptual construction.  Further, the own nature is not the object 
of the word.  Therefore, all [cognitions] in relation to that [own 
nature] are perception.114 
To a certain extent, Dharmakīrti’s words testify my translation of PS 1.7ab because we 
consider the first sentence of this passage as the explanation of arthe vikalpanāt and the 
                                                 
111 Cf. Hattori 1968: 95, n. 1.51.  Cf. also PVA2, p. 331, l. 19. 
112 De D 211b5ff. 
113 PVAt D 2a1ff.  Note that PS 1.7ab was cited by Ravigupta in his R, but the form 
of that citation appears very different from the others we have seen: / rang rig la ni rtog 
pa yang // tshad mar ’dod kyi don la min // rtog pa’i phyir ro …/ (R D 111b3.) 
114 PV 3.287: śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṃ tatra kalpanā / svarūpaṃ ca na 
śabdārthas tatrādhyakṣam ato ’khilam // For commentaries, cf. De D 211b5ff.; PVA2, 
pp. 331-332; R D 111b3ff.; M1, p. 204. 
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rest as that of kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā na, respectively.  Further, according to 
Gyaltsab 115 , if one accepts that the cognition can be both the cognition of the 
supporting-object and the self-awareness, then inferences, for example, the inference of 
“sound is impermanent”, will be conceptual and non-conceptual.  Similarly, sense 
perceptions, for example, the visual sense perception of a vase, will be one cognition 
having two objects (i.e., the vase and perception itself)—that would be contradictory to 
what Dharmakīrti states in PV 3.257ab that one sense cognition should have only one 
object.116 
Moreover, Kedrup points out that PV 3.443ab might be used to testify for the expression 
of “the cognition cognizes itself”,117 as this hemistich can be literally read as “if it [i.e., 
the cognition] does not perceive its own nature, how could it be the cognition of the 
other nature?”118  This interpretation can be found in the commentaries of Ravigupta 
and Manorathanandin.119  However, Kedrup criticizes that such interpretation is just 
like the proverbial blind men grasping an elephant.120  In order to avoid the problems 
                                                 
115 Cf. PVVgyal, pp. 213-214. 
116 Cf. PV 3.257ab: “There is no cognition of two [objects, such as the external object 
and happiness] by one [sense cognition], because of the restriction of the sense 
consciousness.” (na caikayā dvayajñānaṃ niyamād akṣacetasaḥ /)  Cf. also De D 
205a2: / gcig gis gnyis shes ma yin te // yul dang bde ba la sogs pa ’dzin par rigs pa ma 
yin no // ci’i phyir zhe na / dbang po’i sems ni nges phyir ro // dbang po’i shes pa yul 
gzhan la ’jug pa med pas yul nges pa’i phyir ro / 
117 Cf. Munsel, p. 189. 
118 PV 3.443ab: athātmarūpaṃ no vetti pararūpasya vit katham / 
119 Cf. R 154a6 D and M1, p. 250, l. 14. 
120 Cf. PVVke: … gzhung ’di dag gi don la glang po che rtog pa’i dmus long dang chos 
mtshungs … (p. 401.) 
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stated above, he distinctly reads ātmarūpam as a bahuvrīhi compound which modifies 
“the experiencing” (myong byed) and considers this compound as the subject of vetti.  
Hence, PV 3.443ab is interpreted as: the sense perception, which has the form of the 
white and so on, cannot experience the white and so on through having the form of the 
white and so on because it is not experienced by the experience which is its nature.121  
Although both PV 3.443ab and its translation in PVt can be literally adapted for 
Kedrup’s interpretation, it is generally acknowledged that Kedrup’s interpretation 
requires more adaption of the Sanskrit text because literally, the absence of the object 
of vetti is less common than the absence of its subject.  
To prevent the text from becoming the textual basis of the view that “the cognition 
cognizes the cognition itself” or “the cognition cognizes its own entity”, Gyaltsab’s 
interpretation of this verse seems to be a better solution.  Having construed the subject 
of vetti as “the experiencing” (rang myong byed), he interprets this hemistich as that if 
the experiencing does not experience one’s own nature [of the cognition], how can it 
be the experience of others’ nature? 122   This interpretation can be supported by 
Devendrabuddhi’s commentary.123 
                                                 
121 Cf. PVVke: / ngag don ni / dkar sogs snang ba’i dbang shes chos can / khyod kyis 
ji ltar gzhan dkar sogs // kyi rnam pa shar ba’i sgo nas dkar sogs rig pa mi ’thad par 
thal / khyod khyod rang gi dngos por gyur ba’i myong byed kyis mi rig pa’i phyir / (p. 
401.) 
122 Cf. PVVgyal: / ci ste / dkar ’dzin rang gi dngos po rang myong byed kyis mi rig na 
/ dkar ’dzin chos can / ci ltar dkar po gzhan gyi ngo bo rig pa mi ’thad par thal lo / (p. 
326.) 
123 Cf. De 247a1ff. D : 292b2ff. P: …→rang← (corr. : dang D, P) dngos bdag nyid du 
→’gyur← (D : gyur P) ba don dang ’dra ba shes pa des mi rig go zhes ’dod pa de’i tshe 
myong ba ma grub pa can gyi shes pa des ji ltar gzhan gyi ngo bo ste / don gzhan gyi 
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It is noteworthy that Kellner mentions that “the text of PS(V) does not offer any clues 
whether self-awareness is additionally supposed to be limited to certain kinds of mental 
states, or to mental states that occur under specific conditions, for instance, 
wakefulness.” 124   On the contrary, Matilal claims “The Buddhist regards each 
awareness-event perceptual in the sense that it has as its integral part an ‘inner’ (mental) 
perception of the awareness-event itself.” 125   Although Matilal did not refer his 
conclusion to any source material, the textual evidence for his view coincides with 
Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu 1.10: “[One of the four perceptions is] the self-awareness of 
all consciousness and [their] mental factors.” (sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanam.) 
Ganeri criticizes this theory that “every thought is self-aware” by some discoveries 
about unconscious mental activity in animal and infantile.126  To this, in the light of 
the commentaries by several Tibetan scholars, such as Dge ’Dun Grub, even if all 
consciousness and mental factors have self-awareness, it is not necessary for all self-
awareness to be a valid perception (mngon sum tshad ma).  To accurately define the 
terminology in Dharmakīrti’s theory, Dge ’Dun Grub distinguishes the specific notion 
of “the valid self-awareness perception (rang rig mngon sum tshad ma)” from the 
notion of “the self-awareness perception (rang rig mngon sum)”.  The definition of 
the former is a modifier “being new and unmistaken” plus the definition of the latter—
“the cognition which is directed inside”127.  For a more extensive explanation of this 
                                                 
bdag nyid rig par ’gyur te ma yin no / 
124 Kellner 2010: 414. 
125 Cf. Matilal 1986: 143. 
126 Ganeri 1999: 481. 
127  RG: / gsar du mi bslu ba’i shes pa gang zhig / kha nang kho nar phyogs pa’i shes 
pa / (p. 80.) 
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issue, ’Jam Dbyangs Bzhad Pa, in his DRUTHAjy, states: 
In this (i.e., the self-awareness), there are three categories: [self-
awareness as being] the means of knowledge (t. tshad ma, sk. 
pramāṇa), [self-awareness as being] the determining cognition (t. 
bcad shes, sk. paricchinnajñāna) and [self-awareness which has] the 
undetermined appearance (t. snang la ma nges, sk. 
aniyatapratibhāsa).128 
2.2 The Proof of the Self-awareness 
2.2.1 The Premise: The Knowledge of an Object Requires the Determination of 
the Object-cognition 
In Dharmakīrti’s theory, the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) is dichotomized into 
inference and perception.129 The latter can be subdivided into two: the other-awareness 
(alias other-perception) and the self-awareness. 130  Dharmakīrti, in PV 3.425-484, 
structures his proof of the self-awareness in three main steps: (1) proving the cognition 
                                                 
128 GRUTHAjy: / ’dir yang dbye na / tshad ma bcad shes snang la ma nges pa gsum 
yod / (p. 336.) 
129 Cf. PV 3.1ab1: “The means of knowledge is of two kinds because the object of 
knowledge is of two kinds.” (Cf. Franco_Notake 2014: 29.)  For the whole argument 
over the number of the means of knowledge cf. PV 3.1-122. 
130 In general, this dichotomy is valid because in common sense, a cognized object 
must be cognized by a cognition which is either self-awareness or other-awareness.  
However, in a wider sense of philosophical thought, Gelugpa *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamikas, who deny any real existence in the world, consider that this dichotomy 
is only valid to those who accept the real existence in the world.  They refuse to accept 
this dichotomy as the basis of the theory of the cognition of cognition in conventional 
reality.  For details cf. § 5.3 and 5.5. 
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of cognition by the two forms of the cognition, (2) rejecting the view that the cognition 
can be perceived by the other-perceptions arising in succession131 and (3) rejecting the 
view that the cognition can be inferred by the inference.  This reasoning is based on 
the premise: 
The Knowledge of an Object Requires the Determination of the Object-cognition 
I consider this premise as the key principle or the axiom of the epistemology of Dignāga 
and Dharmakīrti.  This is because I did not find they use any meta-theory or logical 
reasoning to prove it (even though there are some explanations of it, which I am going 
to present), indicating that this premise is self-evident and fundamental in their theory. 
                                                 
131 One might argue that there would be a logical loophole in this process, namely, the 
process does not eliminate the possibility of other-perception which may arise 
simultaneously, for instance, a different cognition from the visual perception of blue, 
arising at the same time and being a cognition of the blue-cognition.  To this, Kedrup 
explains that all opponents of self-awareness accept the view that in one mind 
continuum, it would not be possible for different homogeneous cognitions to arise at 
the same time.  Since no one holds the view that the cognition is experienced by a 
substantively different cognition which arises simultaneously, there is no refutation of 
this view. (Cf. PVVke: / blo la rang rig med par ’dod pa’i rgol ba ’di dag thams cad 
kyang rgyud gcig la shes pa du ma cig car skye mi srid pas khyab par ’dod pa sha stag 
yin pas / shes pa rnams rang dang dus mnyam pa’i blo rdzas gzhan gyis myong dgos 
par ’dod pa su’ang med cing / de’i phyir de nyid ’gog pa’i rigs pa ma gsungs so / p. 
388.) However, it is observed that in his ŚV Śūnyavāda 233, Kumārila has mentioned 
a theory by his opponent that the cognition is cognized at the time it is cognizing the 
object. (Cf. Jhā 1909: 177) And according to Bhatt (1989: 53), Pārthasārathi and 
Umbeka attribute such theory to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Nevertheless, I could not find 
out who holds such view in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. 
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The premise can be inferred from Dignāga’s PS(V) 1.9ab.132  According to the text, 
the reason for Dignāga establishing self-awareness to be “the effect of the means of 
knowledge” (pramāṇaphala) is that the accomplishment of the knowledge of an object 
requires the determination of the cognition of that object and self-awareness is hence 
proposed to be the determination.  To put it simply, in Dignāga’s thought a man can 
determinatively cognize an object if and only if he is, with his self-awareness, aware 
that he cognizes the object.  From this premise, one can observe that self-awareness is 
one of the core notions in the epistemology of Dignāga and that is why Dharmakīrti 
contributes nearly a half of the Pratyakṣa chapter of his PV to this notion. To some 
extent, this premise can be attested by experience in our everyday life; for instance, 
when one is looking at a vase, it would be absurd for one to say, “there is a vase, but I 
am not sure whether I see it.”  The premise is repeated by Dharmakīrti time after time 
in PV 3.426cd, 3.428abc1, 3.439c2d, 3.443ab, 3.446, 3.463cd, 3.475ab and 3.539cd133.  
In particular, the explication of this premise is stated in his PVin 1.54cd: 
The observation of an object cannot be established for an 
apprehension [of an object] which is not perceptible.134 
                                                 
132 Cf. § 2.1.2.1. 
133 PV 3.539cd: [Further,] if [one still claims] something is manifested even though the 
manifestation is not established, then, this whole world would be manifested. 
(vyaktyasiddhāv api vyaktaṃ yadi vyaktam idaṃ jagat /) For the translation of the other 
verses, cf. the translation section of this dissertation. 
134 Kellner, Vetter and Watson take apratyakṣopalambhasya as a bahuvrīhi compound 
(Kellner 2011: 420; Vetter 1966: 106, n. 61; Watson 2006: 206, n. 253), but the Tibetan 
translators seem to construe the compound as karmadhāraya. (PVint: / dmigs pa mngon 
sum ma yin na // de mthong rab tu ’grub mi ’gyur / D 166a7.) I follow the Tibetan 
interpretation because it makes the expression of this premise “no cognition perceived, 
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To explain: the apprehension of an object is not [achieved] by the 
existence of the object, but by the existence of its perception.  
Further, if it (i.e., the existence of the object-perception) is not 
established by a means of knowledge, then it does not conform to the 
worldly convention which results from the existence [of a thing] (sk. 
sattānibandhana t. yod pa’i rgyu mtshan can).  If it (i.e., the object-
perception) is not established, then the object is also not established, 
[and] therefore everything would disappear.  Even if something 
exists, it is not qualified as in existence by the worldly convention 
unless it is established.  Therefore, if one does not apprehend the 
awareness of something, [one] does not make [oneself] experience 
[the thing] at all.135 
                                                 
no object perceived” more compact. 
135 PVin: apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati / (pp. 40-41.) 
na hi viṣayasattayā viṣayopalambhaḥ / kiṃ tarhi tadupalambhasattayā / sā 
cāprāmāṇikā na sattānibandhanān vyavahārān anuruṇaddhi / tadaprasiddhau 
viṣayasyāpy aprasiddhir ity astaṅgataṃ viśvaṃ syāt / sato ’py asiddhau 
sattāvyavahārāyogyatvāt / tasmān nānupalabhamānaḥ kasyacit saṃvedanaṃ vedayate 
nāma kiṃcit / 
Cf. also PVint: / dmigs pa mngon sum ma yin na / / de mthong rab tu ’grub mi ’gyur / 
/ yul yod pas ni yul dmigs pa ma yin gyi / ’on kyang de’i dmigs pa yod pas so / / de yang 
tshad ma dang mi ldan pas yod pa’i rgyu mtshan can gyi tha snyad ’jug par mi ’gyur 
ro / / de rab tu ma grub na don rab tu mi ’grub pa’i phyir / thams cad nub par ’gyur ro 
/ / yod kyang ma grub pa la yod pa’i tha snyad mi dmigs pa’i phyir ro / / de’i phyir rig 
pa ’ga’ yang mi dmigs na rig par byad pa zhes bya ba cung zad yod pa ma yin no / (D 
166a7ff : P 264a2ff.) 
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The premise is repeated by Śāntarakṣita.  In his Tattvasaṃgraha 2021cd136, he says: 
“Because of the absence of the experience of the cognition, the experience of the object 
[would] perish.” 137   Moreover, this premise seems to be a widely accepted 
epistemological principle in most Indian philosophies (and in a number of mainstream 
western philosophies138 ).  For instance, Śrīdhara claims, in his Nyāyakandalī, “A 
seeing of the object by means of an apprehension (upalambha) which itself is not 
perceptible (apratyakṣa), cannot take place.”139  It is observed that Śaṃkarites and 
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas are advocates of this premise as well.140  Jainas also accept 
this premise because when they criticize the other-awareness theory proposed by 
                                                 
136 As to the numbering of TS, I follow Dwarikadas. Cf. TSP2, p. 688. 
137  It seems that two manuscripts of TS at Krishnamacharya’s and Dwarikadas’ 
disposal read jñānasaṃvedanābhāvāt parārthānubhavo tadā (cf. TSP1, p. 564 and 
TSP2, p. 688), but it does not make sense contextually.  Krishnamacharya proposes to 
read tadā as tathā (cf. TSP1, p. 564, l. 12), this suggestion is ignored by Dwarikadas. 
(Cf. TSP2, p. 688, l. 2 and n. 1.)  According to Jhā’s translation (cf. Jhā 1939: 958), 
he seems to adopt Krishnamacharya’s suggestion.  However, I choose to follow 
another Sanskrit manuscript, Jaisalmer Jain Jnanabhandara, Ms. ji. tā: 377, f. 202v5, 
which reads: jñānasaṃvedanābhāvān naṣṭo ’rthānubhavas tadā, which exactly 
corroborates the Tibetan translation, TSt: / shes pa rig pa med pa na // de tshe don gyi 
nyams myong ’jig / (D 73b7) (I would like to thank Dr. Yasutaka Muroya for his sharing 
this material.) 
138 Cf. Matilal 1986: 144-155.  Ganeri mentions that Descartes, Locke and Hume are 
all with this train of thought. (Cf. Ganeri 1999: 369.) 
139  Faddegon 1918: 405. Cf. also NK: apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ 
prasidhyatīti / (p. 91.) Jhā’s translation: “one who has no direct perception is never 
known to see an object.” (Jhā 1982: 203.) 
140 Cf. Jhā 1911: 26 and Sinha 1958: 220. 
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Naiyāyikas, they argue that if God needs a second cognition to perceive his first 
cognition, which is supposed to be the cognition of the universe, how can it be possible 
that the second cognition perceives the first one when it is not perceived?141  In PKM, 
Prabhācandra states his rejection of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas when the latter use sense faculty 
as the counterexample that can bring about the cognition of the object without itself 
being perceived and prove that the second cognition can also give rise to the 
apprehension of a previous cognition even though it is not apprehended by itself.  And 
Prabhācandra’s rejection is that if that is the case, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika should take the 
view that “the first cognition of an external object apprehends its object, though it is not 
itself perceived” 142  and Prabhācandra claims “this is not admitted by the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika.”143 
Prabhācandra’s description of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s attitude on the premise might be 
supported by a Phaṇibhūṣaṇa’s commentary on Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya of Nyāyasūtra.  
As Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments on a statement in Bhāṣya—pravṛttisāmarthyāt arthavat 
pramāṇam (“successful activity results when the object is cognised by the instrument 
of valid knowledge”144 ), he considers this statement as Vātsyāyana’s answer to a 
hypothetical objection “the right knowledge of pramāṇa-s is impossible, because there 
is no way to ascertain their validity”145.  In Phaṇibhūṣaṇa’opinion, Vātsyāyana was 
                                                 
141 Cf. Sinha 1958: 215. 
142 Sinha 1958: 218. 
143 Sinha 1958: 218. 
144  Chattopadhyaya_Gangopadhyaya 1967: 3. The Sanskrit text cited by 
Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya is in the form of pramāṇam arthavat pravṛtti-
sāmarthyāt. 
145 Chattopadhyaya_Gangopadhyaya 1967: 3. 
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using that statement to answer “it is possible to establish the validity of pramāṇa, 
inference (anumāna) being capable of it”.146  According to this interpretation, it seems 
that Naiyāyikas would agree that the validity of pramāṇa needs to be established by 
another inference. And this interpretation bears out the following argument.  
Presuming that the opponent might further argue that since such inference needs to be 
established by another inference and so on, there would be an infinite regress problem, 
Phaṇibhūṣaṇa proposes his answer to this argument that the need of ascertaining the 
validity of an inference exists only when there is doubt about the validity, “but there are 
many well-known cases where such a doubt does not arise at all”147.  If this is the case, 
then Naiyāyikas might owe an answer to the argument of Prabhācandra.  
However, Vātsyāyana’s statement might be interpreted in a different way, according to 
Kataoka. He considers that in that statement “Vātsyāyana explains in general how 
pramāṇa leads one to a fruit and establishes that pramāṇa grasps an object (pramāṇam 
arthavat) and therefore is valid.”148  That is to say, the statement is not necessarily to 
be interpreted as an inference of ascertaining the validity of pramāṇa.  Further, we 
find that Bhaṭṭa Jayanta states in NM, “Moreover, it is indeed correct that the grasping 
of an illuminated object such as blue depends on an illuminating cognition.  But it is 
to be considered by what the cognition grasping that [object] is grasped at that time.”149 
And then Bhaṭṭa Jayanta claims that neither another cognition nor the cognition itself 
                                                 
146 Chattopadhyaya_Gangopadhyaya 1967: 3. 
147 Chattopadhyaya_Gangopadhyaya 1967: 4. 
148 Kataoka 2006: 154. 
149  Watson_Kataoka 2010: 325. Cf. also NM: api ca prakāśyasya nīlādeḥ 
prakāśakabodhādhīnaṃ yuktaṃ nāma grahaṇam / bodhasya tu tadgrāhakasya tadā 
kiṃkṛtaṃ grahaṇam iti cintyam / (p. 24, ll. 7-8.) 
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can make the cognition valid.150  Watson and Kataoka interpret this passage as “True, 
illumination requires an illuminator; … But the dependence of the grasping of an object 
on cognition does not entail that the cognition must be grasped in order for the object 
to be grasped.”151 That is to say, according to Watson and Kataoka, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta 
would disagree with the premise in question.  This conclusion is reliable because in a 
previous pūrvapakṣa section Bhaṭṭa Jayanta did realize the premise proposed by his 
opponent.  In NM 3.2.2, when he argues that fatigue will stop the infinite regress 
proposed by Vijñānavādin, he assumes that his opponent might reply, “As you like. 
When exhausted you can take rest. But you will not have grasped an object because as 
long as the illumination remains ungrasped, it is impossible to discern things 
illuminated by that. Thus the grasping of the object could never occur.”152 
Prabhācandra seems to have concluded that Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas are the only ones who 
hold that “an unperceived cognition can apprehend an object.”153  But according to 
Matilal, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the only one who accepts that when the object-cognition 
arises, it is not necessarily cognized, while the Buddhist, the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara 
                                                 
150  Cf. NM: na bodhāntaranibandhanam anavasthāprasaṅgāt / nāpi svaprakāśam 
jñānam ahaṃ nīlam iti pratibhāsāt / (p. 24, ll. 8-9.) (“[The grasping of the cognition] 
is not based on yet another cognition, because that would lead to the undesirable 
consequence of an infinite regress. Nor is a cognition self-illuminating, because it does 
not appear in the form ‘I am blue’.” [Watson_Kataoka 2010: 326]) 
151 Watson_Kataoka 2010: 325. 
152 Watson_Kataoka 2010: 307.  Cf. NM: kāmaṃ śrānto viraṃsyati bhavān / arthaṃ 
tu na gṛhītavān eva / prakāśāgrahaṇe tatprakāśyaparicchedāyogād ity evaṃ na 
kadācid arthagrahaṇaṃ syāt / (p. 14.)  See n. 261. 
153 Cf. Sinha 1958: 218 and n. 39. 
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accept that it is necessary.154  In ŚV Codanāsūtra vv. 33-53, a passage dealing with 
the issue whether pramāṇatva and apramāṇatva are inherent in the cognition, 155 
Kumārila seems to hold that only pramāṇatva is inherent in the cognition, especially 
when he states that “when [a cognition] is pramāṇa by itself, there is no another 
[cognition] at all to be grasped [for its pramāṇatva].”156  Since pramāṇatva of the 
cognition of object here might mean “the validity” or “the authoritativeness” of the 
cognition, as translated by Jhā, 157  this passage can, to some extent, support 
Prabhācandra’s description of the Bhāṭṭa’s attitude to the premise.  However, we also 
find that Kumārila has claimed in ŚV Śūnyavāda 182 that “Otherwise, the real existence 
of the object would not be observed if [its] cognition is not accomplished. Therefore, 
there would be a valid means of knowledge [for the object-cognition] in later.”158  This 
                                                 
154 Cf. Matilal 1986: p. 144. 
155 Cf. ŚVN, pp. 103-109; ŚVT, pp. 42-57; ŚVK [Part 1], pp. 79-92. For translation of 
this section, cf. Jhā 1909: 26-29. A summary of this section is given by Jhā (1966: 75-
76). 
156 ŚV Codanāsūtra 52ab: yadā svataḥ pramāṇatvaṃ atadānyana naiva bgṛhyateb / 
Jhā’s translation: “In case, however, authoritativeness be accepted to be due to (the 
conception) itself, nothing else is wanted (for its cognition).” (Jhā 1909: 29.)  And he 
has another translation-like explanation: “if validity belongs to the cognition by itself, 
then there would be no need of any other cognitions.” (Jhā 1964: 76.)  
a tadānyam ŚVN, ŚVK : tadānyḥ ŚVT. 
b gṛhyate ŚVN, ŚVK : mṛgyate ŚVT. 
157 Cf. Jhā 1909: 26 and Jhā 1964: 76. 
158 ŚV Śūnyavāda 182: nānyathā hy arthasadbhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ samupapadyate / jñānaṃ 
cen nety ataḥ paścāt pramāṇam upajāyate // Jhā’s translation: “If there were no ‘idea’, 
then we could not, in any other way, explain the existence of objects; hence it is that 
after (the object has been perceived), we form an idea (of the idea) as the means of a 
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statement might be interpreted as that the point which he argues with Dignāga is not 
about the premise that the determination of an object requires the establishment of the 
object-cognition, but about which type of cognition, self-awareness or presumption, is 
the apprehension of the cognition which determinatively makes the real knowledge of 
the existence of the object.   
The Restatement of the Premise in ŚV and NM 
It is observed that the premise is restated by Kumārila and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta in a different 
form.  In ŚV Śūnyavāda 22, the premise is represented in a way similar to the one that 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti present.  Kumārila says: 
na cāgṛhīte →jñānākhye prakāśyo← 159  ’rtho ’vadhāryate / 
tadadhīnaprakāśatvād dīpābhāse yathā ghaṭaḥ // (Taber’s translation: 
“And the object which is to be illumined is not ascertained when the 
appearance of the cognition is not apprehended, because its 
illumination is dependent on that, like a vase when there is the light 
of a lamp.”)160 
I am aware that Dignāga does not use the light-example (or lamp-example) to prove the 
premise.  Therefore, it might not be appropriate for us to relate Kumārila’s restatement 
to Dignāga’s view in this case.  However, we find that Dharmakīrti uses light-example 
                                                 
right notion (of the perceived object).” (Jhā 1909: 169.) 
159 jñānākhye prakāśyo ŚVN, ŚVK [Part 2] : jñānākhya prakāśe ŚVT.  Watson and 
Kataoka read jñānākhye prakāśe. 
160 Taber 2010: 284.  Cf. also Watson’s and Kataoka’s translation: “And if the light of 
cognition is not perceived, its object is not apprehended, because [the object’s] 
illumination is dependent on that [cognition], just like a vase [is not apprehended] if the 
light of the lamp [is not perceived].” (Watson_Kataoka 2010: 304, n. 25.) 
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to prove the reflexivity of self-awareness161 and we find no reason to consider that 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have any difference ideas on this issue.  Therefore, we can 
assume that Kumārila’s restatement of his opponent’s view is compatible with the 
theory of Dignāga.  However, in ŚV Śūnyavāda 25, the restatement of the premise is 
changed to: 
prāk cārthagrahaṇād iṣṭā tasyotpattis tadaiva ca / saṃvedanaṃ 
bhaved asya, na cet kālāntare ’pi na // (Watson’s and Kataoka’s 
translation: “And the rise of the [cognition] is accepted to take place 
before the grasping of the object; and at the very time [that cognition 
arises] it must be experienced, otherwise it never could be.”)162 
Such statement continues in ŚV Śūnyavāda 31ab: tasmāt pūrvagṛhītāsu buddhiṣv 
arthopalambhanam / (Taber’s Translation: “Therefore, there is perception [of an object] 
when cognitions have been previously apprehended.”)163 
In NM 3.2.1, the premise is similarly represented by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta as: 
And it follows from that that cognition (asya) must be grasped before 
an object [is grasped]. For we do not find that the light of things such 
as lamps is able to illuminate if it is ungrasped.164 
According to ŚV Śūnyavāda 25 and 31ab and NM 3.2.1, the term of “before (or 
                                                 
161 The prakāśa in PV 3.329. See n. 320. 
162 Watson_Kataoka 2010: 308. 
163 Taber 2010: 286. 
164  Watson_Kataoka 2010: 304. Cf. also NM: tataś cārthāt prathamataram asya 
grahaṇena bhavitavyam / agṛhītasya dīpādeḥ prakāśasya prakāśakatvādarśanāt / (p. 
13). 
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previously)” (prāk, pūrva or prathamataram) is somehow added to the premise. This 
additional term makes the accomplishment of the object-cognition not based on the 
cognition of the object-cognition interpreted by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, which can 
occur at the same time when the object-cognition cognizes its object, but rather on a 
more restricted condition interpreted by Kumārila and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta that the object-
cognition (buddhi or jñāna) must be grasped before the time when the object-cognition 
takes its object.  I cannot find more information from the words of Kumārila about 
what exactly the buddhi is, but Bhaṭṭa Jayanta in his NM 3.2.2 gives us much clearer 
explanation: unlike the external object, the cognition of which can only occur with other 
conditions, such as the light and the absence of the obstacle between our eyes and the 
object to be seen, the cognition, when it arises, does not have any obstacle for itself to 
be perceived.  Its own cognition would not depend on any other condition.  Therefore, 
at the very time when it arises, it must be perceived.165  According to this explanation, 
Kumārila’s statement “that cognition must be perceived before its object is established” 
may not be read literally as meaning that the cognition has to be perceived at a time 
before the object is perceived. Rather, it could mean that the cognition can be perceived 
without any obstacle.  Although we cannot say that Kumārila’s statement must be 
interpreted in the same way, in my opinion, that is the only way to make Kumārila’s 
and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s restatements compatible with the view presented in the works of 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.  However, Taber, Watson and Kataoka follow the literal 
reading of that statement and raise some interesting arguments. 
The Validity of the Light-example in Proving the Premise from the Perspectives of 
Taber, Watson and Kataoka 
In Taber’s view, the light-example in ŚV Śūnyavāda 22 is meant to say, “One has to see 
                                                 
165 Cf. NM, pp. 13-14 and Watson_Kataoka 2010: 306. 
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the source of illumination in order to see objects illumined by it”166 and he concludes 
that this view of “Kumārila’s Buddhist” is but a “questionable assumption”.167  Based 
on common sense that one can see the objects in the daytime without seeing the sun and 
one can see the moon without seeing the sun at night, Taber’s conclusion seems correct 
if his “Kumārila’s Buddhist” is a real “Kumārila’s Buddhist”.  However, Watson and 
Kataoka do not think Taber understands “Kumārila’s Buddhist” correctly.  They 
suggest that we should not simply follow Taber’s interpretation on the view of 
“Kumārila’s Vijñānavādin” and blame the real Vijñānavādin.168  Instead, they propose 
two different paraphrases of the light-example. In the first paraphrase, they suggest not 
paraphrasing agṛhīta literally as “unperceived” but rather loosely as “imperceptible”.  
This change renders the light-example a new meaning that only if the light is perceptible, 
it can illuminate other objects. Hence, the example can lead to a conclusion that 
“cognition is perceptible”169.  Nevertheless, Watson and Kataoka are not satisfied with 
such interpretation because it can only prove that “the cognition is perceptible…but not 
the Vijñānavādin’s stronger conclusion that cognition must be perceived.” 170  
Accordingly, they propose the second interpretation.  In order to support the 
conclusion that the cognition must be perceived, Watson and Kataoka imagine that there 
must be some light which spreads from the light-source (e.g., a lamp) and exists 
between the object and the person seeing it.  This kind of light must be seen by the 
person before he sees the object even when the person cannot see the light-source.  
                                                 
166 Taber 2010: 284. 
167 Taber 2010: 284. 
168 Cf. Watson_Kataoka 2010: 305. 
169 Watson_Kataoka 2010: 305. 
170 Watson_Kataoka 2010: 305. 
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They explain this with an example that “[T]he space between me and the wall is 
experienced as full of light, given that it (the space between me and the wall) looks very 
different in the dark.”171  In Watson 2014, he presents an analogue experiment to 
illustrate such interpretation on why the light must be seen before the object is seen.  
He explains: 
The advantage of this interpretation is that this light must indeed be 
seen in order to illuminate an object. ……Whenever we see an object, 
there will always be some of the light between us and that object, 
even if the source of the light is hidden from us. 
 
Our faculty of seeing must encounter this light on its journey towards 
the object. Hence if this light really is perceptible to the eye, we will 
                                                 
171 Watson_Kataoka 2010: 305. 
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not be able to see the object without first seeing this light. Thus this 
interpretation also explains why the light must be seen first.172 
Watson did not further specify what he meant by “some of the light between us and that 
object”.  For the following discussion, I modify Watson’s picture into the following 
two pictures:  
 
                                                 
172 Watson 2014: 410. 
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In picture 1, I outline a zone 1 (in pink) is an area in which the lamp light runs towards 
the blue object. I consider that the light in this zone 1 is what Watson referred to as the 
“light on its journey towards the object” and “some of the light between us and that 
object”.  In picture 2, I outline a zone 2 (in pink) is an area in which the light reflected 
from the blue object runs towards the person.  According to Watson, before the person 
sees the blue object, he must first see the light in zone 1.  Watson therefore considers 
that this interpretation makes the example of light comparable with the theory that the 
cognition must be previously perceived before its object is perceived.  
However, with my very basic knowledge of optics, light can only go straight.173  Thus, 
there is no way the person can see the light in zone 1 if this experiment is carried out in 
                                                 
173 I am aware that it is open for discussion whether the straight moving of light can be 
influenced by a super gravitational pull (e.g., from a black hole), but this phenomenon 
is not relevant to the present discussion which concerns only our everyday life 
experience. 
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an ideal state, e.g., in the vacuum.  Under that circumstance, the person can only see 
the light in zone 2 which is reflected from the blue object through zone 2, namely, he 
can only see the blue object.  But if this experiment is carried out in a natural state, the 
person can see the light in zone 1 too.  In a natural state, zone 1 can be “experienced 
as full of light” and it is likely that zone 1 “looks very different in the dark” as what 
Watson and Kataoka described.  How do we explain this natural phenomenon?  In 
my view, it is simply because in the natural state, countless invisible particles of air and 
dust in the space reflect the light into that person’s eyes. Thus, all this experiment shows 
is probably just that the person indeed sees two objects: (1) the blue object and (2) the 
haze in the air (which consists of invisible particles of air and dust).  The light reflected 
by the invisible particles in zone 1 will arrive at the person’s eyes before that reflected 
by the blue object because they run a shorter way.  However, this phenomenon is not 
helpful in proving the premise with the light-example. 
A Tentative Interpretation on the Light-example to Prove the Premise by 
Kumārila’s and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Buddhist 
As was mentioned above, I did not find Dignāga and Dharmakīrti ever provide a light-
example as described by Kumārila and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta.  Therefore, if there were any 
problem in using such example, such as those mentioned above by Taber, Watson and 
Kataoka, one may, in favor of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, simply blame the “twisted 
restatements” by Kumārila and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta.  As I have pointed out, the light-
example mentioned by Kumārila and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta can be interpreted in a way that is 
compatible with the theory of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.  It can indeed support the 
premise if we see an object is interpreted as we see the light reflected from the object.  
Accordingly, if the light itself, i.e., the light reflected from the blue object through zone 
2, is not perceived, we cannot see the object, i.e., the form of the object carried out by 
the light.  To this interpretation of the light-example, one might argue that the 
knowledge that “seeing an object is in fact seeing the light reflected from the object” is 
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something discovered and established in the modern theories of optics and cognitive 
psychology and therefore, it should not be used to interpret an ancient philosophical 
text.  Admittedly, most of us acquire such knowledge through modern science, but it 
is not entirely impossible for someone to have such an axiomatic knowledge before the 
time of modern science. 174 
2.2.2 The Strategy of Proving Self-awareness in Pramāṇavārttika 
It is a custom that Indian philosophers do not provide tables of contents for their 
writings.  And that has made it difficult for their readers to fully understand the 
structures of their writings and the strategies used unless one can read through and well 
understand the entire work.  The well thought-out and organized outlines of PS(V) and 
PV first appear in Tibetan commentaries.  Although such outlines by different Tibetan 
commentators are always more or less different from each other, they are certainly of 
great help to all readers ranging from those who attempt to have an overall 
understanding of the structure of the whole text to those who just need to read a limited 
section of the work.  In this dissertation, I select two Tibetan outlines of PV 3.301-539 
(the section relevant to Dharmakīrti’s arguments about self-awareness) from the 
commentaries by Gyaltsab and Kedrup and compare them in appendix I.  According 
to this comparison and the outline from Gyaltsab’s commentary on PS(V) 1.8c-12, 
which is translated in appendix II, I draw a comparison between PS(V) 1.8c-12 and PV 
3.301-539 in appendix III.  I also compare the strategy of proving self-awareness used 
                                                 
174 Watson’s analysis of the use of two Sanskrit terms: ābhāsa and prabhā, which 
makes reference to the light, can be supportive to this point. (Cf. Watson 2014: 408-
409.) Preisendanz provided a comprehensive study of ancient Indian achievements in 
optics by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas. The study shows that some ancient 
Indian philosophers have already realized that the light reflected from the object is one 
of the necessary conditions for the arising of vision. (Cf. Preisendanz 1989.) 
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by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (as demonstrated in appendix III) with that used by the 
opponent of Candrakīrti (as introduced in his MABh 6.72-76).  The outline of the 
strategy used by Candrakīrti’s opponent is provided in appendix IV. 
2.2.2.1 A Comparison between PS(V) 1.8c-12 and PV 3.301-539 
I divide PS(V) 1.8c-12 into eleven sections and pair them with PV 3.301-539 in two 
different ways based on Gyaltsab’s and Kedrup’s commentaries, respectively (see 
appendix I, II and III).  Gyaltsab did not pair up these two texts, but according to his 
outlines of PS(V) and PV, I divide PV 3.301-539 into nine sections and pair them with 
PS(V) 1.8c-12 as shown in the middle column of the table in appendix III.  In contrast, 
Kedrup has clearly paired PV 3.301-539 with PS(V) 1.8c-12 in his PVVke.  I gather 
all his opinions scattered in his commentary and compare PS(V) and PV as shown in 
the right column of the table in appendix III.  Based on all the materials mentioned 
above, I set forth here a brief introduction of these two sets of comparison between 
PS(V) 1.8c-12 and PV 3.301-539. 
Firstly, in Gyaltsab’s opinion, PV 3.301-352 can be related to PS(V) 1.8c-1.9a, which 
is a general explanation of the effect of the means of knowledge according to 
Sautrāntika’s theory.  By contrast, Kedrup relates PV 3.301-319 to PS(V) 1.8cd and 
3.320-337 to PS(V) 1.9a.  The former is the reasoning of the effect of the means of 
knowledge according to Sautrāntika’s theory and the latter is the explanation of the 
Yogācāra theory of the effect of the means of knowledge, namely, self-awareness.   
As to PS(V) 1.9b-10, namely, steps 3, 4 and 5 in appendix III, I relate, following 
Gyaltsab, PV 3.353-362 to PS(V) 1.9bcd, which is the explanation of Sautrāntika’s 
theory of self-awareness; and I relate PV 3.363-366 to PS(V) 1.10, which is the 
explanation that self-awareness is the effect of the means of knowledge.  By contrast, 
Kedrup relates PV 3.338-450 to PS(V) 1.9b and 341-352 to 1.9cd; the former is 
considered to be the explanation of the effect of the means of knowledge for the object-
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cognition according to the Yogācāra theory and the latter is the explanation of necessity 
of such effect of the means of knowledge for the object-cognition in Yogācāra’s theory. 
Kedrup also relates PV 3.353-366 to PS(V) 1.10, which is the explanation of the 
problems originating from the theory of object-cognition without the self-awareness.  
Further, I relate PV 3. 367-421 to PS(V) 1.11ab, in which the view that cognition has 
two forms is proved by the difference between two forms appearing to the object-
cognition and the cognition-cognition, respectively.  By contrast, Kedrup relates PV 
367-424 to PS(V) 1.11ab and interprets it as the proof of cognition having two forms 
and self-awareness. I did not find that Kedrup has ever paired PV 3.425-482 with any 
section in PS(V).  According to his outline of PV 3.425-482, he probably considers 
this section as an independent argument by Dharmakīrti. 
Moreover, in the light of Gyaltsab’s outline of PV, I relate PV 3.422-424 to PS(V) 
1.11cd, which explains that cognition has two forms because two different forms, i.e., 
forms of object and forms of object-cognition, appear in the memory. This is also the 
explanation for that the cognition can be proved by the memory.  In comparison, 
Kedrup relates PV 3.483-484a to PS(V) 1.11cd.  
PS(V) 1.12ab is set forth in two steps: PS(V) 1.12ab1 and PS 1.12b2. And they are 
paired with PV 3.426-483 and PV 3.484a, 511abc, respectively.  The former (i.e., step 
8 in appendix III) explains that the cognition should not be experienced by a 
substantively different cognition, no matter whether such cognition is in the form of 
perception or inference. The infinite regress argument laid in PS(V) 1.12ab1 is 
explained specifically by PV 3.440ab and 474ab.175  The latter (i.e., step 9 in appendix 
III) explains that the memory of cognition can also prove self-awareness.  I consider 
that PV 3.484b-510 is an independent argument by Dharmakīrti, in which he explains 
                                                 
175 Cf. PV 3.440ab and 474ab in part II of this dissertation for its edition and translation. 
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that without self-awareness, one cannot perceive a long syllable.  On a strict literal 
reading, PV 3.484b-510 cannot be related to any part of PS(V).  Although Kedrup 
considers it as an extensive development of PS(V) 1.12b2, I could not agree with him 
because I find that most of the words in PS 1.12 can be found in PV 3.511 and 512.176  
Therefore, I consider that PV 484a and 3.511abc can be related to the infinite regress 
argument stated in PS(V) 1.12b2, although Dharmakīrti does not clearly state the word 
of infinite regress in PV 3.511abc.177  Kedrup pairs the whole PS(V) 1.12ab with PV 
484b-510, which explains that without self-awareness the cognition cannot even 
perceive a long syllable. 
Finally, I relate PV 3.512c-536 and 3.537-539 to PS 1.12cd and PS(V) 1.12cd, 
respectively. The former section (i.e., step 10 in appendix III) extensively explains that 
if there is no self-awareness, the cognition cannot move from one object to another 
object so that one cannot perceive even a long syllable.  The latter section (i.e., step 
11 in appendix III) explains that one should accept self-awareness for some other 
reasons.  By contrast, Kedrup considers PV 3.511-539 as one unit explaining PS(V) 
1.12, in which the authors explain that without self-awareness, cognition cannot move 
from one object to another. 
Having introduced both Gyaltsab’s and Kedrup’s structural analysis of Dharmakīrti’s 
strategy of proving self-awareness as above, I choose to follow Gyaltsab’s commentary 
because based on my understanding of the literal meaning of PS(V) 1.11c-12b2, I find 
Gyaltsab’s interpretation and comparison more convincing.  
2.2.2.2 A Comparison between the Way Used by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to 
                                                 
176 See the verses on page 103. 
177 Details of the argument on this issue cf. § 4. 
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Prove Self-awareness and that Used by Candrakīrti’s Opponent  
I set forth below a comparison between Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s strategy of 
proving self-awareness as introduced above and the similar strategy used by the 
opponent of Candrakīrti. 
In Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s theory, the premise—no cognition experienced, no 
cognition of object—is not only the basis of their epistemology but also the basis of 
their ontology.  This is because if the existence of an object is established by its 
cognition and its cognition is established by self-awareness, then the existence of 
everything will directly or indirectly depend on self-awareness.  In MABh 6.72-76,178 
when Candrakīrti rejects one of the tenets in Yogācāra’s179 theory, the other-dependent 
nature (t. gzhan dbang; sk. paratantra), he reveals that the self-awareness is the only 
means for the Yogācāra to prove the existence of the other-dependent nature that is 
proposed to be the basis of all other phenomena by the Yogācāra.  In MA 6.72, he 
explains: since nothing can be claimed as existent without being confirmed by the 
means of knowledge when the Yogācāra refutes the object which exists beyond the 
scope of the cognition, how can that cognition be confirmed without the object-
reference?  If it cannot be so, then the notion of other-dependent nature, which is 
supposed to be the basis of the existence of all other phenomena, will fail in its own 
existence.  To this, Yogācāra’s responses are introduced by Candrakīrti, which are 
highly similar to the strategies used by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.  Based on the outline 
                                                 
178 Cf. appendix IV. 
179 Cf. appendix IV, § 1.3.1.4.  Candrakīrti does not explicitly reveal who is this 
Yogācāra exactly, but he has mentioned Dignāga’s name in MABh (D 347b2). 
According to the commentators and the context, as explained below, I relate this 
opponent to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, even though Dharmakīrti most probably lived 
after Candrakīrti. 
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of the opponent’s argument in MABh 6.72-76 (see appendix IV), the process of proving 
the self-awareness can be summarized as follows.  
Step 1: Proposing self-awareness to be the valid means of cognition to prove the 
existence of the object-cognition (see appendix IV § 1.2) and laying down the basic 
strategy to prove the self-awareness by rejecting the other-awareness (see appendix IV 
§ 1.3.1.2).  
Step 2: Proposing analogies to prove self-awareness (see appendix IV § 1.3.1.4).   
Step 3: Using the memory-argument to prove the existence of the cognition of cognition 
with the explanation of the premise that nothing can be rememberd unless being 
previously experienced (see appendix IV § 1.3.2.1.1-2).  
Step 4: Disproving the other-awareness of cognition by the argument of infinite regress 
(see appendix IV § 1.3.2.1.3.1).   
Step 5: Disproving the other-awareness of cognition by the argument that the cognition 
would not perceive other objects (see appendix IV § 1.3.2.1.3.2). 
Step 6: The conclusion of the reasoning of self-awareness, which is stated in the last 
sentence in appendix IV § 1.3.2.1.3.2. 
Comparing the above six steps with the corresponding arguments in PS(V) and PV (as 
paired up in appendix III), we can have a general comparison as follows:  
The steps in 
MABh 
The corresponding arguments in PS(V) and PV (see 
appendix III) 
Step 1 Steps 1-5 in appendix III. 
Step 2 PV 3.329 and 482. 
Step 3 PS 1.12b2 and PV 484a (part of step 9 in appendix III). 
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Step 4 PSV 1.12b2 and PV 3.440ab and 472c-474b (part of steps 8 and 
9 in appendix III). 
Step 5 PS 1.12cd and PV 3.484b-536 (step 10 in appendix III). 
Step 6 PSV 1.12cd and PV 3.537-539 (step 11 in appendix III). 
According to the above-mentioned comparisons which enable us to relate the opponent 
in MABh to Dignāga or Dharmakīrti, I summarize Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s 
strategy of proving the self-awareness in two main steps: (1) proving that the cognition 
must be cognized by cognition and (2) proving that the cognition cannot be cognized 
by a substantively different cognition.  The section selected and translated in this 
dissertation, i.e., PV 3.425-484, is in step (2), namely, the rejections of the views that 
cognition can be cognized or experienced by other cognitions, such as a different 
perception or a different inference. 
Before examining in detail how Dharmakīrti proves self-awareness in PV 3.425-483, it 
is worth mentioning that some scholars consider that self-awareness is a vivid 
experience in our everyday life.  For instance, Devendrabuddhi claims “The assertion 
that awareness should not be aware of itself is also contrary to the perception.”180 
Kamalaśīla, in his Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā, also states, “The self-awareness is 
unable to have any fault because it is established by everyone from cowherds on up.”181  
So does Mokṣākaragupta: “The state of being self-aware is established by the 
                                                 
180 De: / gzhan yang blos bdag nyid nyams su myong ba ma yin no zhes bya ba de yang 
mngon sum dang ’gal ba yin no / (D 243a7.) 
181 MALP: / rang rig pa yang gnag rdzi yan chad la grub pa’i phyir klan kar yang mi 
rung ngo / (D 129a2ff.) 
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experience. How can it be denied?”182 These statements seem to conform with our 
intuition in the sense that every person can definitely be aware that he perceives an 
object while he is perceiving the object. However, this opinion is not accepted by all;183 
otherwise, it will be unnecessary for Dharmakīrti to contribute a large section to the 
explanation of the proof of the self-awareness.  Thus, our intuition of self-awareness 
should not be taken as the conclusive proof or disproof of self-awareness.  
2.2.3 The Overall Strategy of Proving Self-awareness in the light of 
Pramāṇavārttika 3.425-484 
Gyaltsab structures Dharmakīrti’s proof used in PV 3.425-483 into three sections: (1) 
PV 3.425 in which Dharmakīrti proves the self-awareness using the same means for 
proving the cognition has two forms in PV 3.367-424, (2) PV 3.426-459 in which he 
rejects that cognition is experienced by another perception and (3) PV 3.460-483 in 
which he rejects that the cognition is experienced by inference. By contrast, Kedrup 
structures the arguments in PV 3.425-482 in two sections: (1) PV 3.425 in which 
Dharmakīrti proves the pakṣadharma of the inferential sign used to prove self-
awareness and (2) PV 3.426-482 in which Dharmakīrti proves the pervasion (t. khyab 
pa, sk. vyāpti) of the inferential sign.184 
2.2.3.1 On PV 3.425 
It has been mentioned in § 2.1.2.4 that PV 3.425 is considered to be the bridge between 
                                                 
182 TBh: / anubhavaprasiddhaṃ ca svasaṃvedanatvaṃ katham apahnuyeta / (p. 18, ll. 
11-12.) 
183 For instance, Rāmānuja claims reversely that if accepting cognition to be self-
luminous, namely without its object, it is contrary to the perception.  Cf. Sinha 1958: 
221. 
184 Cf. appendix I. 
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Dharmakīrti’s commentary on sākārajñānavāda in PV 3.367-424 and his proof of self-
awareness in PV 3.426-539.  And this verse is considered as the textual basis of 
Sautrāntika’s distinct theory of self-awareness.  However, as to whether PV 3.425 is 
an independent section in terms of proving the self-awareness, Gyaltsab and Kedrup 
have different ideas.  The divergence of their opinions is reflected in their different 
interpretations of the word phal cher (prāyas) in the verse. 
As a polysemous word, prāyas has several meanings: mostly, commonly, generally, etc.  
Its Tibetan translation phal cher, which is also used to translate bāhulyena, bāhulika, 
prāyeṇa and bhūyastvena, can also mean mostly, usually and generally, etc. 185  
Manorathanandin simply glosses prāyas as bāhulyena (usually, ordinarily). 186  To 
explain what prāyas exactly means in this case, Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and 
Ravigupta firstly presuppose that PV 3.425 is an answer to a hypothetical question by 
the opponent that if the means used to prove that cognition has two forms is sufficient 
to prove the existence of self-awareness, what is the purpose of saying prāyas in this 
case?187 Then Devendrabuddhi answers as follows. 
That is not the case because it has another purpose. Stating “phal cher” 
(prāyas) is for the purpose of explaining that two forms of the 
                                                 
185 Cf. Negi 2004: 3497 and TTT-online. 
186 Cf. M1, p. 245, l. 17. 
187 Cf. De D 242b3ff.; PVA2, p. 426, l. 21; R D 149b4.  This hypothetical question 
can be considered as a response to the previous statement in PV 3.349cd, in which 
Dharmakīrti has stated that “Because the presence of the object has the nature of that 
[cognition], self-awareness too is considered as the awareness of the object.” 
(arthasthites tadātmatvāt svavid apy arthavin matā /). This is because the statement 
implies that the reason “cognition has the form of the object”, which can prove that the 
form of the object has the nature of the cognition, can also prove the self-awareness. 
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cognition are [a form of the cognition which] becomes the nature 
which is similar to the [external] object and [another form of the 
cognition which] experiences that [form similar to the object188]; 
therefore, the experience of the nature of the object is established, but 
not directly.189 
According to Devendrabuddhi, PV 3.425cd explains the reason why self-awareness can 
be indirectly established when the thesis that “cognition has two forms” is 
established.190  This is because when the cognition appears in the form that is similar 
to the external object, such external object is in fact established by the awareness 
through having the object-appearance or the object-form that has the nature of cognition. 
Accordingly, the awareness is established as the cognition that experiences its own 
nature and the type of self-awareness explained in § 2.1.2.4, i.e., the self-awareness (3), 
can, therefore, be indirectly established.191 
                                                 
188 Cf. Ś: / de yang myong ba yin pa zhes bya ba ni don dang ’dra ba’o // yul gyi rnam 
pa myong bar ’ga’ zhig kyang mi ’dod pa ma yin no / (D 235a7ff.) 
189 De: / de ni ma yin te / don gzhan nyid yin ba’i phyir te shes pa’i tshul gnyis ni don 
dang ’dra ba’i bdag nyid du gyur pa yin zhing de yang myong ba yin pa de’i phyir don 
gyi bdag nyid nyams su myong ba grub pa yin gyi dngos su ma yin no zhes bstan par 
bya ba’i don du phal cher gyi sgra mdzad pa yin no / (D 242b4ff. : P 487a4ff.) 
190 Cf. De: // ci’i phyir tshul gnyis grub pa na don gyis rang rig pa grub par ’gyur zhe 
na / rang gi ngo bor gyur snang ba // zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / (D 243a1ff.) 
191 Cf. De: / gang gi tshe don dang ’dra ba’i bdag nyid du gyur ba tshul gnyis pa’i rang 
gi ngo bor gyur pa snang ba na de’i tshe myong ba grub phyir ro // nyams su myong ba 
mthong ba’i phyir ro // gang gi tshe shes pa yul gyi rnam pa can yin pa de’i tshe ’di’i 
bdag nyid du ’gyur ba’i rnam par shes pas nyams su myong ba yin pa de ltar na bdag 
nyid myong ba nyid grub pa yin no / (D 243a2ff.) 
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Prajñākaragupta has the same idea in explaining why Dharmakīrti uses the term prāyas 
in this verse.  He uses mukhyatas, literally meaning principally, chiefly or particularly, 
to gloss prāyas and considers that when the proposed reason of “having two forms” is 
principally used to establish that the cognition has two forms, self-awareness can also 
be impliedly (ānuṣaṅgikī) established. He also considers PV 3.425cd as the reason 
Dharmakīrti uses to prove that when the perceived object has the nature of the 
perceiving cognition, the cognition must be nothing but self-awareness.192 
In R, when Ravigupta glosses phal cher (prāyas), he uses the word zhar la and an 
appositive word zhugs gyis (implicitly or indirectly), 193 the former of which is used to 
translate ānuṣaṅgikī in PVAt.194  This somewhat shifts the understanding of phal cher 
(prāyas) toward the meaning of “indirectly” (zhugs gyis), especially when the word 
dngos su (directly) is used to contrast with zhugs gyi in the context.  According to 
Indian commentaries, the options for translating prāyas include “relatedly”, “indirectly” 
and “implicitly”.   
Moreover, we find that Gyaltsab also uses the words zhar and zhugs la, which mean 
“secondly” or “implicitly”, to gloss phal cher.  Accordingly, this verse may be 
interpreted as saying that by the means of proving the two forms (the perceiving form 
and the perceived form), self-awareness can also be established, implicitly. 195  
Therefore, it is reasonable to reckon that Gyaltsab may consider that a special type of 
self-awareness, i.e., self-awareness (3) mentioned in § 2.1.2.4, can be inferred merely 
from the proof of Sākārajñānavāda.  However, Kedrup strongly criticizes Gyaltsab’s 
                                                 
192 Cf. appendix VI, § 1.2. 
193 Cf. R D 149b4ff. 
194 Cf. PVAt D 90b1. 
195 Cf. PVVgyal: / gzung rnam dang ’dzin rnam gyi tshul gnyis sgrub par byed pa’i 
rigs pas kyang rang rig mngon sum phal cher te zhar ram shugs la grub pa yin te / (p. 
316.) 
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interpretation of PV 3.425. What concerns Kedrup is that if the self-awareness is 
indirectly or implicitly established, it will logically bring about an unwarranted 
consequence that the opponents, whom Dharmakīrti is going to debate with in the 
following verses, are in fact free from the superimposition (t. sgro ’dogs, sk. āropa) of 
non-existence of self-awareness because they have already accepted a way to prove the 
existence of self-awareness.  That is to say, there would be no opponent in 
Dharmakīrti’s following arguments.  Further, Kedrup mentions that *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamikas also hold the view that cognition has the form of its object but they 
completely reject self-awareness.196  This suggests that although the reason “having 
form” can prove the proposition “cognition has two forms”, it cannot prove (even 
implicitly) the proposition (or conclusion) of “cognition has the self-awareness”.  
Accordingly, Kedrup gives his explanation of the meaning of prāyas: 
The meaning of the four pādas is as follows: to the opponent who 
confirmed that the cognition has two forms, when one is going to 
prove that cognition has the self-awareness with the reason “arising 
in the form of the object” and the example of “happiness”, the 
pakṣadharma of the reason has been established when it was used to 
prove “cognition has two forms”; hence, it is only necessary to 
establish the pervasion (vyāpti) of the reason in this case.197 
In Kedrup’s opinion, the word prāyas indicates that the proof of self-awareness is 
                                                 
196 Cf. PVVke, pp. 384-385. Cf. also the study section § 5 in this dissertation. 
197 PVVke: / zhes sogs rkang pa bzhis blo tshul gnyis su sgrub pa’i rgol ba’i ngor / 
shes pa chos can / rang rig yod de / yul gyi rnam par skyes pa’i phyir / dper na / bad 
sogs bzhin / zhes pa’i rtags kyis phyogs chos tshul gnyis sgrub pa’i rigs pas grub zin 
pa’i khyab pa gcig pu // bsgrubs pas chog par dngos su bstan cing / de’i shugs kyis 
sngar blo tshul gnyis su ma grub pa’i rgal ba’i ngor / rtags ’di bkod pa’i tshe/ rtags 
de’i phyogs chos sgrub pa’i rigs pa ni / blo tshul gnyis su bsgrub pa’i rigs pa ji skad 
bshad pa rnams yin par bstan pa yin no / (p. 385.) 
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partially completed, not indirectly or implicitly.  This explanation appears is 
consistent with the literal meaning of prāyas: “mostly”. 
According to Kedrup’s interpretation and his outline of the section “proving that the 
cognition has self-awareness”198, PV 3.425 is taken as one part of the proof for the self-
awareness (3), which proves the pakṣadharma of the inferential reason in the proof, 
while PV 3.426-482 are taken to be the other part which proves the pervasion (vyāpti).  
This conclusion can also be testified by Kedrup’s commentary on PV 3.426ab: “If there 
is no self-awareness, how can a subsequent sense perception, which has the form or the 
nature of that blue color, experiences a previous sense perception of blue color which 
has ceased.”199 In this commentary, the compound tadrūpa is glossed as “the form or 
the nature of that blue color”.  Kedrup’s interpretation suggests that the issue being 
discussed in PV 3.426 is still about the cognition (dhī) with the form of the object.  By 
contrast, the same compound is glossed by Gyaltsab as “the form of that previous 
cognition”200, which suggests that the issue is about the cognition (dhī) with the form 
of its previous cognition.  Therefore, according to Gyaltsab, the core of the argument 
has been shifted to “the experience of the cognition” from that in PV 3.425 - “the 
experience of the object”.  Gyaltsab’s interpretation, in this case, is consistent with all 
                                                 
198 Cf. appendix I. 
199 PVVke: / rang rig med kyang sngon po de’i dngos po’am rnam pa can (= tadrūpa) 
gyi dbang blo phyi ma yis ni sngo ’dzin dbang shes snga ma ’gags pa de ji ltar myong 
ba yin te / (p. 391.) 
200 Cf. PVVgyal: / blo snga ma de’i rnam pa’i dngos po can (= tadrūpa) gyi blo phyi 
ma yis shes pa snga ma ji ltar yang myong ba yin pa mi ’thad par thal / phyi ma’i dus 
na shes pa snga ma ’gags pa’i phyir / (p. 317.) 
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Indian commentaries.201 
In this dissertation, I would follow the opinion of Gyaltsab and the Indian commentators 
and consider PV 3.425 as an independent section for establishing the self-awareness (3). 
My reason is threefold: firstly, as shown in the following arguments in PV 3.442c2d, 
446, 478bcd and 480, whenever the opponents are supposed to accept that the object of 
the cognition has the nature of the cognition, Dharmakīrti would straightly argue that 
the opponent should then accept the theory of self-awareness.  In my opinion, 
Dharmakīrti would not argue this way if PV 3.425 is not a complete establishment of 
self-awareness.  Secondly, if I take the whole section of PV 3.425-482 or even more, 
the whole section of PV 3.425-539 as the explanation of the establishment of the self-
awareness (2) and (3), then it would be difficult for me to identify which part of them 
is the explanation of self-awareness (2) which is indeed the main type of self-awareness.  
Thirdly, Kedrup literally adapts some verses in PV 3.425-482 in order to interpret them 
as the basis of Dharmakīrti’s explanation of self-awareness (3), however, I find that 
such adaption twists the plain literal readings of those verses (for instance, his 
interpretation of PV 3.443ab202) and I do not see the necessity for doing so.   
At the end of this section, it might be noteworthy that PV 3.425 is not necessarily 
interpreted as a description of self-awareness (3).  As mentioned in § 2.1.2.5, ’Jam 
Dbyangs Bzhad Pa gives only one definition of self-awareness for both the Sautrāntika 
and the Yogācāra, i.e., the self-awareness (2).  Although ’Jam Dbyangs Bzhad Pa’s 
interpretation of PV 3.425 is not found, according to his opinions, we can tentatively 
regard the verse as an interpretation of self-awareness in the following way.  The proof 
that “the cognition has two forms” can directly prove its own appearance (svābhāsa).  
                                                 
201 Cf. De 243a4ff.; PVA2, p. 426, ll. 12-13; R 150b1, M1, p. 245, l. 23.  
202 Cf. § 2.1.2.6. 
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According to the premise explained in § 2.2.1, if its own appearance, viz, the cognition, 
exists, it can be inferred that there must be a cognition of that cognition.  And when 
such inference is established, the self-awareness (2) is “mostly established” (prāyaḥ 
siddha). Subsequently, in PV 425-539, after Dharmakīrti rejects that the cognition of 
the cognition can be either a different perception or an inference, the establishment of 
self-awareness (2) is completed.  For the foregoing interpretation, we can find the 
textual support from Prajñākaragupta’s commentary: “because the appearance [of the 
object], which is the own nature [of the cognition], is apprehended at that time.”203  It 
appears that this new interpretation of PV 3.425 has not been taken in account by any 
previous commentator.  It could be a topic for further research, but I will not further 
discuss it in this dissertation. 
2.2.3.2 Rejecting the Tenet that the Cognition Is Experienced by a Subsequent 
Perception: PV 3.426-459 
Being the main advocate of the tenet that cognition is experienced or cognized by 
another perception, 204  or more precisely, by a successive determination 
(anuvyavasāya), 205  Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is supposed to be the main opponent of 
Dharmakīrti in this section. As for how to organize this extensive argument into sections, 
                                                 
203 PVA2: … yataḥ svarūpabhūta ābhāsas tadā pratīyate / (p. 426, l. 23.) 
204  Cf. Matilal 1986: 143 and Sinha 1958: 214, n. 37. Cf. also PKM: jñānaṃ 
jñānāntaravedyam / (p. 34) and NVṬ: na ca vijñānāni vilakṣaṇāni 
svarūpamātrāvasthitāni parasparavārttān abhijñāni jñānāntaram api grahītum 
utsahante prāg eva svasmād avyāvartayituma / (p. 581, ll. 9-10.) 
a NVṬ reads vyavartayitum. 
205 Cf. Watson_Kataoka 2010, Shaw 1996, Matilal 1986 and Sinha 1958: 199. 
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Gyaltsab and Kedrup have different opinions 206 .  I would principally follow 
Gyaltsab’s trichotomy: (1) PV 3.426-437b: Rejecting that the cognition is not 
perceptible to oneself by rejecting that a subsequent cognition can perceive its previous 
cognition. (2) PV 3.437c-446: Rejecting that the cognition is not perceptible to oneself 
by examining whether an external object, such as white color and so on, can appear 
without self-awareness. (3) PV 447-459: Pointing out the fault in the refutation of self-
awareness. 
2.2.3.2.1 A Successive Cognition Cannot Perceive Its Previous Cognition (PV 
3.426-437b) 
There Would Be No Experience of Object At All If Cognition Is Perceived by A 
Subsequent Cognition (PV 3.426-427) 
According to Gyaltsab and Kedrup, PV 3.426-427 is considered as a unit without 
further subdivision.  However, I would consider that the arguments included in this 
section on the view that the cognition is experienced by the subsequent cognition can 
be further divided into three sections.  First, PV 3.426ab explains the argument that 
if cognition is to be experienced by a subsequent cognition, at the time the subsequent 
cognition perceives the previous cognition (i.e., the object-cognition), the object-
cognition has ceased because it is commonly agreed that the object-cognition is the 
cause of the subsequent cognition and the cause and effect cannot exist at the same time.  
As a result, the object-cognition cannot be the object to be experienced by the 
subsequent cognition. The Jaina also criticizes Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the same basis, 
saying that a cognition cannot be experienced by a subsequent cognition because the 
first one no longer exists at the time the second one arises. There will be no object for 
the second cognition to experience. The Jaina further argues that if one can experience 
                                                 
206 See appendix III. 
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something nonexistent, then why do we consider the perception of two moons as 
faulty?207 Second, PV 3.426cd explains the argument that if the cognition cannot 
experience itself, no experience would exist.  As mentioned in § 2.2.1, PV 3.426cd 
can be considered as the explanation of the crucial premise in Dharmakīrti’s 
epistemology that the knowledge of an object requires not only an object-cognition but 
also the cognition or experience of the object-cognition. If the object-cognition is not 
experienced or determined (by the cognition itself), it cannot experience or determine 
such object either. If this is the case, when the opponent claims that it is the subsequent 
cognition that experiences the object-cognition, it follows that the subsequent cognition 
would be the experience of the object too and that would easily lead to some 
unwarranted consequences, for example, memory could also experience the object 
remembered (namely, you can feel something you remembered).  Third, PV 3.427 
explains that the cognition of object and the cognition of cognition are contrary to each 
other because the former directs outwards while the latter directs inwards.  Therefore, 
if a subsequent cognition perceives its previous cognition in the same manner as 
perceiving an external object,208 then the cognition of cognition would also become 
directing outwards. 
Rejecting Opponent’s Response to the Arguments Stated Above 
To defend his opinion, the opponent may claim that the cognition of an object and the 
                                                 
207 Cf. Sinha 1958: 217. 
208 According to Radhakrishnan and Sinha, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas may hold this view 
because they claim that the cognition is the object of a subsequent cognition as it is an 
object of knowledge, like the vase and so on. (Cf. Radhakrishnan 1940: 67, n. 2 and 
Sinha 1958: 214.) A quotation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s statement is found in PKM: jñānaṃ 
jñānāntaravedyaṃ prameyatvāt paṭādivat / A similar sentence is found in Vyomavatī, 
which has ghaṭādivat instead of paṭādivat. (Cf. PKM, p. 132 and n. 1.) 
80 
 
cognition of a cognition are two independent processes that can be accomplished 
separately.209  To repel this view, in PV 3.428ab, Dharmakīrti reiterates the principle 
that if the cognition is not experienced by self-awareness or others, it cannot experience 
the object; that is to say, by mere cognition of an object, one cannot acquire the 
determinative knowledge of that object. This principle, or premise, is rejected by 
Dharmakīrti’s opponent who proposes another theory in order to make the object-
cognition alone to be determinative. (Cf. § 2.2.1.) And the opponent in PV 3.428cd 
claims that the experience or the determination of the object may be achieved or 
characterized by the similarity between the object and its cognition.  To reject this 
claim, Dharmakīrti states, in PV 3.429ab, that if the similarity alone is the sufficient 
criterion to prove or characterize the experience of the object, then on the same basis, 
the object can, vice versa, be the experience of the cognition.  Needless to say, this is 
ridiculous. 
The opponent in PV 3.429c argues that it is not merely the similarity but the similarity 
qualified by the cognition, namely, the combination of being similar and being 
cognition, becomes the sufficient criterion for a subject to be considered as the 
experience of the object and therefore there would be no such problem that a material 
object is mistaken as the experience. Dharmakīrti replies to his opponent, in PV 3.429d-
430, that if the similarity alone cannot characterize the experience of the object, rather 
                                                 
209 For instance, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta who is one of the critics of Dharmakīrti insists on this 
view.  In his NM 4.2, he claims: api ca prakāśyasya nīlādeḥ prakāśakabodhādhīnaṃ 
yuktaṃ nāma grahaṇaṃ / bodhasya tu tadgrāhakasya tadā kiṃkṛtaṃ grahaṇam iti 
cintyam / (Watson’s and Kataoka’s Translation: “Moreover, it is indeed correct that the 
grasping of an illuminated object such as blue depends on an illuminating cognition. 
But it is to be considered by what the cognition grasping that [object] is grasped at that 
time.” Watson_Kataoka 2010: 325; NM, p. 24.) 
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the similarity qualified by the cognition can do so, then the experience of the object is 
in fact not characterized or defined by the similarity but by the cognition itself. 
The opponent may further argue that if the cognitive act is merely about the cognition 
cognizing itself, then how can there be the worldly experiences which are independently 
related to the object and the cognitive action?  To this, Dharmakīrti, or rather, the 
commentators of PV who interpret the tat in PV 3.430d, consider the similarity between 
the object and the object-cognition as the actual cause of our realization of the 
difference between the cognitive action and the object (kriyākarman).   
The opponent may further argue that if proponent claims that the whole cognitive 
process is related to the cognition only, the opinion of the proponent would be 
contradictory to the worldly knowledge according to which people claim that they 
perceive external objects, namely, objects existent outside their cognition.  For 
instance, it is observed that Bhaṭṭa Jayanta states in NM 2.1: 
nanu pratyakṣādinā pramāṇena parasparavisadṛśapadārtha-
svarūpasaṃvedanasya darśitatvāt…  (Watson’s and Kataoka’s 
Translation: “But [we] have already shown that what we experience, 
through valid means of knowledge such as direct perception, are the 
unique forms of objects which are mutually dissimilar…”210 
To this, in PV 3.431, Dharmakīrti considers the so-called worldly knowledge from the 
perspective of the ultimate reality and claims that the experience of an external object 
is not because the perceived form has the nature of the external object, rather, it is due 
to the superimposition of the nature of an external object on the forms people perceive.  
Therefore, in reality, all knowledge of the external object is nothing but delusion.  
When the opponent, in PV 3.432ab, still insists that there should be a real external 
                                                 
210 NM, p. 10. Watson_Kataoka 2010: 300-301. 
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object as in our everyday experience, in PV 3.432cd, Dharmakīrti questions his 
opponent: how can you explain that the cognition can perceive a substantively different 
thing which does not have any connection with the cognition at all? 
A further examination on the point regarding similarity, which the opponent proposes 
to prove the validity of the object-cognition, is set forth in the following section.  
Dharmakīrti claims, in PV 3.433, that the experience of an object, namely, the 
determination of an object, is the nature of cognition.  This nature does not subject to 
any similarity between the cognition and the object.  Hence, nothing from the external 
object is required for the establishment of cognition.  In the next verse, PV 3.434, he 
puts another question to those who use “the similarity to the object” to define or 
establish the experience of object: how can we define such similarity to the object?  If 
it requires the cognition to be similar to its object in all respects, then the cognition 
cannot perceive its object because there is no cognition that can be completely similar 
to its object, otherwise, the cognition will no longer be the cognition but turn into an 
insentient object.  Or, if such similarity only requires the cognition to be similar to its 
object in certain respects, then each cognition can experience any object because it is 
obvious that we can always find certain common characters between any cognition and 
any object, for instance, any cognition and any object would be similar to each other in 
respect of the characteristic of being existent or the state of being known. 
According to the commentators of PV,211 the opponent, in PV 3.435ab, modifies his 
theory to that the experience of an object is due to “having the form of the object” and 
“arising from the object”.  To this Dharmakīrti argues, in PV 3.435cd, that if so, any 
subsequent cognition, which satisfies the conditions “having the form of the object” 
and “arising from the object”, for instance, a memory of the previous cognition, can be 
                                                 
211 Cf. the first footnote attached to the translation of PV 3.435. 
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the experience of the previous cognition.  When the opponent further defends his 
opinion by stating, in PV 3.436abc, that there is no such fault because the experience 
of the object would certainly arise from the object, but the experience of the cognition 
would not, Dharmakīrti rejects this view.  In PV 3.436d-437b, he says that there is no 
assurance of such certainty as claimed by the opponent and if the opponent could 
somehow prove such certainty, others could, in the same manner, prove the same for 
the cognition.  Dharmakīrti’s view seems more convincing in the light of our everyday 
life experience, as we can easily find an object, for example, a complex puzzle, that can 
challenge both the short term and long term memories of human beings. 
2.2.3.2.2 How Can Object Appear to Cognition If Cognition Is Not Perceptible (PV 
3.437c-446) 
In PV 3.437c-438, Dharmakīrti raises a question: when a man sees an object, does the 
appearance of the object in his cognition have a nature different from the cognition?  
Arguments as to That the Nature of the Object-appearance in the Cognition Is 
Different from the Cognition. 
To the view that the object-appearance in the cognition has a different nature from 
cognition, Dharmakīrti argues that there would be four unacceptable consequences. 
Unacceptable Consequence 1: The Object Would Not Appear in the Cognition 
This is the first unacceptable consequence stated in PV 3.439abc1: if the object-
appearance in the cognition has a different nature from the cognition, there should be 
no such appearance in the first place.  Only something which has the nature of 
cognition can appear in the cognition. 
Unacceptable Consequence 2: The Whole World Would Not Be Manifested 
As the opponent refutes that the cognition is perceptible to the cognition itself, namely, 
the opponent believes the cognition cannot manifest itself to itself, in PV 3.439c2d, 
84 
 
Dharmakīrti argues that if so, the whole world would then not be manifested.  That 
sentence can be considered as Dharmakīrti’s statement of the premise discussed in § 
2.2.1. 
Unacceptable Consequence 3: The Infinite Regress 
The opponent, presumably Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, accepts the perceptibility of the cognition 
but argues that cognition is perceived by another cognition that arises later, not by itself.  
To this, in PV 3.440ab, Dharmakīrti puts forward one of his major arguments: the 
infinite regress.212 
Unacceptable Consequence 4: The Knowledge of an Object Qualified by the 
Cognition Would Not Be Established 
In the following section, PV 3.440c-445, Dharmakīrti introduces the fourth 
unacceptable consequence of the view that the cognition may be perceived by another 
cognition.  In PV 3.440c-441, he criticizes his opponent that if the object-cognition is 
perceived by a subsequent cognition, then at the time of object-cognition, the cognition 
of cognition is not in existence yet and at the time of the cognition of cognition, the 
object-cognition has gone, that is to say, the object and its cognition are confirmed by 
different cognitions at different times.  If that is the case, there is no valid means of 
knowledge to confirm the connection between the object and its cognition, and 
therefore, we cannot see the connection between them.  Since one can firmly claim “I 
know the object” only when he sees the connection between the object and his cognition, 
according to the opponent, there would be no such determination of “I know the object” 
in our world, but this is obviously contrary to our common knowledge. 
To this criticism, the opponent responds, in PV 3.442abc1, that even the object is gone 
                                                 
212 A detailed introduction to this argument is set forth in § 4. 
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at the time of the object-cognition, since the object-cognition carries the form of the 
object, when it is cognized at the time of the cognition of the object-cognition, the 
similarity between the object and the object-cognition will enable the cognition of the 
object-cognition to realize the connection between the cognition and the object.  
Accordingly, it explains how people can speak or act in relation to the notion of “the 
object is known by me”.  However, Dharmakīrti considers that the opponent’s 
statement is tantamount to an acceptance of the view that the cognition perceives only 
a form appearing to it and thus one falls back to the argument he uses in PV 3.425: 
when one accepts that the cognition perceives merely a form in the cognition, the self-
awareness would be indirectly established.  Therefore, in the reply to the argument 
stated in PV 3.442abc1, Dharmakīrti argues, in PV 3.442c2d, if one claims such 
similarity of the cognition is the form which cognition perceives, one has already 
proved the self-awareness.  And immediately in PV 3.443, he reaffirms the premise 
that if the cognition cannot perceive its own nature, it is hardly convincing that 
cognition can perceive another nature and he mentions the refutation of the similarity-
argument stated in PV 3.429ab. 
The opponent further argues that the subsequent cognition, such as reflection or 
recollection, may experience the object through the apprehension of the similarity 
between the cognition and the object.  To this, Dharmakīrti responds, in PV 3.444-445, 
that the apprehension of similarity between two things requires the previously 
established knowledge of both things and one does not have the established knowledge 
of the object because in the opponent’s theory the object-cognition is not yet established.  
Therefore, one cannot claim there is the apprehension of similarity between the 
cognition and the object.  And those who do not accept the similarity, such as Vaiśeṣika, 
would not see the object and object-cognition; consequently, in their theory, speaking 
in about “object”, “cognition” and so on would not be established. 
Argument That the Nature of the Object-appearance in the Cognition Is the 
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Nature of Cognition 
On the other hand, Dharmakīrti states, in PV 3.446, that if the opponent accepts that the 
object-appearance in the cognition has the nature of cognition, he should accept the 
self-awareness because if the cognition is not self-established, it cannot establish its 
object. 
2.2.3.2.3 Other Faults in the Refutation of Self-awareness 
Fault 1: No Object Is Known 
In PV 3.447, Dharmakīrti extends his criticism to other opponents of self-awareness, 
such as the Mīmāṃsakas. He argues that in their theories, any object could hardly be 
known. Before he explains the second fault in the theory of other-awareness, 
Dharmakīrti specifically explains, in PV 3.448-449c1, that the feelings, such as pleasure, 
suffering, desire and so on, which are caused by different conditions, such as the sensory 
faculty, the object, the repeated practice, are all indeed cognition. We do not see any 
other cognition to be their experiencer.213 
Fault 2: People Could Experience Others’ Feelings 
If the opponent insists there is another cognition which experiences these feelings, it 
will cause the fault 2 stated, in PV 3.449c2d, that people could experience others’ 
feelings. 
To fault 2, the opponent argues, in PV 3.450ab, that there is no such fault because only 
the cognition in the same mind-series, which (1) arises from the feelings and (2) has 
their appearance of the feelings, can experience the feelings of that mind-series. 
Cognitions from different persons cannot do so because they do not satisfy these two 
                                                 
213 The Jainas use a similar argument in which pleasure is used as the example to 
establish that the cognition should cognize itself.  Cf. Sinha 1968: 214-215. 
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conditions.  To this, Dharmakīrti replies, in PV 3.450cd-451abc, that the apprehension 
of another person’s feelings must also meet these two criteria proposed by the opponent. 
This is because (1) the cognition of a past object must be an effect of it and (2) a 
cognition without the appearance of an object cannot be the cognition of that object. 
Therefore, an apprehension of the feelings, no matter if it belongs to one’s own or 
another person, must be its effect and possess the appearance of those feelings. 
The opponent further argues that with respect to the apprehension of another person’s 
feeling, the feeling does not appear as a particular object but as the universal. Therefore, 
although one can have an apprehension of another person’s feeling, that apprehension 
is at most an inference but not a perception of the feeling. Hence, even if one has the 
apprehension of the feeling of another person, one cannot experience it. To this 
argument, Dharmakīrti replies, in PV 3.451d-452b, that if the apprehension of the 
feeling of another person does not perceive the particular object which belongs to the 
owner, it cannot perceive the universal of that feeling either, because the universal 
proposed by the opponent has been rejected in PV 3.20ab.  PV 3.452c-453b1 is the 
conclusion of Dharmakīrti’s own position.  
The Rejection of Opponent’s Objection That Experience of One’s Own Feeling Is 
Different from the Apprehension of Another Person’s Feeling 
To Dharmakīrti’s argument, the opponents, such as the Mīmāṃsakas,214 object, in PV 
3.453b2c1, that there should not be the faults stated above because when people 
apprehend others’ feelings, such as pleasure or pain of another person, they do not 
intimately perceive them, but they do so when they experience their own feelings. To 
this objection, Dharmakīrti responds, in PV 3.453c2d, that the difference between the 
experience of one’s own feeling and the apprehension of another person’s feeling would 
                                                 
214 Cf. PVVke, pp. 406-47. 
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not be established in the opponent’s theory because according to the opponent, the 
feeling to be experienced and apprehended is substantively different from one’s own 
experience and the apprehension of another person. Therefore, in the opponent’s theory, 
both the experience and the apprehension experience their object-feeling either 
intimately or indirectly.215 
The Rejection of Opponent’s Argument That Some Unseen Causes and the 
Inherence Can Differentiate the Experience of One’s Own Feeling from Others’ 
Apprehension of That Feeling 
In PV 3.454ab, the opponent further argues that one’s experience of one’s own feeling 
can be differentiated from another person’s apprehension of that feeling by (1) the 
unseen causes, such as the pure or impure actions one has previously done, and (2) the 
inherent connection which connects one’s previous cognitions and subsequent 
cognitions in one mind-series. To this, Dharmakīrti rejects, in PV 3.454cd, that firstly, 
the relation of inherence has been rejected; secondly, if the experience of feelings needs 
to depend on certain actions, the apprehension of feeling would also depend on the 
same216 and consequently, people would not have any apprehension of the feeling of 
another person because they cannot have others’ actions. 
Fault 3 Yogic Perception Will Feel Others’ Feelings 
In PV 3.455, Dharmakīrti indicates that for those opponents who accept yogic 
perception, if the cognition can be experienced by another cognition, the yogis will feel 
others’ feelings and then they will suffer the same way as the suffering person.  The 
opponent argues, in PV 3.456abc, that there is no such fault because the sense faculty 
                                                 
215 See n. 503. 
216 See n. 508 for the reason for this argument and the relevant argument. 
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of the yogis do not contact the object that causes suffering.  To this Dharmakīrti 
objects, in PV 3.456d, that the essence of the experience of feelings, such as pain and 
pleasure, is not the arising of feelings but that of the cognition of feelings. If that is the 
case, the opponent’s theory has the fault mentioned here.  In anticipation that the 
opponent may argue that this fault exists in Dharmakīrti’s theory too, Dharmakīrti 
explains in PV 3.457cd-458 that the others’ suffering and so on in his theory are not the 
objects to be experienced, namely, they do not have the nature of yogic perception, and 
therefore yogic experience will not be affected. This is because in Dharmakīrti’s theory, 
suffering will only appear when it manifests itself to the cognition with the same nature 
of the suffering.  Since yogis’ perceptions do not have the nature of suffering of 
another person, yogis do not experience another person’s pain even when they are 
apprehending it. In conclusion, Dharmakīrti states, in PV 3.459, that for all cognitions, 
merely perceiving an object is different from experiencing it. Taking an object means 
the cognition appears in the form of the object, but experiencing an object requires the 
object with the same nature as the cognition to appear to the cognition, that is to say, 
the cognition experiences itself. 
2.2.3.3 Rejecting the Tenet That the Cognition Is Cognized by Inference: PV 3.460-
483 
The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas are supposed to be the major opponents in this section.  Their 
theories can be generally summarized as follows.  The cognition is not perceptible but 
presumed by the presumption (arthāpatti) 217 . At first, Bhāṭṭas claim that the 
                                                 
217 I consider the inference of cognition rejected in PV 3.460-483 as the arthāpatti 
stated by Bhāṭṭas, though it is known that Bhāṭṭas clearly distinguish arthāpatti from 
anumāna. When Dharmakīrti introduces his opponent’s argument, the way of using the 
term inference (for instance the anumiti in PV 3.468a) might be just out of his insistence 
on using his own classification of pramāṇa.  It is observed that Bhāṭṭas’ description of 
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presumption arises from a subsequent mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa) of the 
cognizedness (jñātatā) or the manifestedness (prākaṭya) which the cognition produces 
in the object when it cognizes the object.  But later on, some Bhāṭṭas, such as 
Cindānanda and Nārāyaṇa, seem to realize that the cognizedness is the character of 
being known by the cognition and therefore the cognition of cognizedness requires the 
presumption of cognition, but now in Bhaṭṭa’s theory the presumption of cognition 
depends on the cognition of the cognizedness, namely, there would be a problem of 
hysteron proteroni in their theory.  To resolve it, they claim that the presumption of 
cognition arises from the “identity-with-what-is-conjoined” (saṃyuktatādātmya), 
which is the connection between the cognition and the object.  However, the proposed 
                                                 
arthāpatti can be classified as the inference in Dharmakīrti’s theory.  For instance, we 
find that in the debate with Prābhākara, Kumārila rejects his opponent’s interpretation 
of Śabara’s description of presumptiona, in which Prābhākara explains that the 
existence of Devadatta in that example is doubtful.  He insists that only when both 
Devadatta’s existence and his absence in the house are known with certainty, the 
presumption of “Devadatta exists outside the house” can be established. (Cf. Jhā 1964: 
139-140.) Such an arthāpatti should be taken as an inference in Dharmakīrti’s 
classification of pramāṇa without controversy.  It is noteworthy that the Naiyāyikas 
also consider the presumption proposed by Mīmāṃsakas simply as an inference (cf. 
Ram-Prasad 2007: 63 and Murti’s foreword in Bhatt 1989: xi). Further, Pārthasārathi 
and other Bhāṭṭas hold different opinions as to the exact difference between arthāpatti 
and anumāna. (Cf. Bhatt 1989, § 9.5.) 
a Cf. “Presumption, also consisting in the presuming of something not seen, on the 
ground that a fact already perceived or heard would not be possible without that 
presumption; for instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house, 
and this non-existence in the house leads to the presumption that he is somewhere 
outside the house.” (Jhā 1933: 16; cf. also Jhā 1964: 139 and Bhatt 1989: 305.) 
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connection does not sound convincing to the opponents of Bhāṭṭas.218 Further, some 
Bhaṭṭas realize there is still a problem for the cognition of Abhāva, of which the object 
is non-existence. If the presumption arises from the cognizedness which the cognition 
produces in the object, there would the absurdity of considering that cognition produces 
a cognizedness in the non-existence.  Trying to avoid such absurdity, some Bhāṭṭas, 
like Pārthasārathi, revise the theory by stating that when cognition cognizes an object, 
it produces a relation between the knower (i.e., the Self) and the known object and then 
one can presume the existence of cognition through recollective cognition of such 
relation.219 Sinha also mentioned a “peculiarity (atiśaya)” (i.e., some qualification) 
which, in Bhāṭṭa’s theory, is considered as produced by the cognition in its object in 
order to bring about the presumption of cognition. But he did not mention who 
specifically holds that view. I assume that this is the same view mentioned in Bhaṭṭa’s 
explanation, which is probably traced back to Pārthasārathi.220 
Dharmakīrti’s arguments over the inference of cognition do not include all the issues 
stated above, some of which appear after the time of Dharmakīrti.  However, his 
                                                 
218 Cf. Bhatt 1989: 52-53, l. 183. Sinha also mentions that Śrīdhara has criticized 
Kumārila that if he uses “cognizedness” as a means to prove the existence of cognition, 
then he will fall for the fallacy of hysteron proteron because cognizedness is in fact a 
relation between the object and the cognition, and if one apprehends cognizedness, he 
must firstly apprehend the two components in the relation: the cognition and the object.  
If that is the case, the cognition has to be established prior to the establishment of 
cognizedness, which is supposed to prove cognition. (Cf. Sinha 1958: 201-202.) 
219  Cf. Bhatt 1989: 53, Sinha 1958: 200 and Jhā 1964, chapter XVIII. However, 
according to criticism provided by Śrīdhara (see n. 218), the proposed relation does not 
seem to solve the problem. 
220 Cf. Sinha 1958: 201 and Bhatt 1989: 51-52. 
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arguments are comprehensive and organized.  Firstly, in PV 3.460ab, Dharmakīrti 
indicates that if one’s cognition is not experienced by one’s perception but by one’s 
inference, the inference must arise from the inferential signs.  If so, there would be 
two main problems: (1) there would be no inferential sign available for one to prove 
one’s own cognition; (2) even if one can propose an inferential sign, there would be no 
means of knowledge to determine the relation between the inferential sign and the 
cognition.  That is to say, the opponent could not establish the pakṣadharma and the 
pervasion (vyāpti) of the proof of cognition.  
2.2.3.3.1 There Is No Inferential Sign Available to Prove One’s Own Cognition 
Dharmakīrti firstly enumerates all possible options that can be the inferential sign to 
prove cognition.  In PV 3.460cd, he lists four kinds: the sense-faculty, the object, the 
cognition and the previous attention, which he believes to be all that can have a causal 
relation with cognition.  In PV 3.461abc1, Dharmakīrti specifically rejects that the 
conjunction with the Self (sk. ātmanaḥ saṃyogaḥ; t. bdag yid phrad pa), which may be 
proposed as an inferential sign by the opponent, has a causal relation with the cognition.  
This is because we do not observe the alleged conjunction having a relation with 
cognition, which is the critical condition to establish the pervasion (vyāpti) for bringing 
about the inference of cognition. 
The General Refutations of the Four Kinds of Inferential signs 
In PV 3.461c2-462c, Dharmakīrti indicates that the reason why the material factors, 
such as sense-faculty or external object, cannot be the inferential sign for proving 
cognition is that, for the opponent who accepts that a material factor can independently 
exist beyond its cognition, cognition does not necessarily exist even when sense-faculty 
or external object exists.  That is to say, sense-faculty or external object can only be 
an inconclusive inferential sign (anaikāntikahetu) if it is used to prove cognition.  
Further, Dharmakīrti explains that the reason why the mental factors, such as cognition 
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or the previous attention of the mind, cannot be the inferential sign to prove cognition 
is simply that they are also cognition. There would be a fallacy of hysteron proteron if 
they are put to prove cognition, which means that the subject to be proved is being 
proved by itself. 
The Manifestation of Object Cannot Be the Inferential sign 
To Dharmakīrti’s refutation, the opponent argues, in PV 3.462d-463a1, that the object 
itself is not the inferential sign; rather, the manifestation of object (arthavyakti) is the 
inferential sign.  Considering that the meaning of the manifestation proposed here can 
be either the cognition or the object, Dharmakīrti gives two replies.  The first is stated, 
in PV 3.463a2b, that if the manifestation means the cognition, the opponent cannot use 
it to prove the cognition because as just explained in PV 461c2-462c, cognition cannot 
be the inferential sign.  On this same basis, the second argument of the opponent that 
the manifestation as an object is the inferential sign can also be rejected because of the 
premise “no experienced cognition, no determination of the perceived object” as 
repeated in PV 3.463cd. 
The Manifestation as a Distinction of Object Cannot Be the Inferential sign 
The opponent who is mentioned in PV 3.464ab claims that the so-called manifestation 
is a distinction (viśeṣa) of object; it does not have the nature of cognition, namely, it is 
not cognition.  To repel this argument, Dharmakīrti gives two arguments in regards to 
two situations, i.e., (1) when such distinction, namely, the cognizedness, is permanent 
and (2) when it is not permanent.  Firstly, given that the opponent may consider the 
distinction as permanent, Dharmakīrti rejects, in PV 3.464cd, the existence of such 
permanent distinction in the object because otherwise, the impermanent object would 
have such a permanent nature. 221  Secondly, if the opponent would consider the 
                                                 
221 I could not find where Mīmāṃsakas identified the cognizedness as permanent or 
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distinction as impermanent, Dharmakīrti replies, in PV 3.465ab, that if so, the 
distinction, i.e., the cognizedness, would be momentary and it would be produced at the 
time after the cognition cognizes the object.  At that time, the object no longer exists 
and consequently, the cognizedness cannot be produced in the object as presupposed in 
opponent’s theory.  Further, Dharmakīrti raises another question to his opponent in PV 
3.465cd1 that when the manifestation is put to be the inferential sign to prove the 
cognition, has it been perceived or not?  In PV 3.465d2-466a1, the opponent is 
assumed to consider the perceived manifestation to be the inferential sign and 
Dharmakīrti points out, in PV 3.466a2b, that the opponent cannot use such inferential 
sign to prove cognition because otherwise, there would be the fallacy of hysteron 
proteron in the opponent’s theory—the proposition to be proved (i.e., the existence of 
the cognition) is, now in the opponent’s reasoning, assumed as the premise to prove the 
existence of its proof (i.e., the cognizedness).222  He further argues, in PV 3.466cd, 
that when the cognition is not seen, the cognizedness (dṛṣṭatā) of the object is 
impossible to be established.223 Therefore, the so-called “cognized manifestation” is 
just an unestablished inferential sign in the opponent’s reasoning.  How can this 
inferential sign prove the cognition? If the opponent would claim that a non-cognized 
distinction of an object is the inferential sign to prove the cognition, Dharmakīrti argues, 
in PV 3.467, that if one claims that the object-cognition is not recognized, but with the 
condition “having the form of the object” only, one can establish the valid observation 
of the object, then we are unable to tell who owns such observation because an unseen 
                                                 
impermanent. However, since the cognizedness is perceived by a subsequent mental 
perception, it is possible for some Mīmāṃsakas to consider it as impermanent so that 
the cognizedness will continue to exist for its perception to arise afterwards.  
222 Śrīdhara states the same criticism against Kumārila. Cf. Sinha 1958: 201-202. 
223 Cf. M1: na ca jñānādarśane dṛṣṭatā yuktā / (p. 256, ll. 18-19.) 
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condition makes no difference to anyone who does not see it.  Consequently, it would 
result in that people cannot be determinative for their own cognition.  If the opponent 
claims that it is the unseen cognizedness the additional condition for people to 
distinguish their own cognition from that of others, then the unseen cognizedness can 
enable a person who does not see the object to apprehend or experience the cognition 
of the object of another person who sees the object, because the person who sees the 
object experiences his own cognition with the same unseen cognizedness as that of the 
person who does not see the object. In PV 3.468abc1, Dharmakīrti concludes that the 
properties of an object alone cannot be the valid inferential sign to establish the 
cognition. 
The Manifestation of Cognition Cannot Be the Inferential sign 
Against the opponents who consider the property of the cognition as the inferential sign 
to prove cognition, Dharmakīrti divides his refutation into two sections in relation to 
their views: (1) the property of cognition that has the nature of the cognition is the 
inferential sign of own nature (svabhāvaliṅga) and (2) the property of cognition that 
has a different nature from cognition is the inferential sign of effect (kāryaliṅga).  To 
the first view, Dharmakīrti rejects, in PV 3.468c2-469c, that such property would not 
be different from the cognition itself because the two arise from the same cause.  To 
the second view, he argues, in PV 3.469d, that if the property of cognition is accepted 
as having a different nature from the cognition and is considered to be the inferential 
sign of own nature for cognition, it will be an inconclusive inferential reason 
(anaikāntikahetu) because such property and the cognition become substantively 
different.  Consequently, as the knowing a horse does not necessarily bring about the 
knowledge of a cow, the knowledge of such property of cognition do not necessarily 
bring about the knowledge of the cognition.  The proponent who holds this second 
view mentioned above may argue that the inferential sign is not the inferential sign of 
own nature but the inferential sign of effect. In order to reject this argument Dharmakīrti, 
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in PV 3.470, categorizes all possible options which may be proposed to be the 
inferential sign of effect to prove cognition into three groups: objects, sense faculties 
and cognitions, each of which can be further categorized into five classes, i.e., form, 
sound, smell, taste and touch for the objects, as well as their five corresponding sense 
faculties and cognitions.  Then he rejects them, in PV 3.471, by stating that sense 
faculties and cognitions cannot be the inferential sign of effect because they are not 
perceptible - sense faculties are commonly accepted as imperceptible by both 
Dharmakīrti and his opponent and cognitions are accepted as imperceptible by the 
opponent in the present argument.  Further, Dharmakīrti argues that form, sound, smell, 
taste and touch cannot be the inferential sign of effect to prove cognition because it is 
commonly accepted that the object is the cause of its cognition.  In PV 3.472ab, 
Dharmakīrti concludes that it would be ridiculous if one proposes an unperceived thing 
to be the inferential sign. 
2.2.3.3.2 There Would Be No Means of Knowledge to Determine the Relation 
between the Inferential Sign and the Cognition 
No Means for Establishing the Relation between the Inferential Sign and One’s 
Own Cognition 
The validity of an inferential sign requires a relation between the inferential sign and 
the property to be proved (sādhyadharma), i.e., the cognition in this case.  According 
to PV 3.473c-473b, even if the inferential sign exists, since the cognition is not 
perceived, one still cannot affirm the relation between the cognition and the sign, 
namely, the pervasion (vyāpti) of the inferential sign cannot be established.  Therefore, 
the inferential sign is still incapable of proving the cognition. To this, the opponent 
argues in PV 3.473cd that the validity of the inferential sign in the present reasoning 
can be established in a previous inference of the existence of cognition of another 
person. It is a fact in our everyday life that one can infer the cognition of another person 
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by his movements, gestures and so on. Accordingly, the opponent tries to argue that the 
proved cognition of another person can be used as an inferential example for the present 
inference of one’s own cognition.  Like the relation between smoke and fire can be 
previously proved in the kitchen and the kitchen can therefore be the inferential 
example for the inference of “the mountain which has the smoke has fire”, the relation 
between the movements etc. and cognition, which is required in the present inference 
of one’s own cognition, can be previously established in the cognition of another person.  
Dharmakīrti responds in PV 3.474ab that it is not correct to say so in your theory 
because in our everyday practice our acceptance of the inference of another person’s 
cognition is based on the establishment of cognition, or precisely, on the establishment 
of our own cognition of each such other person, but in your theory, our own cognition 
is not yet established.  Therefore, you cannot apply the inference of another person to 
be the inferential example for the present inference of one’s own cognition because 
one’s own cognition is not yet established in your theory.  If you do so, then the 
establishment of another cognition will again require another inferential example and 
you would have the fault of infinite regress.  In sum, Dharmakīrti states, in PV 3.474c-
475b, that the establishment of the object requires the establishment of cognition, not 
the other way around. Therefore, one cannot use the object to be an inferential sign to 
prove cognition. 
The Relation between the Inferential Sign and Others’ Cognitions Cannot Be 
Established 
In PV 3.475c-476c1, Dharmakīrti further indicates that if the opponent cannot establish 
the relation between the inferential sign and one’s own mind, as just explained, then he 
would not have the basis for the inference of the cognition of another person.  
Accordingly, the opponent cannot use our everyday experience, such as one can infer 
another person’s mind by learning his thought, listening to his speech or observing his 
gesture, in his reasoning.  In addition, Dharmakīrti points out, in PV 3.476c2d, that if 
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the object is not established, the mental cognition, which requires the object as its 
supporting-object-factor, would not be established either.   
The Way the Cognition Manifests the Object 
Dharmakīrti explains, in PV 3.477, that because the opponent asserts that cognition is 
not perceptible, two imperceptible cognitions cannot be one being manifested by the 
other and one that manifests the other.  To this, the opponent asks, in PV 3.478a, that 
if so, you should not claim that the cognition manifests the object either because in your 
theory the object and the cognition are different and they arise successively too.  
Dharmakīrti replies, in PV 3.478bcd, that in his theory, the cognition doesn’t illuminate 
the object directly but through a transitional process in which the form of the object is 
transited into the cognition.  Indeed, the cognition illuminates itself because the 
object-form appearing to the cognition has the nature of cognition.  
He further argues, in PV 3.479, that if the opponent, who asserts that the cognition 
would be manifested by another subsequent cognition, would accept that the subsequent 
cognition would manifest the previous one in the same manner, namely, through passing 
a similar form of previous cognition to the later cognition, then you actually accept the 
theory of self-awareness. If the opponent does not agree that cognition perceives its 
object through knowing itself, then with merely the similarity between the object and 
the cognition, we cannot distinguish the perceiver from the object, namely, there would 
be the unwarranted consequence that both the cognition and the object should become 
the perceiver to the other or neither is being perceived by the other. In PV 3.480, 
Dharmakīrti concludes that in his theory the cognition naturally illuminates itself and it 
also illuminates the object through the object-manifestation in the cognition, which is a 
similar form of the object with the nature of cognition. 
The opponent may further argue that according to the theory you stated above, the 
subsequent cognition, for example, the memory of a previous object-cognition can also 
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experience that object-cognition because the memory has the form which is produced 
by the object-cognition, but that is ridiculous.  To this, Dharmakīrti explains, in PV 
3.481, that in his opinion, the experience of an object is not only derived from the form 
of the object that manifests itself in the cognition but also more importantly because 
cognition can naturally be aware of itself, namely, the experience of an object should 
arise from the experience of itself.  Given that the opponent may ask why only 
cognition is identified as the illuminator but not others, Dharmakīrti explains, in PV 
3.482, that because of the worldly convention, something which can illuminate itself 
and others is named the illuminator.  For instance, we call the lamp illuminator, 
because it makes itself visible to the visual sense and cognition without other conditions 
but not the object, the illumination of which must depend on other conditions.  Finally, 
Dharmakīrti concludes, in PV 3.483, that one will not have the experience of the notion 
of “the seen object”, in a later memory, for instance, solely due to the object and the 
sense faculty.  Therefore, there must be another cause: cognition.  And as explained 
above, the establishment of cognition cannot be established by another cognition; 
therefore, we should accept self-awareness.  
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3 The Argument of Infinite Regress 
In PV 3.440ab and 474ab, Dharmakīrti raises the arguments of anavasthāprasaṅgataḥ 
(or anavasthiti) twice. His arguments can be considered as the explanation of the same 
argument stated by Dignāga in his PS(V) 1.12ab1, in which the fault of infinite regress 
is called aniṣṭhā and anavasthā.  Literally, these Sanskrit terms mean “no end” or “no 
halt” and they can be used in a neutral sense—for example, the endless process of 
counting natural numbers one by one, but in this case aniṣṭhā and anavasthā should be 
restrictedly interpreted as a vicious infinite regress. This is a classic Reductio ad 
absurdum argument in Indian philosophical debates, in which the author seeks to 
demonstrate that his view, for example, the tenet of self-awareness in this case, is true 
by pointing out that an absurd consequence will follow from the opposite point of the 
view, for example, the tenet of other-awareness.  The absurd consequence in this 
example is an infinite regress process contrary to our experience.  It may simply be 
explained as: if an object is perceived by the cognition and the cognition of the object 
requires another cognition (for instance, another perception or another inference), then 
the cognition of cognition would further require another cognition (for instance, yet 
another perception or yet another inference) and consequently, the cognitive process 
will go on infinitely.  But if this is the case, it would be contradictory to our everyday 
life experience because we never experience such an infinite cognitive process.  
Therefore, the theory of other-awareness must be wrong and the opposite, the tenet of 
self-awareness, is established.  As one of the critical issues among the arguments 
about self-awareness, infinite regress argument encounters stiff resistance from the 
opponents in ancient India as well as in the modern time.  In the following discussion, 
I will introduce two different models of infinite regress arguments raised by Dignāga 
and Dharmakīrti and the objection from Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and two 
modern scholars Ganeri and Kellner. I will investigate what is the nub of this argument 
and find out to what extent one can defend the infinite regress argument in Dignāga and 
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Dharmakīrti’s theories. 
3.1 The Reconstructions and Translations of Pramāṇasamuccaya (Vṛtti) 1.12 
The infinite regress argument for proving the self-awareness theory is initially proposed 
by Dignāga in PS(V) 1.12. Although the previous studies on the literal form of 
PS(V)1.12 in the context of its Sanskrit reconstruction and the literal translation (in 
English) are fruitful, there is still some room for us to improve our understanding of 
this material.  The Sanskrit reconstructions of PS 1.12 are mainly based on various 
citations of PS 1.12 in other Sanskrit materials.  The first reconstruction was made by 
H. R. Rangaswamy Iyengar in 1930.  His reconstruction was mainly based on a 
citation from the Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathimiśra and reads as follows:  
jñānāntareṇānubhave ’navasthā tatra ca smṛtiḥ / 
viṣayāntarasaṃcāras tathā na syāt sa ceṣyate /224 
In 1966, Jambūvijaya reconstructed PS 1.12 as follows: 
jñānāntareṇānubhave ’navasthā tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ / 
viṣayāntarasaṃcāras tathā na syāt sa ceṣyate// 225 
Hattori is probably the first one who translates PS(V) 1.12 into English 226 . His 
translation is primarily built upon the Tibetan translation of PS(V). In the same 
publication, Hattori also makes a same Sanskrit reconstruction of PS 1.12 as what 
Jambūvijaya made, but in his version, seven more citations are taken as evidence from 
                                                 
224 PSVi, pp. 28-29, n. 1. 
225 DN, p. 112. 
226 The first German translation of this verse was made by Frauwallner in 1956, in his 
Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. Please refer to verse number 13 on page 394 of the 
1994 edition of this book for the German translation. 
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three other Buddhist and non-Buddhist works, namely, Vibhūticandra’s marginal notes 
on Manorathanandin’s commentary, Ślokavārtikavyākhyā of Bhaṭṭombeka and 
Ślokavārttikakāśikā of Sucaritamiśra.227 
One of the significant changes from Jambūvijaya’s and Hattori’s reconstruction of PS 
1.12 is that the ca in Iyengar’s reconstruction is replaced by hi. Semantically, compared 
with ca, hi provides more justification for translating it as because228 and makes tatrāpi 
smṛtiḥ a causal clause of jñānāntareṇānubhave aniṣṭhā in Hattori’s translation, so as in 
Kellner’s.229 The reason behind this change, at least for Hattori, might be that out of 
the nine citations he used for his reconstruction, he found seven hi, one ca, and one 
neither hi nor ca.230 However, when examining his sources one by one, I find that 
Hattori had somehow miscounted four of them, which are: 
ŚVT: yathāhuḥ - jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ / 
viṣayāntarasaṃcāras tathā na syāt sa ceṣyate iti // (p. 247, l. 23.) 
ŚVT: tad utkam - jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ iti 
// (p. 284, ll. 19-20.) 
ŚVT: api cātrāpi ca smṛtiḥ iti... (p. 286, l. 11.) 
                                                 
227 Cf. Hattori (1968): 112, n. 1.79. 
228 I am aware that in certain context, even ca can mean because. However, what I am 
going to suggest in the following argument is that if we choose ca instead of hi for the 
reconstruction of PS 1.12, there is a greater chance NOT to interpret a causal relation 
between PS 1.12ab1 and 1.12b2.  
229 Cf. Hattori (1968): 30-31 and see n. 243. 
230 Cf. Hattori (1968): 112, n. 1.79. 
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ŚVN: jñānāntareṇānubhave hīṣṭā231 tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ // (p. 277, l. 
15.) 
Therefore, five out of these nine pieces of evidence are actually in favour of the reading 
ca instead of hi in PS 1.12b. Besides, I see two more pieces of evidence casting doubt 
on the reading of hi as because in PS 1.12ab. Firstly, In Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary 
on PS 1.12,232 I did not find where he had explained such a because. On the contrary, 
I find a sentence of “tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ” in his commentary. It might be controversial to 
consider this sentence as the citation of PS 1.12b2 because one could argue that the 
sentence in PSṬ is to explain the third-order cognition while PS 1.12b2 explains the 
second-order cognition. However, the sentence to be explained appearing in its 
commentary should not be just a coincidence. Hence, by this sentence, I assume that 
Jinendrabuddhi might have read PS 1.12b2 in the form of tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ and he did 
not read ca as because. Secondly, in PV 3.511 - 512233, ca appears between tatrāpi and 
smṛtiḥ: 
PV 3.511: jñānāntareṇānubhavo bhavet tatrāpi ca234 smṛtiḥ / 
dṛṣṭā tadvedanaṃ kena tasyāpy anyena ced imām // 
                                                 
231 This is probably a typo of aniṣṭhā. 
232 See n. 303. 
233 Hattori has also mentioned PV 3.511, 512ab (i.e., the PV 3.513 and 514ab in Hattori 
(1968): 111, n. 77). It is in Vibhūticandra's marginal note in Manorathanandin's 
commentary on these two verses that Hattori found the two citations of PS(V) 1.12ab. 
(Cf. Hattori (1968): 112, n. 79 and M, p. 261, n. 5 and p. 271, n. 5.) However, he did 
not consider these two verses as the source of his reconstruction. 
234  Cf. PVs, p. 94; PVA1, p. 149; PVA2, p. 455 and PVAms 228a2. Note that 
Sāṅkṛityāyana mentions that another manuscript reads hi.  (Cf. PVs, p. 94, n. 7.) 
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PV 3.512: mālāṃ jñānavidāṃ ko ’yaṃ janayaty anubandhinīm / 
pūrvā dhīḥ saiva cen na syāt saṃcāro viṣayāntare // 
I would consider that PV 3.440ab235 and 473cd-474ab236 are part of Dharmakīrti’s 
commentary on PS(V) 1.12ab1, and PV 3.511-512 are Dharmakīrti’s commentary on 
PS(V) 1.12b2cd (see words in bold above). Since the ca in PV 3.511 cannot be 
interpreted as because, this to me suggests that Dharmakīrti might have also read a ca 
in PS 1.12b2 and he did not read that ca as because either. 
Accordingly, it is more likely that PS 1.12ab reads jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā tatrāpi 
ca smṛtiḥ. And if this is the case, it becomes possible to read 
jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā and tatrāpi smṛtiḥ as two paratactic sentences rather than 
causally related. (Indeed, even if we read hi instead of ca, these two phrases are not 
necessarily in a causal relation.)  This reading is important for the following 
discussion because if jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā and tatrāpi smṛtiḥ are two 
                                                 
235 Cf. PV 3.440ab: “Even if [the opponent might argue that] the manifestation (i.e., 
the cognition of the object) is manifested (i.e., cognized) by another manifestation 
[which arises later], [it is not correct,] because there would be the unwarrented 
consqence [of the infinite regress].” (vyakter vyaktyantaravyaktāv api doṣaprasaṅgataḥ 
/) 
236 Cf. PV 473cd-474ab: “If [opponent] says that [previous cognition, as the instance 
of the present inference] is previously (i.e., in the previous inference in relation to other 
series) well established by means of that very inferential sign (such as the movement of 
the body and so on), [proponent answer] that [instance, i.e., the previous cognition] too 
is something to be established (i.e., inferred) by another instance. Therefore, that [would 
lead to] an infinite regress.” (tata evāsya liṅgāt prāk prasiddher upavarṇane // 
dṛṣṭāntāntarasādhyatvaṃ tasyāpīty anavasthitiḥ /) 
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paratactic sentences, namely, they are independent of each other, then it can be inferred 
that Dignāga offers two different arguments of infinite regress in PS 1.12. Unfortunately, 
the opinions that the four translators of PSt held on this issue is unknown because the 
translation of ca (or hi) is absent from two Tibetan translations of PS.237 However, it 
can be assumed that the four translators did not read ca (or hi) as because in this case 
for the reason that if there were a because in the sentence, it seems impossible for all of 
the translators to miss such an important word in their translations. 
For my proposed reading of PS 1.12ab herein, one might argue that the causal relation 
between jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā and tatrāpi smṛtiḥ can be testified by the 
Sanskrit reconstruction of PS(V) 1.12. Thus, we shall now examine the Sanskrit 
reconstruction. 
The first two hypothetical Sanskrit reconstructions of PS(V) are also made by Iyengar 
and Jambūvijaya. Due to lack of source materials in Sanskrit in their time, their Sanskrit 
reconstructions are more of a retranslation than a reconstruction. In 2005, the discovery 
of a Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā 
facilitated an improved hypothetical Sanskrit reconstruction of PS(V) by Steinkellner. 
In his reconstruction, PS(V) 1.12 reads: 
syād etat – rūpādivaj jñānasyāpi jñānāntareṇānubhavaḥ.  tad apy 
ayuktam, yasmāj 
        jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā 
anavasthā iti tajjñāne jñānāntareṇa+anubhūyamāne.  kasmāt. 
                                 tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ │ 
                                                 
237 See PSVt 1.12 on page 108. 
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yena hi jñānena taj jñānam anubhūyate, tatrāpy uttarakālaṃ smṛtir 
dṛṣṭā.  tatas tatrāpy anyena jñānena-anubhave ’navasthā syāt. 
           viṣayāntarasañcāras tathā na syāt sa ceṣyate ║12 ║ 
tasmād avaśyaṃ svasaṃvedyatā jñānasyābhyupeyā. 
It is noteworthy that when Steinkellner first reconstructed PSV 1.12b2, there was a 
yuktā after dṛṣṭā,238 which was restored from PSṬ and considered as the original of the 
dgos pa in PSVt 1.12.239 Taking into account Kellner’s suggestion, Steinkellner now 
have deleted it.240 The reason for Kellner to suggest deleting yuktā is that according to 
her study, it is highly improbable that the Tibetan would translate yuktā as dgos pa. 
Kellner assumes that “Tibetan translators may have had a Sanskrit draṣṭavyā before 
them or understood dṛṣṭā with a necessitative aspect: a memory of the object-cognition 
has to be seen”241. However, when she translates this sentence, she considers that if 
dgos pa means “suitable” or “reasonable”, one may wonder “why observing the 
memory-cognition should be suitable or reasonable, and not the memory-cognition pure 
and simple”242, and therefore, Kellner provides a pure and simple translation for mthong 
dgos pas - “observes”.243 Such translation is probably also influenced by Kellner’s 
                                                 
238 Cf. page 5 on http://www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga PS 1.pdf. 
239 Cf. Kellner (2010): 214, n. 32. For the edition of PSVt 1.12, see page 108. 
240 Cf. page 3 on website: 
http://www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/mediawiki/images/f/f3/Dignaga_PS_1_revision.pdf 
241 Kellner (2010): 214. 
242 Kellner (2010): 214, n. 32. 
243  For the convenience of readers, I cite Kellner’s translation. The citation is a 
combination of her literal translation of PS(V) 1.12ab in 2010 and a free translation of 
PS 1.12cd in 2011. (Cf. Kellner (2010): 215 and 2011: 416.) 
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interpretation of the infinite regress argument, in which she points out that the argument 
might not be convincing because Dignāga’s opponent can hardly grant “that every 
higher-order cognition involved in experiencing a lower-order cognition might possibly 
be remembered”244.  
I agree that the reconstruction of yuktā in PSVs 1.12b2 remains controversial and that 
                                                 
PSV: Let there be the following [objection]: Like colour and the like, 
cognition, too, is experienced through another cognition. – This 
is also incorrect, 
because: 
PS 1.12ab1: When [cognition] is experienced through another cognition, 
there is no end (aniṣṭhā). 
PSV: There is no end (anavasthā) – when the cognition of this [colour 
and the like] is experienced through another cognition. Why? 
PS 1.12b2: Because there is also memory of that [cognition of the 
cognition]. 
PSV: That is to say, when the cognition [C1 of colour and the like] is 
experienced through a cognition [C2], then one observes that for 
that [C2], too, there is memory at a later time. Therefore, when 
this [C2] is [then] experienced by another cognition, there would 
be no end. 
PS 1.12cd: In this way, cognition could not move to another object, but that 
it does so is generally agreed upon. 
 
244 Cf. Kellner (2011): 417. The details of her argument will be explained in§3.3. 
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it makes more sense to retranslate mthong dgos pa as draṣṭavyā. However, I have 
reservations about Kellner’s “pure and simple” translation in which dgos pa is ignored. 
I would suggest translating mthong dgos pa as must see or have to see, which keeps 
dṛṣṭā with a necessitative aspect. I make this suggestion for two reasons. Firstly, I find 
that when Prajñākaragupta explains that a valid cognition of the experience of another 
cognition must be the memory, the memory (smṛti) is followed by an emphasizing 
particle eva.245 Secondly, in Ravigupta’s commentary,246 I find the answer to why 
there must be an observation of the cognition-memory; and as a result, Kellner’s 
concern about the dgos pa in PS(V)t 1.12b2 is not an issue for me. 
The above-quoted PS(V) 1.12 is cited as it is; the italics therein, according to 
Steinkellner, are “all retranslated text, i.e., text that has not been attested as such”.247 
To compare with the original of those italics, I present my edition of PSVt 1.12 on the 
basis of two Tibetan translations, PSVk and PSVv.248 
[PSVt 1.12:] / ci ste gzugs la sogs pa bzhin du →shes pa← (PSVk, 
PSVv P : om. PSVv D) yang she pa gzhan →gyis← (PSVv : gyi PSVk) 
                                                 
245 Cf. PVA2, p. 455-6: tadvedanan tarhi jñānāntareṇeti tatrāpi smṛtir eva pramāṇam / 
Moreover, I find that in TSP 2025, when Kamalaśīla interprets the infinite regress 
argument, he states: kiṃ ca yadi jñānāntareṇānubhavo ’ṅgīkriyate tadā tatrāpi 
jñānāntare smṛtir utpadyata eva (TSP1, p. 563 and TSP2, p. 689), in which the arising 
of the memory of “another cognition” is also strengthened and emphasized by the 
particle eva. 
246 Cf. Ravigupta’s argument in n. 305; my translation and the relevant argument are 
on page 133. 
247 Cf. PSVs, p. VII. 
248 Cf. PSVv D 16b5ff., PSVv P 16a1ff. and PSVk P 96b2ff. Punctuations in the text 
follow PSVv D. 
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myong ba yin no →zhe na← (PSVv D, PSVk : om. PSVv P) / de yang 
rigs pa ma yin te / gang →gi← (PSVv P, PSVk : om. PSVv D) phyir /  
shes pa gzhan gyis nyams myong na // thug med / 
thug pa med pa zhes bya ba →ni← (PSVv : 'di PSVk) / →shes pa← 
(PSVk : om. PSV) shes pa →gzhan← (PSVk, PSVv P : bzhin PSVv D) 
gyis myong bar byed na'o // →ji← (PSVv : ci PSVk) ltar zhe na /  
             de →la'ng← (PSVv : la yang PSVk) dran pa ste /  
→shes pa gang dag gis← (PSVk : shes pa gzhan gyis PSVv)249 shes 
pa de nyams su myong bar byed na / de la yang phyis →kyi← (PSVv : 
om. PSVk) dran pa mthong dgos pas so // des na de la yang shes pa 
gzhan →gyis← (PSVv : gyi PSVk) nyams su myong ba yin na ni thug 
pa med par 'gyur ro //  
de bzhin →du← (PSVk : om. PSVv) yul gzhan →dag← (PSVk : om. 
PSVv) la 'pho ba →ni← (PSVk : om. PSVv) // med 'gyur de yang 
→'dod phyir ro← (PSVk : mthong ba nyid PSVv)250 //  
de'i phyir gdon mi za bar rang rig pa'i shes pa khas blang bar bya'o 
// 
                                                 
249 In Hattori’s edition, he adopts shes pa gzhan gyis. [Hattori (1968): 186, 1.]  I use 
shes pa gang dag gis here because it is literally equivalent to yena hi jñānena, which is 
found in Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, and a citation is 
found in Devendrabuddhi's Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā: shes pa gang gis shes pa nyams 
su myong ba yin no zhes (De D 261b1), which is from a section in which 
Devendrabuddhi explained PV 3.511ab (see n. 303). 
250 de yang 'dod phyir ro = sa ceṣyate in PSVs. 
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In his reconstruction, Steinkellner uses kasmāt to retranslate the ji ltar zhe na between 
PSVt 1.12ab1 and PSt 1.12b2,251 while Iyengar and Jambūvijaya use kathaṃ cet and 
katham, respectively.252 I think Steinkellner’s reconstruction might provide as one 
piece of the evidience for one to argue, as mentioned above, that the ca (or hi) in PS 
1.12b2 should be read as because. However, in this case, I would follow Iyengar or 
Jambūvijaya (if these three are the only options for us to retranslate the ji ltar zhe na) 
because their translations are more common.253  In addition, I found two other places 
in PSVs where katham is used to reconstruct and retranslate ji ltar zhe na.254 
If we read katham instead of kasmāt for ji ltar zhe na here, it seems a bit unsound to 
translate the ca (or hi) in PS 1.12b2 as because. This is because a question beginning 
with how (katham or ji ltar zhe na) is asking about the way in which something happens, 
                                                 
251 I assume that Frauwallner might have had such ji ltar zhe na before him when he 
translated PSV 1.12b2. He chose to translate it as wieso [cf. Frauwallner (1994): 394], 
which can mean either why or how in English. Lodrö Sangpo translates this wieso as 
how [cf. Frauwallner (2010): 422], but according to Frauwallner’s translation of PSV 
1.12b2 - Denn auch bei diesem findet Erinnerung statt [Frauwallner (1994): 394] - I 
consider this wieso as why so. It is possible that Steinkellner’s reconstruction is 
influenced by Frauwallner’s translation. However, if that is the case, it needs to be 
examined whether wieso is the appropriate translation of ji ltar zhe na in this case. 
252 PSVi, p. 30, l. 19 and DN, p. 112, l. 8. 
253 I checked some Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionaries, e.g., MVyut, Negi, Chandra and TTT-
online, but did not find any example showing that ji ltar zhe na is used to translate 
kasmāt. In an email to me (dated 18/12/2013), Steinkellner mentioned that he didn’t see 
any precedent where ji ltar zhe na is used to translate kasmāt either. 
254 Cf. PSVs, p. 1, l. 21 and PSVv D 15a1, PSVs, p. 12, l. 12 and PSVv D 20b7. 
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not the reason why something happens and on most occasions, such a question is not 
followed by an answer beginning with because. 
Further, one might argue that the hi in Steinkellner’s reconstruction of PSV 1.12b2 (see 
page 105) can be another evidence for us to read a hi in PS 1.12b2 and translate it as 
because. However, such argument might not be convincing enough. The first sentence 
of PSV 1.12b2 is claimed to be reconstructed from the sentence in PSṬ: yena hi jñānena 
jñānam anubhūyate / tatrāpy uttarakālaṃ smṛtir dṛṣṭā / na cānanubhūte smṛtir yuktā 
/.255 Therefore, if the hi reconstructed in PSV 1.12b2 meant because, then we can 
assume that the hi in the sentence in PSṬ from which PSV 1.12b2 originates should 
have the same meaning.  However, it seems impossible to translate the hi as because 
in PSṬ; in fact, Blo Gros Brtan Pa, the Tibetan translator of PSṬ, leaves it 
untranslated.256  Moreover, there is no evidence in Devendrabuddhi’s explanation of 
PS 1.12b2 (which is included in his explanation of PV 3.511)257 showing that he has 
ever read any hi and understood it as because in the text. 
It should be noted that by all the above discussion and arguments I have not yet come 
to a conclusion of an abosolutely correct interpretation of PS 1.12ab. I hope these 
discussion and arguments would be helpful in the examination of some existing 
understanding and transalation of PS 1.12ab. By reading PS 1.12ab as two sentences— 
jñānāntareṇānubhave ’navasthā and tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ, I also intend to find the textual 
basis enabling us to infer two models of infinite regress (to be explained). Otherwise, 
                                                 
255 PSṬ, p. 84, ll. 7-8. 
256 Cf. PSṬt: / shes pa gang gis shes pa nyams su myong ba de la yang dus phyis dran 
pa mthong la / nyams su myong ba la yin pa la dran →pa’i← (D : pa P) rigs pa yang ma 
yin no (D 38b6 : P 43b2ff.) 
257 See n. 303. 
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if one considers PS(V) 1.12ab as one sentence, namely that there is only one model of 
argument of infinite regress which must be associated with the memory (i.e., the second 
model of infinite regress to be explained in the next section), it becomes difficult to 
understand on what basis Kellner built the model of infinite regress without the memory 
involved (i.e., the first model of infinite regress to be explained in next section)258.  
3.2 Two Models of Infinite Regresses: Pramāṇasamuccaya (Vṛtti) 1.12 and 
Pramāṇavārttika 3.440ab and 474ab 
Based on the PS 1.12ab I proposed above, we might have another type of reading by 
dividing PS 1.12ab into two parts: jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā and tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ. 
The first part is explained by PV 3.440ab and 473cd-474ab and the second by PV 484a 
and 3.511abc. As illustrated in figure 1 below, the two parts provide two different 
models of the argument of infinite regress.259 
                                                 
258 Cf. Kellner (2011): 413-414. 
259 It is noteworthy that in MABh 6.73a, Candrakīrti restates his opponent’s view as 
follows: 
It is not correct that the [cognition] is experienced by another 
cognition. Why? If it is experienced by another cognition, there 
would be the absurd consequence of infinite regress. To explain: if it 
is accepted that a cognition, which determines the blue color, is 
determined by the cognition which arises immediately after it, then, 
the cognition of blue-cognition would need another experiencer. For 
that [cognition of the cognition of the blue-cognition] too, there must 
be another [cognition]. As a result, the absurd consequence of the 
infinite regress arises. (/ shes pa gzhan gyis kyang de myong bar mi 
rigs te / ci’i phyir zhe na / shes pa gzhan gyis nyams su myong na 
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3.2.1 The Basic Model of Infinite Regress Argument 
The first model of the infinite regress argument can be illustrated by “the continuum of 
C” alone in the figure above.  The continuum is triggered by C1  C2 and then 
continues to C2  C3 and so on.  It means that when the first cognition C1 (i.e., the 
cognition of the object) is perceived by another cognition C2, then C2 will also need to 
be perceived by another cognition C3 and then, since every cognition in the continuum 
                                                 
thug pa med par thal bar ’gyur ro // ’di ltar sngon po yongs su gcod 
par byed pa’i shes pa gcig de’i →mjug← (D : ’jug P) thogs su ’byung 
ba’i rnam par shes pas gcod par khas len na // sngon po’i shes 
→pa’i← (D : pas P) shes pa de la yang myong ba po gzhan yod par 
bya dgos shing / de la yang gzhan zhig ’gyur dgos pas thug pa med 
pa’i skyon du thal lo // D 272a7ff. : P 324b4ff.) (For Kellner’s 
translation, cf. Kellner 2011: 418.) 
It is probably that the opponent here is Dignāga whom Candrakīrti mentioned in the 
end of his MABh. If so, according to Candrakīrti, there is a type of the argument of 
infinite regress in Dignāga’s theory that does not require memory. 
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needs a successive cognition to perceive it, the basic infinite regress of a cognitive 
process is established.  It is observed that besides Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the Jainas 
and Prābhākaras also used this basic argument of infinite regress to criticize the theory 
of other-awareness.260 
As claimed by Dignāga’s opponents, the infinite regress process as described in the 
above basic model can be easily terminated when the observer loses his interest to know 
and trace any one of the cognitions in that chain of cognitive action.  For example, 
Bhaṭṭa Jayanta states, in NM 3.2.2, that when the observer feels too fatigued to trace 
another cognition of cognition, the cognitive progress will stop. 261  His argument 
might have originated from Kumārila who gives more details about how the observer 
may lose his interest in his own previous mind.  In ŚV Śūnyavāda 193, he says: 
Even if the cognition(s) of the (cognitions) in relation to the series of 
the [cognitions] will last until the end [of man’s will], it will be 
interrupted by fatigue or mixture of other pleasant things, just like 
[the cognitions] in relation to the objects.262 
However, although the process might stop in the light of Bhāṭṭas and Nyāya theory 
(details to be explained later), it is not the case in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory 
                                                 
260 Cf. Sinha 1958: 215 and Phillips_Tatacharya 2004: 85. 
261  Cf. NM: tad apy anyeneti ko ’vadhiḥ / śrama iti cet / (p. 14.) Watson’s and 
Kataoka’s translation: “[Vijñānavādin:] Then it too [will be grasped] by yet another 
[cognition]. So what limit [can there be]? [Naiyāyika:] Fatigue [will be the limit].” 
(Watson_Kataoka 2010: 307.) 
262 ŚV Śūnyavāda 193: yāvac →chramaṃ← (ŚVT : chamaṃ ŚVK [Part 2], ŚVN) ca 
tadbuddhis tatprabandhe →ca saty api← (ŚVT : mahaty api ŚVK [Part 2], ŚVN) / 
śramād rucyānyasaṃparkād vicchedo viṣayeṣv iva // 
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because of the premise “no experienced object-cognition, no determination of object” 
as we have discussed in § 2.2.1.  Note that the “object” in this premise includes 
everything in the world, including the cognition. According to the premise, if the 
“continuum of C” stops, there will be one last cognition (CX) in that continuum and the 
CX will not be established by another cognition after it and it will therefore not be 
capable of becoming the means of knowledge of its previous cognition CX-1.  
Consequently, CX-1 will not be established as the means of knowledge of its previous 
cognition CX-2.  Such a chain of reaction will finally result in the first cognition C1 
unproved and consequently make the object unproved.  Therefore, for Dignāga and 
Dharmakīrti, if the cognition is cognized by another cognition, there is certainly a fault 
of infinite regress.263 
By contrast, Kellner explains the basic infinite regress in a very different way using a 
“model for infinite regress arguments” outlined by A. Maurin (hereafter the Maurin-
Argument). 264  Kellner considers “an infinite chain of cognitions triggered by an 
object-cognition” as “[1] main premise”.  And this main premise has two components: 
“[1a] triggering statement”: “the object-cognition c is cognised” and “[1b] regress 
formula”: “All cognitions are cognised by other cognitions.” And from these two 
premises she deduces “[3] unacceptable conclusion”: “the object-cognition c is 
uncognised.”  Kellner’s description is principally similar to “the continuum of C” in 
my figure if her “all cognitions” can be restrictedly understood as “all cognitions in one 
particular cognition-continuum.”  And then Kellner considers the conclusion that “the 
object-cognition c is uncognised” has to require one of the “premises that support the 
regress-generation”—“all cognitions have to be cognised.”  According to this 
                                                 
263 As discussed in § 2.2.1, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta realizes this premise. See n. 152. 
264 Cf. Kellner 2011: 413. 
116 
 
understanding of the argument, Kellner assigns two weak points in Dignāga’s theory: 
first, the premise that “all cognitions have to be cognised”265 is not substantiated and 
second, there is no further explanation from Dignāga as to why the conclusion that “the 
object-cognition c is uncognized” is unacceptable. 266   However, Kellner’s 
interpretation is obviously not the only way to interpret Dignāga’s argument of infinite 
regress and the questions she raised can be easily answered in the light of my 
explanation above (with the interpretations of self-awareness stated in § 2.1): first, 
Dignāga’s tenet of self-awareness does not depend on the additional premise “all 
cognitions have to be cognized”, namely this additional premise is not the so-called 
“regress-generation” and the real “regress-generation” is the premise explained in 
§2.2.1.  Second, the “unacceptable conclusion” claimed by Kellner (i.e., “the object-
cognition c is uncognised”) is not the unacceptable conclusion Dignāga points out.  
Rather, the infinite cognitive process itself is what Dignāga says to be unacceptable to 
his opponent.  Even if we take Kellner’s “unacceptable conclusion” as a conclusion 
which can be inferred from Dignāga’s argument, it is easy for us to understand why 
“the object-cognition c is uncognized” is unacceptable, because if the object-cognition 
c is uncognized, the object will not be cognized, according to the premise. 
3.2.2 The Memory-driven Model of Infinite Regress Argument 
The second argument of the infinite regress is explained by PS(V) 1.12b2. In PV, 
Dharmakīrti did not explain this argument of infinite regress, but his commentators 
gave explanations in their commentaries of PV. 267   This type of infinite regress 
requires two premises.  One is the premise that was explained in § 2.2.1, namely, the 
                                                 
265 Kellner 2011: 414. 
266 Cf. Kellner 2011: 414. 
267 Cf. § 3.3.3. 
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knowledge of an object requires the determination of the object-cognition.  The other 
is that “without previous experience of a thing, there is no memory of the thing” 
(hereafter premise of memory).  The premise is originated from PS(V) 1.11d: “… 
because it (i.e., the memory) does not arise for unexperienced thing”268 and PV 3.373ab: 
“It (i.e., the memory) too arises from the experience.”269 
The memory-driven argument can be illustrated by the combination of “the continuum 
of C” and “the continuum of M” in the above figure.  The infinite regress process is 
started by M1, namely, the memory of C1 (i.e., the object-cognition).  Then according 
to the premise of memory, if C1 was not previously experienced, M1 cannot arise.  
Therefore, M1 can let one infer C2 (the experience of C1 and the cause that gives rise to 
M1), like smoke can let one infer its cause – the fire.  And then if C2 is a cognition 
different from C1, there will be another memory M2 (i.e., the memory of C2).  Based 
on the premise of memory again, M2 can also let one infer C3 (the experience of C2 and 
the cause that gives rise to M2).  Accordingly, by repeating this process, one can 
establish the memory-driven model of infinite regress.   
However, with this description alone, it is possible to terminate such infinite regress 
process and thus make Dignāga’s argument fail.  For example, in ŚV Śūnyavāda 190 
and 191, Kumārila proposes his objection to the memory-driven infinite regress: 
Further, if the objects, such as the vase and so on, are perceived at 
first, immediately thereafter, cognitions are repeatedly apprehended 
by the presumption(s) (arthāpatti) until [the process] stops.  
Accordingly, in the later time, merely that many [cognitions] will be 
remembered.  The memory in relation to that [cognition], which 
                                                 
268 PSV 1.11d: … na hy asāv avibhāvite / 
269 PV 3.373ab: … tasyāś cānubhavād bhavaḥ / 
118 
 
was not conceptually constructed (i.e., not experienced270), too, is so 
like [the memory of] the son of a barren woman, etc. (i.e., 
impossible).271  
It is noteworthy that in his objection, Kumārila acknowledges the premise of memory 
stated above, though he does not agree with Dignāga’s memory-driven infinite regress 
argument. In contrast, the premise is rejected by *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas, as will be 
explained in more details in § 5. 
3.3 The Arguments against J. Ganeri’s and B. Kellner’s Studies on the Memory-
driven Infinite Regress 
3.3.1 Criticisms of the Memory-driven Infinite Regress Argument 
The Criticisms of the Premise of Memory 
In the view of Ganeri, Dignāga’s memory-driven infinite regress argument can only 
work on certain premises, one of which is the premise of memory mentioned above.  
The premise is described by Ganeri as “if S remembers an event or a mental event 
then S previously experienced them.”272  However, Ganeri challenged this premise 
                                                 
270 Bhaṭṭombeka glosses akalpita as “not experienced (ananubhūta)”. Cf. ŚVT, p. 285.  
Sucaritamiśra glosses arthāpatti as akalpita and glosses akalpita as “not perceived 
before (prāg anavagata)”. Cf. ŚVK [Part 2], p. 168. 
271 ŚV Śūnyavāda 190-191: →ghaṭādau ca← (ŚVT : ghaṭādāv ŚVK [Part 2], ŚVN)  
→gṛhīte← (ŚVT : agṛhīte ŚVK [Part 2], ŚVN) ’rthe yadi tāvad anantaram / 
arthāpattyāvabudhyante vijñānāni punaḥ punaḥ // yāvac →chramaṃ← (ŚVT : chamaṃ 
ŚVK [Part 2]) tataḥ paścāt tāvanty eva smariṣyati / →tadāpy← (ŚVT : tadā tv ŚVK [Part 
2]) akalpite ’py evaṃ smṛtir vandhyāsutādivat // 
272 Cf. Ganeri 1999: 474.  In Ganeri’s words, the premise is separately expressed as 
“If S remembers an event, then S previously experienced it” and “If S remembers a 
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with one of his personal experiences that he can remember that the Battle of Waterloo 
took place in 1815 because he was taught about it at school.  He states: 
I do not remember the Battle of Waterloo, the reason being that I was 
not present at the time. However, I do remember that the Battle of 
Waterloo took place in 1815. I remember this because I was taught it 
at school.273 
Accordingly, he comes to a conclusion:  
What memory of a past event demands is not that one has experienced 
that event for oneself, but that one has, at some prior time, come to 
think that it occurred.274   
And he further suggests: 
We must read Diṅnāga as having this broad sense of “experience” in 
mind, and read his thesis as demanding just that a memory whose 
objectual content concerns some event entails a past mental state or 
thought having the same objectual content. This previous thought 
need not be perceptual.275 
To me, Ganeri’s argument here is difficult to accept. In his example, he raises two 
memories: (a) the memory of the Battle of Waterloo and (b) the memory of the event 
that the Battle of Waterloo took place in 1815. According to his first example, one could 
assume that Ganeri agrees to the premise of memory, namely “no past event can be 
                                                 
mental event e then S previously experienced e.” 
273 Ganeri 1999: 473. 
274 Ganeri 1999: 473. 
275 Ganeri 1999: 473-474. 
120 
 
remembered unless it has previously been experienced” 276  because otherwise, he 
would not use the fact that he was not present at the time (i.e., “without experience”) as 
the reason for that he does not remember the Battle of Waterloo.  However, in his 
second example and subsequent argument, Ganeri apparently challenges the premise of 
memory. If I understand correctly, what Ganeri really says is that although one might 
claim that he cannot remember “the Battle of Waterloo” because he was not present at 
the battle, Ganeri would argue that even though he was not present at the battle, he can 
still remember “the Battle of Waterloo” through previously thinking about it by the 
thought of “the Battle of Waterloo took place in 1815”.  To me, it seems Ganeri’s 
argument only demonstrates the ambiguity of the word “memory”.  According to his 
theory, a man in 2017 could have a memory of “he will buy an apple in 2018” if he 
previously had a thought of it or heard about it in 2016. But this sounds weird and I do 
not think Dignāga would accept such interpretation of memory.  According to 
Dharmakīrti, if a person could have a memory of his cognition that was not experienced 
by him before, then the cognition of his own cognition, namely the memory of his own 
cognition, would become no different from his determining cognition (e.g., his 
inference) of the cognition of another person.277 
Further, Ganeri assumes that the validity of the memory-driven infinite regress 
argument would require another premise that “if S experiences an event x, then S can 
subsequently remember x.”278 However, such a premise is immediately considered “to 
                                                 
276 Ganeri 1999: 473. 
277  Cf. PV 3.179: smṛtir bhaved atīte ca sāgṛhīte kathaṃ bhavet / syāc 
cānyadhīparicchedābhinnarūpā svabuddhidhīḥ // 
278 Ganeri 1999: 475. 
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be just false”279 by him.  Similarly, Kellner also mentions that this premise might be 
required for Dignāga’s argument, but it “is wildly implausible as a factual claim.”280 
These arguments can be found in Kumārila’s work.  When facing Yogācāra’s 
memory-driven infinite regress argument, Kumārila argues in Śūnyavāda 189 that a 
prerequisite for such argument is that all cognitions in the series in question must be 
recalled, but such prerequisite is contrary to our experience because we do not have 
such an endless series of memories in our everyday practice.281 And he claims, in 
everyday practice, the cognitions cognize objects, such as the vase and the like, and 
cognitions will be experienced by means of presumptions (arthāpatti) again and again 
until one loses interest.282  Accordingly, Ganeri and Kellner propose a looser premise 
for Dignāga that “all higher-order cognitions that contribute to the experience of a 
remembered first-order cognition are also remembered.”283 Although I do not think it 
necessary to consider this as a premise in Dignāga’s theory, I would accept it as an 
important pre-condition in the memory-driven infinite regress.  This condition is 
applied in a special circumstance that I will explain later.  For Kellner, this premise 
remains unconvincing.284 For her, Dignāga’s infinite regress argument works only if 
                                                 
279 Ganeri 1999: 475. 
280 Kellner 2011: 417. 
281 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 189: tatrāpi smṛtir ity etan na lokānugataṃ vacaḥ / na hi 
vijñanasantānaṃ kaścit smarati laukikaḥ //  Jhā’s translation: “Your assertion that 
‘there is remembrance of each of the cognitions in a series’ is opposed to ordinary 
experience.  For no ordinary person ever remembers any such series of cognitions.” 
(Jhā 1909: 170.) 
282 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 190 and 191 in n. 271 and the translation on page 117. 
283 Kellner 2011: 417.  Cf. also Ganeri 1999: 475. 
284 Cf. Kellner 2011: 417. This premise is problematic to Ganeri too.  (Cf. Ganeri 
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his opponent grants (1) “the possibility that one cognition is remembered”285 (hereafter 
prerequisite 1) and (2) “that every higher-order cognition involved in experiencing a 
lower-order cognition might possibly be remembered”286 (hereafter prerequisite 2).  
Dharmakīrti’s Argument for Self-awareness from Kellner’s Perspective 
Kellner in her paper (2011) mentioned that “Dharmakīrti provides several arguments 
for self-awareness, which have not yet been comprehensively studied”287 and she is 
aware that “Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, offers extensive elaborations on self-
awareness, especially in the Pramāṇavārttika. These have not yet been carefully and 
comprehensively studied with respect to the arguments that they contain”.288 However, 
she also claimed that Dharmakīrti “takes up Dignāga’s argument from memory rather 
laconically in his Pramāṇavārttika, by saying ‘from memory, too, self-awareness is 
                                                 
1999: 477.)  From now on, I will not introduce the rest of the arguments in Ganeri’s 
paper on this issue, because the basis of his argument requires examination (such 
examination is included in my argument about Kellner’s opinions) and his comparison 
study between Dignāga’s theory and the western philosophy is unconvincing to me.  
In addition, some of his conclusions are odd, for example, he says that “the thesis that 
we are necessarily and reflexively aware of our own thoughts is held nowadays to be 
true by virtually nobody” (Ganeri 1999: 481). Ganeri may have been over-confident to 
make such statement because to my knowledge, most of the Tibetan scholars, except 
Gelugpa scholars, are in favor of the theory of self-awareness (which will be discussed 
in detail in § 5).  So in today’s Tibetan society, the thesis that “we are necessarily and 
reflexively aware of our own thoughts” is still quite popular. 
285 Kellner 2011: 417. 
286 Cf. Kellner 2011: 417. 
287 Kellner 2011: 419. 
288 Kellner 2011: 424. 
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established,’ 289  but without expanding it with the help of an infinite regress 
argument.” 290  She therefore made reference to another work of Dharmakīrti, 
Pramāṇaviniścaya.  And in PVin 1.54, she encountered Dharmakīrti’s statement of 
the premise “no cognition perceived, no object perceived” explained in § 2.2.1.  
However, she still found Dharmakīrti’s explanation in PVin 1.54 problematic.  Since 
her arguments are based on her paraphrase of that passage, for the convenience of 
readers, I cite her translation of PVin 1.54: 
To explain: (1) a perception of an object is not due to the existence 
of the object, but due to the existence of its perception.  (2) And if 
the existence of the object’s perception is not established by a means 
of valid cognition (aprāmāṇika), then it does not attach itself 
(anuruṇaddhi) to forms of behaviour that presuppose existence 
(sattānibandhanān vyavahārān). (3) If the perception is then 
unestablished, then the object is also unestablished, so that everything 
would go asunder, for (4) even if something exists, it cannot be 
treated as existent unless it is established.  Therefore, someone who 
                                                 
289 This is Kellner’s translation of PV 3.484a-b1. The Sanskrit text is cited in her paper 
as smṛter apy ātmavit siddhā jñānasya (Kellner 2011: p. 419, n. 26), but the jñānasya 
may be inadvertently quoted because this word does not seem to be reflected in her 
translation. And according to the commentaries by Devendrabuddhi, Ravigupta and 
Manorathanandin, the word jñānasya belongs to the next sentence.  (Cf. De D 
255b4ff., R D 163a7ff., M1, p. 261.)  Note that Sāṅkṛtyāyana has, in his edition of M1, 
read smṛter apy ātmavit siddhā jñānasya as one sentence, but this is a mistake according 
to Manorathanandin’s commentary.) 
290 Cf. Kellner 2011: 419.  
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does not perceive the awareness of something is not aware of 
anything at all.291 
Kellner separates this passage into four parts and considers parts (1) and (2) as two 
premises for the conclusion in part (3), and considers part (4) as the reason to prove part 
(3).292  In such consideration, she finds that even if one, with part (1), accepts that the 
cognition needs to exist for the object to be perceived, he doesn’t need to accept that 
the cognition needs to be cognized for exercising its function.293  For this issue, she 
expects part (2) to be helpful for the solution.294  Based on her translation of part (2), 
she accepts that there can be a discrepancy in the interpretations on this premise with 
different understandings of the phrase sattānibandhanān vyavahārān, namely, the 
various understandings on “how does conceptual determination ‘presuppose’ existence, 
and what is the existence of which it presupposes?”295 I would close my introduction 
to Kellner’s arguments over PVin 1.54cd by briefly introducing two other arguments of 
hers, which are: first, the conclusion in part (3) does not follow from the premises in 
parts (1) and (2) (hereafter argument 1) and second, why should the determination of a 
perceived object require its previous perception to be known?  (Hereafter argument 
2.)296 .  Because most of Kellner’s later arguments and judgments (for instance, she 
considers that a conclusion “everything would go asunder” stated in part (3) are mainly 
                                                 
291 Kellner 2011: 420. 
292 Cf. Kellner 2011: 421. 
293 Cf. Kellner 2011: 421. As to this argument, see my explanations of the premise 
stated in § 2.2.1. 
294 Cf. Kellner 2011: 421. 
295 Kellner 2011: 421. 
296 Kellner 2011: 421. 
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based on her main arguments introduced above, if the following discussion might be 
valuable for a solution of the main arguments she proposed, it would also be helpful for 
other arguments not introduced. 
The Difference between the Infinite Regress Arguments in Proving Self-awareness 
by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti from Kellner’s Perspective 
On the basis of her understanding of PS(V) 1.12 and PVin 1.54cd, Kellner claims that 
the infinite regress argument for Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are different.  She believes 
that “this use of memory is peculiar to Dignāga’s argument, and has been overlooked 
by Matilal, Hayes and Perrett”297 and that “the two philosophers, in these arguments, 
work with different assumptions about why an object-cognition must be cognized: for 
Dignāga it must be cognized in order to enable subsequent memory of it, for 
Dharmakīrti it must be cognized if it is to cognize an object.”298 She further uses the 
Maurin-Argument explaining three differences between the infinite regress arguments 
by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti: (1) The triggering statements are different by “The object-
cognition c is later remembered” for Dignāga and “The object-cognition c cognizes its 
object” for Dharmakīrti; (2) The premises that support the regress-generation are 
different by the “Knowledge-requirement of cognition: all cognitions that cognize their 
objects have to be cognized by themselves” for Dharmakīrti and the other two - 
“Experience-requirement of memory: all cognitions that are remembered later must 
have been experienced earlier” and “There is also memory of higher-order cognitions” 
– for Dignāga; (3) The unacceptable conclusions are different by “The object-cognition 
c does not cognize its object” for Dharmakīrti and a presumed unacceptable conclusion 
                                                 
297 Kellner 2011: 416. 
298 Kellner 2011: 411. 
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“The object-cognition c – or any cognition – cannot be remembered” for Dignāga.299 
3.3.2 The Comparison between the Infinite Regress Arguments in Proving Self-
awareness by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in PS(V) 1.12 and PV 3.425-539 
Kellner’s study mainly refers to PVin when it comes to Dharmakīrti’s theory of self-
awareness.  I compare the sections dealing with the self-awareness arguments in PVin 
and those in PV.  The comparison result is presented in appendix V, in which we find 
that Dharmakīrti’s arguments about self-awareness in PVin only parallel the arguments 
set forth in PV 3.249-280. However, as mentioned above, when considering PV 3.511-
512 which can literally match PS 1.12, we can disregard Kellner’s assumption that the 
use of memory in the infinite regress argument to prove self-awareness is peculiar to 
Dignāga.  In fact, as shown in the comparison between PS(V) 1.12 and PV 3.426-539 
set forth in appendix III which is explained in § 2.2.2.1, there is a close connection 
between the arguments over the self-awareness by Dignāga and those by Dharmakīrti. 
According to that comparison, section 8 shown in appendix III can be related to the 
basic argument of the infinite regress, in which Dharmakīrti directly uses the infinite 
regress argument to prove the self-awareness by PV 3.440ab300.  Section 9 in appendix 
III can be related to the memory-driven infinite regress argument.  As for the 
interpretation of section 10, in relation to PS 1.12cd, Kellner explains that the reason 
why the cognition cannot move to another object is that all cognitions are busy in the 
infinite regress and have no time to perceive another object.  She compares this 
situation with a computer which is running an endless program and cannot move on to 
any other work.  Admittedly, this explanation on its face value is supported by the 
                                                 
299 Cf. Kellner 2011: 423-424. 
300 Cf. PV 3.440ab in the translation section. 
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literal reading of PS(V) and PSṬ.301  However, for a more developed explanation, I 
would follow Dharmakīrti, as he says: 
[Proponent:] How could a subsequent cognition grasp another 
[external object] but not grasp the proximate cognition that produces 
[it], i.e., the one which obtains the characteristic of being grasped 
[object]?302 
According to Dharmakīrti, in PS 1.12cd, Dignāga accused the other-awareness theory 
of a new absurd consequence, which is no longer the infinite regress process, but that 
if the cognition takes its previous cognition as its supporting-object, then for any 
perceiving cognition, all objects other than the cognition immediately prior to that 
perceiving cognition will not be the supporting-object, because “the previous cognition” 
will always have two incomparable advantages of being proximate to its cognition and 
being the immediate producing cause of its cognition and these two characteristics are 
the sufficient conditions for a thing to be the supporting-object of its cognition.  This 
is certainly an explanation that one may consider as the original idea of Dharmakīrti 
inspired by Dignāga, but this is also an explanation compatible with PS(V) 1.12. 
3.3.3 The Memory-Driven Infinite Regress Argument from the Perspectives of 
Dharmakīrti’s Commentators 
To explain how the memory-driven infinite regress argument works with the two 
                                                 
301 Cf. PSṬcr: 84, ll. 10-13. 
302 PV 3.513: tāṃ grāhyalakṣaṇaprāptām āsannāṃ janikāṃ adhiyama / 
            agṛhītvottaraṃ jñānaṃ gṛhṇīyād aparaṃ katham //  
a In all Tibetan translations, we found this word in the plural form - blo de dag (= 
dhiyaḥ). 
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prerequisites proposed by Kellner, one may argue that PV 3.511abc is too terse.  
Admittedly, PV 511abc does not contain adequate information that enables us to have 
an accurate and thorough understanding of the memory-driven infinite regress argument 
in PS(V) 1.12b2, especially when the word aniṣṭhā in PS(V) 1.12b2 is absent in 
Dharmakīrti’s commentary.  But as is well known, the value of Dharmakīrti’s work 
lies not only in his Pramāṇavārttika but also greatly in the commentaries he elicited—
in this case, we are fortunate to have several commentaries on these two verses by 
Dharmakīrti’s followers, such as Devendrabuddhi, Ravigupta and Manorathanandin. 
Among these commentaries, Devendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā provides the 
most minute information regarding the detailed process how a memory of cognition 
triggers an infinite regress in the theory of Dignāga’s rivals.  He states: 
[Opponent:] The cognition, which has the object such as blue, etc., 
would be experienced by another cognition. 
[Proponent:] Even if this were true, there would be no memory in 
relation to the cognition of the cognition too because it is not 
experienced by itself.  To wit, it is observed that memory arises in 
relation to that cognition too, which is accepted to have experienced 
the cognition [of object].  For instance, [in everyday practice we] 
say “I knew my cognition.” [Further,] there is no memory of what 
was not experienced.  [Hence,] how is that [remembered cognition] 
experienced?  [That is to say,] If [you] accept that that [cognition] 
itself (de’i bdag nyid) is not experienced by itself (rang nyid kyis), 
then by what is the cognition of the cognition experienced? 
[Opponent:] It would be experienced by another, i.e., the cognition 
of the cognition too is experienced by another cognition. 
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[Proponent:] To this, just as the previous argument, a memory in 
relation to the later cognition of the cognition too (shes pa’i shes pa 
tha ma la yang) is [then] observed.  Therefore, there would be no 
end to the cognitions which are experienced by another 
[cognition].303 
                                                 
303 De: / sngon po la sogs pa’i yul can gyi →shes pa← (D : om. P) shes pa gzhan gyis 
rjes myong bar / ’gyur ba zhes bya ba de lta yin na yang shes pa’i shes pa la yang dran 
pa gang yin pa de mi ’gyur te / de rang nyid nyams su myong ba med pa’i phyir ro // ’di 
ltar shes pa gang gis shes pa nyams su myong ba yin no zhes ’dod pa de la yang shes 
pa la dran pa skye bar ’gyur ba mthong ste / dper na nga’i shes pa shes par ’gyur pa 
yin no zhes bya ba lta bu’o // nyams su myong ba ma yin pa dran pa ma yin no // gang 
gis de ni myong ba bzhin // gal te rang nyid kyis de’i bdag nyid nyams su myong ba ma 
yin par ’dod na gang gis shes pa’i shes pa nyams su myong ba yin / de ltar ni ’gyur 
mod kyi / gal te gzhan gyis de yin na / shes pa’i shes pa de yang shes pa gzhan gyis 
nyams su myong ba yin no zhe na / ’dir phyogs snga ma de la shes pa’i shes pa tha ma 
la yang dran pa mthong ba de ltar na shes pa gzhan gyis nyams su myong ba thug pa 
med pa yin no / (D 261a7ff. : P 310b1ff.) 
Further, we have two more similar interpretations in Manorathanandin’s 
Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti and Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā: 
M: “[Opponent:] The cognition of the object such as blue and so forth 
would be experienced by another cognition.  [Proponent:] A 
memory in relation to that too, i.e., the cognition of the cognition too, 
is seen.  When the cognition, which has another cognition as its 
supporting object, is gradually remembered and one [does] not 
remember something which was not grasped, an experience of that 
cognition of the cognition must be explained.  By what does [one] 
know that [experience of the cognition of cognition] would exist?  If 
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In Devendrabuddhi’s commentary, the memory-driven infinite regress argument is 
                                                 
[it is known] by self-awareness, then this is established in the same 
manner (i.e., self-awareness) for the previous [cognition] too.  The 
acceptance of an awareness by another [cognition would then] 
become purposeless.” (M1: nīlādiviṣayasya jñānasya 
jñānāntareṇānubhavo bhavet / tatrāpi jñānajñāne ’pi hi smṛtir 
dṛṣṭā / yadā jñānāntarālambakaṃ jñānaṃ krameṇa smaryate na 
cāgṛhītaṃ smaryate iti tasya jñānajñānasya vedanaṃ vaktavyaṃ / tat 
kenāstu vedanaṃ / yadi svasaṃvedanena tadā pūrvakasyāpi tathā 
sthitiḥ, vyartham anyena vedanāṅgīkaraṇam / pp. 271-272, ll. 19-2.) 
PSṬ: “Indeed, [when a cognition is cognized by another cognition,] 
one observes at a later time a memory in relation to that too, i.e., to 
that cognition by which a cognition is experienced.  And, it is 
impossible that there is a memory in relation to something which was 
not experienced.  Therefore, there must be [again] another 
[cognition] which takes the cognition [of the object-cognition] as the 
supporting object and there [would] be a memory in relation to it too.  
Therefore, for this [third-order cognition] too, there [would] be 
another [cognition to perceive it].  Accordingly, if it (i.e., the 
cognition) is experienced by another cognition, there would be 
endlessness of cognitions.” (PSṬcr: yena hi jñānena jñānam 
anubhūyate / tatrāpy uttarakālaṃ smṛtir dṛṣṭā // na cānanubhūte 
smṛtir yuktā // tato ’nyena tadālambanena jñānena bhāvyam.  
tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ // tatas tatrāpy anyeneti // ato 
jñānāntareṇānubhave ’navasthā jñānānām // p. 84, ll. 7-10.) 
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specified in a simple, determinative and instant cognition example – a visual sense of 
blue color.  Admittedly, one may not remember a cognition because of its complexity 
(for instance, the visual sense of one hundred disordered numbers); or because of the 
time passed since the cognition happened (for instance, the smell of my lunch on 10th 
October 1980); or because of its uncertainty (for instance, the feeling of one’s arms 
when one was attracted by a wonderful play). However, for such a visual sense of blue 
color, it should be widely accepted that it can be remembered.  In this postulated but 
practical example, the prerequisite 1 mentioned by Kellner is fulfilled.  
Now Devendrabuddhi’s explanation of the infinite process continues that, if there is a 
memory of blue-cognition, then according to the premise of memory, there must be a 
cognition of blue-cognition and if the opponent would claim that the cognition of blue-
cognition is not the blue-cognition itself but another cognition, then the proponent 
would propose a hypothetical memory of the cognition of blue-cognition.  According 
to the premise of memory again, a cognition of the cognition of blue-cognition is 
established; if the opponent, at this time, claims that this cognition would be cognized 
by self-awareness, then as Manorathanandin explained, the argument of other-
awareness by the opponent becomes pointless from its beginning.  If the opponent 
claims that the cognition of the cognition of blue-cognition continues to be another 
cognition, then this reasoning process becomes endless, that is to say, there is at least 
one infinite regress for the example regarding the cognition of blue.  We should 
remember that establishing such a single case of infinite regress for the cognition of 
blue is logically sufficient for Dignāga’s argument to be a valid refutation of his 
opponent’s theory that cognition is cognized by another cognition and it is all the more 
so since this example can be easily duplicated in countless cases. 
Moreover, it must be clear that in Devendrabuddhi’s commentary, the memory of the 
cognition of blue and other memories of the cognitions of another cognition are quite 
different in terms of the acceptance by the proponent.  As mentioned above, the former 
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is accepted by both sides in the debate and it is the trigger of the memory-driven infinite 
regress argument.  By contrast, the latter can be considered as a series of hypothetical 
conditions solely for the purpose of relaying the reasoning of infinite regress, that is to 
say, the proponents of such memory-driven infinite regress argument, such as Dignāga 
and Dharmakīrti, do not really accept those memories of cognitions of another cognition 
in the infinite regress progress. Otherwise, there would be an unwarranted consequence 
that Dignāga or Dharmakīrti would accept the other-awareness if they indeed accept a 
memory of the cognition of another cognition which is in essence the other-awareness 
on this occasion. 
So far, the commentaries by Devendrabuddhi, Jinendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin 
seem to be still insufficient to explain the question: even if the advocates of other-
awareness, such as Kumārila, accept some memories of the cognitions of another 
cognition, why couldn’t they stop the infinite regress by rejecting the memory of the 
cognition of blue-cognition in the sample case?304  Why must (t. dgos pa) there be a 
memory at a later time in relation to every cognition of another cognition in that infinite 
regress process? This is the prerequisite 2 proposed by Kellner, which is not yet 
established.  The answer for this can be found in Ravigupta’s interpretation of PV 
3.511.  There he says:  
Further, if [the opponent says that] the cognition is experienced by 
another cognition, 
then, [we reply,] how can [you] know that the cognition is 
experienced by another cognition? 
                                                 
304 ŚV Śūnyavāda 191ab: “Accordingly, in the later time, merely that many [cognitions] 
will be remembered.” (/ yāvac →chramaṃ← (ŚVT : chamaṃ ŚVK [Part 2]) tataḥ paścāt 
tāvanty eva smariṣyati /)  For the full statement, see n. 271.  
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[Opponent:] [The cognition] appears as the cognition which 
perceives the [previous] cognition. 
[Proponent:] Then either there is an observation of a memory in 
relation to this other cognition too, or without memory of that other 
cognition, one cannot state by which cognition, either by itself or by 
another, that cognition is made known.  Therefore, how is that 
“another cognition” experienced? 
[Opponent:] The “other cognition” is [again] experienced by another 
cognition. 
[Proponent:] There must be (dgos pa) a memory in relation to that 
too.305 
According to Ravigupta, the opponent cannot simply reject the hypothetical memory of 
the cognition of the cognition of blue because otherwise, the opponent cannot know 
whether the cognition of blue is cognized by itself or another cognition.  To explain: 
when the opponent claims that the blue-cognition is cognized by another cognition, the 
perceiving cognition, i.e., the cognition of the blue-cognition, must be affirmed by 
memory.  Otherwise, the opponent could hardly recognize which type of cognition this 
perceiving cognition is, and consequently, he cannot affirm that the object-cognition is 
                                                 
305 R: / gzhan yang gal te shes pa shes pa gzhan gyis nyams su myong bar ’gyur na / 
de’i tshe shes pa ni shes pa gzhan gyis rig pa’o zhes bya ba de ji ltar shes / ’on te shes 
pa’i ’dzin par byed par shes pa la snang ba yin na / de’i tshe shes pa gzhan de la yang 
dran pa mthong ngam / shes pa gzhan dran pa med par shes pa de’i ’dzin par byed par 
rang nyid kyis shes pa’am gzhan gyis brjod par mi nus pa’i phyir ro // de’i phyir shes 
pa gzhan po de gang gis myong ba yin / ’on te shes pa gzhan po de shes pa gzhan gyis 
myong ngo zhe na / de la yang dran pa dgos pa’i phyir / (D 169a1ff.) 
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cognized by another cognition and not by self-awareness. To this explanation, one 
might have the last question: Why “by memory”?  Why cannot the opponent propose 
a means other than “memory” to affirm the object-cognition or other cognitions in that 
infinite continuum?  To this question: the answer can be found in PV 3.426-483, in 
which the other means proposed by the opponent to affirm object-cognition, such as the 
perception and the inference, have all been rejected by Dharmakīrti.  In that context, 
it is presupposed that perception and inference cannot be the means of establishing the 
object-cognition and the opponent is left with the means of memory as the last resort 
for doing so.  If the opponent stops the continuum of memories at any point, he will 
lose all means to establish a corresponding cognition in the continuum of cognitions 
and that will lead to the collapse of the entire continuum of cognitions, which means 
the object could not be perceived.  It is under this specific context that Dharmakīrti is 
able to make use of the prerequisite 2 together with the premise of “the knowledge of 
an object requires the determination of the object-cognition” to run the entire memory-
driven infinite regress argument.  Now, one might wonder whether such explanation 
of the strategy of Dharmakīrti’s argument can be applied to Dignāga. According to the 
comparison between PS 1.12ab and PV 3.426-484a and 511abc, Dharmakīrtian 
interpretations of PV 3.426-483, namely, the interpretations of the basic model of 
infinite regress argument, is generally compatible with PS(V) 1.12ab1, especially when 
Dignāga’s opponent (in the section precedes PS 1.12) states “if the cognition is 
experienced by another [cognition]” and the “another [cognition]” may include another 
perception or another inference.  Therefore, it is not without basis for us to use the 
commentaries of PV to interpret PS(V) in this discussion. 
3.4 Conclusion: The Nub of the Infinite Regress Argument 
From the explanation above, we can see that the nub of the whole argument of infinite 
regress is whether one accepts the cognitive premise that the knowledge of an object 
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requires the determination of the cognition of object.306 We have also seen that with 
this premise and another premise of memory, Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s argument 
of infinite regress is so far self-consistent.  On the contrary, if one accepts (1) this 
premise and (2) that the awareness of cognition must be either the self-awareness or the 
other-awareness (only *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas disagree on this point), then one must 
accept the theory of self-awareness; otherwise, one cannot avoid the inevitable 
consequence of infinite regress. Now we might wonder: is this argument convincing to 
their opponents?  As I see it, the nub of the argument lies in the cognitive premise, so 
is that premise accepted by the opponents.  As discussed in § 2.2.1, there remain some 
uncertainties as to Bhāṭṭas’ and Naiyāyikas’ attitude about the premise. It is relatively 
clear that Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas might have their own theories 
of the cognition of cognition which do not have the problem of infinite regress. Some 
refutations made by *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas, which pose some real challenges to the 
living advocates of self-awareness (the Tibetan Buddhist), drive me to look into the 
defence of self-awareness from another perspective in § 5. 
  
                                                 
306 Shaw (1996) also stated that “if we admit that another cognition, the object of which 
is a cognition, is necessary for the use of the first cognition, then the above-mentioned 
infinite regress will occur.” (p. 169.) 
136 
 
4 The Argument about Reflexivity 
Since reflexivity is an identifying characteristic of self-awareness, it becomes a critical 
point in the debate of self-awareness.  Reflexivity here means that the agent does an 
act upon itself, namely, the agent, the object and the act become three in one.  Some 
advocates of self-awareness after Dharmakīrti’s time, like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, 
attempt to avoid such argument by saying that self-illuminating is an inherent nature of 
cognition, rather than an act that the cognition cognizes itself. 307  In my opinion, 
reflexivity is an unavoidable issue for all advocates of self-awareness theory, especially 
when an opponent, such as Śrīdhara, raises a question as simple and challenging as 
follows:  
With reference to this we may notice: is this then an illumination of 
the object or of [the intellection] itself? If it is an illumination of the 
object, then the cognition would be about the object in consequence 
of this origin, but not about the [the cognition] itself; and so the 
fallacious result would be that it [i.e. cognition] would be non-
cognisable. But, if on the other hand it is an illumination of [the 
cognition] itself, then the illumination and the thing to be illuminated 
would be the same; and thus oneness of activity and instrument would 
reside in it.308 
                                                 
307 Cf. Williams 2000: 6-7, n. 8 and pp. 20-22. 
308 Faddegon 1918: 404. Cf. NK: atrāpi nirūpyate / kiṃ tadarthasya prakāśaḥ svasya 
vā / yady arthasya prakāśas tadutpatter arthasya saṃvedanaṃ syān na tu svasyeti tasyā 
saṃvedyatādoṣaḥ / athedaṃ svasya prakāśas tad eva prakāśyam prakāśaś ceti 
kriyākaraṇayor ekatvaṃ tadavastham / (p. 91.) Jhā’s translation: “What is it that is 
illumined in the case of the cognition?  Is it the object cognised, or the cognition itself?  
If the former, then cognisance would be that of the object and not that of the cognition 
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The refutation of such reflexive nature in cognition is also proposed by Buddhists, such 
as Jñānagarbha.  In response to the advocates of self-awareness who claim that 
cognition can manifest itself to itself, Jñānagarbha argues: 
Cognition does not perceive itself because it is void of its own 
appearance, like other cognitions. If you do not accept [the cognition] 
manifests itself to itself, [the cognition] would be different [from 
itself], like the blue color and its cognition.309   
This argument is obviously based on the assumption that the subject and the object must 
be different in one single action, which is of course contradictory to the theory of self-
awareness.  In anticipation that the opponent may argue that even though the cognition 
does not appear to itself, the cognition can be experienced by itself because this is the 
nature of the cognition, Jñānagarbha argues that “‘because this is the nature of the 
cognition’ is also not [a valid reason], because there would be the extremely 
unwarranted consequence.” 310   The unwarranted consequence is interpreted by 
                                                 
‘itself;’ and hence there would be an uncognisability of the cognition. If the illumination 
consisted in the cognition itself, then the cognition iteself would be the object as well 
as the action of illumination” (Jhā 1982: 202.) 
309 SDVV: / shes pa ni bdag gis bdag shes pa ma yin te / rang snang bas stong pa’i 
phyir shes pa gzhan bzhin no / / rang snang bar khas mi len na ni tha dad par thal 
bar ’gyur te / sngon po dang de shes pa bzhin no / (D 4b3)  Cf. also SDVP: / rang 
snang bar khas mi len na ni / tha dad par thal bar 'gyur te / sngon po dang de shes pa 
bzhin no zhes bya ba smos te / de ni 'di skad du dper na sngon po dang / der snang ba 
sngon po shes pa ni tha dad de / gang gi phyir sngon po nyid sngon por snang ba ma 
yin pa de bzhin du / shes pa dang shes pa'i bdag nyid du snang ba tha dad par 'gyur ro 
/ (D 19a7ff.) 
310 SDVV: / rig pa’i ngo bo nyid yin pa’i phyir yang ma yin te / ha cang thal bar ’gyur 
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Śāntarakṣita as: “In this manner, any cognition will be omniscient, namely, whatever 
cognition it is, it would not have any object it does not know”311, because the opponent 
accepts the establishment of a cognition without its object appearing to it.  If the 
opponent argues that there would not be such unwarranted consequence because of the 
nature of the self-awareness, Jñānagarbha replies, “This is also impossible because 
there is no reason [to prove such nature which is not the other-awareness but self-
awareness]. If there is no [such a reason], the [above-mentioned] unwarranted 
consequence would remain.”312  If the opponent insists that the self-awareness of the 
cognition can be vividly established by itself, namely, he considers the self-awareness 
to be self-evident by direct perception, Jñānagarbha refuses to accept that because self-
awareness is obviously a controversial theory among scholars.313   
Moreover, all opponents of self-awareness, whether Buddhists or not, clearly reject the 
existence of reflexivity in our real world, which compels the proponents to confront this 
issue in the debate.  It appears that to successfully defend the theory of self-awareness 
one needs to take a stubborn approach, like Prajñākaragupta has done, insisting that 
                                                 
ba’i phyir ro / (D 4b4) 
311 SDVP: / de lta na ni shes pa thams cad kyang thams cad rig pa por ’gyur te / shes 
pa gang yang dngos po ci yang mi shes pa med pa’i ngo bo nyid du ’gyur ro / (D 19b3ff.) 
312 SDVV: / de yang mi rung ste nye ba’i rgyu med pa’i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na ha 
cang thal ba nyid du ’gyur ro / (D 4b4ff.) 
313 Cf. SDVV: “This is also impossible because my response has been previously 
presented and there is no incontrovertible means of knowledge [to prove your opinion], 
namely, other people who do not agree [with you] would not have respect for merely a 
statement of your own theory [without proof].” (/ yang mi rung ste / lan btab zin pa’i 
phyir ram / mi slu ba’i tshad ma med pa’i phyir te / sems mi mthun pa’i gzhan rnams 
ni rang gi tshul brjod pa tsam la gus par mi byed do / D 4b5.) 
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reflexivity can at least exist in something, such as cognition and the light. 
4.1 The Objections to the Example of Proving Reflexivity 
As discussed above and also earlier in § 2.2.2.2, direct experience or direct perception 
cannot be a valid means of cognition to prove or disprove reflexivity in a debate.  In 
the following introduction to the arguments over reflexivity, I find that neither side in 
the debate proposes any single inference to support their position, nor do they apply 
any valid universal premise.  The only means both sides have used are but some 
analogies.  Since the most important thing for an analogy to work is the example, it 
becomes a critical issue for the proponent to propose a valid example to prove 
reflexivity. 
4.1.1 The Questions Concerning the Example 
Kumārila and Śrīdhara challenge their opponents (mainly Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) by 
asking whether they can propose an example to establish the self-awareness.  In ŚV, 
Kumārila states that there is no self-awareness which is both the object and the perceiver 
and there is no example for the reasoning of the nature of oneness or reflexivity.314  
And in Nyāyakandalī, Śrīdhara says: “Further, it is not established that the cognition is 
self-awareness because there is no example [in which one and the same thing] is object 
(karma), instrument (karaṇa) and so on.”315  
4.1.2 Examples of Reflexivity 
The Example of Light316 
                                                 
314 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 64 in appendix VI, § 2.1, n. 649. 
315  na ca svasaṃvedanaṃ vijñānam ity api siddhaṃ karmakaraṇādibhāve 
dṛṣṭāntābhāvāt / (pp. 90-91.) 
316 It is noteworthy that in English the word “light” can mean a radiation that makes 
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I did not find that Dignāga has somewhere proposed any example of reflexivity, but we 
have reasons to believe that at the time of Nāgārjuna, some of his opponents who hold 
the view that the cognition can cognize itself proposed the light to be the example of 
reflexivity because in MK 7.8, a view of Nāgārjuna’s opponent is restated as: “As a 
light illuminates both itself and what is other, so origination brings about the origination 
of both itself and what is other.”317  For those who may argue that, according to the 
context of MK, this is only the example of reflexivity in origination (utpāda) 
specifically, not an example in general, we also have two other restatements of the 
opponents’ views similar to this, in which the cognition or means of knowledge is 
mentioned.  They are from Nāgārjuna’s VV: “Fire illuminates itself as well as other 
                                                 
things visible or a source (or a device) that produces brightness. Some scholars, such as 
Siderits and Katsura (2013), use it to translate pradīpa, while others usually use “lamp”. 
As to the literal translation of pradīpa, I follow the latter. However, as discussed in § 
2.2.1, it seems better to use “light” in this example of self-awareness and Dharmakīrti 
does use “light” as the example in PV 3.329 (see n. 320).  Moreover, it is observed 
that when the opponents of self-awareness, such as Kumārila and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, argue 
against the example of self-awareness, even though the word “lamp” may have been 
used in their opponents’ texts, they understand and interpret such example consistently 
as “the light of the lamp” (e.g., dīpābhāsa in ŚV Śūnyavāda 22 and pradīpaprakāśa in 
NM 3.2.1, cf. § 2.2.1 and see n. 164).  Accordingly, Watson and Kataoka consider that 
when the Yogācāra uses the light to be the example of self-awareness, they do not mean 
the source of light, the lamp, but rather the “light of the lamp”. (Cf. Watson_Kataoka 
2010: 305 and n. 27.)  I agree with them and therefore, in the current discussion I 
mostly use the word “light” when referring to this example of self-awareness, although 
I see that “lamp” or “fire” is used in some texts. 
317  Siderits_Katsura 2013: 76-77. Cf. MK 7.8: pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau 
saṃprakāśayate yathā / utpādaḥ svaparātmānāv ubhāv utpādayet tathā // (MK, p. 112.) 
141 
 
things. Likewise, the pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things.”318 and 
his VAIS: “Like the lamp, those means of knowledge can establish themselves and 
others.”319  
Dharmakīrti has mentioned light as the example of reflexivity in cognition.  In PV 
3.329, he says:  
By virtue of the identity of the nature, the one that illumines [the 
object] is the illuminator of its own nature. Just as light is admitted 
[to illuminate itself], in the same manner the cognition makes itself 
known.320 
And we have PV 3.482, in which Dharmakīrti explains how the lamp (i.e., the light) is 
the example of self-awareness.321 
                                                 
318  Bhattacharya_Johnston_Kunst 1986: 116. VV: adyotayatia svātmānaṃ yathā 
hutāśas tathā parātmānaṃ / svaparātmānāv eṣaṃ prasādyanti pramāṇāni // 
a VVy reads dyo{s}tayati. (p. 277.) 
319 VAIS 23a1: / tshad ma rnams ni mar me bzhin // rang dang gzhan sgrub par byed 
pa yin no / It is noteworthy that two incomplete sentences are found in Spitzer’s 
mamuscript (63a), which reads / (si)ddha iti pramāṇāny api svāt(ma?) / and (si)ddhaḥ 
[na] ca pradīpaḥ… /. The latter is in the next line of the former. These two seem to be 
additional evidence for the use of fire as an example of reflexivity. (Cf. Franco 2004: 
82.) 
320  PV 3.329: prakāśamānas tādātmyāt svarūpasya prakāśakaḥ / yathā 
prakāśo ’bhimatas tathā dhīr ātmavedinī / 
321 PV 3.482: For instance, in the case of two lamps—(they are not the illuminated 
object and the illuminating subject of each other because they two have the same 
illuminating nature)—and in the case of the lamp and the vase (which have different 
own natures: one illuminating and one to be illuminated by another). Depending on the 
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The Example of Blue Color 
The blue color proposed to be an example of self-awareness is found in Śāntideva’s BA 
9.19, in which his opponent says: 
[Opponent:] Unlike the crystal (the color of which depends on other 
objects), the blue color does not depend on other [objects] for being 
blue. Similarly, it is observed that certain things, [like the cognition 
                                                 
[nature of the illuminating or the non-illuminating], the linguistic convention is 
performed with the distinction between illuminating and illuminated. (yathā pradīpayor 
dīpaghaṭayoś ca tadāśrayaḥ / vyaṅgyavyañjakabhedena vyavahāraḥ pratanyate //) For 
more literal explanation of this verse, cf. §2.2.3.3. 
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of form322] are dependent and [certain things, like the cognition of 
cognition322] are independent.323 
The Example of Self 
Another example that may have been proposed by Kumārila’s opponent to prove 
reflexivity is the Self (ātman).  In ŚV he introduces an opponent’s argument that the 
Self accepted by Mīmāṃsaka can be an example to prove reflexivity.324 It is generally 
believed that the opponent of Kumārila in Śūnyavāda is the Yogācāra, but I doubt if that 
                                                 
322  Prajñākaramati and Vibhūticandra interpret parāpekṣam and anapekṣaṃ as “a 
certain thing like the vase depends on a lamp to become visible” and “a certain thing 
like the lamp depends on nothing but itself to become visible”, respectively. (Cf. BAP: 
/ tathā tena prakāreṇa kiṃcid ghaṭādikaṃ parāpekṣaṃ pradīpādyapekṣaṃ prakāśaṃ 
dṛśyate / kiṃcit punaḥ pradīpādikam anapekṣaṃ ca svayaṃprakāśātmakaṃ dṛśyate 
upalabhyate / (p. 189) and BATP 262a2: / de ltar bum pa la sogs pa ’ga’ zhig gzhan la 
ltos pa can yin la mar me la sogs pa ni ltos pa med par snang ba zhes brjod do /) By 
contrast, Gyaltsab provides a different interpretation: it is observed that in the same 
manner, the cognition of something, like the form and so on, depends on the cognition 
which is different [from them] and the cognition is cognized by itself; therefore, the 
cognition does not depend on another perceiver. (Cf. BAVgyal 121a6ff.: de bzhin du 
gzugs la sogs pa ’ga’ zhig rig pa ni shes pa gzhan la ni ltos pas dang / shes pa ni rang 
gis rang rig pa yin pas // rig byed gzhan la ltos pa med pa yang mthong zhe na /). I 
think Gyaltsab’s interpretation makes better sense in the context here. Otherwise, why 
does Śāntideva here use an example - the colors of the blue crystal and the blue object 
to compare with another example - the visibility of the vase and the lamp?  Therefore, 
I follow Gyaltsab in this case. 
323 BA 9.19: na hi sphaṭikavan nīlaṃ nīlatve ’nyam apekṣate / tathā kiṃcit parāpekṣam 
anapekṣaṃ ca dṛśyate / 
324 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 67cd in appendix VI, § 2.3.3.1, n. 658. 
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is still the case in the present discussion.  I do not think the Yogācāra would use the 
Self as the example to prove self-awareness because as the advocate of Selflessness, it 
is unlikely for Buddhists to positively use the Self in their arguments.  Therefore, I 
would consider this Self-example argument as just a hypothetical argument proposed 
by Kumārila.  The reason why he proposes such argument may be that he has stated 
in ŚV Ātmavāda that “the Self is self-illuminated”.325  Kumārila might, therefore, have 
some misgivings about his opponent using this as an example to prove the existence of 
reflexivity.  When rejecting this example, Kumārila explains that the Self can be 
considered as a perceiver or a perceived object by way of its different characteristics in 
different situations.  For example, it can be a perceiver in terms of having the 
characteristic of consciousness while it can be a perceived object in terms of having the 
characteristic of substance.  However, the Self cannot be one thing playing two roles 
in one act, but it can be one thing playing two roles in two different situations.326 
Śrīdhara, in his Nyāyakandalī, also mentions this Self-example.  When his opponent 
proposes the Self to be a thing having two characteristics, i.e., the object and the agent, 
simultaneously, and intends to prove that the cognition too has different natures, such 
as instrument and so on, he states his objection: 
Not so; because the diverse characters are not incompatible in the 
case of the Self; as the objectivity of the Self consists in its being the 
object of the action of cognition; and as in this action the Self is 
independent (of all other things), it has the character of the agent also; 
and certainly there is no incompatibility between objectivity and 
independence. On the other hand, the character of instrument and that 
                                                 
325 See n. 659. 
326 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 68 in appendix VI, § 2.3.3.2.1, n. 660. 
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of action are not compatible; in as much as the instrument is an 
accomplished thing while an action is something yet to be 
accomplished; specially as there could be no identity between the 
effect and the cause.327 
In his opinion, the agent, the instrument and the object in one act must be performed by 
different things and the Self can play different roles in different cases, but it cannot play 
different roles in one single case. 
It is observed that ŚV Śūnyavāda 67cd-69 is mentioned by Prajñākaragupta in his PVA. 
In addition, he mentions another reason why Buddhists should not propose the Self as 
an example to prove reflexivity.  He says that Buddhists who do not accept the 
existence of the Self at all cannot use it as an example which is accepted merely by the 
opponent. 328   This objection is not found in Kumārila’s work.  However, this 
argument seems quite tenable because it is universally acknowledged among Indian 
philosophers that in the context of a debate, all basic constituents of a proposition 
should be mutually accepted by both the proponent and the opponent.  
Prajñākaragupta does not reply to this argument (at least in his explanation of PV 3.425); 
neither does Jayanta nor Yamāri, the commentators of PVA.  Nevertheless, we should 
not be too surprised about the absence of Prajñākaragupta’s reply (if not found 
elsewhere) because as I mentioned earlier, it is unlikely for Buddhists to positively use 
the Self in their statements, so this argument may well be just a hypothetical one 
proposed by Kumārila and Śrīdhara. 
                                                 
327 Jhā 1982: 201-202. Cf. also NK, p. 91. For Faddegon’s translation, cf. Faddegon 
1918: 404. 
328 Cf. appendix VI, § 2.3.3.2.2. 
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4.1.3 The Objections to the Example of Light329 
Light Is Not Something To Be Illuminated 
As mentioned above, the opponent of the Mādhyamika who claims that the cognition 
can cognize itself appears for the first time in Nāgārjuna’s works,330 which is before 
the time the Yogācāra emerges if we follow the opinion that the Yogācāra emerges at 
the time of Asaṅga.  Hence, from a historical approach, Nāgārjuna’s refutation may 
not be considered as a refutation of Yogācāra’s view. But theoretically, his argument 
can be seen as a refutation of the doctrine of self-awareness by Dignāga and 
Dharmakīrti.  Therefore, from a logical angle, I would consider Nāgārjuna as an 
                                                 
329 In the following discussion, I use the word “light” when referring to this example 
of self-awareness, although I see that “lamp” or “fire” is used in some texts. I have 
explained the reason for doing so in footnote 316.  
330  In an article titled “Is Nāgārjuna a Mādhyamika”, Saito argues that from his 
historical and philosophical angles, Nāgārjuna is not a Mādhyamika but merely a 
“founder or originator of the Mahāyāna-Abhidharma movement”. However, the 
evidence he proposed for this conclusion is merely that “Nāgārjuna recognized himself 
only as a ‘Śūnyatāvadin’…and not as a ‘Mādhyamika’ or ‘dBu ma pa’” and “Bhāviveka 
was the first to call himself a ‘dBu ma pa’”.  (Cf. Saito 2007: 155.)  I am hardly 
convinced by such argument. In my opinion, someone expressly claiming himself to be 
a follower of a certain philosophical system is not a prerequisite for this person to be 
considered as a member or the founder of the said philosophical system. I did not see 
such rule in any historical approach and even if such a rule exists in some cases, I do 
not think it should be applied in the current discussion.  On the contrary, I believe the 
criteria for a person to be considered as a member of a philosophical system should be 
whether the person accepts and makes a contribution to that system.  And if a person 
is the first one who does so to a certain philosophical thought, he can be considered as 
the founder of that system.  Therefore, I put aside Saito’s opinion and follow the 
tradition in this field to consider Nāgārjuna as a Mādhyamika. 
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opponent of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.  It is particularly worth noting that the later 
*Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas, such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, use Nāgārjuna’s method 
to confront the Yogācāra.  So to understand Prajñākaragupta’s reply to the attacks on 
the ultimate existence of self-awareness (to be introduced below), it is important to bear 
in mind that when the Mādhyamikas refute self-awareness, they present their 
refutations in two realms: the ultimate reality (paramārthasatya) and the conventional 
reality (saṃvṛtisatya).331 
In MK 7.9,332 Nāgārjuna defines the meaning of illumination (prakāśa) of the light as 
the destruction of the darkness. Whether this definition is accepted by the Yogācāra is 
open for discussion; for instance, Dharmakīrti’s followers may not agree with this 
definition.333 Nevertheless, it is important for Nāgārjuna to build his own thought by 
criticizing other opinions so that he can claim that the light does not illuminate itself 
because there is no darkness to be destroyed in the space occupied by the light.334  To 
reject the light-example, Śāntideva also states that “[light] is not illuminated.”335 When 
                                                 
331 For more information about this issue and the argument as to whether *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamikas refute self-awareness at the conventional level, cf. § 5. 
332 MK 7.9: pradīpe nāndhakāro ’sti yatra cāsau pratiṣṭhitaḥ / kiṃ prakāśayate dīpaḥ 
prakāśo hi tamovadhaḥ // “There is no darkness either in the light or where it is placed. 
What does the light illuminate? Illumination is in fact the destruction of darkness.” 
(Siderits_Katsura 2013: 77.) 
333 Cf § 2.2. Cf. also NM 4.4.1.1. 
334 In VV 34, we find another similar argument by Nāgārjuna: “This is a defective 
proposition (viṣamopanyāsa). Fire does not illuminate itself, for its non-perception is 
not seen to be comparable to that of a vase in darkness (na hi tasyānupalabdhir dṛṣṭā 
tamasīva kumbhasya).” (Bhattacharya_Johnston_Kunst 1986: 117.)  
335 BA 9.18c1: naiva prakāśyate. 
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Kumārila claims that the light is merely an illuminator but not an illuminated object, he 
explains the reason for such claim is that the light does not depend on the illuminator 
to illuminate it. 336  Accordingly, we can presume that in Kumārila’s opinion, 
illumination is an act in which an object needs an illuminator for its manifestation.  If 
so, Kumārila’s description of illumination is essentially consistent with that of 
Nāgārjuna.  However, according to Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s introduction to Yogācāra’s 
description of the term prakāśa, we have another meaning of illumination.  In NM 
4.4.1.1, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta says, “[Vijñānavādin:] An illumination (prakāśa) is what makes 
[something] manifest (prakāśayati).”337  And the way he rejects the reflexivity is to 
reject that one thing can possess two dissimilar natures.  In NM 4.1.1, he states: 
As you know (khalu), the nature of a cognition, being single, cannot 
be both perceiver and perceived by nature, because the natures of the 
perceiver and the perceived, being mutually dissimilar, cannot 
cohabit in one and the same locus.338 
Śrīdhara also states his objection to the light-example in NK; he says:  
[Opponent:] The self-illuminating lamp [can be the example].   
[Proponent:] It is not so because it (i.e., the lamp) is cognized by the 
man and it is made known by the sense of vision and the [cognitive] 
action of that [light] is the cognition. Further, [the lamp] itself [can] 
                                                 
336 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 65 in appendix VI, § 2.3.1, n. 650. 
337 Watson_Kataoka 2010: p. 332. 
338 Watson_Kataoka 2010: 324. (NM: na khalv eva bodhātmā grāhyagrāhakobhaya-
svabhāvo bhavitum arhati grāhyagrāhakarūpayor itaretaravisadṛśatve naikatra 
samāveśānupapatteḥ / p. 23.) 
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not be the instrument, the agent, the object and the action [at the same 
time and in the same case].339 
If I understand this passage correctly, it appears that Śrīdhara rejects the light to be a 
valid example to prove reflexivity by claiming that in a cognitive action of seeing the 
light, the light can only play the role of the object while the roles of the agent, the 
instrument and the action are performed by the man, the eyes and the cognition, 
respectively.  However, there appears to be a logical gap in Śrīdhara’s argument, viz, 
there is no connection at all between the conclusion that the light cannot be the subject-
object-instrument-action in the illuminating action (for instance, the action of 
illuminating a vase) and the proof that the light can only be the object in the cognitive 
action (i.e., the action of seeing the light).  Just like a man cannot play on both sides 
of a table when he is playing an official table tennis championship, but at other times, 
he can nevertheless play that way when he is playing for fun, it could be that in the 
cognitive action of seeing a light, the light can only play one role – the object, but in 
the illuminating action, the light can be both the agent and the object. 
If Light Can Be Self-illuminating, All Actions Should Be Reflexive 
In MK 7.12, Nāgārjuna further argues that if the light can illuminate itself and others, 
such nature of reflexivity should similarly exist for other things. For instance, darkness 
would then conceal itself and others as well.340  In VV, Nāgārjuna’s two verses, 35 and 
36, are in relation to the same argument:  
                                                 
339 NK pp. 90-91: svaprakāśaḥ pradīpo ’sti cen / naivaṃ so ’pi hi puruṣeṇa jñāyate 
jñāpyate cakṣuṣājñānaṃ ca tasya kriyā / na ca svayaṃ karaṇaṃ kartā karma kriyā ca 
bhavati / 
340  Cf. MK 7.12: pradīpaḥ svaparātmānau saṃprakāśayate yadi / tamo ’pi 
svaparātmānau chādayiṣyaty asaṃśayam // 
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If, as you say, fire illuminates itself as it illuminates other things, then 
it will also burn itself. 
If, as you say, fire illuminates both other things and itself, then 
darkness will cover both other things and itself.341 
This type of refutation appears even in some Mahāyānasūtras, which according to 
Mahāyāna Buddhists, are the basis of Nāgārjuna’s tenet. For instance, in MABh 6.76, 
Candrakīrti attributes his same argument to Āryalaṅkāvatāramahāyānasūtra.342  In 
BA 9.17, Śāntideva also uses the same way to refute self-awareness and attributes his 
refutation to Buddha, saying, “Further, it was taught by the lord of worlds that the mind 
does not perceive the mind.  Like the blade of a sword that does not cut itself, so does 
the consciousness.”343  In Prajñākaramati’s commentary on BA, the teaching of the 
lord of worlds is referred to Āryaratnacūḍaparipṛcchānāmamahāyānasūtra 344 , in 
                                                 
341 Bhattacharya_Johnston_Kunst 1986: 116-117. 
342 Cf. appendix IV. 
343 BA 9.17: uktaṃ ca lokanāthena cittaṃ cittaṃ na paśyati / na cchinatti yathātmānam 
asidhārā tathā manaḥ / 
344 BAP: tatredam uktam āryaratnacūḍasūtre: sa cittaṃ parigaveṣamāṇo nādhyātmaṃ 
cittaṃ samanupaśyati / na bahirdhā cittaṃ samanupaśyati / na skandheṣu cittaṃ 
samanupaśyati / na dhātuṣu cittaṃ samanupaśyati / nāyataneṣu cittaṃ samanupaśyati 
/ sa cittam asamanupaśyaṃś cittadhārāṃ paryeṣate kutaś cittasyotpattir iti / ālambane 
sati cittam utpadyate / tat kim anyac cittam anyad ālambanam, atha yad evālambanaṃ 
tad eva cittam. yadi tāvad anyad ālambanam anyac cittam, tad dvicittatā bhaviṣyati / 
atha yad evālambanaṃ tad eva cittam / tat kathaṃ cittaṃ cittaṃ paśyati / na hi cittaṃ 
cittaṃ samanupaśyati / tad yathā na tasyaiva asidhārayā saiva asiṃdhārā śakyate 
chettum, na tenaiva aṅgulyagreṇa tad eva aṅgulyagraṃ spraṣṭuṃ śakyate, evam eva 
tenaiva cittena tad eva cittaṃ draṣṭum iti vistaraḥ // (p. 188, ll. 18-26.) 
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which it was taught that the blade of the knife cannot cut itself, nor can the tip of the 
finger touch itself; similarly, the mind cannot observe itself. 
The Illumination of the Light Depends on Cognition 
To reject the self-illuminating light-example, Śāntideva distinctly argues that having 
cognized that the lamp illuminates, it is explained [that the lamp is cognized] by a 
cognition, [but] having cognized that the cognition illuminates, how can it be 
explained?345  When the cognition is not perceived, it would be meaningless to talk 
about that the light and the like have the nature of illumination or that the vase and the 
like have the nature of non-illumination.346 According to Śāntideva, the reason that the 
light cannot be the example is that the cognition is yet to be established.  Before the 
cognition is proved, one should not propose anything, beyond it and to be proved by it, 
to prove cognition. 
4.1.4 Counterexample: Sense of Vision 
To reject the reflexivity, Kumārila raises a counter-example.  In ŚV, he explains that 
                                                 
345 Cf. BA 9.22a: dīpaḥ prakāśata iti jñātvā jñānena kathyate / buddhiḥ prakāśata iti 
jñātvedaṃ kena kathyate /  
a The numbering of this verse is said to be assigned by Minaev (Minayaf in Vaidya’s 
transliteration) and adopted by La Vallée Poussin and Vaidya. Perhaps in the 
consideration that this numbering somehow lacks textual support, La Vallée Poussin 
has suggested, in a footnote, that the real numbering of this verse is 21. However, 
Minaev’s edition is not at my disposal. Thus, for the numbering of verses, I simply 
follow Vaidya. (Cf. BAP, p. 397, n. 3 and BAv, p. 190, n. 1.) 
346 Cf. BA 9.23: prakāśā vāprakāśā vā yadā dṛṣṭā na kenacit / vandhyāduhitṛlīleva 
kathyamānāpi sā mudhā / Cf. also BAP: prakāśā vā prakāśātmikā dīpavat / aprakāśā 
vā aprakāśātmikā ghaṭādivat / parasparasamuccaye vāśabdadvayam / buddhiḥ yadā 
dṛṣṭā na kenacit, na pratipannā kenacit pratipantrā svayaṃrūpeṇa vā / (p. 191.) 
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when one is looking at a light, the perceiving subject is in fact the sense faculty, not the 
light.  In that case, sense of vision cannot be the object.  However, sense of vision 
can be an object when it is perceived by cognition.  In that case, the cognition would 
be the subject which perceives, but not the object.  It can be an object only when it is 
perceived by another cognition.347  
Using this counter-example, i.e., sense of vision, Kumārila illustrates that one thing can 
possess two contradictory characteristics only when such characteristics are related to 
different aspects or situations; for example, the sense of vision can be the perceiver and 
the perceived object, when they are separately related to different situations, namely, 
the situation that they are watching the light and the situation that they are being 
watched by the cognition.  Accordingly, the example of cognition implies that 
cognition would be a perceiver only when it is related to its object and be an object only 
when it is related to its perceiver - another cognition.  In short, in Kumārila’s view, 
self-awareness cannot be the perceiving agent and the perceived object when it is 
related to itself. 
4.2 Prajñākaragupta’s Response 
4.2.1 Only Cognition Exists in Reality 
In appendix VI, I made a comparison between the relevant criticisms proposed by 
Kumārila in his ŚV Śūnyavāda vv. 64-69 and those proposed by the opponent in PVA.348 
Due to the similarities between the views of Kumārila and the opponent in PVA, as 
revealed by such comparison, I presume that Kumārila is the opponent of 
Prajñākaragupta in the current arguments. Prajñākaragupta’s responses begin with a 
                                                 
347 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 66-67ab in appendix VI, n. 653 and 655. 
348 See n. 649, 650, 653, 655, 658 and 660 and the corresponding parts in PVA. 
153 
 
claim that the state of being the perceiver and the perceived object, which we experience 
in our everyday life, does not exist in reality. 349   This response is rather terse.  
However, it is observed that Dharmakīrti was confronted with a similar argument and 
he has clearly given his answer.  In PV 3.318ab1, his opponent argues that it would be 
contradictory that both the action and the instrument in one action are one real thing. 
To this Dharmakīrti replies that since the difference between the properties, such as the 
action and the instrument, is accepted merely under the worldly convention, we should 
accept that in reality, they are not different from each other.350 In PV 3.330cd-332ab,351 
Dharmakīrti further explains that in fact cognition does not have the forms of the object 
and the perceiver and the two forms what ordinary people use to see in their daily life 
are just due to the mistaken mental construction, which is affected by the ceaseless 
dualistic karmic trace.  The difference between the object and the cognition is 
established at the conventional level just like the hair is seen as the external existent by 
one who has problem with his sense faculty.  And only with this understanding, the 
characteristics of the object and the perceiver would be accepted in our everyday 
practice. In Prajñākaragupta’s comments on PV 3.330cd-332ab, we also find that he 
has also stated “[Things, such as] action, agent and so on, which are conceptually 
constructed, [should] not be apprehended as the real thing.”352  
                                                 
349 Cf. appendix VI, § 2.4.1. 
350  Cf. PV 3.318-319: kriyākaraṇayor aikyavirodha iti ced asat / 
dharmabhedābhyupagamād vastv abhinnam itīṣyate // evaṃprakārā sarvaiva 
kriyākārakasaṃsthitiḥ / bhāveṣu bhinnābhimateṣv apy āropeṇa vṛttitaḥ // 
351 Cf. PV 3.330cd-332ab: avedyavedakākārā; yathā bhrāntair nirīkṣyate // vibhakta-
lakṣaṇagrāhyagrāhakākāraviplavā / tathā kṛtavyavastheyaṃ keśādijñānabhedavat // 
yadā tadā na saṃcodyagrāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇā / 
352 PVA, v. 3.757ab: kalpitaḥ karmakartrādiḥ paramārtho na vidyate / (PVA2, p. 369, 
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It is observed that Jinendrabuddhi has the same opinion when he defends self-awareness.  
In PSṬ, when his opponent questions how cognition can experience itself solely by 
itself and argues that it is unreasonable that the object, the agent and the instrument 
exist in one cognition, Jinendrabuddhi replies that, according to the ultimate reality, 
there is no object and so on for that cognition at all, but like the illumination of a light 
which is conventionally effected by itself, in the case of self-awareness, the same 
convention is not opposed.353 
4.2.2 The Light as an Example for Self-awareness 
As mentioned above, the arguments about the reflexivity of cognition are centered on 
whether there is a reflexive act (for instance, the illumination of the light, which we can 
use as an example of self-awareness) or whether there are valid counterexamples (for 
instance, the sense faculty proposed by Kumārila and so on, which can reject the 
reflexivity). As we have learned in Nāgārjuna’s and Kumārila’s refutations, 
illumination is defined as an act on the object, which makes it illuminated to the visual 
perception. Such act must be done through something other than the sense faculty. We 
have also learned from Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s introduction that the Yogācāra describes the 
illumination as an act which makes something manifested to the visual perception 
through the sense faculty. Prajñākaragupta’s explanation of illumination is consistent 
with such description. 
                                                 
l. 19.) Cf. PVAt: / las dang byed pa po la sogs / / brtags yin dam pa'i don du med / (D 
39a3.) 
353 Cf. PSṬ: kathaṃ punar ātmanaivātmānam anubhavati jñānam / na hi tasyaiva 
karmakartṛkaraṇabhāvo yujyata iti ced evam etat / naiva tasya paramārthataḥ 
karmādibhāvaḥ / tathāpi tādātmyāt prakāśavat tatra tathāvyavahāro na virudhyate / (p. 
70, ll. 11-13.) 
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In the defence of the reflexivity for the cognition and the light, Prajñākaragupta uses a 
double negative expression as the inferential reasons: “not apprehended by others” 
(aparapratyaya) 354 for “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) and “not being illuminated 
by others” (na parasya prakāśakatā) for the light.355  Accordingly, I presume that 
Prajñākaragupta is probably the one who upholds the view proposed by Bhaṭṭa 
Jayanta’s opponent, i.e., illumination is considered as what makes something 
manifest.356 When Kumārila uses the reason “because the light does not depend on an 
illuminator” to prove “the light is not an illuminated object”357, Prajñākaragupta might 
argue that “not depend on an illuminator” in fact means that the manifestation of the 
light does not depend on another illuminator. In this manner, the light-example can be 
interpreted as an object which makes itself manifest, namely, the light has sufficient 
capability of manifesting itself to the visual cognition (through the eyes of course) while 
other objects, like the vase and so on, do not have such capability—their manifestation 
to the visual perception needs an additional illuminator, i.e., the light.  On the other 
hand, we can literally or conventionally say that cognition cognizes itself or the 
cognition is the cognizer of itself.  It is in this respect that the light is considered as a 
valid analogical example to self-awareness, which is considered as a specific nature of 
cognition, a kind of self-sufficiency in manifesting itself to itself. 
4.2.3 Sense Faculty as an Invalid Counter-example 
Prajñākaragupta denies the visual sense faculty as a valid counterexample in rejecting 
                                                 
354 I call this expression a double negative because I think the other (para) can be 
considered as a negation of the self (sva). 
355 Cf. appendix VI, § 2.4.2. 
356 See n. 337. 
357 See n. 650. 
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self-awareness.358  In his opinion, even though the faculty engages in the action of 
seeing an object and it is a sine qua non for the arising of a visual cognition, it cannot 
be deemed as an illuminator.  The strict criterion for a thing to be an illuminator is 
whether it can manifest itself to the cognition with or without the sense faculty. Since 
the manifestation of the sense faculty must depend on something else, such as the light, 
the sense faculty cannot be an illuminator, but rather designated (conventionally) as the 
object only. 
4.2.4 Self as Non-agent in the Cognitive Action 
In addition, assuming that the opponent may accept the Self as the agent in the cognitive 
process or the enjoyer of the pleasure and so on, Prajñākaragupta argues that if pleasure 
is experienced by the Self, which is supposed to be that which experiences and enjoys 
the world and one does not accept that the agent, i.e., the Self, and the object, i.e., the 
pleasure, are one entity, then there would be an unacceptable consequence in our daily 
life that we should experience the pleasure to be something separated from us, just as 
we see a vase as an external object. But this is obviously absurd.  To this argument, 
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, may argue that there would be no such absurd consequence because 
the Self would not experience the pleasure by itself alone but through a special relation, 
the inherence (samavāya), which makes the Self connected with the pleasure. Therefore, 
the pleasure inherently exists in the Self and it is this very relation of inherence between 
the Self and the pleasure that produces the perception of the pleasure.359  However, 
Prajñākaragupta refutes this defence with two points: firstly, assuming that the alleged 
relation, samavāya, can make the cognition, i.e., pleasure, inherent in the Self, 
                                                 
358 Cf. appendix VI, § 2.4.3.  A similar response by Mokṣākaragupta can be found in 
TBh, p. 17. 
359 Cf. Sinha 1958: 216-217. 
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Prajñākaragupta argues that the Self and the cognition would indeed become one 
inseparable entity, such as the cowness and the cow, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 
theory.360  If the Self in fact experiences the cognition that inheres in itself, how can 
the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explain that the Self is not self-aware?  Jayanta gives further 
explanation to this argument, saying, “if the relata (i.e., the Self and the pleasure), which 
have samavāya, are different from each other, the samavāya would not exist; if they are 
not different from each other, both would have the same nature.” 361   Secondly, 
Prajñākaragupta claims that the so-called samavāya has been rejected.  Although 
neither Prajñākaragupta nor his commentators, i.e., Jayanta and Yamāri, mentions that 
in which section of PV or PVA the above refutation is located, it is not difficult to find 
in PV and its commentaries the refutations of samavāya.  For instance, Dharmakīrti 
has stated in PV 3.149ab: “The relation [between the object and the cognition] remains 
                                                 
360  Cf. PDhS, 9: ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṃ yaḥ sambandha 
ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ / (NK, p. 14.) “The relation, which is a cause of the 
idea ‘[this is] here (this is in that)’, between entities that are incapable of existing 
separately [and] that stand as the superstratum and the substratum, is inherence.” 
(Hirano 2009: 46.) Jhā’s translation cf. Jhā 1982: 32. A study and translation of the 
definition of ayutasiddha in Kiraṇāvalī are provided by Hirano (2010). B. K. Dalai also 
provides a comprehensive study on the inherence in Indian Logic in his monograph in 
2005. 
361  Cf. J: / med do (= na) zhes bya ba ni ’du ba can dag tha dad pa yin na ’du ba ma 
yin la, tha mi dad na yang de gnyi ga’i bdag nyid yin na yang ngo / (D 194b1.) We also 
have Yamāri’s explanation: “if the Self and the pleasure and so forth are established as 
not separable, then because [there is] no difference, [the Self] would become self-
awareness. (Y: / gal te bdag dang bde ba la sogs pa yang so so ma yin pa grub na de’i 
tshetha dad pa med pa’i phyir rang rig pa’i rang bzhin nyid du ’gyur te / D 310a5.) 
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non-observed because the observation of the samavāya is absent”362 and in PV 2.69, 
we also find a statement by Dharmakīrti: 
By that (i.e., by the rejection of the relation between sustainer and 
sustained) inherence and the cause characterized by inherence [as 
well as] the fact that the universal, etc., are situated in [certain 
individuals] are rejected, because [things] do not have a support. 363 
In summary, the refutations of reflexivity for the self-awareness and the light are all 
made on two bases: first, the different interpretations of the cognitive act and the 
illumination, and second, the example of counterexamples.  Against all refutations, 
Yogācāras can well establish their own interpretation of the cognitive act and the 
illumination of the light.  Thus, logically speaking, the refutations are loose.  
Although the opponents, such as Prajñākaramati, base their refutations on the worldly 
convention and allege that the advocates of self-awareness would break with the 
worldly convention, such refutations are still far from sufficient to overthrow 
Yogācāra’s self-awareness theory, especially in the light of the fact that the Yogācāra 
can back it up by the experience of our intuition.  To this, Prajñākaragupta has, in PVA 
v. 619, stated:  
If the cognition of the [object] is not perceptible, how can it be known 
that it is cognition?  Who is able to perceive the own nature of this 
imperceptible [cognition]?364 
                                                 
362 PV 3.149ab: samavāyāgrahād akṣaiḥ sambandhādarśanaṃ sthitam / 
363 Franco 1997: 317. Cf. also PV 2.69: etena samavāyaś ca samavāyi ca kāraṇam / 
vyavasthitatvaṃ jātyāder nirastam anapāśrayāt / 
364 PVA v. 3.619: parokṣaṃ yadi tajjñānaṃ jñānam ity eva tat kutaḥ / parokṣasya 
svarūpaṃ kas tasya lakṣayituṃ kṣamaḥ / (PVA2, p. 345, l. 30.) 
159 
 
Therefore, if the opponents cannot disprove the reflexivity in the self-awareness or the 
self-illuminating light based on a meta-theory which can fault the notion of reflexivity, 
the current attacks with just a few counterexamples are not sufficient to shake 
Yogācāra’s theory.  Indeed, before Prajñākaragupta taking up the gauntlet, he has 
clearly seen this shortcoming in the opponents’ attacks and in his commentary on PV 
3.329, when responding to the typical counterexample against self-awareness, “the 
blade of the sword which cannot cut itself”365, he replies: 
By what means of knowledge is the notion of “the contradiction of 
the action in relation upon itself” known? [Your] purpose is not 
achieved by merely a [counter-]example because the example, 
namely the lamp, is possible also in the opposite of what is accepted 
[by you].366 
Prajñākaragupta’s defence is indeed robust and strong. I am not sure whether he was 
aware that the counterexample of “the blade of the sword cannot cut itself” was found 
in two Mahāyānasūtras or whether he held his interpretation of the Sūtras to be 
restricted to other cases. Following his approach, some other refutations of reflexivity 
(in effect of self-awareness), such as that by Nāgārjuna—if light can illuminate itself, 
then fire can burn itself and darkness can conceal itself, would not be difficult to reject, 
because even if reflexivity may exist in some actions, it does not necessarily exist in all 
actions.367 
                                                 
365 PVA: na hi saivāsidhārā tayaiva cchidyate / (PVA2, p. 353, l. 14.) 
366 PVA: svātmani kriyāvirodha iti kutaḥ pramāṇād avagatam. na hi dṛṣṭāntamātrād 
arthasya prasiddhiḥ. samīhitasya viparyaye ’pi dṛṣṭāntasya pradīpasya sambhavāt / 
(PVA2, p. 353, ll. 19-20.) 
367 It may be noteworthy that the argument of “darkness would conceal itself” is not 
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convincing at all because this argument would be based on a prerequisite that darkness 
can at least conceal other things, but darkness is not a thing which can take an action to 
conceal something but just a state of being without light. Therefore, I believe the 
argument of “darkness would conceal itself” can be put aside. 
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5 On *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s Refutation of Self-awareness 
It was mentioned earlier in this dissertation that Mādhyamika scholars have involved 
themselves in the debate on the self-awareness. Unlike the criticisms from non-
Buddhists we have observed in the previous sections, Mādhyamika’s criticism is not 
something the Buddhist advocates of self-awareness (especially, some Tibetan Buddhist 
scholars) can simply reject or ignore, especially when *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s 
rejections of self-awareness are directed to the conventional level, namely, when they 
suggest to completely abandon the doctrine of self-awareness in our world.  However, 
arguments are found over whether *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas, which are represented 
by Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, reject the self-awareness at the conventional level.  
According to Williams, the Tibetan scholars from Nyingmapa and Sakyapa, using 
Śāntideva’s BA as an example, prefer to limit the interpretation of *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamika’s arguments to the ultimate reality alone while Gelugpa considers the 
arguments to be applicable to both the ultimate reality and the conventional level.  
Williams appears to side with the scholars of Nyingmapa and Sakyapa and accordingly 
he provides us with a comprehensive study on the view of Tibetan advocates of self-
awareness, which is represented by the view of modern Nyingmapa scholar, Mi Pham.  
However, some of Williams’ criticisms of the Gelugpas require further examination.  
In this chapter, I will look into the arguments over self-awareness by *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamikas and depict the whole frame of their refutation of self-awareness in view 
of the Gelugpa, using Candrakīrti’s MABh and two commentaries on Śāntideva’s BA 
(by Vibhūticandra and Tsong Kha Pa) as the examples.  After that, I come to my view 
on their arguments, which is the opposite of that of Williams.  Moreover, I will also 
introduce how *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas, including their Tibetan followers (i.e., the 
Gelugpas), explain their theories of memory and the theories of the cognition of 
cognition without the self-awareness. 
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5.1 The Main Purpose of the Refutation of Self-awareness 
At the very beginning of the refutation of self-awareness,368 Candrakīrti questions the 
Yogācāra: according to you, if the external object is not real while the cognition (i.e., 
the other-dependent nature mentioned in MABh) is real, then what is the means of 
knowledge to establish such real existence?  From this question, we can infer that 
Candrakīrti is concerned that if the real existence of other-dependent nature can be 
proved by itself, namely, by the self-awareness, then, there will be a real basis—the 
existence of which is not dependent on another thing (namely, a self-sufficient 
establishment)—for the view of inherent existence which is considered by the 
*Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika as the fundamental wrong view of Self (ātman) and the root 
of all sufferings.  In a paper by Garfield, he mentions that Thupten Jinpa, Blumenthal 
and Williams all agree that this is the main purpose of *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s 
refutations of self-awareness and Garfield adds that this is “a recurrent theme in 
philosophical discussion in the dGe lugs tradition” too.  But Garfield does not think 
“that there is any evidence that Tsong khapa, the founder of Gelugpa, ever offers this 
argument.”369  However, in Tsong Kha Pa’s Drang nges legs bshad snying po, I find a 
statement as follows: 
In short, cognition is conceptually constructed in dependence on [the 
object] to be known.  Accordingly, it is not established by its own 
character.  If so, [the object] to be known too [exists] in the same 
manner [namely not established by its own nature]. Therefore, not 
only the expression of these two (i.e., the cognition and the object) 
are dependent on each other, the referents [of the expressions] are 
                                                 
368 Cf. appendix IV, § 1.1. 
369 Cf. Garfield 2006: 219. 
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merely conceptually constructed by mutually relying on each other.  
Therefore, self-awareness is not accepted.370 
Tsong Kha Pa even attributes his opinion to Nāgārjuna.371 The citation is VV 40, in 
which Nāgārjuna states: 
If the pramāṇas are self-established (yadi ca svataḥ pramāṇasiddhiḥ), 
then the ‘means of true cognition’ are established for you 
independently of the ‘objects of true cognition’ (anapekṣya tava 
prameyāṇi bhavati pramāṇasiddhiḥ).  For self-establishment does 
not require another thing (na parāpekṣā svataḥ siddhiḥ).372 
Accordingly, we might assume, what is Candrakīrti’s purpose of his rejection of self-
awareness is the purpose of Nāgārjuna’s rejection of the self-established pramāṇa. 
5.2 The Refutation of Self-awareness in Ultimate Reality 
The Refutation Laid in the Authoritative Scriptures 
In § 4.1.3, I mentioned that Candrakīrti and Śāntideva have cited some counterexamples 
from Āryalaṅkāvatāramahāyānasūtra and Āryaratnacūḍaparipṛcchānāmamahāyāna-
sūtra, such as the blade of the sword which cannot cut itself, to disprove the self-
awareness. I am aware that Mādhyamikas may use these counterexamples in both 
                                                 
370 Cf. DRNG 158a4-5: mdor na shes pa shes bya la brten nas btags pas rang gi mtshan 
nyid kyis ma grub la shes bya yang de ltar yin pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis de gnyis kyi tha 
snyad phan tshun ltos par ma zad don yang phan tshun ltos btags tsam yin pas rang rig 
mi ’dod pa yin no / 
371 Cf. DRNG 158a5-6: rtsod zlog las kyang / gal te rang las tshad ma grub / gzhal bya 
rnams la ma ltos par / kyod kyi tshad ma grub ’gyur ’dir gzhan la mi ltos 
rang ’grub ’gyur / zhes rang rig bkag pa’i rigs pas kyang zhes so / 
372 Bhattacharya_Johnston_Kunst 1986: 120. 
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ultimate and conventional reality so that the existence of self-awareness can be 
completely denied (details to be explained later).  However, because (1) it is generally 
acknowledged that the refutation of a thing in the Mahāyānasūtras on the teaching of 
ultimate reality is often limited to its existence in the ultimate reality only and (2) 
Śāntarakṣita and his followers, including all Non-Gelugpa Tibetan scholars, would not 
agree to interpret these counterexamples stated in Buddha’s teachings as the refutation 
of the conventional self-awareness, I therefore intentionally consider such 
counterexamples as the refutation concerning ultimate reality in this section so that 
there is room for this argument. 
The Unestablished Memory-reason and Unestablished Causal Relation between 
Memory and Self-awareness 
Two further sections that contributed to the ultimate refutation of self-awareness in 
MABh are about the rejection of the ultimate existence of memory-reason and the 
rejection of the real relation between the memory-reason and the self-awareness.  
Sections § 1.3.2.2.1 (precisely, the section of MABh 6.73bcd) and § 1.3.2.2.4 in 
appendix IV are relevant to the first rejection.  In this argument, Candrakīrti refuses 
the use of the memory-reason to prove self-awareness at the ultimate level because 
according to Mādhyamika’s view, nothing can be established in ultimate reality.  
Section § 1.3.2.2.5 in appendix IV, namely, MABh 6.74, is relevant to the second 
rejection.  In this section, Candrakīrti criticizes Yogācāra’s theory of the memory of 
cognition before presenting his own theory.  He indicates that based on Yogācāra’s 
theory that cognition substantively (or absolutely) exists, if one can remember his 
previous cognition, he should also be able to remember the cognition of another person. 
This is because if the cognitions of one person exist substantively and are different from 
each other, then they are substantively (or absolutely) different from each other, like the 
cognitions of one person and that of another. 
165 
 
According to Candrakīrti, such substantive difference will settle all difference of 
difference, some of which should have been restricted.  For instance, it is generally 
accepted that two different cognitions from two different persons are absolutely 
different from each other without any relation between them (with the exception of yogi 
perception of the cognition of another person) but two different cognitions that arise 
subsequently from one person will have a causal relation between them.  However, if 
cognitions are substantively different from each other, according to Candrakīrti, the 
difference between two cognitions from two persons and the difference between two 
cognitions from one person are in fact the same, namely, they are all absolutely different 
from each other.  Thus, no matter in which mind series they exist, they would not have 
any relation whatsoever. 373  Therefore, in Candrakīrti’s opinion, Yogācāras cannot 
answer the question why one can only remember one’s own previous experience. They 
cannot use memory-reason to prove that a remembered cognition must be previously 
experienced by a cognition.374  
 
  
                                                 
373 For the argument as to that there would be no causal relation when things can be 
established by their own nature, cf. MABh 6.34-38b. 
374 Cf. appendix IV, § 1.3.2.2.5. 
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5.3 The Refutation of Self-awareness in Conventional Reality 
Candrakīrti and Śāntideva refute the self-awareness in the conventional reality mainly 
by challenging the relation between the memory-reason and the self-awareness to be 
proved.  From two different angles, they have dissenting views on the usage of 
memory-reason in proving self-awareness.  I set forth the following analysis of their 
arguments and tentatively provide my responses based on the theory of the Yogācāra. 
It is worth mentioning that the *Prāsaṅgika Madhyamika and the Yogācāra have very 
different views when come to the definitions of the ultimate and the conventional 
realities. Therefore, the self-awareness rejected by the *Prāsaṅgika Madhyamika in 
conventional reality might in fact be the self-awareness accepted by the Yogācāra in 
reality. 
5.3.1 Whether *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s Refutation of Reflexivity Extends to 
Conventional Reality 
First, it is well-known that on most occasions, *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s rejections 
are limited to the ultimate realm only—for example, they do not deny the existence of 
the vase and the like at the conventional level when they reject them in the ultimate 
reality whereas on some other occasions, for instance, when they reject the Self (ātman), 
they propose their rejections without limitation.  However, as to certain specific 
subjects, such as svasaṃvedana and ālayavijñāna, it is controversial whether 
*Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s rejections are limited or not.  There were debates on this 
issue between Gelugpa scholars and almost all non-Gelugpa Tibetan scholars since 
Tsong Kha Pa explicitly claims that *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s refutation of self-
awareness should be extended to the conventional reality.  The debate continues even 
in the modern academic field.375  As to this issue, I would side with Gelugpa scholars, 
                                                 
375 Cf. Williams 2000, Kapstein 2000 and Garfield 2006. 
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who claim that Candrakīrti and Śāntideva completely refute svasaṃvedana in both 
ultimate and conventional realms. This is because, as I see it, similar to the refutations 
of self-awareness by non-Buddhists, *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas’ refutations are mostly 
conducted from an epistemological perspective.  This suggests that in their opinion, 
the acceptance of self-awareness will bring about problems to the epistemic principles, 
which are intended for the conventional knowledge. 376   Thus, *Prāsaṅgika 
Mādhyamika’s refutation should not be limited to the ultimate realm.  In addition, the 
explicit statement by Candrakīrti and the argument by Śāntideva (in view of 
Vibhūticandra and Tsong Kha Pa) demonstrate that both of them intend to refute the 
self-awareness entirely, not just in the ultimate reality. 
Candrakīrti: Self-awareness Cannot Be Proved Even in Conventional Reality 
In an argument claiming that the memory-reason is an inconclusive reason, Candrakīrti 
clearly states that “even if in the light of the conventional practice, it is impossible for 
a memory to be the effect of the self-awareness.” 377   Thereafter, he directs this 
rejection to one of the prerequisites of a valid reason in the current argument - the 
relation between the self-awareness to be proved and the memory-reason.  The 
rejection is set out in two steps.  Firstly, Candrakīrti argues that if the relation between 
the memory and the self-awareness is not affirmed, the memory-reason would be 
merely an inconclusive reason in inferring self-awareness.  If the relation between the 
memory and the self-awareness is affirmed by someone, he must have previously 
affirmed the existence of the two components in that relation, namely, the self-
awareness and the memory.  Therefore, the person who uses the memory-reason to 
                                                 
376 In comparison, arguments from the perspective of ontology can be distinguished in 
the realms of ultimate reality and conventional reality. 
377 Cf. appendix IV, §1.3.2.2.1. 
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prove self-awareness would commit the fallacy of hysteron proteron.  Secondly, 
Candrakīrti further argues that in the light of the law of cause and effect, memory can 
arise from other causes without self-awareness, like “seeing water” and “seeing fire” in 
proving “water-crystal (chu shel)” and “fire-crystal (me shel)” 378 , respectively.  
Therefore, the memory-reason is an inconclusive reason in proving self-awareness.379  
Since both arguments are about the method of reasoning, that is to say, they are about 
the conventional rules of inference of acquiring knowledge, I am of the view that they 
can be considered as the evidence showing that Candrakīrti intends to extend his 
refutation to the conventional practice.  Otherwise, if Candrakīrti only intends to 
refute self-awareness in the ultimate realm only, he would not need to go thus far but 
can simply deny the existence of any relation between the memory and the self-
awareness at the ultimate level by claiming that nothing exists in the ultimate reality.  
In addition, MABh 6.74 also shows that Candrakīrti must have intended to reject the 
self-awareness in the conventional reality.  In order to reject the theory of memory 
proposed by the Yogācāra, Candrakīrti firstly rejects the substantive relation between 
one’s memory and one’s cognition remembered and then he presents a new theory of 
memory.380  If Candrakīrti accepts the self-awareness at the conventional level, he 
may have simply adopted the Yogācāra theory of memory at the conventional level.  
                                                 
378 According to Negi, chu shel is used to translate candrakānta (moon-crystal), which 
is “a gem supposed to be formed from the congelation of the moon's rays and to dissolve 
under the influence of its light” (MW: 386). And me shel is used to translate sūryakānta 
(sun-crystal), which is “a kind of crystal supposed to possess fabulous properties as 
giving out heat when exposed to the sun” (MW: 1243).  
379 Cf. appendix IV, § 1.3.2.2.3. Candrakīrti’s theory of the memory is presented in § 
5.3.3 and appendix IV, § 1.3.2.2.3. 
380 I will explain in more details later in § 5.3.3. 
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Śāntideva’s Refutation in the light of Vibhūticandra’s Interpretation: The Self-
awareness Is Not Established at All 
The debates on whether Śāntideva accepts self-awareness in conventional reality have 
lasted for centuries among Tibetan Buddhist scholars.  Between late eighteenth 
century and early nineteenth century, the debate became heated among a Nyingma 
scholar, Mi Pham, and his Gelugpa peers, Thub Bstan Chos Kyi Grags Pa and Blo 
Bzang Dpal Ldan Bstan ’Dzin.  An introduction to their debates is presented by 
Williams in his monograph, The Reflexive Nature of Awareness, which expands on his 
paper in 1998, “On Rang Rig”.  According to Mi Pham’s commentary on BA and 
Prajñākaramati’s BAP, Williams claims that Śāntideva’s refutation of self-awareness 
must be limited to the ultimate reality, that is to say, Śāntideva accepts the existence of 
self-awareness in our everyday life.  As a supporter of Mi Pham’s theory, Williams 
criticizes the Gelugpas for rashly asserting that Śāntideva’s refutation should be 
extended to the conventional reality.  He even claims that the Gelugpas “are able to 
find only one short and controversial quotation from Candrakīrti in support.”381 
Williams’ contribution to the study of self-awareness won high praise from Kapstein in 
his review of Williams’ book in 2000.  However, some deficiencies in Williams’s book 
have also been heavily criticized by Kapstein and Garfield, including (1) his 
misunderstanding of Gelugpa’s views, especially the view of Blo Bzang Dpal Ldan 
Bstan ’Dzin; (2) a “surprising error”382 in his translation of the word (mdo tsam) in Mi 
                                                 
381 Williams 2000: 43, n. 4. The “one short and controversial quotation” that Williams 
mentioned is probably a statement in MABh: “even if in the light of the conventional 
practice, it is impossible for a memory to be the effect of the self-awareness”. See 
translation in appendix IV, §1.3.2.2.1. 
382 Kapstein 2000: 122. 
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Pham’s text; and (3) his misinterpretation of the keyword (so so rang rig) in the 
argument about self-awareness. The last two points can, to some degree, explain why 
Williams is strongly in favor of Mi Pham’s proof of self-awareness because he uses 
them as the evidence for the necessity of the notion of self-awareness in Nyingmapa’s 
tantric theory of the “Rdzogs Chen (Great Completion)”.383  With the above noted, I 
would like to introduce and examine several relevant conclusions drawn in Williams’ 
book, together with Kapstein’s review.  
In the fourth chapter of his book, Williams says: 
It is worth noting that, among those I have examined, not a single 
commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra prior to the dGe lugs 
commentary of rGyal tshab rje, Indian or Tibetan, explicitly states 
that the purport of Śāntideva’s critique of svasaṃvedana is to negate 
svasaṃvedana as existing even conventionally.384 
Further, in a footnote added to this passage, Williams even stresses that the said “not a 
single commentary” “includes even Tsong kha pa’s own commentary”385.  He explains 
that Tsong Kha Pa, who is the teacher of Gyaltsab, must hold the view, in his other 
works, that the denial of the self-awareness should also be established from a 
conventional perspective, but he does not mention this view in his commentary on the 
ninth chapter of BA.  According to Williams’ assumption, the reason why Tsong Kha 
Pa does not do so might be that Tsong Kha Pa’s final view was not yet formulated at 
                                                 
383 Cf. Williams 2000 (specifically, in the preface, the fourth and the seventh chapters). 
Cf. also Garfield 2006 and Kapstein 2000. 
384 Williams 2000: 56. 
385 Williams 2000: 56 and n. 5. 
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the time he composed his commentary on the ninth chapter of BA.386   
Williams’ fourth chapter, especially the passage cited above, was highly appreciated 
and praised by Kapstein: 
Williams convincingly demonstrates, I think, that the pre-Dge-lugs-
pa commentators, both Indian and Tibetan, were unanimous in their 
view that Śāntideva’s refutation was addressed to the ultimate level, 
and did not pertain to conventional reality at all. The chapter very 
well illustrates the merits of Williams’s broad consideration of 
commentarial writings over and against the common tendency to treat 
a single author or school; for without the perspective supplied by 
Williams, we would have in this case no way to assess just how 
innovative Tsong-kha-pa and his followers really were in their 
approach to the interpretation of Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika.387 
I have strong reservations about Williams’ conclusion and Kapstein’s remarks. And I 
would like to present the two passages mentioned at the beginning of this section in 
order to argue against the conclusions drawn by Williams and Kapstein.  The first 
passage is exactly the one mentioned in Williams’ footnote shown above, namely, a note 
of Tsong Kha Pa’s teaching of the nineth chapter of BA—Spyod ’Jug Shes Rab Le’u’i 
Ṭikkā (as well known as Blo Gsal Ba).  In the same version of this material that 
Williams has used and examined, I come across the following passage, in which Tsong 
Kha Pa explicitly and deliberately states:  
                                                 
386 Williams 2000: 56. 
387 Kapstein 2000: 107. 
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Therefore, when the self-awareness [as a rejected object] was not 
specified [with a modifier “ultimate”], it is obvious that this Ācārya 
(i.e., Śāntideva) would also not accept that self-awareness is 
established at the conventional level. To explain: the reason [for this 
conclusion] is that if [Śāntideva] accepted a [conventional] self-
awareness, then, while he answered the question “how can the 
memory [of a cognition] arise”, he would not have stated “[the 
memory of cognition would arise] from the relation with the 
experience of other [things]” and it would be appropriate [for him to 
answer that question] by stating “[the memory arises] from the cause 
which is the self-awareness.”388 
In this passage, Tsong Kha Pa not only states clearly that Śāntideva does not accept the 
conventional self-awareness but also proposes a convincing proof of his conclusion—
had he accepted it, then when his opponent asks, in BA 9.24ab, how cognition can be 
rememberd if self-awareness does not exist, it would be inappropriate for him to answer 
(based on his own theory of memory without self-awareness) that the memory of 
cognition arises from the realization of a connection between the cognition and the 
rememberd object of that cognition.389  That is to say, if Śāntideva accepted the theory 
of self-awareness, then why doesn’t he simply accept the self-awareness-based theory 
of memory? For what purpose, does he set forth his own theory of memory which is far 
                                                 
388 BAṬzkp: / des na rang rig la khyad par ma sbyar bar tha snyad du rang rig grub 
pa’ang slob dpon ’di mi bzhed par gsal te / rang rig bzhed na rnam shes dran par ji 
ltar ’gyur / zhes pa’i lan du gzhan myong ba dang ’brel ba las zhes sogs smos mi dgos 
kyi / rang rig pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis yin no zhes smos pas chog pas so / (P 8b6ff.) 
389 Cf BA 9.24: yadi nāsti svasaṃvittir vijñānaṃ smaryate katham / anyānubhūte 
saṃbandhāt smṛtir ākhuviṣaṃ yathā / (BAP, pp. 191-192.) 
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from our intuition?390 
The second evidence is an argument in Bodhicaryāvatāratātparyapañjikāviśeṣadyotanī 
by Vibhūticandra, an Indian scholar who is a contemporary of Tsong Kha Pa.  This 
material is also one of the sources used by Williams, in which an important passage 
should not be neglected. When explaining counterexamples, such as the blade of sword 
that does not cut itself, the tip of finger that does not touch itself, as proposed in 
Āryaratnacūḍaparipṛcchānāmamahāyānasūtra to establish that “the mind does not 
perceive itself”, Vibhūticandra explains that these counterexamples are presented to 
show how things act in our world and it is implied that mind should act exactly in the 
same way, namely, mind should always arise with the supporting-object (dmigs pa), but 
not by itself alone. 391  Following such explanation, Vibhūticandra comes to his 
conclusion: 
Therefore, the said “the mind does not perceive itself” [in BA 9.17392] 
[means that] while [self-awareness] is also not established by the 
authoritative scripture (i.e., Buddha’s teaching), it is also not 
established by the worldly appearance and it is also not established 
by the [logical] reasoning.393 
It cannot be clearer that in Vibhūticandra’s view, the self-awareness cannot be proved 
by any of the three valid reasonings – the reasoning based on authoritative scripture 
                                                 
390 Śāntideva’s theory of memory will be explained in § 5.3.4. 
391 Cf. BATP D 261b4-5. 
392 See n. 343. 
393 BATP: / de bas na sems kyis rang mi mthong zhes pa lung las grub pa yang ma yin 
la / ’jig rten gyi snang bas grub pa yang ma yin zhing rigs pas kyang mi ’grub po / (D 
261b5ff., P 312a8ff.) 
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(i.e., Buddha’s teachings), the reasoning based on the well-known convention and the 
reasoning based on logic.  In Buddhism, the means of knowledge can be classified 
into two categories: perception and inference.394 Sometimes, they are classified in three: 
perception, inference and authoritative scripture.395 Therefore, if a thing cannot be 
proved by any of them, it does not exist in ultimate reality or conventional reality.   
With these two evidence studied above, there would be no problem, as raised by 
Williams and Kapstein, for Gelugpa’s interpretation of Śāntideva’s refutation of self-
awareness.  Moreover, in the light of Vibhūticandra’s and Tsong Kha Pa’s explanation, 
Śāntideva’s argument about the self-awareness obviously becomes much more 
comprehensible and reasonable, though it might go a little too far for me to say “that 
Tsong khapa and rGyal tshab are dead right and that Mipham and Williams are dead 
wrong (both hermeneutically and philosophically)”396. 
5.3.2 Candrakīrti’s Refutation (1) – the Fallacy of Hysteron Proteron in the Proof 
of Self-awareness 
Reading Candrakīrti’s statement that “even if in the light of the conventional practice, 
it is also impossible for a memory to be the effect of the self-awareness”397, I presume 
that he considers Yogācāra’s reasoning formula, in which memory-reason is used to 
prove self-awareness, as shown in the following inference: 
                                                 
394 For instance, see n. 129. 
395 Cf. SN: / de ltar ’thad pa’i sgrub pa’i rigs pa de ni mngon sum gyi tshad ma dang 
/ rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma dang / yid ches pa’i lung gi tshad mas mtshan yid lnga po 
dag gis yongs su dag pa yin no / (D 52a4ff.) 
396 Garfield 2006: 202. 
397 Cf. §1.3.2.2.1. 
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The cognition of vase and the like (dharmin / subject) has its self-
awareness (sādhyadharma / property to be proved) because there is a 
memory of it (hetu / reason). 
The reasoning formula I proposed here can be testified by Candrakīrti’s following 
explanation, in which he compares the Yogācāra reasoning of self-awareness with 
another classic example of reasoning formula for the effect-reason as follows: 
The mountain (dharmin / subject) has fire (sādhyadharma / property 
to be proved) because it has smoke (hetu / reason). 
The one I proposed has a similar structure to this classic reasoning example.  
Candrakīrti explains that in this example, one of the prerequisites for the smoke-reason 
to be valid is the pervasion (vyāpti) of the reason, namely, the causal relation between 
the fire and the smoke.  Before one can ascertain such causal relation, one needs first 
to ascertain the existence of both components in that relation, namely, the existence of 
the fire and the smoke.  Likewise, in the current case in which the memory of a 
cognition is intended to be used to prove that the cognition has its self-awareness, one 
needs to firstly ascertain the causal relation between the self-awareness and the memory 
of the cognition and before that, one has to ascertain the existence of the self-awareness 
and the memory of the cognition.  However, the self-awareness is the key issure in the 
current debate and therefore it is impossible to be proved before the reasoning is 
completed.  Accordingly, the Yogācāra faces a problem of hysteron proteron.  The 
validity of Candrakīrti’s refutation as described above depends on whether Yogācāras 
would follow the same formula implied by Candrakīrti, that is to say, whether Yogācāras 
would put “self-awareness” in the position of “sādhyadharma” in the inference.  I am 
aware that in a section of Kedrup’s commentary on PV 3.425-482 (entitled “brief 
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explanation of the summary of the text”),398 he summarizes a formula of Dharmakīrti’s 
reasoning of self-awareness, which has the two-forms-reason, as: 
The cognition (dharmin / subject) has [its] self-awareness 
(sādhyadharma / property to be proved) because it arises in the form 
of the object (hetu / reason).399 
Similarly, in his commentary on PV 3.484, in which Dharmakīrti uses memory-reason 
to prove self-awareness, Kedrup summarizes the reasoning formula as: 
The cognition (dharmin / subject) has [its] self-awareness 
(sādhyadharma / property to be proved) because there is the memory 
“I saw the physical form” (hetu / reason).400   
In these two cases, he puts “self-awareness” in the position of sādhyadharma.  
Admittedly, if these are the formulas Yogācāras would use, then I wonder how they 
defend their theory of self-awareness against Candrakīrti’s challenge.  In addition, as 
Bsod Nams Grags Pa reveals in his commentary on MABh, if Yogācāras put “self-
awareness” in the position of sādhyadharma, there would be another obvious mistake 
in such formulas—Yogācāras cannot propose to their opponent a valid inferential 
example for the reasoning formula.  To illustrate: a valid inferential example is 
required to have both the reason and the sādhyadharma to be its qualities, but the 
opponent in this case will not accept any example that has its self-awareness because 
he does not accept self-awareness at all.  Trying to solve this obvious problem, Bsod 
                                                 
398 Cf. appendix I, the table of contents by Kedrup, §3.2.1.1 and PVVke, pp. 384-389. 
399 PVVke: shes pa chos can / rang rig yod de / yul gyi rnam par skyes pa’i phyir / (p. 
385.) 
400 PVVke: shes pa chos can / rang rig yod de / ngas gzugs mthong ngo snyam du dran 
pa yod pa’i phyir / (p. 428.) 
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Nams Grags Pa proposes the following formula of reasoning for the Yogācāra: 
The visual perception which perceives the form (dharmin / subject) 
has [the experience] that experiences it (sādhyadharma / property to 
be proved) because it is a cognition that has its memory (hetu / 
reason).401 
According to the earlier analysis of Dharmakīrti’s strategy of proving self-awareness, 
this formula can complete a half of the reasoning of self-awareness.  Based on it, I 
tentatively construct two formulas, in which Yogācāras can use the memory-reason and 
a valid example to prove self-awareness without controversy.  The two formulas are 
as follows: 
[Formula 1] 
The cognition of vase and the like (dharmin / subject) has the 
awareness that experiences it (sādhyadharma / property to be proved) 
because it has its memory (hetu / reason); like the vase. 
[Formula 2] 
The experience of the cognition of vase and the like (dharmin / 
subject) is not different from the cognition itself (sādhyadharma / 
property to be proved) because it is claimed to be the experience of 
the object-cognition and if it is different from the cognition of vase 
                                                 
401 Cf. MABhsd: de yang rang rig yod de zhes ni mi ’god de / phyi rgol la rtags chos 
gnyis ldan gyi mthun dpe mi rnyed pa’i phyir / ’o na / ji ltar ’god zhe na / gzugs ’dzin 
mig shes chos can / khyod myong byed yod de / khyod dran pa yod pa’i shes pa yin pa’i 
phyir / (p. 165.) 
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and the like, there would be the unwarranted consequences, such as 
the infinite regress and so on (hetu / reason). 
In fact, formula 1 can be considered as an exemplification of PV 3.484a and PS 1.12b2. 
And formula 2 can be considered as a summary of PV 3.511abc and PS(V) 1.12b2.  
One might argue that since PV 3.484a literally reads, “The self-awareness is established 
by memory [of the past cognition] as well” 402 , the “self-awareness” should be a 
component of the formula as suggested by Kedrup.403  To this argument, the response 
may be that the self-awareness is the property to be proved, but it does not necessarily 
mean that we must put the term “self-awareness” directly in the formula.  In PVVgyal, 
Gyaltsab explains that in the position of sādhyadharma and hetu, we can generally settle 
with “having experience” and “having memory”, respectively; we can then use this 
formula in different cases, such as in the case of object or in the case of cognition (yul 
can, literally “the possessor of the object”) and further break down the formula into two 
forms: “the object (i.e., dharmin / subject) has the experience of the object (i.e., 
sādhyadharma / property to be proved), because it has the memory of object (i.e., hetu 
/ reason)” or “the cognition (i.e., dharmin / subject) has the experience of cognition (i.e., 
sādhyadharma / property to be proved), because it has the memory of cognition (i.e., 
hetu / reason).”404  Given that the first of these two formulas is self-evident in our 
everyday life, “the object” in the formula would become the inferential example (or 
precisely an analogue) for the reasoning in the second formula, namely, the relation 
                                                 
402 PV 3.484a: smṛter apy ātmavit siddhā… 
403 See n. 399 and 400. 
404 Cf. PVVgyal: myong ba yod de / dran pa yod pa’i phyir / ces pa’i rtags kyi nus pa 
so sor phye na / yul myong ba yod de / yul dran pa yod pa’i phyir / ces pa dang / yul 
can myong ba yod de / yul can dran pa yod pa’i phyir / ces par ’gyur la / (p. 348.) 
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between reason and the property to be proved would be established through our daily 
experience of the relation between the memory of the object and the cognition of the 
object—this is exactly the premise of memory I have explained above.  If all these 
explanations are valid, then the second of these two formulas, which is in fact another 
form of the [formula 1] proposed above, can be established. 
5.3.3 Candrakīrti’s Refutation (2) – The Challenge to the Premise of Memory 
In the following argument, which is under the title “1.3.2.2.3” in my translation,405 
Candrakīrti proposes two examples of inconclusive reasons: the fire which cannot be 
used to prove the existence of fire-crystal and the water which cannot be used to prove 
the existence of water-crystal.  The reason why these two reasons are inconclusive is 
that the fire and water can arise from other causes such as the fire drill stick and the 
rain.  I find only one comment on these two examples in Tsong Kha Pa’s commentary 
on MABh, in which he seems to consider the two examples as illustrations of the 
previous argument, namely, he treats this section and the previous one as one continuing 
argument by Candrakīrti.406  However, I do not think the two examples in this section 
perfectly match the memory-reason in the previous section.  Although these two 
examples and the memory-reason are all inconclusive reasons, they are obviously 
different from each other in how they are considered to be inconclusive. 
The reason for the memory-reason being inconclusive is that the opponent who applies 
this reason to infer the self-awareness does not accept the self-awareness and therefore 
                                                 
405 Cf. appendix IV. 
406 Cf. MABhzkp, p. 352.  In his commentary, Tsong Kha Pa uses the following 
sentence to connect this section with the previous one: “The example for [the reason] 
to be non-established in the absence of relation [with sādhyadharma] is …” (’brel pa 
med par mi ’grub pa’i dpe ni /) 
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cannot ascertain whether there is a relation between the reason (i.e., the memory) and 
the property to be proved (i.e., the self-awareness).  By contrast, in the case of the two 
examples mentioned above, according to Candrakīrti, the reason for them being 
inconclusive is that the opponent has found two counterexamples in this case - the fire 
drill sticks and the rain - and therefore he is sure that there is no concomitant relation 
between the two reasons and the two properties to be proved. Thus, I consider this 
section as Candrakīrti’s argument in anticipation that the opponent may use the formula 
proposed in the previous section. I think the point that Candrakīrti argues here is that 
even if the opponent may put “the awareness which experiences the cognition” in the 
position of sādhyadharma in the reasoning formula, the memory is still an inconclusive 
reason because according to Candrakīrti the memory does not necessarily arise from 
the awareness of the object to be remembered. By claiming this, Candrakīrti challenges 
the premise of memory explained in § 3.2. 
Candrakīrti’s Theory of Memory 
Having rejected Yogācāra’s theory of memory, Candrakīrti presents his own, which is 
claimed to be based on worldly convention only.  According to Candrakīrti, if 
cognition does not substantively exist, the memory would arise in the following way: 
one remembers an object one perceived in the past and then one realizes that the object 
he recollects now is the one one perceived in the past; consequently, one has the notion 
“I saw this object before”.  This is all about our memory of the object and the perceiver 
(i.e., the cognition) of the object. 407   According to Jayānanda’s commentary, the 
difference between the theories of memory by Candrakīrti and the Yogācāra is that the 
Yogācāra considers the previous experience of the object and the later memory of the 
object to be two substantively different things, and thus they cannot answer why one 
                                                 
407 Cf. § 1.3.2.3. 
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cannot remember the cognition of another person. In contrast, in Candrakīrti’s theory, 
the previous experience and the later memory of an object do not substantively exist, 
namely, they are not substantively different from each other, 408 and therefore one 
simply (although mistakenly) considers one’s previous experience and current memory 
as one thing. In this way, we can explain our memory in everyday life from a 
conventional perspective without difficulty. In Candrakīrti’s view, the worldly 
phenomena merely exist in our conventional practice.  They appear to our worldly 
knowledge as they are and we in fact do not analyse them at the conventional level.  
We will not analyse them until we want to know the truth of such phenomena and when 
we do so, we will then realize the emptiness of the inherent existence of such 
phenomena at the ultimate level, namely, in the ultimate reality, there is nothing at all.  
Tsong Kha Pa uses the arising of the memory as an example to explain this conventional 
method in his commentary as follows:  
Therefore, previously, the object was experienced and determined by 
the cognition that experienced [it]. Later, by the cognition that 
remembered [it], [the object] would not be non-experienced and non-
determined.  Accordingly, the memory of “I also saw this before” 
arises because this [method Candrakīrti uses to explain the memory], 
too, is the worldly conventional method. However, it is not 
established (’jog pa) through the analysis (dpyad) by the way of [one] 
                                                 
408 Cf. MAṬ: / ’di’i don ni gal te nyams su myong ba dang dran pa’i shes pa dag tha 
dad du las len na de’i tshe rgyud gzhan du gtogs pa’i shes pa bzhin du dran par mi rigs 
so // gal te ’jig rten pa la ltos nas nyams su myong ba dang dran pa’i shes pa dag tha 
mi dad pa de’i tshe nyams su myong ba’i shes pa gang mthong ba de dran pas kyang 
mthong ba’i phyir ngas mthong ngo snyam pa ’byung bar ’gyur ba yin la / de nyid kyi 
phyir dran pa rang rig gi ’bras bur ’gyur ba ma yin no / (D 195a7-b3.) 
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seeking the [true] object that is conceptually constructed (btags don) 
when one was not satisfied with [the object] merely conceptually 
constructed by the worldly convention; that is to say, [this method] is 
the worldly convention, which possesses the untruthful meaning, 
which cannot be attained if one seeks the [true] object constructed.409 
According to Tsong Kha Pa, “analysis” here means a process. In such process, one seeks 
the true object that is presumed as the basis for the worldly convention to be constructed.  
The process is started when one is not satisfied with the simple and pure worldly 
convention, which is considered, by Candrakīrti, as merely constructed without any 
basis. Jayānanda also explains that “there is no opportunity for the worldly convention 
[to be existent under] the analysis (brtag dpyad) and therefore, it is necessary to accept 
whatever we have in the world.”410 
5.3.4 Śāntideva’s Theory of Memory 
Śāntideva offers another different theory of memory in his BA 9.23. When his opponent 
asks “if there is no self-awareness, how is the cognition remembered?” he replies, 
“when [the object] is experienced by another (i.e., the remembering cognition), the 
memory [of the object-cognition] arises from connection [between the object and the 
                                                 
409 MABhzkp: de’i phyir sngar yul nyams myong gi shes pas mnyong ba dang bcad pa 
de / phyis de drang pa’i shes pas ma myong ba dang ma bcad pa min pas / ’di sngar 
yang nga yis mthong snyam du dran pa skye bar ’gyur te / ’di yang ’jig rten gyi tha 
snyad kyi tshul gyi lugs yin gyi / tha snyad btags pa tsam gyis ma tshim par btags 
don ’tshol ba’i tshul gyis dpyad nas ’jog par ni mi bya ste / btags don btsal na mi rnyed 
ba’i brdzun ba’i don can nyid kyi ’jig rten gyi tha snyad yin pa’i phyir ro / (p. 355.) 
410 MAṬ: / ’jig rten pa’i tha snyad brtag dpyad kyi go skabs med pas na ’jig rten na ci 
ltar yod pa de ltar khas blang bar bya dgos pas so / (D 195a6-7.) 
183 
 
cognition411 ], like [memory of] the poison of a rat.”412  To explain: in Śāntideva’s 
opinion, the memory of a thing does not always require the experience of that thing.  
For example, the memory of an object-cognition can arise from the apprehension of the 
connection between the object and its cognition.  ’Jam Dbyangs Bzhad Pa gives a 
commentary on this type of memory-theory as follows.413  When a man remembers an 
object, which he previously experienced, in the form of “I saw this object before”, he 
can naturally realize that he would not have such memory of “seeing the object” without 
his cognition of the object in the past. Accordingly, the man who has the memory of a 
previous object can have the memory of the cognition of the object.  The memory of 
being poisoned by a special kind of rat mentioned in the text is a metaphor.  A man 
was once bitten by the rat and got poisoned.  At that time, he had the feeling of being 
bitten but no feeling of being poisoned.  Later, when the toxin became effective and 
he felt sick, he remembered the fact of being bitten and such memory also reminds him 
of the fact of being poisoned.  The state of being bitten is a metaphor for the object 
which was experienced before and the state of being poisoned is a metaphor for the 
cognition of object which is not experienced by the self-awareness or anything else 
according to Śāntideva.414 
                                                 
411 Cf. BAVgyal 122a1: yul yul can ’brel ba las… 
412 Cf. BA 9.23: yadi nāsti svasaṃvittir vijñānaṃ smaryate katham / ’nyānubhūte 
saṃbandhāt smṛtir ākhuviṣaṃ yathā // 
413 Cf. MABhjy 364b5ff. 
414 Cf. MABhjy 364b5-365a2: ha cang thal ba’i nyis pa de mi ’byung bar thal / yul 
myong ba las dus phyis dran pa skye ba’i tshe / yul can sems spangs nas yul kho na 
drang pa min par ngas sngar ’di mthong ngo zhes yul dang yul can sbrags nas dran gyi 
khyod kyi rang rig ltar yul can yan gar yang mi dran pa’i phyir / der thal / dper na dgun 
dus byi bas lus la dmugs ban a byi dug zhugs kyang mugs pa myong gi dug ma myong 
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Being well known as the manual of religious practice and one of the scriptures of 
*Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s theory, Śāntideva’s BA is treated with utmost respect.  
However, the argument over the theory of memory in BA is hardly convincing.  If we 
follow this theory, especially the metaphor, it appears that the memory of being 
poisoned by the rat is but a reasoning based on the memory of being bitten rather than 
a real memory.  Williams appears to share the same thoughts as I have here.415 By 
contrast, Candrakīrti’s memory of cognition is simpler and clearer.  His theory of 
memory only applies in the context of our worldly convention, in which a man can 
naturally have the notion of “I saw the object before” and that is constructed as the 
memory of cognition.  In Candrakīrti’s opinion, people in the conventional world 
never think about whether cognition is cognized by itself or others.  Therefore, when 
the Yogācāra tries to prove self-awareness through rejecting the theory of other-
awareness, Candrakīrti takes their arguments as being associated with the philosophical 
analysis in ultimate reality.  It is in this regard that Candrakīrti completely rejects the 
self-awareness in both ultimate and conventional realities. 
                                                 
yang dus phyis ’brug gi sgra las nad lung pa na / sngar mugs pa’i dug zhugs pa dran 
pa bzhin yin pa’i phyir / spyod ’jug las / ’brel ba las // dran ’gyur byi ba’i dug bzhin no 
// zhes gsung pa’i phyir / 
415 “Much later, in springtime (when the thunder of the spring rains occurs, our bear 
awakes) our unfortunate person infers from the fact that he does not feel so good and, 
remembering being bitten by the rat, that actually he must have been not only bitten but 
also poisoned by the rat. In the case of the poisoning, the person is not remembering 
that something experienced occurred.  Rather he is inferring the occurrence of 
something not actually experienced at the time, something which, nevertheless, 
accompanied an experience of being bitten.” (Williams 2000: 153.) 
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5.4 The Way One Cognizes One’s Cognition 
When Gelugpa scholars follow the *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika and completely reject the 
self-awareness, they also realize that they need to set up their own theory of the 
cognition of cognition for the *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika.  Otherwise, they cannot 
claim the existence of cognition.  For example, Kedrup proposes a hypothetical 
rejection as follows: 
In *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s theory, it needs to be accepted that 
there is sense perception, mental perception and so on.  To this, if 
these cognitions are established by themselves, then it is 
contradictory to the refutation of the self-awareness and if they need 
to be established by a substantively different cognition, then there 
would be the fallacies, such as infinite regress.  Therefore, there 
would the same fallacy in our [theroy], which is stated [in MABh 
6.72cd] as “how do you know its existence? Further, it is not correct 
to state that [something] non-grasped exists” 416 . How can it be 
rejected?417  
Before presenting his interpretation of *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s theory of the 
cognition of cognition, Kedrup criticizes the view that when the object is established 
                                                 
416 Cf. appendix IV, §1.1. 
417 TTH: thal gyur ba’i rang lugs la yang dbang shes dang yid shes thams cad yod 
par ’dod dgos la / shes pa de dag rang nyid kyis rang nyid yod par grub na rang rig 
bkag pa dang ’gal zhin / shes pa don gzhan gyis yod par ’gyur dgos na thug med pa’i 
skyon du ’gyur ba’i phyir / ’di yi yod pa gang shes par ’gyur / ma bzung ba yang yod 
ces byar mi rung / zhen pa’i nyes pa rang la’ang mtshung par ’gyur ba ji ltar spong zhe 
na / (p. 382.) 
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by the means of knowledge, by the very establishment of the object the means of 
knowledge itself should also be established. 418   Kedrup argues that this view is 
essentially the same of the tenet of self-awareness.  After repeating the objection to 
the reflexivity of the self-awareness, Kedrup further argues that even if the proponent 
might claim that the cognition is not directly apprehended or experienced by itself but 
through the apprehension of the existence of the cognition, there would be another 
philosophical problem as follows.  If the cognition can indirectly apprehend itself, 
then the meditative cognition of the holy practitioner who is observing the ultimate truth 
in the path of seeing of Mahāyāna (ji lta ba mkhyen pa’i theg chen gyi mthong lam 
mnyam gzhag ye shes419) will also indirectly apprehend itself.  If so, the object of the 
meditative cognition will no longer be a non-affirming negation (med dgag) as defined 
in the scripture, but rather an affirming negation (ma yin dgag).  This is because in 
that cognition, when the conceptual appearance of the inherent existence of phenomena 
is negated, the meditative cognition is left as an object to be affirmed (indirectly) by 
itself.420 Accordingly, Kedrup proposes his interpretation of the theory of the cognition 
of cognition for the *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika as follows: 
I will explain it like this: it should not be stated that the existence of 
the visual cognition of blue is established by the visual cognition of 
blue and the way it is established is that it is established by virtue of 
the perceiving of the blue color.  By contrast, by virtue of perceiving 
the blue color, without needing any other means of knowledge, the 
                                                 
418 Cf. TTH: tshad mas gzhal bya grub pa tsam gyis tshad ma yod par ’grub pa’i don 
yang ji lta bu zhe na / (p. 382.) 
419 TTH, p. 383. 
420 Cf. TTH, pp. 382-385. 
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visual cognition of blue can directly lead to the memory of “the visual 
cognition of blue perceived the blue color”.421  In that case, the 
remembering cognition of “the blue color was perceived by the visual 
cognition of blue” itself can eradicate both superimpositions of “the 
absence of the blue color” and “the absence of the visual cognition of 
blue”. Accordingly, [the remembering cognition] is the means of 
knowledge, which is able to lead to the determination of the existence 
of them (i.e., the blue color and its visual cognition) merely by the 
[remembering] cognition directed toward [its object] (blo kha phyogs 
pa tsam gyis).  Therefore, the very remembering cognition is the 
means of knowledge in relation to the existence of the visual 
cognition.  Further, when the later remembering cognition 
remembers the blue color, it does not remember the object apart from 
the cognition that perceives the blue color, but remembers it as “I saw 
the blue color” through specifying it by the perceiving [cognition] of 
the blue color.  Hence, when the very remembering cognition 
remembers both the blue color and the perceiving [cognition] of the 
blue color, the visual cognition of blue is therefore established 
through depending on the fact that the visual cognition of blue 
perceives the blue color, but not established by the visual cognition 
of blue [itself].  Likewise, the visual cognition of blue perceives the 
blue color, but in the case that the visual cognition of blue perceives 
                                                 
421 Syntactically, the second sngo ’dzin mig shes in the text can also be the subject of 
the sentence. However, since the subject in the next sentence, in which sngo ’dzin mig 
shes kyis sngon po gzung ba dran pa’i shes pa de nyid is one inseparable compound, I 
choose to take the first one as the subject in this sentence. (Cf. the next footnote.) 
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the very fact that it perceived the blue color, it is not the means of 
knowledge.  By contrast, the very remembering cognition, which 
remembers the fact that the visual cognition of blue perceived the 
blue color, is the means of knowledge in relation to that [fact].422 
This interpretation of *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika’s theory of the cognition of cognition 
becomes one of the tenets in Gelugpa later.  Its further explications are found in several 
well-known textbooks (yig cha) in Gelugpa’s monastic colleges, with slight differences 
among them, though.  For example, Bsod Rnams Grags Pa and his followers seem to 
closely follow Kedrup’s interpretation.  They deny that the cognition can be 
                                                 
422 TTH: kho bo ni ’di ltar smra ste / sngo ’dzin mig shes kyis sngo ’dzin mig shes yod 
par grub / ji ltar grub na sngon po gzhal ba’i stobs kyis grub ces mi smra’i / sngo ’dzin 
mig shes kyis sngon po gzhal ba’i stobs kyis tshad ma gzhan brgyud mi dgos par 
sngo ’dzin mig shes kyis sngon po gzung ba dran pa’i shes pa dngos su ’dren la / 
sngo ’dzin mig shes kyis sngon po gzung ba dran pa’i shes pa de nyid kyis sngon po 
med pa dang sngo ’dzin mig shes med pa gnyi ga’i sgro ’dogs bcad nas blo kha phyogs 
pa tsam gyis de dag yod pa’i nges pa ’dren nus pa’i tshad ma yin pas dran shes de nyid 
mig shes yod pa la tshad ma yin zhing / rjes kyi dran shes kyis sngon po dran pa na 
sngo ’dzin blo yul du spangs nas dran pa ma yin gyi ngas sngon po mthong ngo snyam 
du sngo ’dzin gyis khyad par du byas nas dran pa yin pas dran pa de nyid kyis sngon 
po dang sngo ’dzin gnyi ga dran pa yin la / des na sngo ’dzin mig shes kyis sngon po 
gzhal ba la ltos nas sngo ’dzin mig shes grub pa yin kyang sngo ’dzin mig shes kyis 
grub pa min no / de bzhin du sngo ’dzin mig shes kyis sngon po gzhal yang sngo ’dzin 
mig shes kyis sngon po gzung ba de nyid ’jal ba la sngo ’dzin mig shes tshad ma ma yin 
gyi sngo ’dzin mig shes kyis sngon po gzung ba dran pa’i shes pa de nyid de la tshad 
ma ma yin no / (pp. 385-386.)  Syntactically, this passage consists of only two 
sentences (each ends with no). For reader’s convenience, I translate it into nine 
sentences, the last word of each sentence is in bold. 
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established, either directly or indirectly, by itself.423  By contrast, in ’Jam Dbyangs 
Bzhad Pa’s commentary on MABh, the theory of “cognition can be established by itself” 
is reiterated.  He claims that in the visual cognition of blue, the object and the 
cognition appear as two different things at a distance and this can be established by our 
everyday experience. He even claims that the speech of “the cognition perceives itself” 
can be accepted at a crude level in our convention (tha snyad rags pa) because he rejects 
the argument in which one completely denies such speech in our everyday practice by 
applying the subject-object-in-one-thing argument.  In his rejection, ’Jam Dbyangs 
Bzhad Pa says that the analysis of subject-object-in-one-thing should be strictly applied 
at a subtle level in our convention (tha snyad zhib mo).424  Further, he specifies the 
remembering cognition, which is proposed to be the means of knowledge of the 
cognition, as the remembering mental perception (drang shes tshad ma yid mngon).425 
5.5 Conclusion 
It is well known that in Madhyamaka’s philosophy, any ultimate existence will come 
under the rigorous examination with various sound reasonings and it is generally 
acknowledged that the advocate of ultimate self-awareness no longer exists among 
Buddhist scholars (represented by Tibetan) for centuries. Therefore, the essence of the 
arguments over the self-awareness between the *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika (in the light 
of Gelugpa’s interpretation) and the advocates of self-awareness is whether there is still 
room for self-awareness to exist at the conventional level.  The main challenge from 
the *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika in the arguments is that if the self-awareness exists at the 
conventional level, there will be a problem to establish the theory of dependent-arising 
                                                 
423 Cf. Padma 2006: 110-115. 
424 Cf. MABhjy 367b4ff. 
425 Cf. MABhjy 367b2. 
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(pratīyasamutpāda), in which everything is claimed to conventionally exist with 
reference to others. To the *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika, claiming the existence of a thing 
at conventional level means claiming that it exists in our conventional life without any 
need for philosophical analysis. Thus, given self-awareness is a concept that needs to 
be considered by philosophical analysis, the *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika holds the view 
that it does not exist in our conventional life. To defend self-awareness against such 
challenge, one needs to focus on how to interpret the characteristic of self-awareness in 
our conventional life or how to interpret the theory of dependent-arising.  To this, I do 
not see any satisfactory answer from the Buddhist advocates of self-awareness thus far. 
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Part II: An Annotated English Translation of the Portion Establishing Self-
awareness in Pramāṇavārttika 3.425-484 
 
dvairūpyasādhanenāpi prāyaḥ siddhaṃ svavedanam /  
svarūpabhūtābhāsasya tadā saṃvedanekṣaṇāt // 425 
/ tshul gnyis sgrub par byed pas kyang // rang rig phal cher grub pa yin /  
/ rang gi ngo bor gyur snang ba // de tshe myong bar grub phyir ro / PVt 
/ tshul gnyis sgrub par byed pas kyang // phal cher rang rig →grub← (P : sgrub D) pa 
yin /  
/ rang gi ngo bor gyur snang ba // de tshe myong ba mthong phyir ro / PVR 
 
By means of proving that [the cognition] has two forms, the self-awareness is mostly426 
established as well, because at that time, the appearance (i.e., the perceived form427) 
which is the own nature [of cognition] is seen due to the awareness.428 
                                                 
426 I choose to use “mostly”, the very literal meaning of prāyas or phal cher, in my 
translation. For the argument about the translation of prāyaḥ cf. § 2.2.3.1. 
427 Cf. Ś: / rang gi ngo bor gyur pa yang de yin la snang ba yang de yin pas na zhes 
bya ba ni khyad par gyi bsdu ba (= *viśeṣaṇasamāsa) ste / shes pa'i bdag nyid du gyur 
pa'i yul gyi rnam pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go / (D 235b3.) 
428  Manorathanandin analyses saṃvedanekṣaṇāt as saṃvedanād īkṣaṇāt in his 
commentary: tathā jñānasya svarūpabhūtasyābhāsasyākārasya tadā 
dvirūpajñānotpattikālo saṃvedanād anubhūter īkṣaṇāt ／ (M1, p. 245, ll. 17-19.) A 
literal translation might be “because at that time i.e., at the time of the arising of 
cognition with two forms, the appearance, i.e., the form, which is the own nature of 
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cognition, is seen (īkṣaṇa) because of the awareness, i.e., the experience.” This 
interpretation is consistent with that of Prajñākaragupta if we relate the pratīyate and 
pratīti in Prajñākaragupta’s commentary to the īkṣaṇa in the kārikā. (Cf. appendix VI, 
§ 1.2.)  
193 
 
→dhiyā ’tadrūpayā←429 jñāne niruddhe ’nubhavaḥ →kathaṃ←430 /  
                                                 
429  PVs, PVP and PVM read dhiyā ’tadrūpayā. The commentary in PVA - yadi 
taduttarakālabhāvinyāparayā buddhyā ’tadākārayārthāpattyādirūpayā jñānam iṣyate – 
supports this reading. Besides, PVPt- / de dngos can min blo yis ni / and PVAt – de’i 
rnam pa can ma yin pa’i blo gzhan gyis… / (D 93b6 : P 110a1) are consistent with PVP 
and PVA. 
However, PVs may not be reliable for determinating the literal reading of the part 
before ’nubhavaḥ because that part in PVs is in a pair of square brackets indicating that 
it is restored by Sāṅkṛtyāyana on the basis of PVAms and Mms. (Cf. § 1.3.1.2.) 
Furthermore, Tosaki has suspected that the words 
dhiyā ’tadrūpayā ’grāhyajñānasvarūpayā in M1 may be a corruption of dhiyā 
tadrūpayā grāhyajñānasvarūpayā. (Cf. Tosaki 1985: 107, n. 9).  Although he did not 
substantiate his hypothesis because he did not have the manuscript at his disposal, one 
of my findings in Mms could support his opinion. My finding is that a sentence of 
Manorathanandin’s commentary on PV 3.426ab, the basis of the restored PVM 3.426ab, 
reads tadā dhiyā ’tadrūpayā ’grāhyajñānasvarūpayā niruddhe grāhye jñāne katham 
anubhavaḥ / (M1, p. 245, l. 24). The part corresponding to dhiyā ’tadrūpayā must be 
dhiyā ’tadrūpayā ’grāhyajñānasvarūpayā, the original of which in Mms reads 
.  If we observe the two avagrahas in 
it more carefully, in contrast to the normal appearance of the avagraha in Mms, for 
example,  (Mms 48a1, the last word), the appearance of the two avagrahas in this 
line looks obviously finer and both avagrahas are apparently not right in between the 
letters before and after them, but rather compactly inserted from the bottom. Hence, it 
is highly possible that these two avagrahas were added after the first transcription of 
the text has been done. Manorathanandin does not offer further explanation on this pāda.  
Accordingly, I consider that PVM is also not completely reliable for determinating the 
literal reading of the text in the current case.  Tosaki (1985: 107, n. 9) also claims that 
Manorathanandin’s view is not clear. (Manorathanandin の見解は判然としない。) 
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svaṃ ca rūpaṃ na sā vettīty utsanno ’nubhavo →’khilaḥ←431 // 426 
                                                 
On the other hand, PVt, PVR and PVD - / →de’i← (D : de’i tshe P) dngos po can gyi blo 
yis ni / (D 243a4ff. : P 287b7) clearly presuppose the reading of dhiyā tadrūpayā and 
therefore the sentence can be translated as “When the [previous] cognition (jñāna) has 
[already] ceased, how [can it be] experienced by the (subsequent) cognition (dhī) which 
has the form of that [previous cognition]?” Tibetan commentators, such as Gyaltsab and 
Kedrup, follow PVt. Tosaki follows Devendrabuddhi, (cf. Tosaki 1985: 107, n. 9) that 
is to say, he sides with Tibetan commentators. Interestingly, this translation and the one 
I offer in the main text are not necessarily contradictory to each other if we consider 
that in this translation the question is about how there can be a subsequent cognition 
having the form of the previous cognition while in the other translation, the question is 
about how the subsequent cognition without the form of the previous cognition can 
experience the previous cognition. 
However, although we find that PVR supports dhiyā tadrūpayā, Ravigupta’s 
commentary supports the opposite. A sentence in Ravigupta’s commentary of this pāda 
reads / dus phyis ’byung ba’i blos blo snga ma’i rang bzhin nam / rnam pa med par 
don gyis go ba la sogs pa’i ngo bos shes pas shes ’dzin pa na / (R D 150b1 : P 179b5 
ff), which is exactly the sentence we have seen in PVA. Therefore, it is not clear whether 
the translation of PVR of this pāda is correct. 
I follow Prajñākaragupta’s reading because the condition stated in this argument “when 
the previous cognition has already ceased” seems to imply that the reason why the 
subsequent cognition cannot experience the previouse cognition is that it cannot carry 
the form or the nature of the previous cognition. 
430 kathaṃ PVms, PVM : kutaḥ PVs, PVP. 
431 The word  (38v, 4) in PVms is read as akhilaḥ in PVs (p. 88, n. 2) by 
Sāṅkṛtyāyana, but he suggests replacing it with arthinaḥ (PVs, 88, l. 2) perhaps because 
he has read “arthinaḥ” in some other manuscripts of PVA. In fact, the reading 
of ’rthinaḥ is reported in his PVA1 (p. 117, l. 2), and when Sāṅkṛtyāyana brings out his 
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bahirmukhañ ca tajjñānaṃ bhāty arthapratibhāsavat /  
buddheś ca grāhikā →buddhir←432 nityam antarmukhātmani // 427 
/ de dngos can gyi blo yis ni // shes ’gags ji ltar myong ba yin /  
/ des rang ngo bo’ang myong med phyir // nyams myong ma lus ldog par ’gyur /  
/ don du snang ba dang ldan shes // de ni phyi rol mngon phyogs snang /  
/ blo la ’dzin par byed pa’i blo // rtag tu bdag la nang mngon phyogs / PVt 
/ de’i dngos can gyi blo yis →ni← (D : na P) // shes pa ’gags pa ji ltar myong /  
/ des rang ngo bo myong med phyir // nyams myong ma lus ’chad par ’gyur /  
/ don du snang ba dang ldan pa // shes te phyi rol mngon phyogs dang /  
/ blo la ’dzin par byed pa’i blo // rtag tu bdag la →nang← (D : na P) mngon phyogs / 
                                                 
PVA2, he keeps his previous reading (p. 429, l. 19), though he already read a khilaḥ in 
PVAms (p. 429, n 1). Further, the translation of this pāda in PVAt reads / nyams su 
myong lus ldog par ’gyur / . In this case, lus should not be simply considered as a 
corruption of ma lus because it is hard to imagine how nyams myong ma lus can be 
corrupted into nyams su myong lus. In the comments on this verse in PVAt, we found 
two lus (D 93b4: P 110a4) that were probably corruptions of yul, because their Sanskrit 
equivalent is viṣaya (PVA2, p. 429, l. 25). Accordingly, if lus in this verse is a corruption 
of yul, it would explain Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s reading. 
However, PVAms (215a7) clearly reads (= ’khilaḥ). Although the embedded 
form for this word is not available in PVA, the word sakala (PVA2, p. 429, l. 24), which 
means “complete” or “all”, can be considered as Prajñākaragupta’s gloss of akhilaḥ. 
Moreover, the embedded form of this word in M is also akhilaḥ and Tibetan translations 
ma lus in PVt, PVR point at akhilaḥ as well. 
432 PVeM reads vittīr. 
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433 When the [previous] cognition (jñāna) has [already] ceased, how [can it be] 
experienced by the (subsequent) cognition (dhī) which do not have the form of that 
[previous cognition]? And [according to you] that [cognition] does not experience its 
own nature. Therefore, all experiences have vanished. 
Moreover, the cognition (jñāna), which has the image (pratibhāsa) of the object appears 
(bhāti) as directed outside (i.e., towards external things). But, the cognition, which 
apprehends the cognition is always directed inside. 
 
yo yasya viṣayābhāsas taṃ vetti na tad ity api / 
→prāptaṃ←434… / 428abc1 
                                                 
433 According to the commentaries, this verse is a reply to the objection of the opponent 
- Even without self-awareness, cognition could still be perceived, like an object, by a 
following cognition having the similar form. 
De: / ’o na ci yin zhe na / tshul gnyis su ’byung ba de dus phyis ’byung ba’i ngang tshul 
can gyi blos nyams su myong ba yin no zhe na / (D 243a3ff. : P 287b5ff.) 
PVA: sattyam etan na rūpādivyatirekāt parāpi dhīḥ / tathāpi na svasaṃvittis tasyā 
grahaṇm anyataḥ / (PVA2, p. 429, l. 16) 
M: jñānāntareṇa sarūpeṇa jñānam arthavad vedyate iti cet / (M1, p. 245, l. 21) 
434 prāptaṃ PVms, PVPms, PVeMms, PVP1 : prāptā PVP2, PVM. 
Although this word appears as the first word of the third pāda of this verse, it should 
be considered as in one unit with PV 3.428ab and be related to ity api. All Tibetan 
translations obviously testify to this reading. Sāṅkṛtyāyana in his PVP1 reads it in the 
same way too. Nevertheless, while making his PVP2, Sāṅkṛtyāyana changed his mind 
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/ yul gang gi ni snang ba gang // des de myong min zhes pa’ang ’thob / PVt 
/ gang zhig gang gi yul du snang // de des myong ba min thob ’gyur / PVR 
 
[If the cognition is not perceptible,] whatever (yo) the appearance of the object may be 
for that [cognition] (yasya), it is also obtained that that (tat) (i.e., the cognition with that 
form) would not experience that [object] (tam).435 
                                                 
and construes this word with what follows in PV 3.428cd relating it to the kā in PV 
3.428c by changing it into the feminine form. This reading is adopted in his PVs. 
Furthermore, although he gives a faithful transcript of the embedded word: prāptaṃ in 
Manorathanandin’s commentary (cf. M1, p. 246, l. 16), he maintains his decision in 
reconstructing the basic text (cf. M1, p. 246, l. 14) and ignores prāptam as an embedded 
word and does not mark it in bold in his M1.  
435 From different commentaries, I find at least three types of analyses for the two 
relative pronouns yaḥ and yasya in these two pādas. 
1. According to Manorathanandin, two relative pronouns, yaḥ and yasya, are 
respectively related to viṣayasyābhāsaḥ and jñānasya. (tathā svavedanatābhāve yo 
viṣayasyābhāsa ākāro yasya jñānasya taṃ svākārārpakaṃ viṣayaṃ tadākāravat 
jñānaṃ na vetti iti prāptaṃ / M1, p. 246, l. 12) “Thus, when self-awareness does not 
exist, whatever form, namely, the appearance of the object, the awareness has, it is 
obtained that the cognition with that form will not be aware of the object which gives 
it its own form.” Ravigupta reads it in the same way: / shes pa gang zhig dang ’brel pa 
can gyi yul du snang ba gang yin pa’i yul de ni / (R D 150b7 : P 180a7).  
2. According to Prajñākaragupta, yaḥ and yasya are respectively related to avabhāsaḥ 
and viṣayasya. (yasya hi viṣayasya yo ’vabhāsaḥ ajñānasyaa sanniviṣṭas tam 
viṣayābhāsi jñānam arthaṃ na vetti / PVA2, p. 430, l. 9) “Whatever an appearance is 
there, which is persent (sk. sanniviṣṭa, t. gnas pa) in the cognition and is indeed of the 
object, the cognition having the appearance of an object (viṣaya) will not be aware of 
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the object (artha).” Kedrup adopted this interpretation. (PVVke, p. 392) 
3. Devendrabuddhi seems to relate gang (= yaḥ) to don (= arthaḥ) and gang zhig (= 
yasya) to yul du snang (= viṣayābhāsasya). (De: /gang zhig yul du snang gang de // don 
gang yin pa de shes pa / D 243b3ff. : P 288a7) 
In addition, most commentators and editors deem PV 3.428abc1 as independent of PV 
3.427. The exception is Kedrup. (Cf. appendix I.) He considered them as one argument, 
in which PV 3.427 is considered as the reason for the conclusion stated in PV 3.428abc1. 
Kedrup even places his commentary on PV 3.428abc1 prior to that of PV 3.427. 
According to him, PV 3.427-428abc1 should be interpreted as follows: 
There would also (t. ang; sk. api) be an absurd consequence that the 
blue color is not experienced by the subsequent sense perception, 
which appears in the form of that blue object, because [the subsequent 
cognition] is the experiencing of the previous sense perception which 
appears in blue color. The pervasion [of this inferential reason is 
established], because while the cognition, which has the appearance 
in the form of the object, must illuminate (snang ba) the object 
through directing itself outside, the cognitions, which perceptibly 
grasp the cognition that becomes the object of their own experience, 
is always directed inside. (PVVke: yul sngon po gang gi ni rnam par 
snang ba gang yin pa’i dbang shes phyi ma des sngon po de myong 
ba min zhes pa’ang thob par thal / de sngo snang dbang shes snga 
ma’i myong byed yin pa’i phyir / khyab ste / don du snang ba dang 
ldan pa’i shes pa de ni kha phyi rol du mngon par phyogs pa’i sgo 
nas yul snang bas khyab la / rang gi myong byar gyur pa’i blo la 
mngon sum du ’dzin par bed pa’i blo rnams rtag tu bdag la nang 
mngon phyogs pas khyab pa’i phyir / p. 392.) 
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… kā saṃvid anyā ’sti tādrūpyād iti cen matam // 428c2d 
prāptaṃ saṃvedanaṃ sarvasadṛśānāṃ parasparam / 429ab 
/ gal te de dang ’dra ba las // myong gzhan ci yod ces ’dod na /  
/ ’dra ba thams cad phan tshun du // myong ba nyid ni thob par ’gyur / PVt 
/ gal te de ’dra las myong ba // gzhan yod ces ni ’dod ce na /  
/ ’dra bas thams cad phan tsun dag // myong ba nyid du thob par ’gyur / PVR 
 
[Proponent:] What is the awareness [of object] other than [the awareness of the 
cognition which is the nature of the object]?  
[Opponent:] [There should be an awareness of object] due to the similarity of that 
[object].436 
                                                 
It appears that Kedrup’s interpretation explains api better. 
a  (= jñānasya) PVAms (216a5) : jñāna PVA1, PVA2. 
436 The Tibetan translations of these two pādas (in PVt, PVR) and the embedded words 
of this verse in De (D 243b4ff.), consistently read them as one sentence. All these 
translations begin with gal te and end with na, which indicate that iti cet governs not 
only tādrūpyād but also kā saṃvid anyā ’sti. Ravigupta reads these two pādas as one 
sentence too. (Cf. R: / ’on te yul dang ’dra ba las myong ba gzhan gang zhig yod de / 
med pa kho na’o // de’i phyir don dang ’dra ba nyid la gzugs la sogs pa myong ba’o 
zhes brjod do zhe na / D 151a1ff. : P 180b1ff.)  Accordingly, these two pādas can be 
translated as: “[Opponent:] What is the awareness other than [that established] by the 
similarity to that [object]?” 
Gyaltsab and Kedrup also interpret these two pādas as one sentence too: 
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PVVgyal: don de dang ’dra ba las myong ba’i rgyu mtshan gzhan ci yang yod pa ma 
yin no zhes ’dod na / (p. 319) 
PVVke: shes pa rnams yul de dang ’dra ba las ma gtogs pa’i myong ba’i ngo bor ’jog 
byed gzhan ci zhig yod ces ’dod do zhe na / (p. 392) 
According to them, these two pādas may be interpreted as: “If [the opponent] claims 
that, except ‘being similar to that [object]’, what can be [the reason for establishing 
(’jog byed)] the awareness [as awareness of a certain object]?” 
Gyaltsab’s and Kedrup’s interpretations highlight that being similar to that is the 
sufficient condition for something to be the awareness of that, and hence make 
opponent’s argument more logically relevant to the following response, in which 
Dharmakīrti points out some unwarranted consequences due to such assertion. 
By contrast, Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin read these two 
pādas in two sentences, of which “kā saṃvid asti” is a question to the opponent by 
Dharmakīrti, and “tādrūpyād iti cen matam” is the opponent’s answer. For example, 
Manorathanandin says: 
Due to the imperceptibility of that [cognition of object], the object 
too would be imperceptible because what is the awareness of the 
object other than the awareness of the cognition which is the own 
nature of the object? [Opponent:] The awareness of object is not due 
to the self-awareness, but to having the same form of that, i.e., the 
similarity to the object. (tatparokṣatayā artho api parokṣaḥ syāt a 
yato ’rthasvarūpadhīvedanād anyā kā saṃvid arthasya asti // b 
tādrūpyād viṣyasārūpyād asvasaṃvedanād arthasya saṃvid iti cen 
matam / M1, p. 246, ll. 16-18.) 
Cf. also De: / ’o na ci yin zhe na / don dang ’dra ba tsam gyis don nyams su myong ba 
yin no zhe na / (D 243b5 : P 288b1ff.) and PVA: tasmāt ātmani sthitā tadākārā 
c’svasaṃvedanamc antareṇa api buddhir eva / yadi tarhi svasaṃvedanam antareṇa api 
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[Proponent: If so,] all similar things would be an awareness of each other.  
 
buddhiḥ →sarūpā←437 tadvic cet nedānīṃ vit sarūpikā // 429cd 
/ gal te blo ’dra de myong na // da ni ’dra las myong ma yin / PVt 
/ de ’dra’i blo de myong zhe na // da ni rig pa ’dra bdag →min← (corr.438 : nyid D, P) / 
PVR 
 
                                                 
pūrvārthākāramātrād anyathā vā tadā / (PVA2, p. 430, ll. 17-18.) 
a M has a daṇḍa here, but Frauwallner suggests deleting it. 
b Frauwallner adds a second daṇḍa here, probably to indicate the end of Dharmakīrti’s 
statement. 
c Editions of PVA read svasaṃvedanam (PVA1, p. 118, l. 9; PVA2, p. 430, l. 17), and 
PVAms, at the beginning of folio 216a7, does not indicate an avagraha. However, 
according to the context and the Tibetan: rang rig ma yin pa (= ’svasaṃvedanam) (D 
94a6 : P 110b8), I read ’svasaṃvedanam. 
437 sarūpā PVms, PVPms, PVM, PVP2 : svarūpā PVs, PVP1. The Tibetan translations 
of this word in PVt, PVR, PVP are ’dra (= sarūpā). 
438 According to PVR (D 151a5 : P 180b6), there is no negation in PV 3.429d, but there 
should be a negation based on Ravigupta’s comments: de ni ’dod mod kyang / ’dra ba 
tsam gyi don nyams su myonng ba ma yin te / ’o na ci zhe na / blo don gyi dran pa can 
ni don rnams rig pa’o / … da ni blo la gnas pa’i ’dra khas len na / don rnams ’dra bas 
rig par mi ’gyur gyi / (R D 151a3ff. : P 180b4) 
The negation is also found in PVP: / ’dra ba thams cad phan tshun du // myong ba nyid 
ni thob par ’gyur // gal te blo ’dra de myong na // da (P : de D) ni ’dra las myong ma 
yin /  
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[Opponent: It is not enough to be similar.] The awareness of that [object must] be a 
cognition that is similar [to the object].  
[Proponent:] In this case, the awareness is not similar [to its object].439  
                                                 
439 Some in-depth analyses of this pāda are found in its commentaries. For example, 
Devendrabuddhi says: 
It is not the case that the experience of object is characterized (mtshan 
nyid) by merely the similarity [between the object and its 
cognition]” … “If the experience is characterized by the similarity 
which is qualified by the nature of the cognition, the experience of 
the object is not due to the similarity to the object. (De: / ’dra ba tsam 
don nyams su myong ba’i mtshan nyid ni ma yin no / … / gal te blo’i 
ngo bo nyid kyis ’dra ba khyad par can nyams su myong ba’i mtshan 
nyid yin pa de’i tshe don dang ’dra bas don nyams su myong ba ma 
yin no / D 243b7ff. : P 288b4ff.)   
Cf. also M: sārūpyaṃ vedanalakṣaṇaṃ na bhavati kintv anubhavarūpatā saty api 
sārūpye yamalakādīnām anubhavatvāt | (M1, p. 246, l. 24ff.) and PVA: nanu 
sarūpāṇām arthānāṃ parasparam agrāhakatā dṛśyate (/) grāhakaṃ ca rūpaṃ buddhiḥ 
/ (PVA2, p. 431, l. 21) and R (see n. 438.) 
We also find that in the translations of this sentence in PVt, PVP and the embedded 
words of the verse in De, a las is added after ’dra ba, which changes the interpretation 
of sarūpikā from nominative into ablative. 
According to the commentaries, we have a general understanding of this verse: 
Dharmakīrti argues that, when the opponent would add one more condition - being 
cognition – to define awareness in order to avoid the unwarranted consequence which 
Dharmakīrti just pointed out, then in this case, the opponent should agree that the 
awareness is not defined by “being similar to the object” only but also by “having the 
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svayaṃ so ’nubhavas tasyā na sa sārūpyakāraṇaḥ /  
kriyākarmavyavasthāyās tal loke syān nibandhanam // 430 
/ →de yi← (D: de’i P) myong de (om. D : yi P) rang nyid de // de ni ’dra ba’i rgyu can 
min /  
/ bya ba las kyi rnam gzhag gi // ’di ni ’jig rten na rgyur ’gyur / PVt 
/ nyams su myong ba de rang nyid // de de ’dra ba’i rgyu can min /  
/ bya ba las kyi rnam →gzhag← (D : bzhag P) gi // de ni ’jig rten na rgyur ’gyur / PVR 
                                                 
nature of the awareness”. 
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440The experience of that [cognition arises] by itself. It is not caused by similarity.441 
                                                 
440 Manorathanandin provides the opponent’s argument for this verse: 
[Opponent:] If there is the awareness due to the force of the similarity, 
then, there should be the awareness due to the similarity by having 
the nature of the cognition too. Therefore, the difference between 
indeed the grasped and the grasping is attained. (M: yadi 
sārūpyavaśād vedanaṃ tadā buddhyātmanāpi sārūpyād vedanaṃ 
syāt / tathā grāhyagāhakayor bheda eva prāpta ity āha / M1, p. 247, 
ll. 1-2.) 
Ravigupta raises another presupposed argument of the opponent: 
[Opponent:] The experience of the awareness is caused by the 
similarity, because it is experience, like the experience of the object. 
(R: / ’on te blo’i nyams su myong ba ni ’dra ba’i rgyu can te / nyams 
su myong ba’i phyir don nyams su myong ba bzhin no zhe na… / D 
151a7 : P 181a1ff.)  
441 The vahuvrīhi compound sārūpyakāraṇaḥ is translated as rgyu can PVt, De and 
PVR. However, in PVPt it is translated as rgyu mtsan. This translation might be 
influenced by Prajñākaragupta’s interpretaiton of this sentence: na hi svavedanasya 
sārūpyaṃ kāraṇaṃ / (PVA2, p. 432, l. 2; PVAms 217a3), which is translated as: ’dra 
ba ni rang rig rgyu mtshan amina no / (PVAt D 95b4ff. : P 112b2.)  
a Although both D and P read yin, this must be a corruption of min. 
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442That [similarity to the object]443 would be the cause of the respective determination 
(vyavasthā) of the [cognitive] action and the object444 in the world. 
                                                 
442  According to Prajñākaragupta, Manorathanandin and Ravigupta, the following 
sentence is the answer to a presupposed question by the opponent: if the awareness is 
aware of itself, how and for what purpose to say that the awareness is similar to the 
object? 
PVA: svarūpaṃ ced aparapratyayaṃ sākṣād avagamyate kim atra sārūpyeṇa / yady 
apareṇāsya sārūpyam tadedam viditam anyadā neti nedam evaṃ vikalpyate / gatodake 
kaḥ khalu setubandha iti hi nyāyaḥ / kim idānīṃ sārūpyeṇety api na vācyam / (PVA2, 
p. 432, ll. 2-4.) 
M: evaṃ tarhi bāhye ’py arthe buddhisārūpyaṃ niṣphalam ityāha / (M1, p. 247, l. 5) 
R: / ’o na gal te blo rang nyid nyams su myong ba yin →na← (D : om. P) / ’dra bas →ci← 
(D : om. P) zhig bya zhe na / (D 151b2 : P 181b4) 
Further, a different presupposed question was suggested by Kedrup: [Opponent:] if the 
perceived form could not establish the entity of the experience, then, what could 
establish it? (gzung rnam de myong ba’i ngo bo’i ’jog byed ma yin na / des gang ’jog 
par nus zhe na / (PVVke, p. 394.) 
443 Unlike other commentators (cf. De D 244a2; PVA2, p. 432, l. 6; J D 198b3; Y D 
313a1; M1, p. 247, l. 7, PVVgyal, p. 320), Kedrup interprets ’di (= tat) as “means of 
the knowledge of the object-aspect” (PVVke: gzung rnam tshad ma ’di ni ’jig rten na / 
p. 394.) 
444 According to Indian commentators, kriyā is interpreted as the cognitive action of 
“experience” and “apprehension”; karma is interpreted as “the external object, such as 
blue and yellow”. 
PVA: nīlasya karmaṇaḥ saṃvittiḥ pītasyeveti kriyākarmapratiniyamārtham iṣyate / 
(PVA2, p. 432, l. 7) 
R: / rtogs pa’i bya ba’i las →ni← (D : na P) sngon po la sogs pa ste / (D 151b2 : P 
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→svabhāvabhūtatadrūpasaṃvidāropaviplavāt←445 /  
nīlāder anubhūtākhyā nānubhūteḥ parātmanaḥ // 431 
/ rang gi ngo bo’i rang bzhin →de’i← (D: de P) // myong ba sgro ’dogs ’khrul pa las /  
/ sngo sogs myong bar grags yin gyi // gzhan gyi bdag nyid myong →las min← (D: ma 
yin P) / PVt 
/ ngo bo nyid gyur de rang bzhin // myong →ba← (P : ba’i D) sgro ’dogs ’khrul ba las /  
/ sngo sogs myong bar grags pa ste // gzhan gyis bdag nyid myong →bas← (D : las P) 
min / PVR 
 
446The designation of blue etc. as experienced is due to the confusion which consists in 
                                                 
181a4ff.) 
M: kriyāyā arthād anubhūteḥ a karmaṇo bāhyasya… / (M1, p. 247, l. 7)  
a M reads a daṇḍa here, but Frauwallner suggests removing it. 
445 Tosaki reads these two pādas as svabhāvabhūtatadrūpasaṃvid āropaviplavāt and 
hence he reads PV 3.431 as two sentences. (Cf. Tosaki 1985: 113.) According to the 
analysis of saṃvid in PVA and M as accusative - saṃvidam (PVA2, p. 432, 1. 2) and 
ablative / genitive - saṃvidaḥ (M1, p. 247, 1. 2), respectively, Prajñākaragupta and 
Manorathanandin seem to read saṃvid inside the compound because otherwise saṃvid 
should have remained in nominative form in their interpretations. 
446  According to Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin, the 
presupposed objection by the opponent for this verse is that if the awareness or 
experience is self-awareness, this is contrary to the worldly view which acknowledges 
an external object. 
De: / →gal te nyams su myong ba’i bdag nyid← (D : om. P) kyis gsal ba nyams su myong 
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[the cognition being] a superimposition of the awareness of the form of that [object] 
which has [its] own nature [on the external objects], but not due to the experience of 
[the object which has] other nature [than awareness]. 
 
dhiyo nīlādirūpatve bāhyo ’rthaḥ kiṃpramāṇakaḥ /  
                                                 
ba yin pa ci’i phyir de sngon po la sogs pa phyi rol nyams su myong ba yin no zhes tha 
snyad du byed ce na / (D 244a2ff. : P 288b8.) 
PVA: na tāvad bāhyārthavāsināṃ nīlādikaṃ bāhyaṃ svasamvedanam / ataḥ 
sārūpyabhāvād vyavasthāpyate. anyathā loke na bāhyārthanīlāditāvyavasthā / (PVA2, 
p. 432, ll. 7-9.) 
M: na hy asya sārupyam antareṇeyam asya saṃvittir iti śakyaṃ vyavasthāpayituṃ / 
(M1, p. 247, l. 9) Sāṅkṛtyāyana has related this sentence to a comment probably 
attributed to Devendrabuddhi: yadi svānubhavātmatayaiva prakāśo 
nārthānubhavātmatayā tadā saṃbandhābhāvād arthānubhavavyapadeśo na yukta ity 
āha / M1, p. 247, n. 2) 
Kedrup’s reconstruction of this presupposed objection makes more sense in terms of its 
logical connection to the previous verse: 
In relation to the common people, there is the speech that sensory 
perception apprehends external object, such as form, etc. In the same 
manner, is the very means of knowledge of the perceived form the 
reason for the apprehension of the external object, such as form, etc.? 
(PVVke: ’o na ’jig rten na dbang shes rnams kyis phyi rol don du 
gyur pa’i gzugs sogs rtog par tha snyad byed pa yod pa bzhin du / 
gzung rnam tshad ma de nyid phyi rol du gyur pa’i gzugs sogs rtogs 
pa’i ’jog byed yin nam zhe na / p. 394.) 
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dhiyo ’nīlādirūpatve sa tasyānubhavaḥ katham // 432447 
/ blo ni sngo sogs dngos yin na // phyi rol don la tshad ma gang /  
/ blo ni sngo sogs dngos min na // de ni ji ltar don myong yin / PVt448 
/ sngo sogs blo yi dngos yin na449 // phyi rol don la tshad ma gang /  
/ sngo sogs →blo yi← (D : blo’i P) dngos min na // de des myong bar ji ltar ’gyur / PVR 
 
If the cognition has the nature of [the objects, such as] blue and so forth, how can the 
external object be established? If the cognition does not have the nature of [the objects,] 
such as blue and so forth, how can that [cognition] be the experience of that [object 
which has no connection with the awareness]? 450 
                                                 
447 A quotation of this verse appears in PKM, p. 84, ll. 16-17 as: dhiyo nīlādirūpatve 
bāhyo ’rthaḥ kiṃ nibandhanaḥ / dhiyo ’nīlādirūpatve bāhyo ’rthaḥ kiṃ nibandhanaḥ // 
448 PV 3.432cd is repeated twice in PVt Peking version. (233b8ff.) 
449 It is worth noting that PVR seems to read nīlādi and anīlādi in PV 3.432a and 432c 
outside the compound as nīlādi rūpatve and anīlādi rūpatve. This reading sounds weird 
because the sentence would then be read as “if blue, etc. are (or not) the nature of 
awareness”. Nevertheless, I think that PVR 3.432a and 432c are simply a mistranslation 
(though I do not know the reason for this mistake) because we find that in Ravigupta’s 
commentaries, these two pādas are correctly interpreted as / gal te shes pa nyid sngon 
po’i rnam pa can te bdag nyid gsal ba yin na / … / blo sngon po la sogs pa’i ngo bo 
nyid ma yin na ni / (R D 151b5-7 : P 181b1-3.) 
450 Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta and Manorathanandin read the whole verse as two 
questions to the opponent by Dharmakīrti. (Cf. PVA2, p. 432, ll. 20-31; R D 151b5ff. : 
P 181b1ff.; M1, p. 247, ll. 16 and 21.)  
In contrast, Devendrabuddhi splits this verse into two parts: the first two pādas are the 
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yadā saṃvedanātmatvaṃ na sārūpyanibandhanam /  
siddhaṃ tat svata evāsya kim arthenopanīyate // 433 
/ gang tshe myong ba’i bdag nyid ni // ’dra ba’i rgyu can ma yin na /  
/ ’di de rang nyid grub pas na // don gyis ci →zhig← (D : gzhi P) nye bar sgrub / PVt 
                                                 
question to Dharmakīrti by the opponent; the last two pādas are a response by 
Dharmakīrti. (Cf. De D 244a7 : P 289a6.) Gyaltsab follows this interpretation in his 
comments. (Cf. PVVgyal, pp. 320-321.)  
The difference of these two interpretations is noted by Kedrup. He adopts 
Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation in his commentary and explains that the purpose of 
these questions is to reject the external object. (Cf. PVVke: gzhan yang phyi rol gyi don 
yod pa ni ji ltar yang ’thad pa ma yin te / p. 395) 
It is worth noting that, Tosaki interprets the first two pādas by adding a “however (し
かし)” between them. 
[Untimately,] a cognition [is cognized by itself (namely, self-
awareness)] as having aspects of blue, etc. [However,] by which 
means of knowledge is [the existence of] the external object [known]? 
[(勝義には)知は青等の相をもつ(ものとして自証される)が，
(しかし)外境対象（の存在）はいかなる量によって（知られる）
であろうか。] (Tosaki 1985: 114) 
If this adversative conjunction implies that Tosaki reads the first question an opponent’s 
question as Devendrabuddhi did, then, it seems puzzling why the opponent raises such 
a question immediately after Dharmakīrti has just given a statement that there is in fact 
no means of knowledge of an external object indeed and the assumption of an external 
object is only due to the superimposition in PV 3.431. Thus, I follow PVA and M. 
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/ gal te myong ba’i bdag nyid ni // ’dra ba’i rgyu can ma yin na /  
/ de ni rang nyid kyis grub pas // ’di la don gyis ci zhig ’jog / PVR 
 
When having nature of the experience is not caused by similarity451, then [having the 
nature of experience] is established only by itself, therefore, what does the object 
contribute to that [cognition]452? 
 
sarvātmanā hi sārūpye jñānam ajñānatāṃ vrajet /  
sāmye kenacid aṃśena syāt sarvaṃ sarvavedanam // 434453 
                                                 
451  The compound sārūpyanibandhanam was translated as ’dra ba’i rgyu can by 
Tibetan translators of PVt, PVR and De (D 244b3 : P 289b1ff.). However, its translation 
in PVP is ’dra ba’i rgyu mtsan (D 96b3, P 113b4). 
452 Although the logical subject of PV 3.433d is artha, most commentators, except 
Manorathanandin, take “the similarity to the object” as the real subject.  For instance: 
De: / don dang ’dra bas don nyams su myong ba la ci zhig rnam par gzhag ces bya ba’i 
don to / (D 244b3); PVA: aparam api tat svarūpaṃ svata eva / tataḥ sārūpyāt 
samvedanam iti kaḥ sambandho / (PVA2, p. 433, l. 1); R: / de ltar na don gyis ci zhig 
phan te / don dang ’dra bas don rig pa’o zhes ji ltar rnam par gzhag ces bya ba’i tha 
tshig go / (D 152a3.) 
453 This verse is missing from PVms.  PVs and PVP2 read sarvātmanā hi sārūpye 
jñānam ajñānatāṃ vrajet / sāmye kenacid aṃśena syāt sarvaṃ sarvavedanaṃ // (PVs, 
p. 88; PVA2, p. 433, ll. 8-9.) PVt and PVP testify the same reading as PV and PVP2. 
However, in PVs, p. 88, n. 9, Sāṅkṛtyāyana reports that in the palm-leaf manuscript 
from Shalu monastery and Manorathanandin’s comments, the first two pādas read: na 
ca sarvātmanā sāmyam ajñānatvaprasaṅgataḥ / This reading is testified by PVR.  
Frauwallner seems to favor the second reading because he deletes PV 3.434ab in PVs. 
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/ bdag nyid kun gyis ’dra na ni // shes pa shes pa nyid →min← (D : mi P) ’gyur /  
/ cha ’ga’ zhig gis mtshungs na ni // thams cad thams cad kyis myong ’gyur / PVt 
/ shes pa nyid min thal ’gyur phyir // bdag nyid kun gyis mtsungs ma yin /  
/ cha ’ga’ zhig gis mtsungs na ni // thams cad thams cad kyis myong ’gyur / PVR 
 
If the similarity [used to prove awareness] is in respect of all characteristics, then 
awareness would not be awareness, [because the awareness could not be similar to its 
object in all respects]. If the similarity would be in respect of certain portion [of 
characteristics, then] every cognition would be the awareness of all objects, [because 
things are all similar to each other in some respects]. 
 
yathā nīlādirūpatvān nīlādyanubhavo mataḥ /  
tathānubhavarūpatvāt →tasyāpy←454 anubhavo bhavet // 435 
                                                 
He also changed the last word of this verse into sarvavedakaṃ. 
It is worth noting that, according to M, Sāṅkṛtyāyana reconstructed another form of this 
verse, which expresses the similar meaning as that in my edition, as follows: 
na ca sarvātmanā sāmyam ajñānatvaprasaṅgataḥ /  
na ca kenacid aṃśena sarvaṃ sarvasya vedanaṃ // (M1, p. 248, ll. 6-7.) 
Considering that the verse in PVA is the only one supported by a Sanskrit manuscript 
in this case and that there is no big difference in its interpretation among other 
commentaries, I follow PVA. 
454  (= rūpatvāt tasyāpy) PVAms (218a1) : tulyo ’py PVs, PVP1, PVP2. 
PVeM and all Tibetan translations - de yang - favor tasyāpi. 
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/ ji ltar sngo sogs ngo bo’i phyir // sngo sogs nyams su myong bar ’dod /  
/ de bzhin nyams myong ngo bo’i phyir // de yang nyams su myong bar ’gyur / PVt 
/ ji ltar sngo sogs ngo bo’i phyir // sngo sogs nyams su myong bar ’dod /  
/ de ltar nyams myong ngo bo’i phyir // de yang nyams su myong bar’gyur / PVR 
 
455Just as [the opponent] accepts that the experience of blue and so forth is due to having 
                                                 
455 In the verse, only one reason is used by the opponent to characterize the experience 
of the object: having a similar form. However, in the commentaries of Devendrabuddhi, 
Prajñākaragupta and Ravigupta another reason, namely, the arising from that, is added. 
[Opponent:] The experience of an object is not characterized by 
‘arising from certain [object]’ and ‘having the form of certain [object]’ 
only.  
[Proponent:] How?  
[Opponent:] The [cognition] is experienced by a cognition which 
arises immediately after the cognition that experiences [the object] 
and arises in the form of that [object] from the cognition that 
experiences [the object].  (De: / gal te gang zhig gang las byung ba 
dang gang gi rnam pa can yin pa zhes bya →ba de← (P : bde D) tsam 
gyis ni don nyams su myong ba’i mtshan nyid ma yin na / gang gis na 
nyams su myong ba’i shes pa de ma thag tu ’byung ba can / nyams 
su myong ba’i shes pa las de’i rnam par ’byung ba’i shes pas de 
nyams su myong ba yin par ’gyur / (D 245a1ff. : P 290a2ff.) 
Cf. also PVA: / …yadi ca yatutpattiḥ sarūpatā ca tasya vedanaṃ tadā / (PVA2, p. 433, 
l. 16) and R: / ’on te gang las skyes pa dang de’i rnam pa can ni sngon po la sogs pa’i 
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the form of blue and so forth, in the same manner, [there is an undesired consequence 
that] there would be a [subsequent] experience for that [previous experience] too, 
because [there is] the form of that experience.456 
 
nānubhūto ’nubhava ity arthavat →tadviniścayaḥ←457 /  
                                                 
cha ’ga’ zhig gis yin gyi // shes pa don thams cad las skyes pa ni ma yin no // de bas na 
thams cad thams cad kyi rig par byed pa ma yin no zhe na / (D 152a7 : P 182a5ff.) 
These interpretations in fact foreshadow their interpretations of the last anubhavaḥ in 
this verse as a subsequent experience. Cf. M: kim 
anubhavarūpatvāttasyānubhavasyārthaviṣayasyāpi pūrvvakasyottaraṃ jñānam 
anubhavo na bhavet | (M1, p. 248, ll, 14-15.) Cf. also R: / …shes pa →snga← (P : sna 
D) ma de shes pa phyi mas nyams su myong bar ’gyur ro / (D 152b2 : P 182a8ff.) 
456 Since the opponent in the current discussion is the one who claims that the cognition 
is experienced by a subsequent cognition, the literal reading of PV 3.435ab does not 
seem to be “an undesired consequence” to the opponent unless this “subsequent 
cognition” has a specific meaning. According to Devendrabuddhi’s commentary (see n. 
455), the opponent defends his opinion by describing the experience of cognition as “a 
cognition that arises immediately after (de ma thag tu ’byung ba can) the cognition that 
experiences [the object]”. Therefore, we can presume that the anubhavaḥ mentioned in 
PV 3.435d is a cognition arising later than the experience of cognition proposed by the 
opponent. Kedrup, in addition, gives an example for what is that subsequent cognition 
– the memory of the awareness (cf. PVVke, p. 397). 
457 PVs and PVP read tadviniścayaḥ (PVAms, 218a3; PVA2, p. 433, l. 30), but tad does 
not appear in all Tibetan translations, inclusive of PVP – / don bzhin du ni nges min pa 
/ (D 97b2 : P 114b6). This tat is also omitted in M – arthavad artha iva gṛhīte 
viniścayo… (Mms 48b6; M1, p. 248, l. 19). In PVM1, Sāṅkṛtyāyana reconstructed this 
PVM1 3.436b as arthavad (hi) viniścayaḥ. 
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tasmād adoṣa iti cet nārthe ’py asty eṣa sarvadā // 436 
/ nyams myong nyams su myong ngo zhes // don bzhin du ni nges min pa /  
 / de phyir nyes pa med ce na // don la’ang de ni rtag tu med / PVt 
/ nyam su myong ba’i myong ba de // don bzhin rnam par nges pa med /  
/ de phyir skyon med ce na yang // don la’ang de ni rtag tu med / PVR 
 
[Opponent:] There is no [such] fault because there is no determination in the [form] 
“the experience is experienced” as [in the form] “the object [is experienced]”.   
[Proponent:] In relation to the object also, there is not always this [determination in the 
form “the object is experienced”].458 
                                                 
458 In this verse, the opponent defends the validity of the reasons - the similarity to the 
cognition and the arising from the cognition (both were previously used to prove an 
immediate subsequent experience of cognition) - by refuting that such reasons can be 
applied to establish a subsequent awareness (i.e., a memory of cognition) to be the 
experience of cognition. The opponent claims that unlike an object which could always 
bring about the experience of that object, the cognition does not always bring about a 
memory of the cognition. Hence, Dharmakīrti indicates that an object too does not 
always bring about an experience of that object. 
To explain Dharmakīrti’s rejection, Devendrabuddhi says: 
In respect to a certain object, there would be no determination of 
stating that every moment of the cognitions that continually arises is 
the experience of this object. (De: / yul gcig ’ga’ zhig tu rgyun 
gyis ’byung ba can gyi shes pa dag la skad cig ma re re don ’di nyams 
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kasmād vā ’nubhave nāsti sati sattānibandhane / 437ab 
/ yod pa nyid kyi rgyu yod na // myong la med pa’ang ci yi phyir / PVt 
                                                 
su myong ba yin no zhes bya ba’i nges par mi ’gyur ro / D 245a3ff. : 
P 290a6ff.) 
Prajñākaragupta’s explanation of this issue gives more details:  
On this point we reply: The mere cause as such does not always 
produce the effect. The cause can become an [actual] producer in 
dependence on assistant [causes]. [Dharmakīrti] shows precisely that 
[when saying] this [determination] does not always [arise] in respect 
to the object too. It means that in relation to the object too, the 
determination indeed does not exist because in some cases an error is 
seen. (PVA2: atrocyate / na hi kāraṇam ity eva kāryasya janakaṃ 
sadā / sahakāriṇam āsādya kāraṇaṃ kārakaṃ bhavet // tad eva 
darśayati / nārthe ’py asty eṣa sarvadā / na hy arthe ’pi niścayo 
bhavati kvacid abhrāntiadarśanāt / p. 434, l. 3.) 
The word kvacid in this explanation is further interpreted by Yamāri. He says: 
The so-called somewhere (la lar) means that it is because even in the 
case of the experience of sun rays (smig rgyu), the delusion of the 
nature of the water, etc. is seen. (Y: / la lar zhes bya ba smig rgyu la 
sogs pa nyams su myong ba la yang chu la sogs pa’i rang bzhin 
du ’khrul ba mthong ba’i phyir ro / D 314a3ff. : P 418a6ff.)  
a PVA2 here reads bhāti but PVAms reads   (= bhrānti). Tibetan translation ’khrul 
pa support the reading of PVAms. 
216 
 
/ yod pa nyid →kyi← (kyi P : kyis D) rgyu yod // ci phyir nyams su myong ba med / PVR 
 
Further, when the cause of the existence [of the determination of the experienced] is 
present in regard to the experience, then, why isn’t there [the determination of the 
existence of experience]?459 
                                                 
459 This translation mostly depends on Manorathanandin’s comments: 
When the causes of the existence of the determination of something 
as experienced, namely, the similarity and the arising from that, are 
there for the experience (of cognition), why isn’t there a 
determination of the existence (of that experience)? Even in regard to 
the object, only the similarity and the arising from that are the cause 
that something experienced; these two [causes] are common for the 
cognition of that [object] too. (M1: kasmād vā ’nubhave 
a’nubhūtaniścayasyaa sattānibandhane sārūpye tadutpāde ca sati 
nāsti sattāniścayaḥ / arthe ’py anubhūtanibandhane 
sārūpyatadutpattī eva te tajjñāne ’pi samāne / p. 249, l. 3.) 
Ravigupta comments on these two pādas similarly: / yang na sngar gyi nyams su myong 
ba la nges pa yod pa’i rgyus don bzhin du ci’i phyir nges pa med pa yin / (R D 152b5 : 
P 182b5) 
A slightly different interpretation of sattānibandhana comes from Prajñākaragupta’s 
comments: 
Indeed, all causes of the experience are there for the experience. How 
is it possible that there is still no determination? (PVA2: anubhave hi 
sarvam anubhavanibandhanam asti / tathāpi na niścaya iti katham 
etat / p. 434, l. 15.) 
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api cedaṃ yad ābhāti dṛśyamāne sitādike // 437cd 
→puṃsaḥ←460 sitādyabhivyaktirūpaṃ saṃvedanaṃ sphuṭam /  
tat kiṃ sitādyabhivyakteḥ pararūpam athātmanaḥ // 438 
/ gzhan yang dkar sogs mthong ba na // dkar sogs mngon par gsal ba yi /  
/ rang bzhin rig pa →gsal← (D : bsal P) ba ni // skyes →bu’i← (corr.461 : pa’i D, P) snang 
                                                 
Accordingly, these two pādas may have another interpretation: “when the causes of 
something [namely of the experience] exist, why isn’t there a determination in regard 
to the experience?” 
This difference between the interpretations of sattānibandhana: “the cause of the 
existence of experience” and “the cause of the existence of the determination of 
experience” may be diminished by a comment of Devendrabuddhi: “when there is a 
cause of the existence of the previous cognition, there is the cause of the determination 
of the experience.” (/ sngar gyi shes pa yod pa nyid kyi rgyu ni yod na nyams su myong 
ba →nges← (P : des D) pa’i rgyu yod na’o / De D 245a6 : P 290b1.) However, according 
to Devendrabuddhi, these two pādas are read as two separate clauses so that anubhave 
is no longer related to sattānibandhe as other commentators propose; and this is also 
the way in which Ravigupta reads these two pādas. 
a Although ’nubhūtaniścayasya may be literally read as of the experienced 
determination, this reading is unlikely in the context of the current argument. 
460 PVs reads puṃsaḥ as genitive singular.  Its equivalent incorporated in M (M1, p. 
249, l. 6) and De (D 245b1 : P 290b4), and even that in PVP (D 98a3 : P 115b1) it is 
read in the same say. In contrast, PVAms (218a7) and PVA2 (p. 434, l. 21) reads 
puṃsāṃ as genitive plural.  Further, in R, the equivalent appears in nominative / 
instrumental case. 
461 The correction is based on puṃs in different Sanskrit materials and skye bus in PVR. 
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ba ’di gang yin /  
/ de ci dkar sogs →mngon gsal← (D : sngon bsal P) las // gzhan dngos ’on te bdag gyur 
yin / PVt 
/ gzhan yang dkar po →sogs← (D : la sogs P) snang ba // skyes bus nyams myong gsal 
ba ni /  
/ dkar sogs mngon par gsal ba can // gang yin ’di ni snang bar ’gyur /  
/ de ni dkar sogs gsal ba las // gzhan nam ’on te rang dngos yin / PVR 
 
[Proponent:] Moreover, [if self-awareness is not admitted,]462 when something with 
[properties such as] white and so forth is being seen [by a man463], what appears as a 
clear awareness, which has the nature of a manifestation of [an object] such as white 
and so forth for a man463, does it have a different nature from the manifestation of white 
and so forth, or [does it have] the same [nature] of [the manifestation]464? 
 
pararūpe ’prakāśāyāṃ vyaktau vyaktaṃ kathaṃ sitam /  
jñānaṃ vyaktir na sā vyaktety avyaktam akhilaṃ jagat // 439 
                                                 
462  Cf. M1: svasaṃvedanānabhyupagame... (p. 249, l. 5.)  Cf. also R: “If the 
awareness is imperceptible…” (R: gal te shes pa lkog tu gyur pa yin na / D 152b7: P 
182b8). 
463 Cf. De D 245b1 and R D 153a1. 
464  Cf. R: / nyam su myong ba de dkar po la sogs pa mngon par gsal ba las tha dad 
pa’i ngo bo nyid yin nam / ’on te dkar po la sogs pa mngon par gsal ba’i bdag nyid kyi 
ngo bo yin grang na / (D 153a2 : P 183a3.) 
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vyakter vyaktyantaravyaktāv →anavasthāprasaṅgataḥ←465 / 440ab 
/ gzhan dngos yin na gsal ba ni // gsal min →ci← (D : ji P) ltar dkar gsal ’gyur /  
/ shes pa gsal yin de gsal min // ’gro ba ma lus gsal ma yin /  
/ gsal ba gsal gzhan gyis gsal →na’ang← (D : na P) // thug pa med par thal ’gyur phyir 
/ PVt 
/ gzhan dngos yin na gsal ba rnams // mi gsal na cis dkar po gsal /  
/ shes pa gsal yin →de← (corr.466 : te D, P) gsal min // de phyir ’gro kun gsal mi ’gyur /  
/ gsal ba gsal gzhan gyis gsal na // thug pa med par thal phyir ro / PVR 
 
[Proponent:] If467 [it has a] different nature, when the manifestation [of white and so 
on] is not illuminated, how would white be manifested?  The cognition is 
manifestation, [because manifestation is the nature of cognition] 468 .  [If] that 
                                                 
465 PVP1, PVP2 and PVs read api doṣaprasaṅgataḥ. The corresponding part in PVAms 
(218b5) is not clear, but it seems to support the reading of api doṣaprasaṅgataḥ. 
However, all Tibetan translations (in PVt, PVR and PVP) read thug pa med par 
thal ’gyur phyir.  In the commentaries, all relevant phrases - thug pa med pa’i skyon 
du thal ba (De D 246a3ff.), anavasthā (PVA2, p. 435, l. 13 and M1, p. 249, l. 19) and 
thug pa med par thal ba (R D 153b4) – appear independently, not as the interpretation 
of another word. Frauwallner (Cf. M1, p. 249) and Tosaki (1985: 122, n. 55) suggested 
reading anavasthāprasaṅgataḥ. I follow their suggestion. 
466 The correction is made according to sā in all Sanskrit materials and de in PVt. 
467 Cf. the na in PVt and PVR. 
468 Cf. PVA2: … api tu jñānarūpā vyaktiḥ / (p. 435, l. 7.) Cf. also PVAt: ’on kyang shes 
pa’i rang bzhin gsal ba yin no / (D 98b4); R: ’on kyang shes pa gsal ba ni shes pa’i ngo 
bo nyid yin na ni / (D 153b1ff.) 
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[manifestation with the nature of cognition]469 is not manifested, then, the whole world 
[would] not be manifested. 470 
If the manifestation (i.e., the cognition of the object) is manifested (i.e., cognized) by 
another manifestation [which arises later]471, [it is not correct,] because there would be 
an infinite regress. 
 
dṛṣṭyā →cājñātasambandhaṃ←472 viśinaṣṭi tayā katham // 440cd 
yasmād dvayor ekagatau na dvitīyasya darśanam /  
dvayoḥ saṃsṛṣṭayor dṛṣṭau syād dṛṣṭam iti niścayaḥ // 441 
/ mthong dang ’brel pa shes med pa // →ci← (D : ji P) ltar de yis khyad par ’gyur /  
/ gang phyir gnyis las gcig rtogs tshe // gnyis pa mthong ba yod ma yin / 
                                                 
469 Manorathanandin and Devendrabuddhi do not interpret this sā. Prajñākaragupta’s 
interpretation appears: “but that manifestation has the nature of the cognition.” (api tu 
jñānarūpā vyaktiḥ sā / PVA2, p. 435, l. 7). Further, Ravigupta has a similar 
interpretation: / ’on kyang shes pa gsal ba ni shes pa’i ngo bo nyid yin no / (R D 153b1 : 
P 183b4ff.) 
470 According to Manorathanandin (see n. 471) and Kedrup (p. 399, l. 10ff.), gsal ba 
(vyakti) can be interpreted as “experience” in this case.  
471 Cf. Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin: De: de dus phyis ’byung ba can gyi gsal 
ba… / (D 246a2 : P 291a8); M1: vyaktyantarād uttarakālabhāvivedanād… / (p. 249, ll. 
18-19.) 
472  cājñātasambandhaṃ PVP : vājñātasambandhaṃ PVs. Neither vā nor ca is 
mentioned in M. The two translations of dang in PVt and PVR seem to favor ca.  I 
adopt ca here while other scholars, like Tosaki, choose vā (Tosaki 1985: 123). 
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/ gnyis dag ’brel par mthong ba na // mthong zhes bya bar nges par ’gyur / PVt 
/ mthong dang ’brel ba shes med can // de tshe ji ltar khyad par ’gyur /  
/ →gang← (P : gal D) phyir gnyis las gcig rtogs nas // gnyis pa mthong ba yod ma yin / 
/ gnyis ni ’dres pa dag mthong na // mthong ba zhes ni nges par ’gyur / PVR 
 
And how can he (i.e., the cognizer) distinguish [an object], whose connection with that 
cognition [which is unknown by itself] is not known, by that [cogntion]? [The 
connection is not known] because when one of the two (i.e., the object or its cognition) 
is known, there is no observation of the second one.473  If two (i.e., the object and the 
                                                 
473 To explain this sentence, Manorathanandin says:  
“That is to say, when the object is seen, the cognition is not perceived 
because the perceiving of that [cognition] is in the future. And when 
the cognition is perceived, the other one (i.e., the object) is not 
[perceived] because it is in the past.” (M1: tathā hi ayadā ’rtho 
dṛśyate na tadāa buddhir upalabhyate tadupalambhasya bhāvitvāt / 
yadā ca buddhir upalabhyate na tadā ’nyaḥ atītatvāt / pp. 249-250, 
ll. 28-1.) 
We also found a similar explanation in De: / gang gi tshe yul dmigs par gyur pa de’i 
tshe / de dmigs pa ma yin te / rang rig par thal pa’i phyir ro // gang gi tshe shes pa 
gzhan gyis yul dmigs pa rtogs pa de’i tshe / don ma yin gyi dmigs pa de nyid ’ba’ zhig 
yin no // de’i phyir ’dis ’di mthong ngo zhes bya bar yang mi ’gyur ro / (D 246b2ff. : P 
292a2ff.) 
a All editions of M read …na padārtho dṛśyate na tadā… (Cf. also M2, p. 228, ll. 15-
16 and M3, p. 150, l. 24). The reading is illogical given the context. From Mms, we 
have . A cancellation mark appears on top of the first na and a 
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cognition of the object) were seen to be mixed together, there would be a determination 
“it (i.e., the object) is seen”. 
 
sarūpaṃ darśanaṃ yasya dṛśyate ’nyena cetasā /  
→dṛṣṭākhyā tatra cet←474… 442abc1 
/ gang gis mthong ba ’dra →ba← (D : na P) ni // sems gzhan gyis ni mthong gyur pa /  
/ de la mthong zhes brjod ce na / … PVt 
/ gal te gang gis ’dra ba mthong // sems gzhan gyis ni mthong gyur pa /  
/ de la mthong ba zhes bya →na← (P : ba D) / … PVR 
 
[Opponent:] The cognition which has the similar form to that [object]475 is seen by 
                                                 
very tiny na is added between dṛśyate and tadā. Further, the two words after the first 
na in the manuscript are obviously yadārtha not padārtha. 
474 dṛṣṭākhyā tatra cet PVP : dṛṣṭākhyā tan na cet PVs. The translations in PVt, PVR 
and PVP are consistent with PVP. Further, the equivalent incorporated in M is tatra 
arthe dṛṣṭākhyā dṛṣṭavyavahāra iti cet... / (M1, p. 250, ll. 6-7.). Sāṅkṛtyāyana restored 
dṛṣṭākhyeti na cet in M1 (p. 250, l. 5), but this was corrected by Shastri and Pandeya in 
their M2 (p. 228, l. 6) and M3 (p. 150, l. 10). 
475  The word yasya in this verse or its embedded form in the commentaries are 
translated as gang gis in most Tibetan translations except that in Peking version of De 
(292a5), where it is translated as “gang gi”.  Accordingly, Gyaltsab relates gang gis to 
“the reason” (rgyu mtshan) and Kedrup relates it to “a visual perception” (mig shes) (cf. 
PVVgyal, p. 325 and PVVke, p. 400). However, according to the glosses in De, R and 
M, yasya should be related to the object. 
De: / ’on kyang gal te →gang gi← (P : rang gis D) zhes bya ba sngon po la sogs pa’i 
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another consciousness. [Then] the speech in relation to the [notion of “it is seen”] is 
observed.476 
                                                 
yul ’ga’ zhig ’dra ba mthong / (D 246b4 : P 292a5) 
R: / ’on kyang sngon po la sogs pa’i don gyi ngo bo nyid gang zhig… / (D 154a3 : P 
184a8) 
M: yasyārthasya sarūpaṃ... (M1, p. 250, l. 6.) 
476 The objection means that, even though the object vanished, when a subsequent 
cognition perceives the previous cognition of the object, it can still perceive the object 
because the cognition of the object has the similar form of the object. 
To illustrate the meaning of this objection, Prajñākaragupta gives an example: 
When one grasps a man who is connected to a stick [in the form] 
‘[here is] a stick holder’ by an experience of such [a man having stick 
a] which is different from those (i.e., the stick and the manb), [then 
there is such] determination. (PVA2: yathā cdaṇḍīti daṇḍayuktasyac 
puruṣasya tadvyatiriktena tathābhūtasya saṃvedanena parigrahe 
vyavasāyaḥ / p. 435, l. 34.) (PVAt: dper na dbyug pa dang ldan pa’i 
skyes bu dbyug pa can zhes de las gzhan gyi de lta bur gyur pa myong 
bas yongs su bzung ba na nges pa yin no / D 99b2 : P 117a3ff.) 
a Cf. Y: / de lta bur gyur pa (= tathābhūtasya) zhes bya ba ni →dbyug← 
(P : dbugs D) dang bcas pa’i skyes bu’o / (D 315a2 : P 419b1) 
b Cf. Y: / de las gzhan gyis (= tadvyatiriktena) zhes bya ba ni →dbyug← 
(P : dbyig D) pa dang skyes bu dag las tha dad pa’i rig pas so / (D 
315a2 : P 419a8ff.) 
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…siddhaṃ sārūpye ’sya svavedanam // 442c2d 
athātmarūpaṃ no vetti pararūpasya vit katham / 443ab 
… / ’di ’dra bas na rang rig grub /  
/ ci ste rang dngos mi rig na // →ci← (D : ji P) ltar gzhan gyi ngo bo rig / PVt  
… / ’di ’dra rang rig grub pa yin /  
/ ’on te rang dngos mi rig na // ji ltar gzhan gyi ngo bo ni / PVR 
 
[Proponent:] If the similarity of this [cognition with that object is established], the self-
awareness is established. If it (i.e., the experiencing aspect of the cognition) does not 
perceive the own nature [of the cognition], how could it (i.e., the cognition) know 
another nature?477 
 
sārūpyād vedanākhyā ca prāg eva →prativarṇitā←478 // 443cd 
                                                 
c PVAt reads … dbyug pa dang ldan pa’i skyes bu dbyug pa can 
zhes … (≈ daṇḍīti daṇḍyuktasya) (D 99b2 : P 117a3). 
477 All Indian commentators and Gyaltsab share the same literal interpretation of PV 
443ab. (Cf. De D 247a1ff. : P 292b2ff.; PVA2, p. 436, ll. 8-21; R D 154a5ff. : P 184b4; 
PVVgyal, p. 326.) It is worth noting that a very different interpretation is presented by 
Kedrup and Dge ’Dun Grub. Cf. § 2.1.2.6 and 2.2.1. 
478 In PVAms (in the middle section of 219b1), this word is illegible.  Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s 
transcript reads pratipāditā (PVA1, p. 126, l. 3; PVA2, p. 436; PVs, p. 89). However, 
Frauwallner, in PVs, corrects it with prativarṇitā which possibly originates from 
Manorathanadin’s commentary (Mms, in the middle section of 49a4; M1, p. 250, l. 19). 
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/ ’dra ba las ni myong zhes pa’ang // sngar nyid rnam par →bsal← (corr.479 : gsal D, P) 
ba yin / PVt 
/ ’dra ba las kyang myong zhes pa // sngar nyid rab tu →bsal← (corr.480 : bsal D : gsal 
D) ba yin / PVR 
 
And that something is named “cognition” because of the similarity was already 
contradicted before481. 
                                                 
This alternative is also testified by Prajñākaragupta’s commentary. He interprets these 
two pādas as: “it is impossible that [the cognition] is experienced by another [cognition] 
because it has the similar form.” (…sarūpam etad iti pareṇa vedanam asambhavi / 
PVA2, p. 436, l. 23). The word “impossible” (asambhavi) can be considered as the 
interpretation of prativarṇitā rather than pratipāditā. 
Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s choice of pratipāditā was probably influenced by the Tibetan 
translations, PVt or even PVR. However, all other Tibetan sources, including De and 
PVAt, testify the reading of prativarṇitā.  Note that Tosaki keeps pratipāditā (Tosaki 
1985: 125).  
479  Although both D and P read gsal, according to all other Indian and Tibetan 
commentaries, gsal must be a corruption of bsal. 
480 Although both D and P read gsal here, according to Ravigupta’s interpretation: / 
shes pa la gnas pa’i ’dra ba las shes pa med pa yin yang don rig par byed pa zhes zer 
ba ni snga ma nyid du bzlog zin te / (D 154a7ff. : P 184b6ff.), bzlog zin (“was 
contradicted”) is synonymous with bsal ba but not gsal ba. 
481 Devendrabuddhi, Ravigupta and Manorathanandin point out that “before” means 
“in verse 429ab”. 
De: / ’dra ba thams cad phan tshun dag / myong ba dag ni thob par ’gyur // zhes bya 
ba’i skabs su spangs zin to / (D 247a3 : P 292b5) 
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dṛṣṭayor eva sārūpyagraho ’rthaṃ ca na dṛṣṭavān /  
prāk kathaṃ darśanenāsya sārūpyaṃ so ’dhyavasyati // 444 
/ mthong ba dag ni ’drar ’dzin na // don ni sngar mthong yod min pas /  
/ →ci← (D : ji P) ltar de ni mthong ba dang // ’dra ba yin par →des← (D: de P) nges ’gyur 
/ PVt 
/ mthong ba dag nyid ’dra ba ’dzin // sngar ni don mthong med pa yin /  
/ ji lte mthong ba ’di yis ni // ’dra ba de las nges par ’gyur / PVR 
 
482 Only between two [things] that were perceived [before] is the apprehension of 
similarity [possible], but [the cognizer] did not see the object before. How does he 
determine the similarity of that [object] with respect to the cognition? 
 
sārūpyam api necched yaḥ tasya nobhayadarśanam /  
                                                 
R: / ’dra ba thams cad phan tshun du // myong ba →dag tu← (D : dag P) thob par ’gyur 
// zhes bya ba der →bsal← (D: gsal P) te / (D 154a1 : P 184b7) 
M1: / …prāptaṃ saṃvedanaṃ sarvasadṛśānāṃ parasparam ity anena prativarṇitā 
pratyuktā // (p. 250, l. 19) 
482  Prior to interpreting this verse, Ravigupta presents the opponent’s objection: 
moreover, if it is established by the similarity, then it is correct that the object is 
experienced because of that. (/ gzhan yang gal te ’dra bas grub pa de’i tshe de las don 
rig par rigs te / R D 154b1 : P 184b7) 
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tadārtho →jñānam←483 iti ca jñāte ceti gatā kathā // 445 
/ ’dra ba nyid kyang mi ’dod pa // gang yin de la gnyis mthong med /  
/ de tshe don dang shes pa zhes // de dag smos su ga la yod / PVt 
/ ’dra ba nyid kyang mi ’dod pa // gang yin de yis gnyis mthong med /  
/ de tshe don dam shes pa zhes // de dag shes pa’i gtam zin to / PVR 
 
One484 who would not accept even485 the similarity [of the cognition to the object] 
does not see these two (i.e., the object and the cognition of the object). In that case, the 
statement about “object”, “cognition” and “[these] two are known” is gone486. 
                                                 
483 PVs reads jñātam. 
484 Gyaltsab (PVVgyal, p. 327) regards “Vaiśeṣika, etc.” (bye brag smra ba sogs) as the 
one gang yin (sk. yaḥ) refers to. 
485 According to Ravigupta and Manorathanandin, the word “even” (t. kyang; sk. api) 
implies that the opponent does not accept self-awareness either.  
R: / kyang gi sgras ni rang rig pa nyid kyang khas mi len pa’i rgol ba… / (D 154b5 : 
P 185a4) 
M: / sārūpyam api śabdāt svasaṃvedanaṃ yo vādī necchet… / (M1, p. 251, l. 3) 
486 Manorathanandin and Prajñākaragupta do not gloss gatā kathā, but they do explain 
that gatā kathā may silence the whole world (cf. PVA2, p. 437, l. 2; M1, p. 251, l. 6). 
Manorathanandin further explains the reason for this outcome: “it is because the 
everyday practice [of language] is caused by the apprehension.” 
(…pratītinibandhanatvād asya vyavahārasya / M1, p. 251, ll. 6-7.)  
In this case, PVt does not render the Sanskrit correctly, because it seems to take kathā 
as an adverb “how”. If so, the feminine gatā would be difficult to interpret. Like gatā, 
the translation of zin in PVR can mean both “apprehended” and “gone”. Ravigupta’s 
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atha svarūpaṃ →sā←487 tarhi svayam eva prakāśate /  
yat tasyām aprakāśāyām arthaḥ syād aprakāśitaḥ // 446 
/ ci ste →rang← ( P : rab D) dngos ’o na de // rang nyid rab tu gsal bar ’gyur /  
/ gang phyir de mi gsal na ni // don mi gsal ba nyid du ’gyur / PVt 
/ ci →ste← (D : te P) rang dngos yin na →de← (D : te P) // rang nyid rab tu gsal bar ’gyur 
/  
/ gang la de mi gsal na yang // don yang mi gsal nyid du ’gyur / PVR 
 
If [what appears in the cognition is its] own nature, [then] the [cognition] illuminates 
itself because when that [cognition] is not illuminated, the object would not be 
illuminated. 
 
→etenānātmavitpakṣe←488 sarvārthādarśanena ye /  
apratyakṣāṃ dhiyaṃ prāhus te ’pi →nirvarṇitottarāḥ←489 // 447 
/ bdag rig min pa’i phyogs dag la // don kun mthong med ’di yis ni /  
                                                 
gloss - bzlog pa (R D 155a3) – indicates the latter is the meaning in this case; the 
equivalent in De – ldog pa (D 247b1) – indicates the same. 
487 PVs reads na. 
488 etenānātmavitpakṣe PVAms, PVs : etenātmavitpakṣe PVP1, PVP2. 
489 In PVA2, p. 437, n. 1, Sāṅkṛtyāyana mentions that PVPms reads prativārṇitā, but 
PVPms 3.447cd (in the middle of 219b7) is illegible so we cannot verify Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s 
statement.  Further, that reading would make the metre of the verse incorrect. 
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/ blo ni mngon sum →min← (D: mi P) smra ba // gang yin de la’ang lan btab bo / PVt 
/ don kun mthong med tshul ’di ni // bdag rig min pa’i phyogs dag la /  
/ blo mngon sum min rab smra ba // gang yin de la’ang lan brjod do / PVR 
 
Because of that [which has been said above], according to the position that there is no 
self-awareness, there would be no seeing of any object. Therefore, [those] who maintain 
that the cognition is not directly perceived, [like Jaimini, 490  etc.] have also been 
answered.491 
 
āśrayālambanābhyāsabhedād bhinnapravṛttayaḥ /  
sukhaduḥkhābhilāṣādibhedā buddhaya eva tāḥ // 448 
pratyakṣās tadviviktaṃ ca nānyat kiṃcid vibhāvyate /  
→yat tajjñānaṃ←492…  449abc1 
                                                 
490 Cf. M1, p. 251, l. 17 and De D 247b5 : P 293b3. 
491  Devendrabuddhi gives an example of the answer: “…if the cognition of these 
[objects] is not perceptible, the statement that these objects or cognition are known 
should disappear.” (De: / dper na de dag gi blo mngon sum nyid ma yin na don nam 
shes pa de dag shes pa’i gtam ldog par ’gyur zhes bshad pa lta bu’o / D 247b5ff. : P 
293b2). This example is already stated in PV 3.445cd. Ravigupta considers that the 
answer was given in PV3.446ab. (R: / tshul ni sngar bstan pa nyid bzhin du / gsal ba 
dang mi gsal bar myong ba mngon sum nyid ma yin na / don rig pa med par ’gyur zhes 
bya ba yin no / D 155b3 : P 186a5) 
492 PVM and PVeM read yat tajjñānaṃ. PVs reads tathā sati, but Frauwallner suggests 
correcting it to yat tajjñānaṃ. PVPms 3.449abc1 (in the middle of 220a2) is illegible.  
Sāṅkṛtyāyana fails to recognize yat ta(j)jñānaṃ, which he transcribes at the beginning 
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/ rten dmigs goms pa’i khyad par las // tha dad →par← (D : pa P) ni ’jug pa can /  
/ bde sdug ’dod pa la sogs pa’i // khyad par mngon sum de dag ni /  
/ blo nyid de las tha dad gzhan // de shes gang yin cung zad kyang /  
/ rtogs med… / PVt 
/ rten dmigs →goms pa’i← (D : pa’i P) bye brags las // tha dad par ni ’jug pa can /  
/ bde sdug ’dod pa la sogs →pa’i← (P : pa’o D) // tha dad →pa yi← (D : pa’i P) blo nyid 
dag /  
/ mngon sum de las tha dad →gzhan← (D : gzhag P) // cung zad gsal min shes gang de / 
PVR 
 
These various pleasure, pain, desire and so on,493 which have different occurrences 
according to the distinction of basis [such as the sensory faculties], objects [such as the 
pleasure to be experienced] and the repeated practice [of the mind such as those 
previous occurrences of mind], are indeed cognitions. [Therefore,] they are perceptible. 
And nothing else different from these [pleasure and so on] is manifested (i.e., 
apprehended), which [would be] cognition [of the pleasure and so on].494 
                                                 
of PVA1, p. 127, l. 14 and PVA2, p. 437, l. 29, is indeed the beginning of PV 3.449c. 
And hence, he tries to reconstruct PVP 3.449c by adding tathā sati and yat tajjñānaṃ 
to PVP1 3.449c and PVP2 3.449c, respectively (cf. PVA1, p. 127, ll. 14-16 and PVA2, 
p. 437, ll. 29-31). 
493 Devendrabuddhi specifies that “etc.” includes aversion and exertion and so forth. 
(Cf. De: / sogs pa smos pas ni zhe sdang dang rtsol ba la sogs pa gzung ngo / D 248a1ff. : 
P 293b8) 
494 For a different translation of this verse, cf. Padmakara 2002: 267. 
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… paro ’py →etān←495 bhuñjītānyena vid yadi // 449c2d 
/ …gzhan →gyis rig← (D : gyi rigs P) yin na // gzhan gyis kyang ni de spyod ’gyur / PVt 
/ gal te gzhan gyis rig na ni // gzhan gyis kyang ni de myong ’gyur / PVR 
 
If [one maintains that] the cognition is [cognized] by another [cognition], even another 
[person] may enjoy these [happiness etc.]. 
 
tajjā tatpratibhāsā vā yadi dhīr vetti nāparā / 450ab 
/ gal te des bskyed pa dang der // snang ba’i blo →rig← (P : rigs D) gzhan min na / PVt 
/ des bskyed pa’am der snang ba’i // blos rig gzhan gyis ma yin na / PVR 
 
[Opponent:] If the cognition arises from those [happiness and so forth] or has the 
appearance of those [happiness and so forth], it can experience [them], but another 
[cognition] does not [have these two conditions]. 
 
ālambamānasyānyasyāpy asty avaśyam idaṃ dvayam // 450cd 
                                                 
495 PVs and PVM read etān. Although PVA, PVt and PVR read either enāṃ or de, not 
in plural form, all interpretations comment that this pronoun indicates “happiness and 
so forth” (sk. sukhādīn, t. bde pa la sogs pa). Even if we can consider sukhādi as 
singular, the feminine enāṃ does not fit here.  Therefore, I choose etān. Note that 
Tosaki opts for enām (Tosaki 1985: 131). 
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atha notpadyate tasmān na ca tatpratibhāsinī / 
sā dhīr nirviṣayā prāptā … 451abc  
/ dmigs par byed pa gzhan la yang // gnyis ’di gdon mi za bar yod /  
/ ci ste de las skyes min zhing // der snang can yang ma yin na /  
/ blo de yul med can du ’gyur / PVt 
/ dmigs par byed pa gzhan la yang // ’di gnyis gdon mi za bar yod /  
/ ci ste de las skyes min zhing // der snang ba can ma yin na /  
/ blo ni yul med thob par ’gyur / PVR 
 
[Proponent:] these two (i.e., the arising from happiness and so on, and having the 
appearances of happiness and so on) necessarily exist for [the cognition of] another 
[person] which has [happiness and so on] as an object.  [Thus, he can also enjoy them.]  
If [one accepts that the cognition which apprehends another enjoyer’s happiness etc.] 
neither arises from that [happiness] nor has the appearance of that [happiness, then] that 
cognition would be without object. 
 
…sāmānyaṃ ca tadagrahe // 451d 
na gṛhyata iti proktaṃ na ca tad vastu kiṃcana / 452ab 
… / de ma →rig bzung← (D : gzung P) na spyi dag kyang /  
/ mi ’dzin de ni cung zad kyang // dngos min zhes kyang sngar bshad do / PVt496 
                                                 
496 The positions of translations of iti proktam are different in PVt and PVR, showing 
the different interpretations as to whether na ca tad vastu kiṃcana should be subsumed 
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… / de mi ’dzin na spyi dag kyang /  
/ mi ’dzin zhes ni sngar bshad de // de dngos cung zad kyang dngos min / PVR 
 
It was explained497 that if there is no perceiving of that [particular happiness and so on 
which belong to the enjoyer], the universals [of happiness and so forth which inhere in 
them] are not perceived. Further, that [universal] does not exist to the slightest degree. 
 
tasmād arthāvabhāso ’sau nānyas tasyā dhiyas tataḥ // 452cd 
siddhe pratyakṣabhāvātma→vidau←498 … 453ab1 
/ de phyir don snang ba de ni // blo de las gzhan min des na /  
                                                 
under the scope of iti proktam. According to the comments of De, R and M, iti proktam 
means the rejection of the universal which was stated in PV 3.20a (cf. De D 248b5 : P 
294b1; R D 156b1 : P 187ab, M1, p. 253, ll. 1-2). Nevertheless, according to De and R, 
na ca tad vastu kiṃcana was also previously taught. 
De: / ’di ltar / de dngos cung zad kyang yod min // zhes bya ba yang gong du bstan zin 
to // (D 249a1ff. : P 295a4ff.) 
R: / gzhan yang gang gis rjes su dpog pa’i yul du gyur pa’i spyi de ni dngos po cung 
zad kyang ma yin te / ’di yang sngar bstan zin to / (D 156b1 : P 187a6ff.) 
497 According to Devendrabuddhi, Ravigupta and Manorathanandin, this statement 
refers to PV 3.20ab: atatsamānatāvyaktī tena nityopalambhanam / (= de mtshungs min 
dang gsal ba min / des na rtag tu mdigs ’gyur te /).  Cf. De D 248b5; R D 156b1 and 
M1, p. 253, l. 2. 
498 vidau PVP2, PVM : vidā PVs : vido PVP1.  PVPms is barely legible in this case 
(220b3); I can tentatively read vido. 
234 
 
/ mngon sum dang ni bdag rig grub / … PVt 
/ de phyir don snang ba ’di ni // blo de las ni gzhan ma yin /  
/ des mngon sum dang bdag →rig← (P : rigs D) grub / … PVR 
 
Therefore, that appearance of the object is not different from [the nature of] that 
cognition.499 Therefore, both being perception and self-awareness are established. 
                                                 
499 Manorathanandin interprets this sentence as follows:  
Because of the group of arguments (yuktikalāpa) immediately stated 
above, this appearance of the object, which is vividly appearing, is 
not different from that cognition which is accepted as imperceptible, 
but has indeed the nature of that [cognition]. (/ tasmād anantaroktād 
yuktikalāpāt arthāvabhāso ’sau sphuṭaṃ prakāśamānas tasyāḥ 
aparokṣatveneṣṭāyāa dhiyo nānyaḥ kiṃ tu tadrūpa eva / M1, p. 253, 
ll. 6-7.) 
It is unclear to me what Manorathanandin means here by saying that the cognition is 
accepted as imperceptible.  Devendrabuddhi gives another interpretation of this 
sentence: 
Therefore, the object-appearance of the cognition that is accepted as 
grasping of others’ happiness etc., which has an appearance 
characterized as vivid, is not different from the cognition. (De: / de’i 
phyir de las gzhan pa’i bde ba la sogs pa’i ’dzin pa nyid du ’dod pa’i 
blo gang yin pa’i don snang ba de ni gsal ba nye bar mtshon pa’i 
snang ba gang yin pa de ni / blo de las ni gzhan ma yin / D 249a2ff. : 
P 295a5ff.) 
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... gṛhṇāti →tān←500 punaḥ /  
nādhyakṣam iti ced eṣa kuto bhedaḥ →samarthayoḥ←501 // 453b2cd 
… / gal te de la ’dzin byed kyang /  
/ mngon sum nyid ni min zhe na // don mtshungs tha dad de gang las / PVt 
… / gal te de la ’dzin byed kyang /  
/ mngon sum nyid ni min zhe na // don mtsungs de dag cis tha dad / PVR 
 
                                                 
The interpretations in PVA and R are similar to that in De: 
PVA: / yadi nāmānumānaṃ parasukhasvabhāve / tadanyathākāre tu svasamvedanam 
eva / tad api parasukhasyaiva rūpam iti cet / na (/) pareṇāvedanāt / (PVA2, p. 439, ll. 
1-3) 
R: / gang gi phyir blo gzhan gyis pha rol gyi bde ba shes pa’i ngo bo nyid (om. P : dang 
D) don snang ba ’di ni pha rol gyi bde ba shes pa’i blo de las gzhan pa ma yin te / (D 
156b2 : P 187a7ff.) 
a Mms (49b4) reads  
500 tān PVP2, PVM : tat PVs, PVP1. PVAms (220b5) is in very bad condition here, but 
can be read as tān. 
501  PVAms (220b5) is unclear here,  , but I can still read ma, not mā. 
Although PVA1 (p. 129, l. 12) and PVA2 (p. 439, l. 11) read ma, Frauwallner corrects 
it in his PVA2 by adding a long vowel sign after ma. PVs (p. 90) and M (Mms 49b5) 
read mā. According to MW (p. 1153) and Böthlingk_Roth (part 7, p. 710), samārtha 
seems to be a wrong reading of śamārtha. I follow PVA. 
236 
 
[Opponent502:] One grasps these [pleasure or pain belonging to another series - santāna 
-] indirectly. [Proponent:] How can this difference exist between these two (i.e., the 
experience of one’s own series and the inference of the cognition of another series) 
which have the similar object?503 
 
adṛṣṭaikārthayogādeḥ saṃvido niyamo yadi /  
sarvathānyo na gṛhṇīyāt saṃvidbhedo ’py apoditaḥ // 454 
/ ma mthong don gcig ldan sogs kyis // gal te myong →ba← (D : ba’i P) →nges← (corr. : 
des D, P) yin na /  
/ gzhan ni rnam kun ’dzin mi ’gyur // myong ba’i dbye ba’ang →bsal← (P : gsal D) zin 
to / PVt 
/ gal te mthong med las don gcig // lhan sogs myong bar nges na ni /  
                                                 
502 Kedrup identifies the opponent in this verse by names bye brag pa (Vaiśeṣika), rig 
pa can (Naiyāyika), and grangs can pa (Sāṃkhya). Cf. PVVke, p. 407. 
503 According to Devendrabuddhi, “the similar object” here means that the object, i.e., 
the happiness and so on, which are experienced by one’s own experience and inferred 
by the inference of another person, respectively, are substantively different from the 
experience and the inference. From this perspective, the opponent cannot say that the 
inference of another person cannot experience the happiness etc., but one’s own 
experience can do so. (Cf. De: / don mtshungs de tha dad gang las de nyams su myong 
ba po’i gang yin pa de ngo bo nyid kyis gzhan gyi gang yin pa de ltar na yul mtshungs 
pa can gyi shes pa de dag gis ’di ni mngon sum yin la / gzhan ni ma yin no zhes bya 
ba’i khyad par ’di gang las gang yin / de ltar na gnyi ga yang mngon sum nyid dam 
lkog tu gyur pa nyid du mtshungs pa nyid ’gyur te gzung bar bye brag med pa’i phyir 
ro / D 249a5ff.) 
237 
 
/ gzhan gyis rnam kun mi ’dzin cing // myong ba’i tha dad dag kyang →bsal← (corr. : 
gsal D, P) / PVR 
 
If [the opponent says:] because of [the cause, such as] the unseen [that is characterized 
as pure or impure504, or] the inherence in the same thing505 and so on, [which exists 
only for one who perceives the suffering and happiness in one’s own series506] etc.,507 
                                                 
504 “The unseen thing (adṛṣṭa)” is interpreted as adṛṣṭāc chubhāśubhādilakṣaṇād (M1, 
p. 253, l. 20), chos dang chos ma yi pa’i mtshan nyid (De D 249b1 and R D 157a1). 
A similar statement is found in Vaiśeṣikasūtra and its commentary where Kaṇāda and 
Candrānanda explain the distinction of the consciousness: dharmāc ca / (9.24) 
ananubhūtārthaviṣayam api svapnajñānaṃ śubhāśubhasūcakaṃ dharmāc ca śabdād 
adharmāc ceti / (VS, p. 70, ll. 17-18). 
505 Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin interpret ekārthayoga as ekārthasamavāya. 
(Cf. PVA2, p. 439, ll. 20-21; M1, p. 253, l. 20.) 
Kaṇāda, in his VS 10.10, the section on the explanation of the division of inherence, 
makes a similar statement: ekāthasamavāyiṣu kāraṇāntareṣu darśanād ekadeśa ity 
ekasmin / (VS, p. 74, l. 11). 
506 Cf. M1: ...svasantānavartisukhagrāhikāyāḥ... (p. 253, ll. 20-21.) 
507 Devendrabuddhi and Ravigupta specify that the word “etc.” includes other causes 
accepted by the opponent, such as the pleasure and displeasure (dga’ ba dang mi dga’ 
ba la sogs pa) of Iśvara, etc. (Cf. De D 249b3; R D 157a2.) Different consequences out 
of such emotions of Iśvara are further explained as a complex of vivid perceiving of 
happiness and dull perceiving of suffering, or otherwise. (Cf. Ś: / dbang phyug dga’ ba 
dang mi dga’ ba la sogs pa zhes bya ba la / dbang phyug dga’ ba las bde ba gsal bar 
dmigs shing sdug bsngal mi gsal bar dmigs pa’o // mi dga' ba las ni bzlog pa'o / D 
238b4ff.) 
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there is a restriction of awareness, [Proponent:] the other [person508] would not grasp 
                                                 
508 Note that Kedrup interprets gzhan (anya) as “the previous [moment of] happiness 
and so on which is substantively different from itself (i.e., the subsequent cognition in 
the one’s own series)” (… rang las rdzas gzhan du gyur ba’i bde sogs snga ma rnams … 
PVVke, p. 408), while Devendrabuddhi, Ravigupta and Manorathanandin interpret 
gzhan or anya as “a man (skyes bu) different from the enjoyer (bhoktṛ) who has the 
unseen causes which bring the restricted experience of one’s own suffering or happiness” 
a.  These two interpretations lead to two different explanations of PV 3.454c.  Except 
Kedrup, all other commentators including Gyaltsab explain this pāda as follows: 
In order to distinguish the enjoyer’s experience from the inference of another person, 
the opponent presents two reasons in the first two pādas, namely, (1) the unseen forces 
belonging to the enjoyer and (2) the inherence in the same thing, i.e., the soul.  
Dharmakīrti replies in PV 3.454c: such reasons would also bring about an absurd 
consequence that there would be no cognition of another person’s cognition at all, 
because no one can have the unseen cause and inherence in another mind series.  That 
is to say, in PV 3.454c, Dharmakīrti considers that the pervasion (vyāpti) used in his 
opponent’s argument—if there are no unseen forces (i.e., the pure or impure action done 
previously) or inherence in the same thing, then there is no experiencing of feeling— 
can also be applied to the perceiving (√grah) of the feeling. In several commentaries, 
the reason for such consideration is explained as follows. Since the opponent claims 
that the experiencing of the feeling is a subsequent cognition, such experiencing and 
the feeling should be substantively different from each other just like the feeling to be 
experienced different from another person’s cognition. Therefore, the additional 
conditions proposed by the opponent cannot effectively distinguish (1) the difference 
between the enjoyer’s experience and the enjoyer’s pleasure from (2) the difference 
between another person’s experience and the enjoyer’s pleasure. (Cf. De D 249b4ff., Ś 
D 238b4ff., R D 157a3ff., PVVgyal, p. 332.) 
However, according to Kedrup, if Dharmakīrti would argue with his opponent in the 
way stated above, he would accept a theory, which can be derived from above 
explanation, that the cognition of the feeling of another person requires the unseen 
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action in the person who has that cognition. And this will come to an unacceptable 
conclusion that Buddha does not have his cognition of others’ suffering.  Accordingly, 
Kedrup gives his distinct explanation of PV 3.454cd as follows: 
The subsequent cognition in the mind series of Lha Sbyin (Devadatta), 
which perceives Lha Sbyin’s pleasure and so on, (dharmin / subject) 
cannot perceive or experience all his previous happiness and so on, 
which are substantively different from itself (sādhyadharma / 
property to be proved), because the relation, which makes them (i.e., 
the subsequent experience and the previous pleasure) inherent in the 
eternal Self, is not established (hetu / reason). [The reason is 
established] because if such relation, which makes them inherent in 
the Self, is established, they must exist at the same time.  Further, 
[there might be a view] similar to that the object is perceived without 
a form [passed to the cognition] but through the direct contact [with 
the cognition].  [The claim] in relation to such view that there is a 
difference between the experience and non-experience [of one’s 
pleasure] due to the influence of the previous karmic action, too, is 
rejected by the valid reasoning in rejecting [the view that] “depending 
on the unseen [action] another object would arise in [proximity or 
distance]”b. (Cf. PVVke: / lha sbyin gyi bde sogs la rtog pa’i lha 
sbyin rang rgyud kyi blo phyi ma chos can / khyod kyis rang las rdzas 
gzhan du gyur ba’i bde sogs snga ma rnams ni rnam pa kun tu ’dzin 
cing myong bar mi ’gyur bar thal / de dag dang bdag gi don gcig la 
ldan pa’i ’brel ba ma grub pa’i phyir te / bdag rtag pa’i don gcig la 
ldan pa’i ’brel ba grub na dus mnyam yin dgos pa’i phyir / gzhan 
yang yul rnam med thug phrad du ’dzin par mtshungs pa la sngon gyi 
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[the happiness] in any way. The difference in cognitions [which have the same object] 
has also been rejected [by PV 3.412cd509]. 
 
510yeṣāṃ ca yogino ’nyasya pratyakṣeṇa sukhādikam /  
                                                 
las dbang gis myong ma myong gi dbye ba yod pa’ang / gal te der 
yang mthong med la / brten nas gzugs gzhan ’byung ’gyur na / zhes 
sogs ’gog pa’i skabs su rigs pa yang dag gis bsal zin to // p. 408.) 
According to this explanation, PV 3.454c is the reply to the defence of ekārthayoga, 
while PV 3.454d is the response to the defence of adṛṣṭa. I am inclined to follow 
Kedrup’s interpretation, though he is the only one advocating it. 
a Cf. De: / gzhan gyi rnam kun mi ’dzin cing // skyes bu dang ’brel ba can gyi bde ba la 
sogs pa gzhan rnam pa thams cad du rnam pa ’ga’ zhig kyang mi ’dzin pa nyid du ’gyur 
ro / (D 249b4.) 
R: de’i tshe ma mthong ba la sogs pa’i stobs kyis rnam pa thams cad du rnam pa gang 
gis kyang skyes bu gzhan gyis pha rol gyi bde ba la sogs pa ’dzin pa ma yin no zhes 
bya bar ’dir ci ste mi ’gyur / (D 157a2ff.) 
M1: …tenānyasya na bhoktṛteti… (p. 253, l. 21.) 
b / gal te der yang mthong med la / brten nas gzugs gzhan ’byung ’gyur na / = PV 
3.412cd: tatrāpy adṛṣṭam āśritya bhaved rūpāntaraṃ yadi / On the other hand, 
Manorathanandin seems to indicate that apodita refers to PV 3.407ab, because only in 
those two pādas is the phrase vyaktāvyakta cited in M. (Cf. M1, p. 253, l. 25.) Ravigupta 
also proposes a citation—rigs zhes bya ba phan tshun rten—to which apodita refers, 
but I cannot find the source of this statement. 
509 See n. 508 
510 For Franco’s translation of this verse cf. Franco 2011: 90. 
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vidanti tulyānubhavās tadvat te ’pi syur āturāḥ // 455 
/ gang dag rnal ’byor mngon sum →gyis← (D : la P) // gzhan gyi bde ba la sogs →pa← 
(D : la P) /  
/ myong la nyams myong mtshungs pas na // de yang de bzhin gdung bar ’gyur / PVt 
/ gang dag rnal ’byor mngon sum gyis // gzhan gyi bde ba la sogs myong /  
/ ’dod la →nyams myong mtsungs ’gyur bas← (D : nyams su myong mtsungs pas P) // de 
dag de bzhin nyams →nyon mongs← (P : snyon smongs D) ’gyur / PVR 
 
Further, for those [opponents, like Kaṇāda 511  who maintains that] yogis perceive 
happiness and so forth of other [people] by perception, inasmuch as they (i.e., yogis) 
too have the same experience [as the suffering person], they too would suffer just like 
                                                 
511 According to Devendrabuddhi the opponent in this verse is Jaimini (rgyal dpog pa, 
De D 249b7 : P 296a5ff.), i.e., the Mīmāṃsaka. However, Prajñākaragupta and 
Ravigupta suggest the Vaiśeṣika to be the opponent. (Cf. R D 157a6 and PVA as follows.) 
Prajñākaragupta specifically states that Mīmāṃsaka and Lokāyata are not the 
opponents in this case. (ayeṣāṃ (cā)lokāyatamīmāṃsakānāṃa yoginaḥ santi 
kaṇādādīnāṃ … / PVA2, p. 440, l. 16) 
Note that Shastri identifies the opponents as the Vaibhāṣika, which might be a typo of 
Vaiśeṣika. (Cf. M2, p. 232, n. 3.) 
a PVA1 and PVA2 read yeṣāṃ lokāyatamīmāṃsakānāṃ. PVAms (221a6), although in a 
poor quality in this section, can be read as yeṣāñ ca lokāyatamīmāṃsakānāṃ. However, 
the reading lokāyatamīmāṃsakānāṃ makes no sense because these schools of thoughts 
do not accept yogic perception. The negation is testified by Tibetan translation: / ’jig 
rten rgyang phan pa dang dpyod pa ma yin pa gzegs zan pa la sogs pa rnal ’byor pa 
yod pa gang yin pa dag la / (PVPt D 103b4 : P 122a1). 
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that [suffering person]. 
 
viṣayendriyasampātābhāvāt teṣāṃ tadudbhavam /  
nodeti duḥkham iti ced … 456abc 
/ gal te yul dbang ’dus med pas // de las byung ba’i sdug bsngal ni /  
/ de dag →la ni skye← (D : las ni skyes P) min na / …PVt 
/ gal te yul dbang ’dus med phyir // de dag gi ni sdug bsngal dang /  
/ de las ’byung can skye min na / …PVR 
 
[Opponent:] Because there is no contact between the object and the sense faculty [of 
the yogis], the suffering which arises from that [contact] does not arise for them (i.e., 
the yogis). 
 
… na vai duḥkhasamudbhavaḥ // 456d 
→duḥkhasaṃvedanaṃ←512 kiṃ tu →duḥkhajñānasamudbhavaḥ←513 / 457ab  
… / sdug bsngal skyes par →gyur← (D : ’gyur P) nyid ni /  
/ sdug bsngal myong min ’on kyang ni // sdug bsngal shes pa skyes pa yin / PVt 
… / sdug bsngal kun nas ’byung ba dag /  
                                                 
512  duḥkhasaṃvedanaṃ PVPms (221a7): duḥkhāsaṃvedanaṃ PVs, PVP1, PVP2 : 
duḥkhasya vedanaṃ PVM, PVeM and the manuscript found in Shalu monastery (Cf. 
PVs, p. 90, n. 4). Tosaki (1985: 139, n. 117) adopts duḥkhasya vedanaṃ in his edition.  
513 duḥkhajñānasamudbhavaḥ PVP, PVM : duḥkhe jñānasamudbhavaḥ PVs. 
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/ sdug bsngal myong min ’on kyang ni // sdug bsngal →shes← (D : zhes P) pa ’byung ba 
yin / PVR 
 
[Proponent:] The awareness of suffering is indeed not the arising of the suffering, rather 
[the awareness of suffering is] the arising of the cognition of suffering. 
 
→na hi duḥkhādy asaṃvedyaṃ pīḍānugrahakāraṇam←514 // 457cd 
/ sdug bsngal la sogs myong min par // gdung dang phan ’dogs rgyu ma yin / PVt 
/ sdug bsngal la sogs ma myong ba // gdung dang phan ’dogs rgyu ma yin / PVR 
 
[In our opinion,] because the suffering and so on are not experienced [by Yogis], [they] 
are not indeed the cause of the grasping of harm or benefit. 
 
bhāsamānaṃ svarūpeṇa pīḍā duḥkhaṃ svayaṃ yadā /  
na tadālambanaṃ jñānaṃ na tadaivaṃ →prasajyate←515 // 458 
/ gang tshe rang nyid sdug bsngal gyi // rang gi ngo bor snang ba ni /  
/ gdung yin de dmigs shes →min← (D : yin P) pa // de tshe de ltar thal mi ’gyur / PVt 
/ gang tshe bdag nyid sdug bsngal na // rang ngo bor snang gdung ba yin /  
                                                 
514 PVs reads duḥkhopakārayor hetur na hi duḥkhādyavedane. However, Sāṅkṛtyāyana 
mentions that a palm leaf manuscript of PV (in Shalu monastery) and PVeM read na hi 
duḥkhādy asaṃvedyaṃ pīḍānugrahakāraṇam / (PVs, p. 90, n. 6) 
515 prasajyate PVp : prayujyate PVs, PVM. 
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/ de dmigs shes pa de ltar min // de tshe thal bar ’gyur ba med / PVR 
 
The suffering itself, which appears with its own nature, is the harm (i.e., the pain).516 
When there is no cognition (i.e., experience) which has that [pain517 ] as an object-
support [for yogis], then there would be no unwanted consequence like that (i.e., that 
the yogi would be pained by taking other’s suffering as an object). 
 
bhinne jñānasya sarvasya tenālambanavedane /  
→arthasārūpyam ālamba ātmā vittiḥ svayaṃ sphuṭaḥ←518 // 459 
                                                 
516 All Tibetan translations consider sdug bsngal (duḥkha) and gdung ba (pīḍa) as the 
subject and predicate, respectively. However, Manorathanandin seems to take pīḍā as 
the subject and duḥkha as the predicate: “The harm is the suffering itself, which appears 
with its own nature, i.e., the perceptible characteristic, namely, the manifestation which 
does not depend on others.” (M1: / duḥkhaṃ svayaṃ paranirapekṣaprakāśaṃ 
svarūpeṇa prakāśasvabhāvena bhāsamānaṃ pīḍā / p. 254, l. 21.) 
517 Cf. De: / sdug bsngal la sogs rgyud gzhan nam // rang gi rgyud las ’byung ba gzung 
bar gyur pa yin gyi rnam par shes pas dmigs shing ’dzin pa gdung ba ma yin no / (D 
250b1 : P 297a1ff.) and R: …. / de’i tshe de sdug bsngal bar ’gyur gyi sdug bsngal 
gsum la dmigs pa’i shes pa… / (D 157b6 : P 189a2ff.) 
518 We have three different forms of these two pādas from PVs, PVA and M: 
PVAms and PVA2: arthasārūpyam ālamba aātmā vittiḥa svayaṃ sphuṭaḥ. 
PVs: arthasārūpyam ālambya ātmavittiḥ svayaṃ sphuṭā / 
PVM: arthasārūpyam ālamba ātmā vittiḥ svayaṃ sphuṭā / 
PVs seems the most unreliable in this case. Frauwallner corrects PVs according to PVM. 
It is worth noting that the Tibetan translations: bdag myong and bdag rig (in PVt and 
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/ des na shes pa thams cad kyi // dmigs myong dag ni tha dad yin /  
/ don dang ’dra ba dmigs pa ste // rang nyid gsal ba bdag myong yin / PVt 
/ des na shes pa thams cad kyi // dmigs myong dag ni tha dad →yin← (P : min D) /  
/ don dang ’dra ba dmigs pa ste // rang nyid gsal ba bdag rig yin / PVR 
 
Therefore, for all cognitions, having an object519 and [being] awareness are different 
(i.e., having different characteristics). [To explain:] Having an object is similarity to the 
object. [By contrast,] awareness itself520 is vivid by itself.521 
                                                 
PVR, respectively) may be a translation of ātmavittiḥ, but the translation in De, bdag 
nyid rig, and the individual gloss for bdag (De D 250b3 : P 297a5) imply the reading 
ātmā and vittiḥ. 
The difference between PVP and PVM is between sphuṭaḥ and sphuṭā, which relate to 
ātmā and vittiḥ, respectively. I follow PVP. 
a PVA1 reads ātmavittiḥ (p. 131, l. 21). 
519 Dreyfus translates ālambana as “observation”. (Cf. Dreyfus 1997: 401.) 
520  Prajñākaragupta (PVA2, p. 441, l. 13) interprets ātmā as nature (ātmarūpam). 
Devendrabuddhi interprets in the same way: “itself means certain distinction of own 
nature” (…bdag ni rang bzhin gyi bye brag →’ga’← (P: ’ba’ D) zhig go / (De D 250b3 : 
P 297a5) And De is further interpreted by Śākyabuddhi as: “that [explanation] of itself 
- distinction of nature – means [here] suffering. ‘certain’ means that it arises as having 
the nature of apprehension from nothing but its own series.” (Ś: / bdag ni rang bzhin 
gyi bye brag nyid de sdug bsngal lo // ’ga’ zhig ces bya ba ni rang gi rgyud nyid las 
rtogs pa’i bdag nyid du skyes pa zhes bya ba’i don to / D 239b6 : P 295a6) 
521 Manorathanandin seems to take the third and fourth pādas to be the explanation of 
ālambana and vedana of the second pāda, respectively. Hence, the third and the fourth 
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api cādhyakṣatābhāve dhiyaḥ syāl liṅgato gatiḥ / 460ab 
/ gzhan yang mngon sum med pas na // blo ni rtags las rtogs par ’gyur / PVt 
/ gzhan yang mngon sum nyid med na // blo ni rtags las →rtogs← (P : rtags D) par ’gyur 
/ PVR 
 
Further, if cognition is not perceptible to the senses, the apprehension [of the cognition] 
would [arise] from the [inferential] sign. 
 
tac cākṣam artho dhīḥ pūrvo manaskāro ’pi vā bhavet // 460cd 
kāryakāraṇasāmagryām asyāṃ sambandhi →nāparam←522 / 
sāmārthyādarśanāt / …461abc1 
/ de yang dbang po don →sngar← (corr. : nam D: snar P)523 blo // yang na yid byed snga 
                                                 
pādas may read:  
[To explain: Having] object [means] having similarity to the object. [Awareness means 
that] the awareness itself is vivid by itself (i.e., regardless of others). (M1: tathā hi 
arthasārūpyam ālamba ālambanārthaḥ ātmā svayaṃ paranirapekṣaḥ sphuṭā vittir 
vedanārthaḥ / p. 255, ll. 3-4)  
However, I prefer to take ālamba and vittiḥ to be equivalents of ālambana and vedana, 
respectively, and considers arthasārūpyam and ātmā svayaṃ sphuṭaḥ as their 
explanation, respectively. 
522 PVM1 reads nāparām, but Frauwallner corrects it to nāparam according to M. (Cf. 
M1, p. 255, l. 14.) 
523 According to pūrvaḥ, the snar in Peking version should be a corruption of sngar. 
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mar ’gyur /  
/ rgyu ’bras tshogs pa ’di dag las // ’brel pa can gzhan yod min te /  
/ nus pa mthong ba med phyir ro / … PVt 
/ de yang dpang po don dam blo // yid byed snga ma nyid kyang ’gyur /  
/ ’di yi ’bras bu’i rgyu tshogs na // ’brel ba can gzhan yod ma yin /  
/ nus pa mthong ba med phyir ro / … PVR 
Further, that [inferential sign] would be the sense-faculty, the object, the cognition or 
the previous attention of the mind. In relation to this complex of cause and effect, there 
is no other [thing, such as the conjunction with the Self (sk. ātmanaḥ saṃyogaḥ; t. bdag 
yid phrad pa)524 and so on] having a connection [with the cognition] because one does 
not observe the capacity [of another thing to be in the positive and negative 
concomitance with the cognition525]. 
 
… tatra nendriyaṃ vyabhicārataḥ // 461c2d 
→tathārtho←526 dhīmanaskārau jñānaṃ tau ca na sidhyataḥ /  
                                                 
524 M1, p. 255, l. 14 and De D 251a3. 
525 Cf. R: / de la rjes su ’gro ba dang ldog pa yis gzhan pa’i nus pa der ma mthong ba’i 
phyir ro / (D 158a7 : P 189b5ff.)  In Pārthasārathi Miśra’s Śāstradīpikā, it is mentioned 
that the cognition can be inferred from the connection (saṃbandha) between the Self 
and the object. (Cf. ŚD: jñānakriyādvārako yaḥ kartṛbhūtasyātmanaḥ karmabhūtasya 
cārthasya parasparaṃ saṃbandho vyāptṛvyāpyatvalakṣaṇaḥ sa 
mānasapratyakṣāvagato vjñānaṃ kalpayati / p. 202) 
526 PVs reads tathārthau. 
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nāprasiddhasya liṅgatvaṃ...462abc 
… / de la ’khrul phyir dbang po min /  
/ don yang de bzhin blo yid byed // shes yin de yang ma grub nyid /  
/ ma grub pa ni rtags nyid min / … PVt 
… / de la ’khrul phyir dbang po min /  
/ de bzhin don dang →blo yid← (D : blo’i P) byed // shes yin de dag kyang mi ’grub /  
/ ma grub →pa← (D : par P) ni rtags nyid min / … PVR 
Among these, the sense-faculty is not [that sign] because there is the deviation.527 The 
object is just like that.528 [Further,] the cognition and the attention of the mind are the 
cognition [itself, because of being the nature of the cognition]. And these two are not 
established [previously, i.e., before the cognition which is to be established]. Something 
not established is not the [inferential] sign. 
 
...vyaktir arthasya cen matā // 462d 
liṅgaṃ ... 463a1 
… / gal te don gsal rtags yin par // ’dod na … PVt 
… / gal te don gsal rtags yin par // ’dod na … PVR 
                                                 
527 Manorathanandin explains the deviation in this case: “because even when it (i.e., 
the sense faculty) is present, the cognition does not [necessarily] arise [in relation to it].” 
(…. saty api tasmin jñānābhāvāt / M1, p. 255, ll. 15-16.) 
528 Cf. M: “In the same manner, the object too is not the inferential sign because of the 
deviation from cognition.” (/ tathārtho’pi jñānavyabhicārān na liṅgaṃ / M1, p. 255, l. 
16) 
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[Opponent:] The manifestation of the object (i.e., jñātatva529) is supposed [by us] to be 
the sign. 
 
... saiva nanu jñānaṃ vyakto ’rtho ’nena varṇitaḥ /  
vyaktāv ananubhūtāyāṃ tadvyaktatvāviniścayāt // 463a2bcd 
… de nyid shes min nam // →’dis← (D : ’di P) ni gsal →gyur← (D : ’gyur P) don gsal te /  
/ gsal →ba← (D : bar P) nyams su myong min na // de yis gsal →’gyur← (D : gyur P) mi 
nges phyir / PVt 
… de shes ma yin nam // ’dis ni don →gsal← (D : gsal ba P) gsal ba ste /  
/ gsal ba nyams myong ma yin la // de gsal nges pa med phyir ro / PVR 
530 [Proponent:] That [manifestation] itself is indeed the cognition [because it is 
characterized by the perception of object].531 By this (i.e., by the previous statement532), 
                                                 
529 Cf. PV 3.466cd. 
530 Devendrabuddhi points out that the following rejections go against two opponent 
views: (1) the view that the manifestation of object is the sign, which is rejected by 
saiva nanu jñānaṃ; (De: / don ni rtags ma yin no // ’o na ci yin zhe na / don →gyi← (P : 
gyis D) gsal ba yin zhe na / ... D 251b2ff. : P 298a7ff.) and (2) the view that the 
manifested object is the sign, which is rejected by the rest of the verse. (De: / blo gzhan 
gang ma grub pa yin par gyur na don gang la rtags yin par ’dod / … D 251b3 : P 298a8) 
531 According to M: / na ca tad eva liṅgi ceti yuktaṃ / (M1, p. 255, l. 22), this sentence 
entails the rejection that it is impossible for the cognition itself to be the inferential sign 
that proves the cognition, which has been explained in PV 3.462abc. 
532 In De (D 251b3 : P 298a7ff.), anena is absent in the translation. According to Jayanta, 
anena is related to the previous statement saiva nanu jñānaṃ. [Cf. J: / ’dis ni (= anena) 
zhes bya ba →ni← (D : om. P) gsal ba shes pa nyis yin bas so / D 207a4 : P 241b3.]  
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the manifested object is explained (i.e., rejected533) because when the manifestation [of 
cognition] is not experienced, there is no determination of [the object] being 
manifested.534 
                                                 
Ravigupta interprets ’dis (= anena) as “by this non-establishment of manifestation” (Cf. 
R: / gsal ba ma grub pa ’dis… / D 159a1 : P 190b1), which is implied in the previous 
statement—when it is said that the manifestation itself is in fact the cognition, this 
manifestation becomes the property to be proved in this case. Manorathanandin’s 
interpretation seems to be the opposite, but then, his interpretation does not make sense 
to me: “By this, namely, by the explanation that the manifestation is the sign, the 
manifested object is explained, i.e., rejected.” (/ anena vyakter liṅgatvakathanena 
vyakto ’rtho varṇitaḥ pratikṣiptaḥ / Mms 50a5; M1, p. 255, l. 23.) I suspect that 
liṅgatvakathanena is a corruption of aliṅgatvakathanena. 
533 Cf. De: … gsal ba bkag par rig par bya’o / (D 251b3 : P 298b1) and M: … varṇitaḥ 
pratikṣiptaḥ / (M1, p. 255, l. 23.) 
534 Manorathanandin’s explanation of PV 3.463cd may be translated as follows: 
To explain: if the manifestation which has the nature of cognition is 
not experienced, there is no determination for the manifestedness of 
that, namely, for manifestedness of the manifestation, which has the 
connection with the object. Therefore, it is not the inferential sign 
because there would be the unwarranted consequence that something 
would be the inferential sign on account of [its] existence only. (M1: 
tathā hi vyaktau buddhirūpāyām ananubhūtāyām 
arthasambandhinas tadvyaktatvasya vyaktivyaktatvasyāviniścayān 
na liṅgatvaṃ sattāmātreṇa liṅgatve ’tiprasaṅgāt // p. 255, l. 23 – p. 
256, l. 2.) 
My translation is supported by the relevant interpretation in R: 
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athārthasyaiva kaścit sa viśeṣo vyaktir iṣyate / 464ab 
/ ’on te gsal →de← (P : te D) don nyid →kyi← (D : kyis P) // khyad par ’ga’ zhig yin ’dod 
na / PVt 
/ ’on te don gyi bye brag →’ga’← (P : dga’ D) // de nyid gsal bar ’dod na ni / PVR 
[Opponent:] The manifestation is accepted as certain distinction of the object itself 
[which exists in its own nature, but is not cognition]535. 
                                                 
When the manifestation was not experienced, manifestedness will not 
be known with the manifested object. Thus, the manifested object 
will not be the inferential sign because it is not established. (R: / gsal 
ba nyams su ma myong ba de’i tshe gsal ba’i don gyis gsal ba nyid 
mi shes pa’i phyir ro // de bas na gsal ba’i don ma grub pa’i phyir 
rtags ma yin no / D 159a2 : P 190b1ff.) 
Briefly, this verse states that if the inferential sign previously proposed by the opponent, 
i.e., “the manifestation of object”, is in fact a cognition, it cannot be an inferential sign 
because the cognition cannot be proved by itself.  If the inferential sign is considered 
as “the manifested object”, then it cannot be an inferential sign either, because the 
inferential sign will not be established before the cognition is established.  
535 Cf. M: athārthasyaiva svabhāvabhūtaḥ sa kaścit svabhāvaviśeṣo vyaktir iṣyate na 
jñānaṃ / (M1, p. 256, l. 4). A similar gloss in De, ... / bdag nyid du gyur pa’i gsal 
ba ’dod na ni / D 251b5 : P 298b4), is further explained by Śākyabuddhi: “‘to be itself’ 
means ‘independently of the distinction of the cognition’” (Ś: ... bdag nyid du gyur pa’i 
zhes bya ba ni blo’i khyad par la ltos pa med pa nyid kyis zhes bya bar sems so / D 
240a4 : P 295b4ff.) 
A detailed interpretation is given by Ravigupta as follows:  
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nānutpādavyayavato viśeṣo ’rthasya kaścana // 464cd 
tadiṣṭau vā pratijñānaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasajyate / 465ab 
                                                 
If [the opponent] does not agree that the manifestation [of the objetct] 
has the nature of cognition,a but [uses the word] ‘manifestation’ in 
respect to a certain distinction of the object which is characterized as 
the ability of manifestation of the activity of the cognition. (R: / ’on 
te blo’i ngo bo nyid ni gsal ba zhes mi bya’i / ’on kyang don gyi bye 
brag ’ga’ zhig blo’i byed pa la snang du rung ba’i mtshan nyid can 
la gsal ba zhes brjod do zhe na / D 159a2ff. : P 190b2ff.) 
According to Kedrup, such distinction of the object can be specifically illustrated as 
follows: 
[Opponent:] The manifestation of object, namely the inferential sign 
for one’s own cognition, is accepted as a certain distinction of the 
object, which previously abides in an unmanifested nature [and] is 
manifested by conditions. (PVVke: … / ’on te rang blo’i rtags don 
gsal ba de sngar mi gsal ba’i ngo bor gnas pa rkyen gyis gsal bar 
byas pa’i don nyid kyi khyad par ’ga’ zhig yin par ’dod do zhe na / p. 
415.) 
To explain: in these two pādas, the opponent tries to point out a distinction in the object 
itself, namely the manifestedness of object, to be the inferential sign that proves the 
cognition. According to Kedrup, such distinction has previously abided in an 
unmanifested state until the extra condition makes it manifested. 
a I assume that the Tibetan transposes the subject and the predicate. 
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/ skye ba dang ni ’jig med pa’i // don la khyad par ’ga’ yang med /  
/ de ’dod na yang shes so sor // skad cig ’jig par thal bar ’gyur / PVt 
/ skye ba dang →ni← (D : mi P) ’jig pa →min← (corr. : yi D, P) / 536 / don la bye brag 
cung zad med /  
/ de ’dod →na yang← (D : na’ng P) shes so →sor← (D : om. P) // skad cig →’jig← (P : ’jigs 
D) par thal bar ’gyur / PVR 
 
[Proponent:] There is no distinction (i.e., the nature of manifestation) whatsoever of the 
object which has no arising and decay [because it (i.e., the object) would have abiding 
and unique nature537]. Or even if538 such [distinction539] is accepted, [the object] would 
be momentary on account of each [of its] cognitions [because, when the previous own 
                                                 
536 PVR 3.464a and R are inconsistent with the Sanskrit materials and PVt. Meanwhile, 
their Dege and Peking versions are inconsistent either. R: / skye ba dang →ni← (D : mi 
P) ’jig pa →min← (corr. : yi D, P) // don la bye brag cung zad med // ces bya ba la / don 
gang zhig la skye ba dang / →’jig← (P : ’jigs D) pa dang / ldan pa →ma← (D : om. P) yin 
pa’i don de la blo’i chos las bye brag cung zad kyang yod pa ma yin no / D 159a3ff. : 
P 190b3ff.) 
537 M: …sthiraikarūpatvād... / (M1, p. 256, l. 6.) 
538 My translation refers to the Tibetan translation of the vā in PV 3.465a, i.e., na yang 
or na’ng. 
539 Manorathanandin and Ravigupta interpret the tat in compound tadiṣṭau as “the 
distinction” (cf. M1, p. 256, l. 10; R D 159a5). Such distinction should literally refer to 
ānutpādavyayavato viśeṣo. In contrast, Devendrabuddhi glosses de ’dod na’ang (= 
tadiṣṭau) as “even if it is accepted that the object has arising and decay,” (De: / ci ste 
don de skye ba dang ’jig par ’dod pa… / D 251b7 : P 298b6ff.) 
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nature is destroyed, a different own nature will arise with each cognition540]. 
 
sa ca jñāto ’tha vājñāto bhavej jñātasya liṅgatā // 465cd 
yadi →jñāne←541 ’paricchinne jñāto ’sāv iti tat kutaḥ / 466ab 
/ de →’ang← (D : yang P) des pa’am shes ma gyur // gal te shes pa rtags yin na /  
/ shes par yongs su bcad med par // →de← (P : des D) shes zhes bya de gang las / PVt 
/ de yang shes pa’am shes min ’gyur // gal te shes pa rtags yin na /  
/ shes pa yongs su ma bcad par // →’di← (D : ’dir P) shes so zhes ji ltar shes / PVR 
 
Further, that [distinction] must be either cognized or non-cognized. If the cognized 
[distinction] is the sign, [then] given that cognition is not determined, how can one 
[know that] this [object] is cognized? 
 
jñātatvenāparicchinnam api tad gamakaṃ katham // 466cd542 
/ shes →gyur← (D : ’gyur P) nyid du bcad med kyang // de ni →ci← (D : ji P) ltar go byed 
yin / PVt 
/ shes nyid yongs su ma bcad par // de ni ji ltar go byed yin / PVR 
                                                 
540  Cf. M: tasya viśeṣasyeṣṭau vā pratijñānam arthasya pūrvasvabhāvanāśe sati 
svabhāvāntarotpādāt kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasajyate / (M1, p. 256, ll. 10-11.) 
541 jñāne PVA, M : jñāte PVs. 
542 PV 3.466cd is missing in PVPms (222b5), but appears in Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s transcripts. 
(Cf. PVA1, p. 134, l. 28; PVA2, p. 443, l. 29.) 
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[On the other hand, if the non-cognized distinction of object were the sign, then the 
distinction] is also not determined as cognizedness (jñātatva). How can it make known 
[the cognition]?543 
 
→adṛṣṭadṛṣṭayo←544 →’nyena←545 →dṛṣṭā←546 dṛṣṭā na hi kvacit /  
viśeṣaḥ so ’nyadṛṣṭāv apy astīti syāt svadhīgatiḥ // 467 
/ mthong ba mthong →gyur← (D: ’gyur P) min gzhan →gyis← (P : gyur D) // mthong 
→gyur← (D : ’gyur P) ’gar yang mthong ’gyur med /  
                                                 
543 Gyaltsab considers these two pādas as the continuation of a previous discussion, 
where Dharmakīrti disproves the pervasion of the opponent’s reason. Gyaltsab deems 
the next verse as the rejection of the second hypothetical argument: taking non-cognized 
object to be the sign. (Cf. PVVgyal, p. 339) By contrast, Kedrup considers these two 
pādas to be the official answer to the second hypothetical argument and attributes his 
understanding to Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi. (Cf. PVVke, pp. 416-417.)  
544 PVM1 (p. 256, l. 20) reads adṛṣṭādṛṣṭayaḥ. However, PVeM1 reads adṛṣṭā dṛṣṭir 
jñānaṃ yeṣāṃ. (Cf. M1, p. 256, l. 21. Cf. also Mms 50a7.) 
545 PVs reads ’rthena. 
546 PVM1 reads draṣṭrā, which may be restored from M: … anyena draṣṭrā dṛṣṭā iti na 
dṛṣṭā niścayaviṣayāḥ syuḥ / (M1, p. 256, ll. 21-22; Mms 50a7).  It is observed that the 
second dṛṣṭā in this sentence is missing from Shastri and Pandeya’s editions. (Cf. M2, 
p. 235, l. 11; M3, p. 155, l. 15.)  Although including draṣṭrā into the restoration of the 
kārikā will make the sentence much easier to read, Tosaki (1985: 149) has suggested 
that draṣṭrā is not the word in the kārikā but the two dṛṣṭā(s) are. (See n. 550.) 
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/ khyad par de gzhan mthong ba la’ang // yod phyir rang blo rtogs par ’gyur / PVt547 
/ ma mthong ba can gzhan →gyis← (corr. : gyi D, P)548 ni // mthong ba la lar mthong ba 
med /  
/ bye brag de gzhan mthong ba la’ang // yod phyir rang blo rtogs par ’gyur / PVR 
 
549 Because [the objects], the cognitions of which are not seen, are seen by another 
                                                 
547 PVP 3.467 reads / mthong ba mthong 'gyur min gzhan gyis // mthong 'gyur 'ga' yang 
mthong 'gyur med // khyad par de gzhan mthong ba las // yod phyir rang blo rtogs par 
'gyur / (D 106b2-5 : P 125a7-125b3.) 
A poor literal translation of PVt 3.467ab misleads the Tibetan commentaries, such as 
PVVgyal (p. 339), PVVke (pp. 416-417), PVVgo (252b2ff.) and thus these 
commentaries provide little assistance for the literal reading of the Sanskrit text.  
Kedrup may have realized the problem of the Tibetan translation. He criticizes 
Gyaltsab’s explanation of this verse and he restores another translation of this verse 
from the citations scattered in De and Ś, which is closer to the Sanskrit text: 
/ ma mthong mthong can gzhan gyis ni / 
/ mthong ba la lar mthong ba med / 
/ bye brag de gzhan amthong ba la’anga (corr. : ma mthong la’ang PVVke, PVVke’) / 
/ yod phyir rang blo rtogs par ’gyur / (PVVke, p. 417; PVVke’ 199a1ff.) 
a mthong ba la yang De D 252a7; Ś D 240b7ff. 
548  This gzhan gyi should be the translation of anyena. Therefore, gyi must be a 
corruption of gyis. Ravigupta’s interpretation of this word as “skyes bus” (D 159b5 : P 
191a7) supports this correction. 
549 Devendrabuddhi considers this verse as a consequence of the alternative that “if the 
non-cognized [distinction of object] is the sign...” (De: / ci ste shes pa ma yin pa rtags 
yin pa de ltar na… / D 252a5ff. : P 299a6) 
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[person] anywhere, they are not [restrictly] seen [by the seer].550 This distinction (i.e., 
                                                 
Ravigupta provides another hypothetical objection for this verse to respond as follows: 
[Proponent:] If the cognition is different from the seen object and it 
is not apprehended, how can the nature of the observation be 
determined?  [Opponent:] Even if the cognition is imperceptible, 
since the object is seen, it is said that “it is seen”. (R: / gal te mthong 
ba’i don las shes pa tha dad cing rtogs pa med na ni / ji ltar mthong 
ba’i ngo bo nyid yongs su gcod // ’on te don mthong ba’i phyir shes 
pa lkog tu gyur pa yin na yang / mthong ba zhes bya ba yin no zhe na 
/ D 159b4 : P 191a6ff.) 
550 Tosaki’s translation of PV 3.467ab is as follows: 
Indeed, [the object cognized by a certain person] is never perceived 
[in the manner:] “this is perceived.” [This is because his] perception 
is not perceived by the other [person].［実に，（或る人の対象は）
他（人）によっては「知覚された」と決して知られない。(そ
れは、かれの)知覚が(他人によって)知られない(からである)。］
(Tosaki 1985: 148.) 
Tosaki might have referred to Manorathanandin’s commentary: hir yasmād adṛṣṭā 
dṛṣṭir jñānaṃ yeṣāṃ te ’rthāḥ kvacid anyena draṣṭrā dṛṣṭā iti na dṛṣṭā niścayaviṣayāḥ 
syuḥ / (M1, p. 256, ll. 21-22) for the above translation. If I understand this passage 
correctly, what Manorathanandin means here is that because the object, whose 
cognition is not seen, would be seen by another cognizer, therefore, restricted objects 
would not be seen, namely, objects cognized by one person would not be restricted to 
him only.  My interpretation may be supported by a more detailed explanation 
provided by Devendrabuddhi as follows: 
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If the inferential sign is something unperceived, even so, whatever is 
the unseen object can be those [inferential signs].  These objects 
have cognitions which are not seen.a The man other than the observer 
who is considered as the seer do not see the seen [objects] anywhere, 
namely, do not see those [objects] seen [by the observer], at all. (De: 
/ ci ste shes pa ma yin pa rtags yin pa de ltar na yang don gang dag 
ma mthong ba de dag yin / don de dag ni ma mthong ba →mthong 
ba← (P : om. D) can no // lta ba por mthong bar ’dod pa las gzhan 
gyis ni skyes bu ’ga’ zhig gis / mthong ba la lar mthong ba de dag 
ma mthong ba nyid yin no / D 252a5ff. : P 299a6ff.) 
To explain the reason why the objects would not be restricted to the observer, 
Devendrabuddhi gives a further explanation as follows: 
If [merely] such “having form” is accepted as ‘the observation [of the 
object]’, there would be the conclusion that everyone in every case 
would see everything. (De: / de lta bu’i rnam pa can mthong bar khas 
len na thams cad kyis thams cad la don thams cad mthong bar ’gyur 
ro zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go / D 252a6ff.) 
And the reason is further explained by Ravigupta as follows: 
Further, given that even if [the cognition] is not seen, the object can 
be seen, it would be seen by me, namely, [the oject] seen by another 
person would be seen by me because the distinctions of seen objects 
are identical. (R: / gal te yang ma mthong bar yang don mthong na ni 
rang nyid kyis mthong bar ’gyur gzhan gyis mthong bas kyang rang 
gis mthong bar ’gyur te / mthong ba’i don gyi khyad par gcig pa’i 
phyir ro / D 159b5ff.) 
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the cognizedness) exists even in the case that [the object] is seen by another [person]. 
Therefore, [another person would] apprehend his own cognition [of the object by the 
same cognizedness].551 
                                                 
a The sentence / don de dag ni ma mthong ba mthong ba can no / is interpreted 
differently by Kedrup as shown in noteb below. However, I translate in accordance with 
the sentence in M—yasmād adṛṣṭā dṛṣṭir jñānaṃ yeṣāṃ te ’rthāḥ. 
b Kedrup has a different interpretation of this passage as follows: 
“In this manner, the so-called non-seer (t. ma mthong can; sk. adṛṣṭa) 
is the one who does not see the object and the so-called seer is the 
one who sees the object.  Between these two, the object is accepted 
to appear to the seer; others who are not the observer do not see the 
objects which are seen by the person who is the observer.” (PVVke: 
/’di ltar don la lta ba po ma yin pa ni ma mthong can zhes bya zhing 
/ don la lta ba ni mthong can zhes bya la / de gnyis kyi nang nas don 
la lta ba por mngon par ’dod pa las / gzhan lta ba po ma yin pa de 
nyid kyis ni / lta ba po’i skyes bus mthong ba’i don de dag la lar 
mthong ba med cing ma mthong ba zhes bya ba … / p. 417.) 
551 Cf. M: “The distinction (i.e., the cognizedness) exists for the object even in the case 
where it is seen by another person. Thus, another person, whose sense faculty has not 
been active in relation to that [object], would have an apprehension of my own 
cognition [of the object] because of the distinction of the apprehension of object.” (M: 
sa viśeṣo ’rthasyānyena puruṣeṇa dṛṣṭāv apy astīti puruṣāntarasyātadvyāpṛtendriyasya 
tasmād arthagataviśeṣāt svadhīgatiḥ syāt / M1, p. 257, ll. 1-2) 
If there is a doubt as to how to understand sva, namely, whether it refers to the observer 
of the object or another person, Devendrabuddhi’s commentary provides help. 
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tasmād anumitir buddheḥ svadharmanirapekṣiṇaḥ /  
kevalān nārthadharmāt kaḥ svadharmaḥ svadhiyo ’paraḥ // 468 
/ de phyir rang chos ltos med can // don chos yan gar ba las ni /  
/ blo ni rjes su dpog ma yin // rang chos rang blo las gzhan ci / 552 PVt 
                                                 
When another person does not perceive the object but sees that 
distinction (i.e., the cognizedness), it is certainly not known that [such 
distinction] belongs to others because there [would be] no 
determination for [the distinction] to exist for only one person. 
Therefore, [other persons] would apprehend my cognition. It is not 
correct that one accepts that [one] does not see that object, but [one 
can still] infer his cognition [of that object]. (De: / don de mi shes pa’i 
bye brag de skyes bu gzhan mthong ba la yang gzhan gyi yod de ma 
shes pa nyid yin no (corr. : na D, P) / skyes bu gcig la yod par nges 
pa med pa’i phyir ro // de’i phyir rang blo rtogs ’gyur / don de ma 
mthong ba yin no zhes ’dod pa de’i yang rang nyid blo rjes su dpag 
par ’gyur na rigs pa ma yin no / D 252a7ff. : P 299a8ff.) 
In short, the unwarranted consequence is that another person who does not have a 
cognition of an object may still have the inference of such object-cognition, namely, the 
experience of the object-cognition in this case.  This is because such inference can 
arise on account of the cognizedness proposed by the opponent as the valid inferential 
sign for the object-cognition. Such cognizedness is the same for both sides, just like the 
cookedness in the cooked rice, if it exists, would not be the object only for the person 
who cooks the rice. 
552 PV 3.468d and 3.469a in PVt and PVPt (D 107a6) are transposed. 
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/ de yi rang chos la →ltos← (D : bltos P) pa // med par don chos ’ba’ zhig las /  
/ blo ni rjes dpog ma yin te // rang blo las gzhan rang chos ci / PVR 
 
Therefore, the cognition is not inferred from the property of the object alone regardless 
of its own property. [If the opponent says that its own property (i.e., the property of the 
cognition)553 is the reason for apprehending object-cognition,]554 [reply:] what is its 
own property apart from the cognition itself? 
 
→yaḥ pratyakṣo dhiyo← 555 hetuḥ tulyakāraṇajanmanaḥ /  
                                                 
553 Although Manorathanandin glosses svadharma as ātmadharma, I do not consider 
the ātma in this case as the Self because D, PVA and R do not seem to support such 
interpretation. 
De: / gzhan yang rang blo las skyes bu gzhan dang aranga chos rang gi yul zhig yod na 
gang yin / (D 252b3) 
PVA2: / tasmād ātmadharmeṇātmabuddher anumāpakena bhavitavyam / svadharmaś 
ca nāparo buddher asti / (p. 444, ll. 26-27.) 
PVAt: / des na bdag gi blo rjes su dpog par byed pa ni bdag gi chos su gyur dgos so // 
rang gi chos kyang blo las gzhan ni med do / (D 107a6ff.) 
R: / de bas rang gi chos kho na rang rang gi blo rjes su dpog pa yin te / chos de yang 
rang gi blo las gzhan cig zhig yin te ci yang med do / (D 160a4.) 
a The word rang is omitted in D and P. I add it in the line according to the citation in Ś: 
rang chos rang gi yul zhes bya ba ni …/ (D 241a3.) 
554 Cf. M1: athātmadharma eva sa kaścid buddher gamaka iti cet āha / (p. 257, ll. 7-
8.) 
555 PVM reads pratyakṣādhigato. 
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tasya bhedaḥ kuto buddher 469abc 
 
/ blo rtags mngon sum gang yin pa // rgyu mtshungs pa las skyes pa de /  
/ blo las tha dad gang las yin / PVt 
/ blo (D : yi P) rgyu mngon sum gang yin pa // rgyu mtsungs pa las skyes pa can /  
/ blo las de ji ltar tha →dad← (P : dang D) / PVR 
 
[Opponent: The happiness which arises from the same cause of the cognition would be 
the reason for inferring the cognition.]556 [Reply:] How could there be a difference 
between the cognition [which is imperceptible557] and that reason of cognition which is 
perceptible [and which] arises from the same cause [as the cognition]? 
 
vyabhicāry anyajaś ca saḥ // 469d 
rūpādīn pañca viṣayān indriyāṇy upalambhanam /  
muktvā na kāryam aparaṃ tasyāḥ samupalabhyate // 470 
/ gzhan skyes de yang ’khrul pa can /  
/ gzugs sogs yul ni lnga po dang // dbang po dang ni dmigs pa dag /  
/ ma gtogs de yi ’bras bu gzhan // nye bar mtshon pa ma yin no / PVt 
                                                 
556 Cf. R: / ’on te bde ba la sogs pa’i blo rgyu mtshungs pa las skyes pa can gyi blo de 
rjes su dpog la ste / bdag nyid kyi chos yin pa’i phyir ro zhe na / (D 160a5). 
557 Cf. R: …mngon sum du ’gyur pa’i bde ba la sogs pa ni blo mngon sum ma yin pa’i 
rgyu yin te /… (D 160a6). 
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/ gzhan skyes de yang ’khrul pa can /  
/ gzugs sogs yul ni lnga po dang // dbang po dag dang dmigs pa dag /  
/ ma rtogs de yi ’bras bu gzhan // nye bar mtshon pa ma yin no / 558 PVR 
 
But, [if its own property] arises from other [causes than those of cognition], it [would] 
deviate [from the cognition].  559Except for five objects such as the form and so forth, 
the sense faculties and the apprehension(s) (i.e., the cognitions), no further effect of that 
[cognition] is perceived. 
 
tatrātyakṣaṃ dvayaṃ pañcasv artheṣv eko ’pi nekṣyate /  
rūpadarśanato jāto yo ’nyathā vyastasambhavaḥ // 471 
                                                 
558 The fourth pāda is omitted in Peking version (192a8). 
559 According to Devendrabuddhi and Ravigupta, PV 3.470-3.472ab reject the view 
that the cognition can be inferred from its effect. 
De: / gzhan yang don gzhan du gyur pa’i blo gzhan du gyur pa’i rtags las rjes su dpog 
pa na / de’i rtags ni ’bras bu’i sgo nas ’gyur pa yin no // de la blo’i ’bras bur ’gyur na 
yul la sogs par ’gyur ro / (D 252b6ff. : P 300a2ff.) 
R: / ’on te blos bskyed pa nyid kyi chos ’ga’ zhig blo’i rtags yin no zhe na / (D 160b2 : 
P 192a7) 
By contrast, Manorathanandin seems to consider this verse as a conclusion of what was 
stated. (Cf. M1: uktam evārthaṃ saṃgṛhṇann āha / p. 257, l. 18.) Manorathanandin did 
not clearly explain what was stated. I do not see how this verse can be understood as a 
conclusion of the previous verses. Thus, I follow Devendrabuddhi and Ravigupta in this 
case. 
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/ de la gnyis ni dbang po ’das // don lnga dag →la← (D : las P) gzugs mthong las /  
/ skyes pa gzhan du srid bral ba // gang yin gcig kyang rtogs pa med / PVt 
/ de la gnyis ni mngon sum →ste← (D : te P) / 560 / gzugs mthong ba las skyes pa gang 
/  
/ don lnga dag las →gcig← (D : ci P) mthong min // gzhan du gsal ba srid pa can / PVR 
 
Among these [three, i.e., the objects, the sense faculties and the apprehension], the two 
(i.e., the sense faculties and the apprehension) are beyond the sense faculty (i.e., beyond 
the direct perception). Among the five objects (i.e., form and so on), not even one is 
seen as arising from seeing form (etc.) [and] whose existence is destroyed otherwise 
(i.e., without the cognition).561 
                                                 
560 PVR does not read the negation here. The commentary reads consistently:  
“Among these, namely, among the form, etc., both sense faculties and the cognitions 
are perceptible. Therefore, they are not the effect or sign.” (R: / de la gzugs la sogs pa 
rnams kyi nang nas dbang po dang shes pa gnyis ni mngon sum ste / de’i phyir de 
ni ’bras bu ’am rtags ma yin no / D 160b5 : P 192b3)  
However, just as Kedrup commented in his PVVke (p. 420), sense faculties are 
commonly agreed to be imperceptible to both Buddhist and their opponents. Thus, I 
suspect that the translation of R in this case is corrupt. 
561 Cf. De: “Further, one should not argue that the form, etc. are the inferential sign. To 
explain: as to the five objects such as the form and so forth, none of them is seen as that 
which arises from the cognition of form, namely, they do not arise from the cognition. 
If [the opponent says,] how can it be like that? [Proponent:] how can the possibility of 
[the arising] from others be eliminated? That is to say, how can there be the elimination 
or the rejection of [the arising] from others.” (De: / gzugs la sogs pas rtags su ’gyur ro 
zhes bya ba yang yod pa ma yin te / ’di ltar / gzugs la sogs pa yi // don lnga dag la 
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yad evam apratītaṃ tal liṅgam →ity atilaukikam←562 / 472ab 
                                                 
gzugs mthong skyes // gang yin gcig kyang mthong ba med // blo las skyes gang yin 
pa’o // ci ’dra ba zhig ce na / rnam gzhan gsal ba →srid← (D : sid P) pa ci // rnam pa 
gzhan du gsal →zhing← (D : cing P) spangs pa gang la yod pa zhes bya bar tshig rnam 
par sbyar ro / D 253a4ff. : P 300b1ff.) 
PVA and R offer a similar interpretation. 
PVA2: pañcasv artheṣv eko ’pi rūpādiṣu tathābhūto nekṣyate yo rūpadarśanād 
upajātaḥ / na hi rūpādayo rūpadarśanato jāyante kāraṇāntarād upajātatvāt / (p. 445, 
ll. 13-14.) 
R: / gzugs la sogs pa’i don lnga’i nang nas don gang zhig gzugs mthong ba las skyes 
pa’i don gcig kyang mthong ba ma yin no // de lta yin na gzugs mthong ba ma rtogs 
pa la gsal ba srid pa can te ma byas pa skye ba can yin no / (D 160b5ff. : P 192b3ff.) 
According to these interpretations, yaḥ seems to be related to jātaḥ (De and Pr) and 
ekaḥ (R). And therefore, PV 3.471a2bcd is to explain that when the opponent intends 
to use five objects to be the inferential sign of effect to prove the cognition, Dharmakīrti 
rejects it by stating that the objects are not the effect of the cognition. 
Manorathanandin’s interpretation is as follows. 
“Among the five objects, i.e., form, etc., not even one is seen, which is admitted to be 
destroyed, i.e., its existence rejected, otherwise, i.e., without a cognition, while being 
observed [and] to arise from the seeing a form of an object, i.e., from the cognition.” 
(M: rūpādiṣu pañcasv artheṣu eko ’pi nekṣyate buddher apratyakṣatvāt / yo yāvad 
dṛśyamāno anyathā jñānam antareṇa vyastasambhavaḥ pratikṣiptasattvo viṣayasya 
rūpadarśanato buddher jāto ’bhyupagamyate / M1, p. 258, ll. 4-6.) 
562 ity atilaukikam PVM : ity atisāhasam PVP1, PVP2 : apy alaukikaṃ PVs (but in 
square brackets).  PV 3.472ab is omitted from PVAms. Only two syllables are left 
on 223b4, by the left string hole. Sāṅkṛtyāyana mentioned that the manuscript of PV 
266 
 
/ de ltar shes med gang yin →de← (P : te D) // rtags zhes bya ba bab →col← (P : chol D) 
yin / PVt 
/ de ltar shes →med← (corr. : byed P : bye D)563 gang yin te // rtags yin zer ba bzhad gad 
rgyu / PVR 
 
[The statement] “the inferential sign [for the cognition] is what is not perceived in this 
manner (i.e., as explained previously564)” is beyond the world (i.e., ridiculous). 
 
vidyamāne ’pi liṅge tāṃ tena sārdham apaśyataḥ // 472cd 
kathaṃ →pratītir liṅgaṃ←565 hi nādṛṣṭasya prakāśakam / 473ab 
/ rtags yod na yang de dang ni // lhan cig ’brel pa mthong med par /  
                                                 
from Shalu monastery also reads … ity atilaukikaṃ for the last few words. (Cf. M1, p. 
91, n. 3.) PVD (D 253a6 : P 300b3) reads ’jig rten ’da (= atilaukika or lokottara). PVt 
and PVP (D 108a6 : P 127a8) read bab col (= atisāhasa). PVR reads bzhad gad rgyu (= 
hāsakara).  
563 Cf. R: / rang gi ngo bo nyid kyis shes pa →ma← (D : om. P) yin pa de ni →nye← (P : 
nyi D) bar gyur pa tsam gyis blo’i rtags yin no zhes zer ba ’di dag ni shin tu bzhad gad 
kyi rgyu yin no / (D 160b7ff. : P 192b6ff.) 
564 Cf. De D 253a7: ’di lta ste / bshad ma thag pa’i tshul gyis… 
565 pratītir liṅgaṃ PVM : pratītiliṅgaṃ PVs, PVP1, PVP2. PVPms (in PVAms 223b4) 
could faintly read pratītir liṅgaṃ. It is worth noting that a plural word, rtags dag ni, 
which should be the equivalent of liṅgaṃ, is found in all Tibetan translations except 
PVP which reads rtags dang ni (D 108a7 : P 127b2). Nevertheless, according to the 
quotation of these words in J D 209a7 : P 244b1:…rtags dag ni zhes bya ba ni…, dang 
should be a corruption of dag. 
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/ →ci← (D : ji P) ltar rtogs ’gyur rtags dag ni // ma mthong ba yi gsal byed min / PVt 
/ rtags yod pa dag yin na yang // de dang lhan cig de mthong med /  
/ ji ltar rtogs te rtags dag ni // ma mthong na ni gsal byed min / PVR 
 
Even if the inferential sign [that proves the cognition] exists, how can there be an 
apprehension [of the cognition by the inferential sign] for [a person who] does not see 
that [cognition] along with that [sign]? The inferential sign indeed does not make 
apparent the unseen [thing, such as cognition]. 
 
tata evāsya liṅgāt prāk prasiddher upavarṇane // 473cd 
dṛṣṭāntāntarasādhyatvaṃ tasyāpīty anavasthitiḥ / 474ab 
/ rtags de nyid →las← (D : la P) sngar de ni // grub pa nyid du brjod na ni /  
/ de la yang ni dpe gzhan zhig // bsgrub bya yin phyir thug →med← (D : mad P) ’gyur / 
PVt 
/ rtags de nyid las ’di snga bar // grub pa yin par smra na ni /  
/ dpe gzhan bsgrub par bya ba nyid // de la yang zhes thug med ’gyur / PVR 
 
If [opponent] says that [previous cognition, as the instance of the present inference] is 
previously (i.e., in the previous inference in relation to other series) well established by 
means of that very inferential sign (such as the movement of the body and so on),566 
                                                 
566 The difficulty for reading these two pādas lies in how to interpret asya and tasya, 
and read tata eva and liṅgāt as the appositive. 
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Manorathanandin’s interpretation is as follows. 
[If the opponent] says or considers that for the purpose of an 
establishment of the positive concomitance in relation to one’s own 
series (ātman, i.e., svasantati a), that cognition should be previously 
well established, i.e., determined, by means of an inference i.e., by 
means of that very inferential sign, … (M: tata eva liṅgād asya 
jñānasyānvayasiddhyartham ātmany anumānāt prāk prasiddher 
niścayasyopavarṇane vābhidhīyamāne... M1, p. 258, ll. 15-16)  
This interpretation is ambiguous.  First, although asya is interpreted as “cognition”, it 
fails to specify which cognition it refers to.  Second, ātmani in the sentence could be 
related to either the compound before it or the word after it; these two options can then 
lead to entirely different readings. The translation I made above is in the light of the 
following commentaries. 
By contrast, Devendrabuddhi’s commentary explain the verse in greater detail. He first 
explains the opponent’s view: 
[The opponent says] this might be the case, but [when] a cognition is 
intended to be proved in one’s own series by a certain inferential sign, 
that inferential sign [might have been used to] prove a cognition in 
[the series of] another [person]. Because of the establishment [of the 
inferential sign in that case], by the concomitance of [the series of] 
another [person and the inferential sign], [the cognition] in one’s own 
series can be inferred. (De: / de ltar ni ’gyur mod kyi rtags gang gis 
bdag nyid la blo sgrub par ’dod pa’i rtags de nyid las gzhan la blo 
grub par ’gyur ro // de sgrub pas gzhan rjes su ’gro ba las bdag nyid 
la rjes su dpog pa yin no zhe na / (D 253b3ff. : P 301a2ff.) 
The subordinate clause and main clause of the second sentence in Devendrabuddhi’s 
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explanation are further elucidated by Śākyabuddhi: 
The statement of “de ltar ni ’gyur mod kyi rtags gang gis bdag nyid 
la blo” means that the person who infers [the cognition] (rjes su dpog 
pa po) intends to establish the cognition in his own [series] by the 
inferential sign, such as, the moving or shaking of the body and so on. 
(Ś: / de ltar ni ’gyur mod kyi rtags gang gis bdag nyid la blo zhes 
bya ba la sogs pa la rtags gang gis te / lus kyi g-yo ’gul la sogs pas 
rjes su dpog pa po bdag la blo bsgrub par ’dod pa’i’o / D 241b3 : P 
297a7) 
The statement of ‘rtags de nyid las gzhan la’ is [to explain] that the 
cognition is going to be established in the similar instances (t. mthun 
pa’i phyogs; sk. sapakṣa). [But] the inferential instance is absent. (Ś: 
/ rtags de nyid las gzhan la zhes bya ba ni mthun pa’i phyogs la 
blo ’grub par ’gyur te / dpe med par zhes bya bar sems so / D 
241b3ff. : P 297a7ff.) 
Devendrabuddhi continues his comments by giving a literal interpretation of PV 
3.473ab: 
In this manner, the [opponent] states that this was previously 
established by means of that very inferential sign, that is to say, this 
was accepted in respect of the concomitance by means of a previous 
inference. (De: / de de ltar na rtags de nyid las ni sngar ’di ni rjes 
su ’gro ba dag la rjes su dpag pa las sngar ’di ni grub pa yin par 
khas len na rjod par byed na’o / D 253b4ff. P 301a3ff.) 
Ravigupta’s explanation is laconic and by and large consistent with De. (Cf. R: / gzugs 
la sogs pa’i rtags de nyid las blo la sogs pa’i bsgrub par bya ba sngar ’brel pa shes 
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[proponent answer] that [instance, i.e., the previous cognition567] too is something to be 
established (i.e., inferred) by another instance. Therefore, that [would lead to] an 
infinite regress. 
 
ity arthasya dhiyaḥ siddhir nārthāt tasyāḥ kathañcana // 474cd 
tadaprasiddhāv arthasya svayam evāprasiddhitaḥ / 475ab 
/ de phyir blo las don grub kyi // don las ji ltar yang de min /  
/ de ma grub par don rang nyid // rab tu grub pa med phyir ro / PVt 
/ de phyir blo las don grub kyi // don las de ni nam yang min /  
/ de ma grub na don rang nyid // rab tu grub pa med phyir ro / PVR 
 
Therefore, the object is established by the cognition [which has the object-appearance], 
                                                 
pa’i dus su blo khas len par byed na / D 161a5 : P 193a4ff.) 
It is worthwhile to note that in all Tibetan translations, either in verse or interpretation, 
inclusive of Ś, J and Y, tata eva liṅgād is consistently translated as rtags de nyid las, 
which literally means “by / from that very sign”. All these translations approve of 
reading tata eva and liṅgād as appositive. 
a For Devendrabuddhi’s and Śākyabuddhi’s interpretations of bdag (= ātman), cf. the 
rest of this footnote. For Manorathanandin’s interpretation of ātman in the current 
context, cf. n. 569. 
567 Manorathanandin specifies tasya as anvayasādhakasyāpy anumānasya. (Cf. M1, p. 
258, l. 19) By contrast, Devendrabuddhi and Ravigupta specify it as dbe. (Cf. De D 
253b4 and R D 161a5) Tosaki follows M (Tosaki 1985: 155, l. 6 and n. 170), but I 
follow De and R. 
271 
 
not in any way the [cognition] by the object. Because when it (i.e., the cognition) is not 
well established, the object is not well established only by itself [without the cognition]. 
[Hence, how can it be the inferential sign?] 
 
pratyakṣāṃ ca dhiyaṃ dṛṣṭvā tasyāś ceṣṭābhidhādikam // 475cd 
paracittānumānaṃ ca na syād ātmany adarśanāt / 
→sambandhasya←568… 476abc1 
/ mngon sum blo dang de las ni // brjod dang g-yo ’gul sogs mthong nas /  
/ gzhan sems rjes dpag mi ’gyur te // bdag la ’brel pa mthong med phyir / PVt 
/ mngon sum blo ni mthong nas kyang // de yi g-yo ’gul brjod la sogs /  
/ gzhan sems rjes dpog mi ’gyur te // bdag ’brel mthong ba med phyir ro / PVR 
 
[According to opponent’s tenet,] one would not have the inference of the mind of 
another [person] by seeing the perceptible cognition and gesture, speech and so forth, 
which [arise] from it [in one’s own series], because the relation [between the cognition 
and gesture and so on] in oneself (i.e., in one’s own series) is not seen.569 
                                                 
568 sambandhasya PVA, PVM3, PVeM : sabandhasya PVs, PVM1, PVM2. 
569 Manorathanandin’s explanation is as follows. 
And [we] would not accept the inference of mind of another [person] 
from seeing gesture etc. connected to [the cognition of] anther 
[person], whose pervasion was grasped, after seeing a cognition 
perceptible [to onself] and its [effects] such as gesture, speech and so 
ona because one does not see the connection between the cognition 
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and the [body] movement and so forth in oneself, i.e., in one’s own 
series. (M: svaprakāśatvāt pratyakṣāṃ dhiyaṃ tasyāś ca 
ceṣṭābhidhādir yasya sukhaprasādavaivarṇyādes taṃ dṛṣṭvā 
gṛhītavyāptikasyānyasambandhiceṣṭādidarśanāt paracittānumānaṃ 
ceṣṭaṃ na syāt buddher ātmani svasantatau ceṣṭādibhiḥ saha 
sambandhasyādarśanāt / M1, p. 259, ll. 2-6.) 
This explanation is ambiguous because of the subtle interpretation of ceṣṭābhidhādikam 
as well as the possibility for na syāt to govern all words prior to it or the sentence 
gṛhītavyāptikasyānyasambandhiceṣṭādidarśanāt paracittānumānaṃ ceṣṭaṃ only.  
The latter option is rejected here because it is impossible that the opponent could have 
accepted the perceptible cognition in the current argument.  By contrast, 
Devendrabuddhi’s literal interpretation is easier to understand. 
There would not be an inference of the consciousness of another 
person on account of the observation of the perceptible cognition in 
relation to one’s own series, and the observation of those which are 
the effects of that cognition in relation to one’s own series, such as 
‘gesture, speech and so forth’;b the phrase ‘and so forth’ means the 
color and the complexion of the face.  Why? Because one does not 
see the connection in relation to oneself, i.e., [one’s] cognition. (De: 
/ bdag la mngon sum blo ni mthong nas kyang / bdag la mngon sum 
gyi blo de’i ’bras bur gyur pa g-yo ’gul brjod la sogs / g-yo ’gul dang 
rjod par byed pa’o // sogs pa smos pas ni gdong gi mdangs dang kha 
dog ’gyur ba mthong ba gang yin pa des / gzhan sems rjes dpog 
mi ’gyur ro // ci’i phyir zhe na / bdag ste blo la ’brel pa mthong ba 
med pa’i phyir ro / D 254a1ff. : P 301a8ff.) 
Devendrabuddhi further explains: 
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The consciousness of another person is going to be inferred by that 
[reason] which is with the perceived concomitance when the gesture, 
etc., become the effect of that perceptible cognition in one’s own 
series. In this manner, another [person] does not have the method for 
such apprehension in one’s own [series]. If this is the case, how can 
they infer [the other consciousness] through the gesture, etc., which 
have the co-operative connection with that [cognition]? (De: / bdag 
la blo mngon sum du ’gyur ba yin pa de’i g-yo ’gul la sogs pa ’bras 
bu nyid du ’gyur ba de’i tshe ’brel pa gzung ba can de las gzhan la 
blo rjes su dpog par ’gyur na / ’di ltar bdag nyid la de’i rtogs pa’i 
thabs gzhan yod pa ma yin na / gang las de dag dang lhan cig ’brel 
pa gzung ba can gyi g-yo ’gul la sogs pa las rjes su dpog par ’gyur / 
D 254a2ff. : P 301b2ff.) 
Prajñākaragupta gives a similar explanation: 
If a cognition and something connected to it are apprehended in some 
way in one’s own [series] by perception, then by seeing the inferential 
sign connected to [a cognition], there can be an inference [of 
cognition] in another [person] too; otherwise, [such an inference] is 
not correct. (PVA2: yadi pratyakṣenātmani buddhitatsambandhinoḥ 
kathaṃcit pratītis tadā tatsambaddhaliṅgadarśanāt paratrāpi 
buddher anumānam bhavet anyathā na yuktam / p. 446, ll. 18-19).  
On this, Ravigupta’s comment is clear and concise. 
According to your tenet, if the cognition in one’s own series is not 
perceptibly seen, other consciousness in other series should not be 
inferred by the observation of the gesture of that [cognition], i.e., the 
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…manobuddhāv arthaliṅgāprasiddhitaḥ // 476c2d 
/ yid kyi blo la don gyi rtags // rab tu grub pa yod min phyir / PVt 
/ yid kyi blo yang ma yin te // don rtags grub pa med phyir ro / PVR 
 
Because in the case of mental consciousness [which arises only by the force of karmic 
trace (vāsanāmātrabalabhāvinyā) and does not depend on the object]570, the inferential 
                                                 
gesture and speech of the body, such as the effects of temporary 
distinction of the body, because the connection was not seen between 
the cognition and gesture and so forth in one’s own series. (R: / khyod 
kyi lugs kyis bdag nyid la blo mngon sum gyis ma mthong bar de’i g-
yo ’gul te lus kyi bsgul bskyod dang brjod pa ste / lus kyi gnas skabs 
kyi khyad par la sogs pa’i ’bras bu mthong nas / gzhan gyi rgyud la 
yod pa’i gzhan gyi sems rjes su dpog par mi ’gyur te / bdag nyid la 
blo dang g-yo ’gul la sogs pa ’brel par ma mthong ba’i phyir ro / D 
161b4ff. : P 193b4ff.) 
a In M (cf. M1, pp. 2-3 and Mms 50b6ff.), the sentence—yasya 
sukhaprasādavaivarṇyādes taṃ—seems slightly corrupt and I leave it untranslated. 
Perhaps a word missing before tam was there showing the causal relationship between 
“gesture, speech, and so on” and “happy feeling, good temper, change of complexion 
and so on”. 
b In De, the dvandva compound g-yo ’gul brjod (ceṣṭābhidhā) is paraphrased as g-
yo ’gul dang rjod par byed pa’o. Considering that the English translations for these two 
expressions would not be different, I left the paraphrase not translated. 
570 Cf. De: / mig la sogs pa’i blo rnams ni don dang ldan pa nyid yin pa’i phyir rjes su 
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sign of the object is not established, [the mental consciousness too could not be 
established.]571 
 
prakāśitā kathaṃ vā syād buddhir buddhyantareṇa vaḥ /  
aprakāśātmanoḥ →sāmyād←572 vyaṅgyavyañjakatā kutaḥ // 477 
/ khyod kyi blo ni blo gzhan gyis // →ci← (D : ji P) ltar rab tu gsal bar ’gyur /  
/ gsal min bdag tu mtshungs pa’i phyir // gsal bya gsal byed gang las yin / PVt 
/ khyod kyi blo yang blo gzhan gyis // ji ltar rab tu gsal bar ’gyur /  
/ gsal min bdag mtsungs →pa yi phyir← (D : pa’i phyir ro P) // gang la gsal bya gsal 
byed dngos / PVR 
 
Indeed how would the consciousness according to you be illuminated (i.e., perceived) 
                                                 
dpag par ’dod na yang nang gi nye bar len pa’i bag chags sad pa tsam las byung ba’i 
ngang tshul can phyi rol gyi don la ltos pa med pa’i yid kyi blo gang yin pa…/ (D 254a4). 
M: | api ca vāsanāmātrabalabhāvinyā manobuddhau vikalpabuddhau viṣaya-
bhūtasyārthasyābhāvāt arthasya liṅgasyāsiddhito… (p. 259, ll, 7-8.) 
571 Cf. De: / yid →kyi← (D: om. P) blo →la← (P : om. D) yang rjes su dpag par ’gyur ba 
ma yin pa nyid yin no / (D 254a3 : P 301b3ff.) There might still be questions: how could 
the refutation be completed by rejecting the inferential sign of object only? What about 
the other two, namely, the inferential sign of sense faculties and the inferential sign of 
apprehension? To answer these questions, Kedrup says, the other two have been 
rejected in PV 3.471a1 where it states “among these three, the two (i.e., the sense 
faculties and the apprehension) are beyond the sense faculty. “ (Cf. PVVke p. 418, ll. 
11-15.) 
572 sāmyād PVAms, PVM : sa syād PVA1, PVA2 : sā mā PVs.  
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by another consciousness (i.e., the perception)? Because the invisible nature [of these 
two cognitions573] is the same, how can [they] be one which is manifested and one 
which manifests? 
 
viṣayasya kathaṃ vyaktiḥ prakāśe rūpasaṃkramāt /  
sa ca prakāśas tadrūpaḥ svayam eva prakāśate // 478 
/ yul ni →ci← (D : ji P) ltar gsal →ba← (P : bar D) yin // gsal la ngo bo ’pho phyir ro /  
/ gsal de’ang de yi ngo bo nyid // rang nyid rab tu gsal ba yin / PVt 
/ yul ni ji ltar gsal ba yin // gsal (om. D : ba P) la ngo bo ’pho phyir ro /  
/ gsal ba de yang de’i dngos te // rang nyid rab tu gsal bar byed / PVR 
 
[Opponent:] How can the object be manifested? [Proponent:] Because of the transition 
of the form [of the object] into the illumination (i.e., into the cognition by itself). Further, 
the illumination which has the form of that [object] is illuminated by itself alone. 
 
tathābhyupagame →buddher←574 buddhau buddhiḥ svavedikā /  
siddhānyathā tulyadharmā viṣayo ’pi dhiyā saha // 479 
                                                 
573 Cf. De: / de de ltar na blo gnyi ga yang bdag nyid rig pa’i ngo bo yin pa’i phyir / 
(D 254b3.) R: / shes pa gnyi ga yang mi gsal ba’i bdag nyid ying na / (D 162a2ff.) 
Manorathanandin is the only one to gloss aprakāśātmanor as liṅgaliṅginor, (cf. M1, p. 
259, l. 13) which means “because of the inferential sign and the possessor of the 
inferential sign”. 
574 PVs and PVM read buddheḥ. 
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/ de ltar blo la blo ’dod na // blo ni rang nyid rig par grub /  
/ de lta min na yul yang ni // blo dang lhan cig chos mtshungs nyid / PVt 
/ de ltar blo ni khas len na // blo la blo ni rang rig par /  
/ grub kyi gzhan du chos mtshungs can // yul yang blo dang lhan cig ces / PVR 
 
If one admits that a cognition [to be cognized (prakāśyā)] is [manifested] in the 
cognition [which cognizes it (vyañjikā)] in the same manner [as the object is 
experienced by means of passing a similar form to the cognition, then] the cognition is 
established as making itself known.  Otherwise (i.e., if one does not admit that the 
cognition makes itself known), the object too [would] have the same property as the 
cognition.575 
 
iti prakāśarūpā naḥ svayaṃ dhīḥ saṃprakāśate /  
                                                 
575 Manorathanandin’s interpretation of this sentence is: “the [object] too would make 
known the cognition; that is to say, both cognition and object which have the similar 
form would make each other known.” (M: …so ’pi buddher vyañjakaḥ syāt; sarūpayor 
dhīviṣayayor anyonyaṃ vyañjakatā bhavet / M1, p. 260, ll. 7-9.) De, Ś, PVA and R have 
the similar interpretation. (Cf. De D 255a1ff. and Ś D 242a4ff. and R D 162b1ff.) 
By contrast, Kedrup interprets de ltar min na (anyathā) as “if the form of the object is 
not manifested in the cognition” and then he interprets the rest of the sentence as that, 
if the object is not manifested in the cognition and the cognition does not manifest in 
the object, then due to such similarity, the object would apprehend the cognition, just 
like the cognition apprehends the object; or, conversely, the cognition would not 
apprehend the object, just like the object does not apprehend the cognition. (Cf. PVVke, 
p. 424.) 
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anyo ’syāṃ rūpasaṃkrāntyā prakāśaḥ →san prakāśate←576 // 480 
/ →de’i← (D : de P) phyir nged kyi blo rang nyid // gsal ba’i ngo bos rab gsal zhing /  
/ gzhan der ngo bo ’pho ba yis // gsal ba na ni rab gsal nyid / PVt 
/ de phyir kho bos blo gsal dngos // de ni rang nyid gsal bar ’dod /  
/ ’di la gzhan dngos ’phos →pas← (D : pa P) na // gsal bar gyur pa gsal →ba← (P : pa D) 
yin / PVR 
 
Therefore, in our opinion, the cognition which has the nature of illumination illuminates 
[itself] by itself. The other (i.e., the object 577 ), inasmuch as it is illuminated, is 
manifested by the transition of [its] form into that [cognition]. 
 
sādṛśye ’pi hi dhīr anyā prakāśyā na tayā matā /  
svayaṃ →prakāśanād←578 arthas tadrūpeṇa prakāśate // 481 
yathā pradīpayor dīpaghaṭayoś ca tadāśrayaḥ /  
vyaṅgyavyañjaka →bhedena←579 vyavahāraḥ pratanyate // 482 
                                                 
576 PVs reads samprakāśate. 
577 Cf. De D 255a2 and R D 162b3. 
578 PVM reads prakāśamānā. 
579 PVP and PVs read bhāvena, but in the footnotes in PVs (p. 92, n. 5.) and PVA2 (p. 
448, n. 2), Sāṅkṛtyāyana mentions that the manuscript from Shalu Monastery and PVeM 
read bhedena (cf. M1, p. 261, l. 3).  PVt reads ngo bo yis (= bhāvena), while PVD (De 
D 255b2), Ś (D 242a6) and PVR read khyad par gyis (= bhedena). Moreover, the 
commentary in PVA— tathānvyavyatirekaparikalpitāpoddhāratas tathā vyavahāro na 
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/ ’dra ba yin yang de yis ni // blo gzhan rab tu gsal mi ’dod /  
/ rang nyid rab tu gsal phyir don // de yi ngo bos rab gsal yin /  
/ dper sgron gnyis bzhin mar me dang // bum pa dag kyang der brten nas /  
/ gsal bya gsal byed ngo bo yis // tha snyad rab tu rgyas par byed / PVt  
/ ’dra ba yin na yang blo gzhan // ’di yis gsal bar mi ’dod de /  
/ rang nyid gsal bar byed pa’i phyir // don de’i ngo bo gsal bar ’gyur /  
/ dper na sgron ma dag bzhin du // gsal bya gsal →dyed← (P : byad D) khyad par gyis 
(corr. : gyi D, P) /  
/ mar me bum pa de rten can // tha snyad du ni grags pa yin / PVR 
 
580 Even if there is similarity [between two cognitions one after another581], it is not 
accepted that another cognition (i.e., the previous one) is illuminated by that [similar 
cognition] because it is illuminated by itself.  
[Opponent: In this manner, then, how can the object, which does not have the nature of 
illumination, be illuminated?]  
                                                 
paramārthata ity alaṃ prasaṅgena /, appears to support the reading of bhedena as well.  
Thus, I choose bhedena. Note that Tosaki (1985: 162) chooses bhāvena in his edition. 
580 Kedrup proposes a hypothetical counter-argument, which precedes PV 3.481-482: 
if you, i.e., the proponent, accept that the cognition perceives the object through a 
manifestation of object in the cognition, why don’t you accept that a cognition, like a 
memory of a previous visual cognition, can subsequently experience that visual 
cognition for the same reason. (Cf. PVVke, p. 425.) 
581 Cf. De D 255a3ff. 
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[Proponent:] The object is illuminated by [the cognition] which has its form.582 
For instance, in the case of two lamps—(i.e., they are not the illuminated object and the 
illuminating subject of each other because they two have the same illuminating 
nature)—and in the case of the lamp and the vase [which have different own nature: 
one illuminating and one to be illuminated by another]. Depending on the [nature of the 
illuminating or the non-illuminating], the expression [in our world] is done with the 
difference between the illuminating and the illuminated. 
 
viṣayendriyamātreṇa na dṛṣṭam iti niścayaḥ /  
tasmād yato ’yaṃ tasyāpi vācyam anyasya darśanam // 483 
/ yul dang dbang po tsam gyis ni // mthong zhes bya bar nges ma yin /  
/ des na gang las ’dir ’gyur ba // gzhan de’ang mthong bar gdon mi za / PVt 
/ yul dang dbang po tsam gyis ni // mthong ba zhes byar nges pa med /  
/ de’i phyir gang las ’di de’i ’am // yang na shes pa gzhan gyir snang / PVR 
 
Only on account of the object or the sense faculty, there [would] be no determination 
of “[object] as seen” [in the later memory]. Therefore, seeing of something other [than 
the object and sense faulty, namely the cognition] as well, from which this 
[determination arises], has to be stated. 
                                                 
582  Kedrup interprets the meaning behind this sentence as that the memory may 
manifest the previous cognition through the manifestation of the previous cognition in 
the memory, but it does not mean that the previous cognition is directly experienced by 
the memory. (Cf. PVVke, p. 425.) 
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smṛter apy ātmavit siddhā… 484a 
/ dran pa las kyang bdag rig →grub← (D : ’grub P) / PVt 
/ dran pa las kyang bdag rig grub / PVR 
 
The self-awareness is established also from memory [of the past cognition]. 
 
…→jñānasyānyena←583 vedane / 
dīrghādi→grahaṇaṃ←584 na syād bahumātrānava→sthiteḥ←585 // 484bcd 
… / shes pa gzhan gyis rig na ni /  
/ ring sogs ’dzin par mi ’gyur te // yun ring gnas pa med phyir ro / PVt 
… / shes pa gzhan gyis myong na ni /  
                                                 
583 Sāṅkṛtyāyana relates this jñānasya to the previous line. (Cf. M1, p. 261, l. 13.)  
Nevertheless, I could not find jñānasya in bold in that line, which is the way 
Sāṅkṛtyāyana uses to indicate embedded words in the relevant section of M. When 
Pandeya and Śastri edit M, they adopt Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s interpretation. Further, both of 
them regard jñānasya in jñānasyātītasya as the embedded word and make it in bold: 
jñānasyātītasya. (M2, p. 239, ll. 6, 16, 19; M3, p. 158, ll. 2, 11, 14.)  This 
interpretation is not the only way to read M here. In my opinion, it is better if jñānasya 
stays in the second line and the jñānasya between pūrvakasya and vedane in M is 
considered to be the embedded word. 
584 °grahaṇan PVAms (225a1) : °grahṇan PVA2. 
585 Sāṅkṛtyāyana omits the visarga in °sthiteḥ (PVA2, p. 448, l. 27). 
282 
 
/ yi ge mang sdod med pa’i phyir // yi ge ring sogs ’dzin mi ’gyur / PVR 
 
If [the opponent says that] the [previous] cognition is experienced by another 
[cognition], [the proponent answers,] the long [syllables] and so forth would not be 
grasped because it (i.e., the first syllable one heard from a long sentence) [would] not 
exist for a long period. 
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Appendix I: A Comparison between the Tables of Contents of Pramāṇavārttika 
3.301-539 by Gyaltsab and Kedrup 
 
By Gyaltsab By Kedrup 
The segmented contents (of 
eliminating the wrong view about 
the meaning of the effect of 
perception). (301-539) 
1 The extensive explanation of 
the effect of means of 
knowledge. (301-352) 
2 Establishing it (i.e., the effect of 
means of knowledge) by refuting 
the objections. (353-366) 
3586 Proving the feasibility of the 
theory of the effect of means of 
knowledge. (367-539) 
1.1 General analysis of the proof 
of cognitive action. (301)  
301 301-
309 
The segmented contents (of 
eliminating the wrong view 
about the meaning of the effect 
of perception). (301-539) 
1 Establishment of the effect of 
means of knowledge for the 
Sautrāntika. (301-319) 
2 Establishment of the effect of 
means of knowledge for the 
Yogācāra. (320-366) 
3 Proving the feasibility of 
theory of the effect of means of 
knowledge. (367-539) 
1.1 Summary. 
1.2 The commentary on the text. 
(301-319) 
1.2.1 The explanation of the 
effect of means of knowledge in 
                                                 
586 Indeed, in PVVgyal, the number here is no. 2 (PVVgyal, p. 280), but this item is 
omitted in the previous table (cf. PVVgyal, p. 23, n. 3).  According to Kedrup, the 
three sections of PV 3.301-319, 320-366 and 367-539 are under the title of “Eliminating 
the wrong view about the meaning of the effect of perception”.  In Gyaltsab’s table 
we also find this title exactly before PV 3.301, but only PV 3.301-319 and 320-366 are 
under this title. (Cf. PVVgyal, pp. 19-23.)  Assuming that Gyaltsab and Kedrup shared 
the same view on this issue, I change the number to no. 3 and put all PV 367-539 in the 
third part under the title “Eliminating the wrong view about the meaning of the effect 
of perception” in PVVgyal. 
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author’s theory. (301-309) 
1.2.2 The refutation of others’ 
effect of means of knowledge. 
(310-317) 
1.2.3 Defending the author’s 
theory. (318-319) 
1.2 Particularly explaining the 
effect of means of knowledge. 
(302-336) 
1.2.1 The first presentation of the 
effect of means of knowledge. 
(302-319) 
1.2.2 The second effect of means 
of knowledge: self-awareness. 
(320-340) 
1.2.3 The third effect of means of 
knowledge.587 (341-352) 
1.2.1.1 Summary. (302-304) 
302-
304 
  
1.2.1.2 Extensive explanation. 
(305-319) 
1.2.1.2.1 Establishment of our 
theory of the effect of means of 
knowledge. (305-309) 
1.2.1.2.2 Refutation of others’ 
theories of the effect of means of 
knowledge. (310-317) 
1.2.1.2.3 Refutation of [others’] 
objections. (318-319)  
305-
309 
  
                                                 
587 The titles for 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 are indeed two brief statements: “the second" and “the 
third”.  The translation here is according to their forms which appear as the titles of 
the relevant sections. 
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1.2.1.2.2 Refutation of others’ 
theories of the effect of means of 
knowledge. (310-317) 
1.2.1.2.2.1 Brief explanation. 
(310-311) 
310-
311 
310 1.2.2 The refutation of others’ 
effect of means of knowledge. 
(310-317) 
1.2.2.1 A brief explanation [of 
the refutation] to [other’s] view. 
(310) 
1.2.1.2.2.2 Extensive 
explanation. (312-317) 
312-
317 
311-
317 
1.2.2.2 The extensive 
explanation of refutations which 
are distinguished [for different 
opponents]. (311-317) 
1.2.1.2.3 Refutation of [others’] 
objections. (318-319) 
318-
319 
318-
319 
1.2.3 Defending the author’s 
theory. (318-319) 
1.2.2 The second effect of means 
of knowledge: self-awareness. 
(320-340) 
1.2.2.1 The refutation of the 
proof of the cognition of external 
object. (320-332) 
1.2.2.2 Stating the reason for 
being against the cognition of the 
external object. (333-340) 
1.2.2.1.1 The statement of the 
refutation [of the proof of the 
cognition of external object]. 
(320-325)  
320-
325 
320-
328 
2 Establishment of the effect of 
means of knowledge for the 
Yogācāra. (320-366) 
2.1 Summary. 
2.2 Entering the explanation of 
the text. (320-366) 
2.2.1 The explanation of 
Yogācāra’s effect-apprehension 
of self-awareness. (320-337) 
2.2.2 The explanation of 
Yogācāra’s effect-apprehension 
of other-awareness. (338-340) 
2.2.3 The extensive explanation 
of the refutation of the necessity 
in relation to the other-
awareness. (341-352) 
2.2.4 The extensive explanation 
of the refutation of the necessity 
in relation to the effect-
apprehension of self-awareness. 
(353-366) 
2.2.1.1 The refutation of the 
proof of the awareness of the 
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[external] object of the 
Sautrāntika. (320-328) 
2.2.1.2 The explanation of the 
effect of means of knowledge of 
self-awareness. (329-332) 
2.2.1.3 The explanation of the 
proof of the view that the 
perceived-form of sense 
perception does not arise from 
the [external] object. (333-337) 
1.2.2.1.2 The refutation of [the 
objection] that [your theory] 
would be contradictory to the 
appearance [of the object] if it 
were external.  (326-332) 
1.2.2.1.2.1 The refutation of the 
view that the perceiving and the 
perceived are substantively 
different. (326-330b)  
1.2.2.1.2.2 The explanation that 
[the cognition which perceives] 
the appearance as the [external 
object] is the deceptive 
cognition. (330c-332b) 
1.2.2.1.2.3 Establishing that the 
self-awareness is the effect [of 
means of knowledge]. (332cd) 
1.2.2.1.2.1.1 The refutation of the 
substantive difference between 
the perceiving and the perceived 
which relies on the external 
object. (326) 
326   
1.2.2.1.2.1.2 The fault which also 
exists in the same way in relation 
to the substantive difference 
between the perceiving and the 
perceived [which relies on] the 
327   
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cognition. (327) 
1.2.2.1.2.1.3 The refutation of the 
contradiction in our arguments 
[proposed by the opponents]. 
(328-330b) 
328-
330b 
329-
332 
2.2.1.2 The explanation of the 
effect of means of knowledge of 
self-awareness. (329-332) 
1.2.2.1.2.2 The explanation that 
[the cognition which perceives] 
the appearance as the [external 
object] is the deceptive 
cognition. (330c-332b) 
330c-
332b 
  
1.2.2.1.2.3 Establishing that the 
self-awareness is the effect [of 
means of knowledge]. (332cd) 
332cd   
1.2.2.2 Stating the reason for 
being against the cognition of the 
external object. (333-340) 
1.2.2.2.1 The external object 
does not make sense. (333-334) 
1.2.2.2.2 Presenting the 
inferential sign against the 
external object. (335-336) 
1.2.2.2.3 The conclusion which is 
proved by that [inferential sign]. 
(337-340) 
333-
334 
333-
337 
2.2.1.3 The explanation of the 
proof of the view that the 
perceived-form of sense 
perception does not arise from 
the [external] object. (333-337) 
1.2.2.2.2 Presenting the 
inferential sign against the 
external object. (335-336) 
1.2.2.2.2.1 The literal 
explanation. (335) 
335   
1.2.2.2.2.2 The means of 
knowledge which establishes the 
336   
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inferential sign.588 (336) 
1.2.2.2.3 The conclusion which is 
proved by that [inferential sign]. 
(337-340) 
337-
340 
338-
340 
2.2.2 The explanation of 
Yogācāra’s effect-apprehension 
of other-awareness. (338-340) 
1.2.3 The third effect of means of 
knowledge. (341-352) 
1.2.3.1 The presentation of the 
effect of means of knowledge.589 
1.2.3.2 The presentation can be 
established, even though there is 
no external object. (341-352) 
1.2.3.2.1 Proving the effect. 
(341-345) 
1.2.3.2.2 The refutation of 
[opponent’s] rejection of it (i.e., 
1.2.3.2.1). (346-350) 
1.2.3.2.3 The analysis of [the 
object] to be apprehended. (351-
352) 
341-
345 
341-
352 
2.2.3 The extensive explanation 
of the refutation of the necessity 
in relation to the other-
awareness. (341-352) 
 
1.2.3.2.2 The refutation of 
[opponent’s] rejection of it (i.e., 
1.2.3.2.1). (346-350) 
1.2.3.2.2.1 Refuting a fault that 
the perceiving-form is the means 
of knowledge. (346-349b) 
346-
349b 
  
                                                 
588 In PVVgyal (pp. 258-259), this title is stated with a pair of question and answer—
"By what kind of means of knowledge is the inferential sign established?" “It should be 
known by two [arguments]." And the two arguments are presented as “to present the 
inferential" and “the way to prove”.  I summarize them as above. 
589 There are several subdivisions under this title, which are additional explanations by 
Gyaltsab.  I do not include them in this table. 
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1.2.3.2.2.2 Refuting a fault that 
the objects of means of 
knowledge and the effect of 
means of knowledge would be 
different from each other. (349c-
350b1) 
349c-
350b
1 
  
1.2.3.2.2.3 The explanation that 
the self-awareness is the effect. 
(350b2cd) 
350b
2cd 
  
1.2.3.2.3 The analysis of [the 
object] to be apprehended. (351-
352) 
351-
352 
  
2 Establishing it (i.e., the effect of 
means of knowledge) by refuting 
the objections. (353-366) 
2.1 What does the presentation of 
the effect of means of knowledge 
appear like? (353-356) 
2.2 The refutation of the ultimate 
establishment of different 
components [in one cognition]: 
the perceived, the perceiving and 
the self-awareness. (357-362) 
2.3 The explanation of the 
feasibility of Yogācāra’s effect of 
means of knowledge. (363-366) 
353-
356 
353-
356 
2.2.4 The extensive explanation 
of the refutation of the necessity 
in relation to the effect-
apprehension of self-awareness. 
(353-366) 
2.2.4.1 The explanation that 
even though there is no 
presentation of the effect of 
means of knowledge of self-
awareness in reality, it presents 
in the convention which is on the 
basis of the deluded state that the 
perceived, the perceiving and 
the self-awareness appear 
separately. (353-356) 
2.2 The refutation of the ultimate 
establishment of different 
components [in one cognition]: 
the perceived, the perceiving and 
the self-awareness. (357-362) 
2.2.1 The explanation of the 
refutation (in 2.2). (357-359) 
357-
359 
357-
358 
2.2.4.2 The explanation of the 
reason that there is no 
presentation of the effect of 
means of knowledge of self-
awareness in reality. (357-359) 
2.2.4.2.1 The way to prove. 
(357-358) 
  359 2.2.4.2.2 The presentation of the 
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inferential sign. (359) 
2.2.2 The refutation of the 
objections to (2.2.1). (360-362) 
360-
362 
360-
362 
2.2.4.3 The refutation of the 
argument that it is correct that 
the perceived, the perceiving 
and the experience are deluded 
as different [things]. (360-362) 
2.3 The explanation of the 
feasibility of Yogācāra’s effect of 
means of knowledge. (363-366) 
363-
366 
363-
366 
2.2.4.4 The way to present the 
effect of means of knowledge of 
self-awareness in the 
convention. (363-366)  
3 Proving the feasibility of the 
theory of the effect of means of 
knowledge. (367-539) 
3.1 The reasoning to prove that 
the cognition has two forms. 
(367-424) 
3.2 The reasoning to prove the 
self-awareness. (425-539) 
3.1.1 Proving [that the cognition 
has two forms] by the reasoning 
stated in PS 1.11ab.590 (367-421) 
3.1.2 Proving [that the cognition 
has two forms] by the reasoning 
stated in PS 1.11cd591. (422-424) 
3.1.1.1 Proving [that the 
cognition has two forms] with the 
acceptance of [external] object. 
(367-406) 
3.1.1.2 Proving [that the 
cognition has two forms] with the 
refutation [of external object]. 
367-
369 
367-
369 
3 Proving the feasibility of 
theory of the effect of means of 
knowledge. (367-539) 
3.1 Proving that the cognition 
has two forms. (367-424) 
3.2 Proving that the cognition 
has self-awareness. (425-539) 
3.1.1 A brief explanation of the 
general meaning of the treatise. 
3.1.2 The explanation of the 
treatise. (367-424) 
3.1.2.1 Proving that the 
cognition has two forms by the 
inferential sign that the memory 
has the form of the object from 
the view accepting the external 
object. (376-386) 
3.1.2.2 The extensive 
explanation of the reasoning of 
proving that the cognition has 
two forms through rejecting the 
                                                 
590 Cf. PVVgyal: yul shes de yi shes pa yis (≈ viṣayajñānatajjñānaviśeṣāt)… (p. 23.) 
591 Cf. PVVgyal: dus phyis dran pa las kyang ste (≈ smṛter uttarakālaṃ ca)… (p. 23.) 
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(407-415) 
3.1.1.3 Explaining the other 
reasoning [to prove that the 
cognition has two forms]. (416-
421) 
3.1.1.1.1 The reasoning [to prove 
that the cognition has two forms] 
on the basis of Dignāga’s 
teaching. (367-397) 
3.1.1.1.2 The different reasoning 
[to prove that the cognition has 
two forms] set out in this 
commentary. (398-406) 
3.1.1.1.1.1 The relation [between 
the object and the cognition] 
explained in Dignāga’s teaching. 
(367-377) 
3.1.1.1.1.2 How to explain 
[1.1.1.1.1]. (378-386) 
3.1.1.1.1.3 Depending on the 
teaching [of Dignāga], 
Dharmakīrti explained another 
reasoning [to prove that the 
cognition has two forms]. (387-
397) 
3.1.1.1.1.1.1 Proving two forms 
by the cognition which is the own 
nature of the perceived object. 
(367-369) 
external object. (387-397) 
3.1.2.3 The extensive 
explanation of the fault in 
accepting that the cognition does 
not have the form through 
accepting the external object. 
(398-421) 
3.1.2.4 Proving two forms by the 
inferential sign that the memory 
follows the experience. (422-
424) 
3.1.2.1.1 Proposing the thesis 
that the perception of other-
awareness has the form of the 
object. (367-369) 
3.1.2.1.2 Firstly explaining the 
reasoning of proving that 
memory has the form of the 
object. (370-377) 
3.1.2.1.3 Proving that the other-
awareness has the form of the 
object by the inferential sign that 
memory has the form of the 
object. ( 378-386) 
3,1.1.1.1.1.2 Being easy to 
apprehend the two forms in the 
cognition which does not have 
that [own nature of the perceived 
object]. (370-377) 
3.1.1.1.1.1.2.1 The explanation 
of [3.1.1.1.1.1.2]. (370) 
370 370ab 3.1.2.1.2 Firstly explaining the 
reasoning of proving that 
memory has the form of the 
object. (370-377) 
3.1.2.1.2.1 Establishing the 
relation [between the memory 
and the object]. (370ab) 
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  370cd 3.1.2.1.2.2 Explaining the 
reasoning [in 3.1.2.1.2.1]. 
(370cd) 
3.1.1.1.1.1.2.2 The refutation of 
the objection [to 1.1.1.1.1.2.1.]. 
(371-377) 
3.1.1.1.1.1.2.2.1 Refuting the 
view that the memory perceives 
the objects which are of different 
kind. (371)  
371 371 3.1.2.1.2.3 The refutation of the 
objection by the doubt. (371-
377) 
3.1.2.1.2.3.1 That [3.1.2.1.2.3] 
by Vaiśeṣika. (371) 
3.1.1.1.1.1.2.2.2 Refuting the 
perception of the non-associated 
compositional factor (t. ldan 
min ’du byed pa; sk. 
*viprayuktasaṃskāra). (372a) 
372a 372-
377 
3.1.2.1.2.3.2 That [3.1.2.1.2.3] 
by Vaibhāṣika. (372-377) 
3.1.1.1.1.1.2.2.3 Refuting the 
view that the own nature of the 
external object is the perceived 
object. (372b-377) 
372b-
377 
  
3.1.1.1.1.2 How to explain 
[1.1.1.1.1]. (378-386) 
3.1.1.1.1.2.1 Feasibility for [the 
cognition] to have form. (378-
380) 
378-
380 
378-
386 
3.1.2.1.3 Proving that the other-
awareness has the form of the 
object by the inferential sign that 
memory has the form of the 
object. (378-386) 
3.1.1.1.1.2.2 Non-feasibility for 
[the cognition] not having form. 
(381-384) 
381-
384 
  
3.1.1.1.1.2.3 Summary. (385-
386) 
385-
386 
  
3.1.1.1.1.3 Depending on the 
teaching [of Dignāga], 
Dharmakīrti explained another 
reasoning [to prove that the 
cognition has two forms]. (387-
387-
390c 
387-
390c 
3.1.2.2 The extensive 
explanation of the reasoning 
proving that the cognition has 
two forms through rejecting the 
external object. (387-397) 
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397) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.1 That the cognition 
has two forms is proved by 
sahopalambhaniyama. (387-
390c) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.2 The Refutation of 
the objection [to 3.1.1.1.1.3.1]. 
(391-396) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.3 Summary. (397) 
3.1.2.2.1 Proving two forms 
through rejecting the external 
object. (387-390c) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.2 The Refutation of 
the objection [to 3.1.1.1.1.3.1]. 
(391-396) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.2.1 Refuting the proof 
of the existence of external 
object. (390d-391) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.2.2 Refuting the fault 
of the non-existence [of external 
object]. (392-396) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.2.1.1 The literal 
meaning [of the verse]. (390d-
391) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.2.1.2 Get to know 
three conditions of the cognition. 
390d-
391 
390d-
391 
3.1.2.2.2 Additionally refuting 
the proof of the existence of the 
external object. (390d-391) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.2.2 Refuting the fault 
of the non-existence [of external 
object]. (392-396) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.2.2.1 Refuting the 
non-feasibility of the cause and 
effect [by the non-existence of 
external object]. (392-393) 
392-
393 
392-
396 
3.1.2.2.3 Refuting the objection 
to the refutation of the external 
object. (392-396) 
3.1.1.1.1.3.2.2.2 Refuting the 
non-feasibility of the inferential 
sign of effect [by the non-
existence of external object]. 
(394-396) 
394-
396 
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3.1.1.1.1.3.3 Summary. (397) 397 397 3.1.2.2.4 Explaining that [it] is 
not contrary to the Buddha’s 
teaching. (397) 
3.1.1.1.2 The different reasoning 
[to prove that the cognition has 
two forms] set out in this 
commentary. (398-406) 
3.1.1.1.2.1 Proving two forms by 
the non-mistaken sense 
perception. (398-401) 
398-
401 
398-
401 
3.1.2.3 The extensive 
explanation of the fault in 
accepting that the cognition does 
not have the form through 
accepting the external object. 
(398-421) 
3.1.2.3.1 The absurd 
consequence that the mode of 
the appearance [of the object] 
for all sense perceptions which 
take one object would not be 
different [from each other] at all. 
(398-401) 
3.1.2.3.2 The absurd 
consequence that in the mistaken 
sense perception [the object] 
would be established as its 
appearance. (402-406) 
3.1.2.3.3 The absurd 
consequence that there would be 
no difference between the clear 
and the unclear object, such as 
far and near. (407-415) 
3.1.2.3.4 The absurd 
consequence that the sense 
perception cannot perceive the 
extreme short instance of 
perceived object. (416-421) 
3.1.1.1.2.2 Proving [two forms] 
by the mistaken [sense 
perception]. (402-406) 
402-
406 
402-
406 
3.1.2.3.2 The absurd 
consequence that in the mistaken 
sense perception [the object] 
would be established as its 
appearance. (402-406) 
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3.1.1.2 Proving [that the 
cognition has two forms] with the 
refutation [of external object]. 
(407-415) 
3.1.1.2.1 To state the reasoning 
[in 1.1.2]. (407ab) 
3.1.1.2.2 The refutation of the 
argument [on 1.1.2.1]. (407c-
414) 
3.1.1.2.3 Summary. (415) 
407ab 407ab 3.1.2.3.3 The absurd 
consequence that there would be 
no difference between the clear 
and the unclear object, such as 
far and near. (407-415) 
3.1.2.3.3.1 The explanation of 
the reasoning [of 3.1.2.3.3]. 
(407ab) 
3.1.1.2.2 The refutation of the 
argument [on 1.1.2.1]. (407c-
414) 
3.1.1.2.2.1 The refutation of the 
argument that is based on the 
distinction of the appearance 
between the object and the sense 
faculty. (407c-408a)  
407c-
408a 
 
407c-
414 
3.1.2.3.3.2 The refutation of 
objection to that [absurd 
consequence in 3.1.2.3.3]. 
( 407c-414) 
3.1.1.2.2.2 The refutation of the 
argument about the clear and 
unclear appearances [mentioned 
in 1.1.2.2.1]. (408b-412b) 
408b-
412b 
  
3.1.1.2.2.3 The refutation of the 
argument that the action depends 
on the sense faculty. (412c-414) 
412c-
414 
  
3.1.1.2.3 Summary. (415) 415 415 3.1.2.3.3.3 Summary. (415) 
3.1.1.3 Explaining the other 
reasoning [to prove that the 
cognition has two forms]. (416-
421) 
3.1.1.3.1 The explanation of the 
reasoning [in 1.1.3]. (416-417c) 
416-
417c 
416-
417a 
3.1.2.3.4 The absurd 
consequence that the sense 
perception cannot perceive the 
extreme short instance of 
perceived object. (416-421) 
3.1.2.3.4.1 The explanation of 
the reasoning [in 3.1.2.3.4]. 
(416-417a) 
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3.1.1.3.2 The refutation of the 
objection to [1.1.3.1]. (417d-421)  
417d-
421 
417b-
421 
3.1.2.3.4.2 The refutation of the 
objection [to 3.1.2.3.4.1]. (417b-
421) 
3.1.2 Proving [that the cognition 
has two forms] by the reasoning 
stated in PS 1.11cd592. (422-424) 
422-
424 
422-
424 
3.1.2.4 Proving two forms by the 
inferential sign that the memory 
follows the experience. (422-
424) 
3.2 The reasoning to prove the 
self-awareness. (425-539) 
3.2.1 Proving [the self-
awareness] by the previous 
reasoning. (425) 
425 425 3.2 Proving that the cognition 
has self-awareness. (425-539) 
3.2.1 The statement that the self-
awareness is established by the 
proof [which has] established 
“two forms”. (425-482) 
3.2.2 The statement that the 
existence of the self-awareness 
is established by the proof of 
“memory”. (483-539) 
3.2.1.1 A brief explanation of the 
summary of the text. 
3.2.1.2 Entering the main 
explanation of the text. (425-
482) 
3.2.1.2.1 The statement that 
when the existence of the self-
awareness in the cognition is 
proved by the proof of 
“[cognition] having the grasped-
aspect”, the property of the 
subject (t. phyogs chos, sk. 
pakṣadharma) would be proved 
by the method which proves “the 
two forms”. (425) 
                                                 
592 Cf. PVVgyal: dus phyis dran pa las kyang ste (≈ smṛter uttarakālaṃ ca)… (p. 23.) 
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3.2.2 Proving [the self-
awareness] by other reasoning. 
(426-539) 
3.2.2.1 Refuting that [the 
cognition] is experienced by the 
experiencing substantively 
different [from the cognition]. 
(426-483) 
3.2.2.2 Proving the self-
awareness by the proof of 
memory. (484-539) 
3.2.2.1.1 It is illogical that self-
awareness does not exist while 
[the cognition] is accepted to be 
perceptible. (426-459) 
3.2.2.1.2 Refuting the view that 
[the cognition] is imperceptible 
to oneself. (460-483) 
3.2.2.1.1.1 Refuting [that view] 
based on the examination of the 
successive cognitions. (426-
437b) 
3.2.2.1.1.2 Refuting [that view] 
by examining whether white, etc. 
are appearance. (437c-446) 
3.2.2.1.1.3 It is absurd if there is 
no self-awareness. (447-459) 
3.2.2.1.1.1.1 The absurd 
consequence that experience 
would not exist at all. (426-427) 
426-
427 
426-
428ab 
3.2.1.2.2 The extensive 
explanation of the method to 
establish the pervasion of that 
proof (t. khyab pa, sk. vyāpti). 
(426-482) 
3.2.1.2.2.1 The refutation of the 
view that cognition is directly 
experienced by the cognition 
which arises after itself as a 
different substance. (426-437b) 
3.2.1.2.2.2 Establishing “it is 
experienced by grasping-aspect” 
by the method of refuting other 
alternatives. (437c-446) 
3.2.1.2.2.3 The refutation of the 
view that because all cognitions 
are imperceptible, they are 
experienced by the cognition 
which is substantively different, 
though there is no self-
awareness. (447-482) 
3.2.1.2.2.1.1 The [explanation 
of] the refutation (in 3.2.1.2.2.1). 
(426-428ab) 
3.2.2.1.1.1.2 The refutation of 
[the opponent’s] argument about 
2.2.1.1.1.1.1]. (428-437b) 
3.2.2.1.1.1.2.1 The absurd 
consequence that the object 
would not be experienced. 
428ab
c1 
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(428abc1) 
3.2.2.1.1.1.2.2 The refutation of 
[the opponent’s] argument about 
2.2.1.1.1.1.1]. (428-437b) 
3.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.1 It is not correct 
that the similarity to an object 
alone is the reason for the 
cognition of an object. (428c-
429b) 
428c2
-429b 
428cd 3.2.1.2.2.1.2 The refutation of 
the objection of that [refutation 
in 3.2.1.2.2.1.1]. (428cd-437ab) 
3.2.1.2.2.1.2.1 The statement of 
the objection [of that refutation 
in 3.2.1.2.2.1.1]. (428cd) 
3.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.2 It is not correct 
that the particular similarity is the 
reason. (429c-432) 
429c-
432 
429 3.2.1.2.2.1.2.2 The refutation of 
that [objection in 
3.2.1.2.2.1.2.1]. (429-437ab) 
3.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.1 If the meaning 
of the similarity is accepted as 
“[having] the similar quality”, 
the object and the cognition 
should not be different. (429) 
  430-
433 
3.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.2 If the meaning 
of the similarity is accepted as 
“[having] the grasped-aspect”, it 
is not feasible that it can 
characterize something as the 
experience [of object]. (430-
433) 
3.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.3 The refutation 
based on the examination of the 
similarity. (433-437b) 
433-
437b 
434 3.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.3 The statement 
of another fault of infinite 
regress [caused by accepting the 
meaning of] similarity as 
“[having] the similar quality”.593 
                                                 
593 PVVke: ’dra ba chos mtshungs pa thugs med kyi skyon gzhan bstan / (p. 393.) 
Admittedly, this title is quite ambiguous to me.  It seems irrelevant to Kedrup’s 
explanation on PV 3.434: / gsum pa ni / gzhan yang gal te shes pa yul dang ’dra ba’i 
don yul dang chos mtshungs pa la byas nas / de nyid myong ba’i ’jog byed du khas 
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(434) 
3.2.2.1.1.2 Refuting [that view] 
by examining whether white, etc. 
are appearance. (437c-446) 
3.2.2.1.1.2.1 The examination of 
the manifested object. (437c-
438) 
437c-
438 
435-
437ab 
3.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.4 The refutation 
of the objection of the way that 
[considers] the perceived aspect 
as the proof of the experience [of 
the object]. (435-437ab) 
3.2.2.1.1.2.2 The refutation 
based on the examination. (439-
446) 
3.2.2.1.1.2.2.1 Refuting that [the 
object] is different substance 
from the manifesting. (439-445) 
3.2.2.1.1.2.2.2 The self-
awareness is established if the 
manifesting is [the object’s] own 
nature. (446) 
3.2.2.1.1.2.2.1.1 The absurd 
consequence that the object 
would not appear. (439-440b) 
439-
440b 
437cd
-446 
3.2.1.2.2.2 Establishing “it is 
experienced by grasping-aspect” 
by the method of refuting other 
alternatives. (437c-446)  
3.2.2.1.1.2.2.1.2 The absurd 
consequence that the object 
would not be grasped as the 
particularity of the cognition. 
(440c-445) 
3.2.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.1 Presenting the 
absurd consequence. (440c-441) 
440c-
441 
  
3.2.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.2 The refutation 
of [opponent’s] objection of that 
[argument in 2.2.1.1.2.2.1.2.1]. 
442-
445 
  
                                                 
blangs na don ma yin pa chen por ’gyur te / ’di ltar shes pa de yul dang bdag nyid kun 
gyis ’dra na ni / shas pa shes nyid min ’gyur zhing / cha ’ga’ zhig gis mtshungs na ni / 
thams cad thams cad kyis myong ’gyur ba’i phyir ro / (PVVke, p. 396.) 
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(422-445) 
3.2.2.1.1.2.2.2 The self-
awareness is established if the 
manifesting is [the object’s] own 
nature. (446) 
446   
3.2.2.1.1.3 It is absurd if there is 
no self-awareness. (477-459) 
3.2.2.1.1.3.1 The other 
[opinions] are also rejected by 
these reasoning. (447) 
447 447 3.2.1.2.2.3 The refutation of the 
view that because all cognitions 
are imperceptible, they are 
experienced by the cognition 
which is substantively different, 
though there is no self-
awareness. (447-482) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.1 The explanation 
that the previous reasoning can 
also indicate the reasoning 
which refutes that [view in 
3.2.1.2.2.3]. (447) 
3.2.2.1.1.3.2 The self-awareness 
is established in relation to the 
happiness, etc. (448-449c1) 
448-
449c1 
448-
449c 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2 The extensive 
explanation of other methods to 
refute that view. (448-482) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.1 The refutation of 
the view that there is no self-
awareness because all 
cognitions are imperceptible. 
(448-459) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2 The refutation of 
the view that all cognitions are 
imperceptible. (460-476) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.3 The refutation of 
the view that all cognitions are 
necessarily experienced by the 
cognition which is substantively 
different [from it]. (477-482) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.1.1 The statement 
that there is the self-awareness 
which is established by the 
301 
 
perceptions such as the 
cognition of happiness, etc. 
(448-449c) 
3.2.2.1.1.3.3 It is absurd that [the 
cognition] will be experienced by 
the cognition which has different 
substance. (449c2-459) 
3.2.2.1.1.3.3.1 Presenting the 
absurd consequence. (449c2-
453b1) 
449c2
-
453b
1 
449d-
459 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.1.2 The refutation 
of the objection that happiness, 
etc., need to be experienced by 
the perception which is 
substantively different. (449d-
459) 
3.2.2.1.1.3.3.2 The refutation of 
[opponent’s] objection of that 
[argument in 2.2.1.1.3.3.1]. 
(453b2-459) 
3.2.2.1.1.3.3.2.1 Presenting the 
objection. (453b2-454) 
453b
2-454 
  
3.2.2.1.1.3.3.2.2 The absurd 
consequence in relation to the 
yogic perception. (455-459) 
455-
459 
  
3.2.2.1.2 Refuting the view that 
[the cognition] is imperceptible 
to oneself. (460-483) 
3.2.2.1.2.1 The absurd 
consequence that one’s own 
cognition is necessarily 
apprehended by the inferential 
sign. (460ab) 
460ab  3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2 The refutation of 
the view that all cognitions are 
imperceptible. (460-476) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.1 An absurd 
consequence that one’s 
cognitions have to be established 
by proof. 
3.2.2.1.2.2 It is not correct to 
accept that [view stated in 
3.2.2.1.2.1]. (460c-483) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1 Extensive 
explanation of the impossibility 
for an inferential sign to prove 
the cognition of one’s own mind 
series. (460c-472b) 
460c-
461c1 
460-
462c 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2 The extensive 
explanation of why it is not 
feasible. (460-476) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1 The 
statement that it is not feasible if 
it (i.e., one’s cognition) needs to 
be apprehended by the proof of 
“a sense perception”. (460-
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3.2.2.1.2.2.2 It is not correct that 
there is the means of knowledge 
which can determine the relation 
[between the object and the 
cognition] when the cognition is 
imperceptible to one’s own 
cognition. (472c-483) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.1 There must be no 
inferential sign other than the 
sense faculty, etc. (460c-461c1) 
476ab) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.2 The 
statement that it is not feasible if 
it (i.e., one’s cognition) needs to 
be apprehended by the proof of 
“a mental perception”. (476cd) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1 The 
statement that a valid proof to 
establish that [cognition] is 
unavailable. (460-472ab) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.2 The 
statement that there is no 
concordant instance to establish 
that [cognition]. (472cd-476ab) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1.1 The 
general refutation of the valid 
proof of establishing that 
[cognition]. (460-462c) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2 Merely the sense 
faculty, etc. cannot be the 
inferential sign. (461c2-468c1) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.3 The property of 
one’s cognition cannot be the 
inferential sign. (468c2-472b) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.1 Presenting the 
refutation. (461c-462c) 
461c2
-462c 
  
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2 The refutation 
of [opponent’s] argument about 
that [refutation in 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.1]. (462d-468c1) 
462d-
468c1 
462d-
468c 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1.2 The 
particular refutation of such a 
valid proof [for establishing the 
cognition]. (462d-472b) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1.2.1 The 
refutation of the acceptance of a 
valid proof of the own nature 
that establishes that the self-
cognition exists on its own. 
(462d-469) 
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3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1.2.2 The 
refutation of the acceptance of a 
valid proof of the effect that 
establishes that [cognition]. 
(470-472) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1.2.1.1 The 
refutation of the view that the 
appearance of object is the 
proof. (462d-468c) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.3 The property of 
one’s cognition cannot be the 
inferential sign. (468c2-472b) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.3.1 The property of 
the cognition which is the 
substance of the cognition cannot 
be the inferential sign. (468c2-
469c) 
468c2
-469c 
468d-
469 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1.2.1.2 The 
refutation of the view that the 
property of one’s own cognition 
is the proof. (468d-469) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.3.2 Different 
substance cannot be the 
inferential sign. (469d-472b) 
469d-
472b 
470-
472 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1.2.2 The 
refutation of the acceptance of a 
valid proof of the effect that 
establishes that [cognition]. 
(470-472) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2 It is not correct that 
there is still a means of 
knowledge which can determine 
the relation [between the object 
and the cognition] when the 
cognition is imperceptible to 
oneself. (472c-483) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.1 There is no means 
of knowledge which determines 
the relation [between the object 
and the cognition]. (472c-475b) 
472c-
475b 
473-
476b 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.1.2 The 
statement that there is no 
concordant instance to establish 
that [cognition]. (472cd-476ab) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.2 Due to the 
absence of that, it is not correct 
that the cognition of the mind of 
475c-
476 
476cd 3.2.1.2.2.3.2.2.2.2 The 
statement that it is not feasible if 
it (i.e., one’s cognition) needs to 
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another person cannot be 
apprehended either. (475c-476) 
be apprehended by the proof of 
“a mental perception”. (476cd) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.3 Presenting other 
faults in [the assertion] that 
[cognition] is experienced by the 
cognition which is of different 
substance. (477-483) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.3.1 It is not correct 
that the previous and the later 
cognitions are the manifested and 
the manifesting. (477) 
477 477 3.2.1.2.2.3.2.3 The refutation of 
the view that all cognitions are 
necessarily experienced by the 
cognition which is substantively 
different [from it]. (477-482) 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.3.1 The 
[explanation of] the refutation 
[in 3.2.1.2.2.3.2.3]. (477) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.3.2 The refutation 
of [opponent’s] argument against 
that [argument in 
2.2.1.2.2.2.3.1]. (478-482) 
478-
482 
478-
482 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.3.2 The refutation 
[of the rejection in 
3.2.1.2.2.3.2.3]. (478-482) 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.3.3 Therefore, self-
awareness should definitely be 
accepted. (483) 
483 483-
484a 
3.2.2 The statement that the 
existence of the self-awareness 
is established by the proof of 
“memory”. (483-539) 
3.2.2.1 The statement that self-
awareness is established by the 
proof of “memory”. (483-484a) 
3.2.2.2 Proving the self-
awareness by the proof of 
memory. (484-539) 
3.2.2.2.1 A brief (of 3.2.2.2). 
(484a) 
484a   
3.2.2.2.2 Extensive explanation 
(of 3.2.2.2). (484b-539) 
3.2.2.2.2.1 An absurd 
consequence that it is unavailable 
for a cognition to grasp the long 
syllable if there is no self-
awareness. (484b-510) 
3.2.2.2.2.2 An absurd 
484b-
486b 
484b-
486b 
3.2.2.2 In the section to 
determine the pervasion of that 
proof, to extensively refute the 
view that [the cognition] is 
experienced by the cognition 
which is substantively different 
[from itself]. (484b-539) 
3.2.2.2.1 An absurd 
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consequence that it is impossible 
to grasp the external object by 
accepting the establishment of 
such theory. (511-539) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.1 The statement of the 
absurd consequence. (484b-
486b) 
consequence that it is impossible 
for cognition to grasp the long 
syllable, etc. (484b-510) 
3.2.2.2.2 An absurd 
consequence that the other 
cognition would not move to the 
object. (511-539) 
3.2.2.2.1.1 The statement of the 
absurd consequence. (484b-
486b) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2 The refutation of the 
argument against that [absurd 
consequence in 3.2.2.2.2.1.1]. 
(486c-510) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.1 The untenability 
of the proposition that only one 
aural cognition arises from all 
components of the long syllable. 
(486c-489) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2 The refutation 
based on the investigation of the 
proposition that multiple aural 
cognitions arise from multiple 
[syllables]. (490-510) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.1.1 The refutation 
of the view that it (i.e., the aural 
cognition of a long syllable) 
remains between the previous 
[part] and the later [part]. (486c-
488b) 
486c-
488b 
486c-
488b 
3.2.2.2.1.2 The refutation of the 
objection of that [absurd 
consequence]. (486c-510) 
3.2.2.2.1.2.1 The refutation of 
the view that only one aural 
cognition arises from all 
components of a long syllable. 
(486c-489) 
3.2.2.2.1.2.2 The refutation in 
relation to the investigation of 
the view that multiple aural 
cognitions arise from multiple 
components of that [long 
syllable]. (490-510) 
3.2.2.2.1.2.1.1 The refutation of 
the view that it exists between 
the previous portion and the later 
portion. (486c-488b) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.1.2 A fault in 
relation to the view that those 
components arise together. 
(488c-489) 
488c-
489 
488c-
489 
3.2.2.2.1.2.1.2 The statement 
that there would still be a fault 
even all portions arise together. 
(488c-489)  
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2 The refutation 
based on the investigation of the 
490 490-
510 
3.2.2.2.1.2.2 The refutation in 
relation to the investigation of 
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proposition that multiple aural 
cognitions arise from multiple 
[syllables]. (490-510) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1 The refutation 
of [the view] that the cognition 
which perceives the objects and 
the experience of cognition are 
substantively different and arise 
successively. (490-505) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.2 The refutation 
of [the view] that [the cognition 
of the object and the experience 
of the cognition are substantively 
different and] arise 
simultaneously.  (506-510) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.1 Untenability 
of the view that the experience 
which is substantively different 
and arises without increasing. 
(490) 
the view that multiple aural 
cognitions arise from multiple 
components of that [long 
syllable]. (490-510) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2 Untenability 
of the view that it (i.e., the 
experience which is 
substantively different) can be 
prolonged. (491-505) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.1 The 
statement of the absurd 
consequence. (491-492) 
491-
492 
  
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2 The 
refutation of [opponent’s] 
argument against that [absurd 
consequence stated in 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.1]. (493-505) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.1 
Untenability of the view that [the 
substantively different 
experiences of the cognitions that 
493-
496 
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exist before and after] are 
connected by the sense cognition. 
(493-496) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.2 
Untenability of the view that [the 
substantively different 
experiences of the cognitions that 
exist before and after] are 
connected by the mental 
cognition. (497-498) 
497-
498 
  
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.3 
Untenability of the view that [the 
substantively different 
experiences for the cognitions 
that exist before and after are 
connected] with the complex of 
these two (i.e., the sense 
cognition and the mental 
cognition). (499-505) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.3.1 The 
statement of the refutation. (499-
502b) 
499-
502b 
  
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.3.2 The 
others would therefore be refuted 
as well. (502c-505) 
502c-
505 
  
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.2 The refutation 
of [the view] that [the cognition 
of the object and the experience 
of the cognition are substantively 
different and] arise 
simultaneously.  (506-510) 
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.2.1 The 
contradiction to [opponent’s] 
accepted [theory] and the 
reasoning.  (506-508) 
506-
508 
  
3.2.2.2.2.1.2.2.2.2 The statement 509-   
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that the fault would remain if the 
experiencing which is 
substantively different arises 
successively. (509-510) 
510 
3.2.2.2.2.2 An absurd 
consequence that it is impossible 
to grasp the external object by 
accepting the establishment of 
such theory. (511-539) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1 The extensive 
explanation of the absurd 
consequence that the cognition is 
impossible to move to the 
external object. (511-536) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2 The statement of 
other reasonings [for establishing 
self-awareness]. (537-539) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.1 The statement of 
the absurd consequence. (511-
512) 
511-
512 
511-
512 
3.2.2.2.2 An absurd 
consequence that the other 
cognition would not move to the 
object. (511-539) 
3.2.2.2.2.1 The statement of the 
absurd consequence. (511-512) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.2 The establishment 
of the pervasion of that 
[reasoning]. (513-517) 
513-
517 
513-
517 
3.2.2.2.2.2 The refutation of the 
objection of that [absurd 
consequence]. (513-539) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1 The refutation of 
the view that, with an external 
object nearby and the 
vanishment of the previous 
[cognition], it [i.e., the later 
cognition] moves to the object. 
(513-517) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3 The refutation of 
[opponent’s] argument against 
that [absurd consequence]. (518-
536) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1 The refutation 
of [opponent’s] argument over 
518-
519 
518-
519 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2 The refutation of 
the view that due to the 
vanishment of the capacity of 
the previous grasping, (the later 
cognition) moves to the object. 
(518-534) 
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the way how [the cognition] 
moves to the external object. 
(518-534) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.2 The refutation 
of the objection that the object 
and the previous cognition are 
grasped simultaneously. (535-
536) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1 The extensive 
explanation of the refutation. 
(518-531) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.2 Summary. 
(532-534) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.1 The 
refutation of the view that the 
cognizing activity is based on the 
exhaustion of the capacity which 
the previous cognition produces 
the latter. (518-525) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.2 The 
refutation of the view that it is the 
cause but not the object to be 
grasped. (526-531) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.1.1 The 
statement of an absurd 
consequence. (518-519) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 The statement of 
the refutation. (518-519) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.1.2 The 
refutation of the response to that 
[absurd consequence]. (520-525) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.1.2.1 The 
response. (520-521) 
520-
521 
520-
521 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 The refutation of 
the objection of that [refutation]. 
(520-534) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1 The refutation 
of the objection from the 
Buddhists. (520-521) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.1.2.2 The 
refutation of the response to that 
[absurd consequence]. (522-525) 
522-
525 
522-
525 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2 The refutation 
of the objection from other 
schools. (522-525) 
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3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.2 The 
refutation of the view that it is the 
cause but not the object to be 
grasped. (526-531) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.2.1 The 
refutation. (526) 
526 526-
534 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.3 The refutation 
of the objection by eliminating 
other alternatives. (526-534) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.2.2 The 
refutation of [opponent’s] 
argument against that [refutation 
in 3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.1.2.1]. (527-
531) 
527-
531 
  
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.1.2 Summary. 
(532-534) 
532-
534 
  
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3.2 The refutation 
of the objection that the object 
and the previous cognition are 
grasped simultaneously. (535-
536) 
535-
536 
535-
536 
3.2.2.2.2.2.3 The refutation of 
the view that the object and the 
previous cognition are grasped 
together. (535-536) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2 The statement of 
other reasonings [for establishing 
self-awareness]. (537-539) 
537-
539 
537-
539 
3.2.2.2.2.2.4 The refutation of 
the view that the previous is not 
experienced by merely the last 
cognition which moves to the 
object. (537-539) 
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Appendix II: The Outline of Pramāṇasamuccaya (Vṛtti) 1.8c-12 from Gyaltsab’s 
Commentary on Pramāṇasamuccaya (Vṛtti)594 
 
3 The refutation of the wrong view about the effect 
[of means of knowledge]. 
3.1 The presentation of the effect of means of 
knowledge. 
3.2 The determination of such presentation. 
3.1.1 General explanation of the effect of means of 
knowledge for one who accepts external object.  
PS(V) 1.8c-1.9a 
3.1.2 It is feasible that self-awareness is the effect 
[of means of knowledge], even if five external 
objects of sense are considered as the [objects] to be 
perceived. 
kiṃ kāraṇam. 
PS(V) 1.9bcd 
3.1.3 The presentation of the effect of means of 
knowledge of self-awareness. 
evaṃ jñānasaṃvedanaṃ 
anekākāram upādāya tathā 
tathā pramāṇaprameyatvam 
upacaryate. nirvyāpārās tu 
sarvadharmāḥ. āha ca 
PS 1.10 
3.2 The determination of such presentation. 
3.2.1 Proving that cognition has two forms. 
3.2.2 Proving self-awareness. 
3.2.1.1 Proving [cognition having] two forms due to 
the difference between forms in relation to the 
apprehension of object and cognition. 
atha dvirūpaṃ jñānam iti 
kathaṃ pratipādyam. 
PSV 1.11ab 
3.2.1.2 Proving [cognition having two forms] by the 
inferential sign of the later memory [of object and 
PSV 1.11cd 
                                                 
594 PSVgyal 13b4-17b2. 
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cognition]. 
3.2.1.2.1 The explanation of 3.2.1.2. 
3.2.1.2.2 In addition, explaining the reason to prove 
self-awareness. 
3.2.1.2.2.1 The argument [by the opponent]. 
syād etat rūpādivaj 
jñānasyāpi 
jñānāntareṇānubhavaḥ.  
tad apy ayuktam, yasmāj 
3.2.1.2.2.2 The response to the argument. PSV 1.12 
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Appendix III: A Comparison between Pramāṇasamuccaya (Vṛtti) 1.8c-12 and 
Pramāṇavārttika 3.301-539595 
 
Steps PS(V) 1.8c-12 PV 3.301-
539 
According to 
Gyaltsab 
PV 3.301-539 
According to 
Kedrup 
1 
[PS 1.8cd:] savyāpārapratītatvāt pramāṇaṃ 
phalam eva sat/ 
na hy atra bāhyakānām iva pramāṇād 
arthāntaraṃ phalam. tasyaiva tu 
phalabhūtasya jñānasya viṣayākāratayā 
utpattyā savyāpārapratītiḥ. tām upādāya 
pramāṇatvam upacaryate nirvyāpāram api 
sat. tad yathā phalaṃ hetvanurūpam 
utpadyamānaṃ heturūpaṃ gṛhṇātīty 
kathyate nirvyāpāram api, tadvad atrāpi. 
301-352596 
301-319597 
2 
[PS 1.9a:] svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra 
dvyābhāsaṃ hi jñānam utpadyate 
svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ ca. 
tasyobhayābhāsasya yat svasaṃvedanaṃ tat 
320-337598 
                                                 
595 Explanation of this table refers to § 2.2.2.1. 
596  For the explanation of Gyaltsab’s explanations of every step in this table, cf. 
appendix I and II. 
597 For the explanation of Kedrup’s explanations of every step in this table, cf. appendix 
I.  Further, some Kedrup’s explanations offered as he paired PSV 1.8c-12 with PV 
3.301-539 would also be introduced as follows.  According to Kedrup, this section is 
to present the effect of the means of knowledge of the Sautrāntika. (Cf. PVVke, p. 262.) 
598 According to Kedrup, this section is to explain the effect of the means of knowledge 
of self-awareness. (Cf. PVVke, p. 281.) 
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phalam. 
3 
kiṃ kāraṇam. 
[PS 1.9b:] tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ / 
yadā hi saviṣayaṃ jñānam arthaḥ, tadā 
svasaṃvedanānurūpam arthaṃ 
pratipadyata iṣṭam aniṣṭaṃ vā. 
353-362 
338-340599 
4 
yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ, tadā 
[PS 1.9cd1:] viṣayābhāsataivāsya 
pramāṇaṃ 
tadā hi jñānasvasaṃvedyam api svarūpam 
anapekṣyārthābhāsataivāsya pramāṇam. 
yasmāt so ’rthaḥ 
[PS 1.9d2:] tena mīyate // 
yathā yathā hy arthākāro jñāne pratibhāti 
śubhāśubhāditvena, tattadrūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ 
pramīyate. 
341-352600 
5 
evaṃ jñānasaṃvedanaṃ anekākāram 
upādāya tathā tathā pramāṇaprameyatvam 
upacaryate. nirvyāpārās tu sarvadharmāḥ. 
āha ca 
[PS 1.10:] yadābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tat 
pramāṇaphalate punaḥ / 
grāhakākārasaṃvittyos trayaṃ nātaḥ 
pṛthak kṛtam // 
363-366 353-366601 
                                                 
599 According to Kedrup, this section is to explain the effect of the means of knowledge 
of other-awareness. (Cf. PVVke, p. 281.) 
600 According to Kedrup, this section is to remove the doubts about the effect of the 
means of knowledge of other-awareness in Yogācāra’s theory. (Cf. PVVke, p. 282.) 
601 According to Kedrup, this section is the extensive explanation of the necessity of 
the self-awareness to be the effect of the means of knowledge. (Cf. PVVke, p. 283.) 
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6 
atha dvirūpaṃ jñānam iti kathaṃ 
pratipādyam. 
[PS 1.11ab:] viṣayajñānatajjñānaviśeṣāt tu 
dvirūpatā /  
viṣaye hi rūpādau yaj jñānaṃ tad 
arthasvābhāsam eva. viṣayajñāne tu yaj 
jñānaṃ tad viṣayānurūpajñānābhāsaṃ 
svābhāsaṃ ca. anyathā yadi viṣayānurūpam 
eva viṣayajñānaṃ syāt svarūpaṃ vā, 
jñānajñānam api viṣayajñānenāviśiṣṭaṃ 
syāt. 
367-421 367-424602 
7 
na cottarottarāṇi jñānāni 
pūrvaviprakṛṣṭaviṣayābhāsāni syuḥ, 
tasyāviṣayatvāt. ataś ca siddhaṃ 
dvairūpyaṃ jñānasya. 
[PS 1.11c:] smṛter uttarakālaṃ ca 
dvairūpyam iti sambandhaḥ. yasmāc 
cānubhavottarakālaṃ viṣaya iva jñāne ’pi 
smṛtir utpadyate, tasmād asti dvirūpatā 
jñānasya svasaṃvedyatā ca. 
kiṃ kāraṇam. 
[PS 1.11d:] na hy asāv avibhāvite // 
na hy ananubhūtārthavedanasmṛtī 
422-425 483-484a603 
                                                 
602 According to Kedrup, PS 1.11ab is explained by PV 3.367-424, among which PV 
3.367-386 explain the proof which proves that the cognition has two forms; PV 3.387-
397 explain the refutation of opponent’s objection to the method which proves that 
cognition has two forms through rejecting the external object; PV 3.398-421 explain 
the fault in the acceptance that cognition does not have two forms according to the 
acceptance of the external object; PV 3.422-424 explain how memory of cognition 
proves that cognition has two forms. Cf. PVVke, pp. 341-342 and appendix I. 
603 According to Kedrup, from yasmāt to the end of PSV in this step is explained by 
PV 483-484a. Cf. PVVke, pp. 426-427.  
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rūpādismṛtivat. 
8 
syād etat rūpādivaj jñānasyāpi 
jñānāntareṇānubhavaḥ.  tad apy ayuktam, 
yasmāj  
[PS 1.12ab1:] 
jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā  
anavasthā iti tajjñāne jñānāntareṇa 
anubhūyamāne. 
426-483 
484b-510604 
9 
kathaṃ cet.  
[PS 1.12b2:] tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ / 
yena hi jñānena taj jñānam anubhūyate, 
tatrāpy uttarakālaṃ smṛtir dṛṣṭā yuktā.  
tatas tatrāpy anyena jñānena-
anubhave ’navasthā syāt. 
484a and  
511abc 
10 
[PS 1.12cd:] viṣayāntarasañcāras tathā na 
syāt sa ceṣyate // 
512c-536 
511-539605 
11 
tasmād avaśyaṃ svasaṃvedyatā 
jñānasyābhyupeyā. 
537-539 
 
  
                                                 
604 According to Kedrup, PSV in step 8 and PS 1.12b2 are explained by PV 484b-510. 
Cf. PVVke, p. 427. My disagreement on this is explained in § 2.2.2.1. 
605 Cf. PVVke, p. 427. 
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Appendix IV: An Annotated Translation of Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya 6.72-76 
Outlines 
1. The Refutation of Self-awareness 
1.1 Question: What Is the Proof of the Cognition If There Is No External Object? 
1.2 Opponent’s Response to 1.1 
1.3 The Refutation of 1.2 
1.3.1 The Refutation of Reflexivity 
1.3.2 The Refutation of the Memory-driven Reasoning of the Self-awareness 
1.3.3 The Conclusion of the Refutation of Self-awareness 
1.3.1 The Refutation of Reflexivity 
1.3.1.1 If Cognition Can Act Reflexively, So Can Others 
1.3.1.2 Opponent: The Self-awareness Is Established by Rejecting the Other-awareness 
1.3.1.3 The Refutation of 1.3.1.2 
1.3.1.4 An Introduction to Yogācāra’s Reasoning of the Self-awareness Using the 
Analogical Examples of Fire and the Like 
1.3.2 The Refutation of the Memory-driven Reasoning of the Self-awareness 
1.3.2.1 Introduction to the Memory-driven Reasoning of the Self-awareness 
1.3.2.2 The Explanation of 1.3.2 
1.3.2.3 The Explanation How Memory Arises without Self-awareness 
1.3.2.1 Introduction to the Memory-driven Reasoning of the Self-awareness 
1.3.2.1.1 The Explanation of the Memories of the Object and the Object-cognition 
1.3.2.1.2 The Explanation of the Premise: No Experienced Cognition No Memory of 
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Cognition 
1.3.2.1.3 Proving the Self-awareness by Rejecting the Other-awareness 
1.3.2.1.3.1 The Explanation of the Infinite Regress in the Theory of Other-awareness 
1.3.2.1.3.2 The Explanation of the Failure of Perceiving Other Object in the Theory of 
Other-awareness 
1.3.2.1.3.3 The Conclusion of 1.3.2.1 
1.3.2.2 The Explanation of 1.3.2 
1.3.2.2.1 The Refutation of the Ultimate Existence of Memory 
1.3.2.2.2 The Explanation on That the Memory Is an Inconclusive Reason Even in the 
Conventional Prospective 
1.3.2.2.3 The Memory Can Arise without Self-awareness 
1.3.2.2.4 The Explanation on That the Memory Is an Unproved Reason to Prove Self-
awareness 
1.3.2.2.5 The Refutation of the Real Existence of Memory 
1.3.2.3 The Explanation on How Memory Arises without Self-awareness 
1.3.3 The Conclusion of the Refutation of Self-awareness 
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The Translation and the Text 
 
1. The Refutation of Self-awareness 
1.1 Question: What Is the Proof of the Cognition If There Is No External Object? 
1.2 Opponent’s Response to 1.1 
1.3 The Refutation of 1.2 
1.1 Question: What Is the Proof of the Cognition If There Is No External Object? 
[MABh:] Therefore, it has been explained that the cognition is impossible without 
external object.  Accordingly, to reject [the view] that there must be at least something 
(i.e., other dependent nature) real, it is to say: 606 
[MA 6.72:] If the other-dependent nature, which is empty of two [things], namely, free 
from the grasping (i.e., the cognition) [and] without the grasped (i.e., the object), exists, 
how do you know its existence? Further, it is not correct to state that [something] non-
grasped exists.607 
[MABh:] Even if the other-dependent nature, which is empty of the said grasped and 
                                                 
606 MABh: / de’i phyir de ltar phyi rol med par rnam par shes pa mi srid par bstan nas 
dngos po tsam zhig tu yod pa nyid dgag par bya ba’i phyir bshad →la← (D : pa P) / (D 
271b5-6 : P 324a1.) 
607 MABh: gal te gzung med ’dzin pa nyid bral zhin // gnyis kyis stong pa’i gzhan dbang 
dngos yod na // ’di ni yod par gang gis shes par ’gyur // ma bzung bar yang yod ces 
byar mi rung // (D 271b6 : P 324a1ff.) Cf. also MA 6.72: grāhyaṃ vinā 
grāhakatāviyuktaṃ dvayeṇa śūnyaṃ paratantrarūpam / yady asti kenāsya paraiṣi 
sattām agṛhyamānaṃ ca sad ity ayuktam // 
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grasping, exists, by what [kind of] cognition you apprehend it?608 
1.2 Opponent’s Response to 1.1 
The [cognition] perceives itself.609 
1.3 The Refutation of 1.2 
1.3.1 The Refutation of Reflexivity 
1.3.2 The Refutation of the Memory-driven Reasoning of the Self-awareness 
1.3.1 The Refutation of Reflexivity 
1.3.1.1 If Cognition Can Act Reflexively, So Can Others 
[MABh:] It is not correct because it is contradictory [to the worldly custom] if the action 
is toward [the agent] itself.  Likewise, the blade of a sword cannot cut itself; the tip of 
a finger cannot touch itself; a well-trained strong and nimble man cannot ride on his 
own shoulder; fire cannot burn itself; the eye cannot see itself.  Nor can the cognition 
cognized by another [cognition] because it would be contrary to your own tenet, that is 
to say, because it would be the case that if the cognition is the object of another 
[cognition], then the view of “being the mind alone” would be destroyed.  Therefore, 
in this manner, there will be no cognition at all for that [cognition] and on this occasion, 
when [the cognition] is not perceived, it does not exist.610 
                                                 
608 MABh: / gal te →gzung← (D : bzung P) ba dang ’dzin pa zhes bya ba gnyis kyis 
stong pa gzhan →gyi← (D : gyis P) dbang yod na de’i yod pa de khyod kyis shes pa gang 
gis dmigs / (D 271b5-271b7 : P 324a1-324a3.) 
609 MABh: de nyid kyis de ’dzin par ni / (D 271b7 : P 324a3.) 
610 MABh: mi ’thad de / rang gi bdag nyid la byed par ’gal ba’i phyir ro // ’di ltar ral 
gri’i so de nyid kyis de nyid mi gcod la / sor mo’i rtse mo de nyid kyis de nyid la mi reg 
cing // legs par bslabs pa’i g.yer zhing yang →gzor← (D : gze P) can gyis kyang rang gi 
321 
 
1.3.1.2 Opponent: The Self-awareness Is Established by Rejecting the Other-
awareness 
[MABh:] To this, [the opponent] states: although every cognition is not perceived by 
other [cognition], there is self-awareness [as the perceiver of the cognition].  
Therefore, that [cognition] is perceived by the self-awareness alone and it does 
therefore exist.611 
1.3.1.3 Refutation of 1.3.1.2 
[MABh:] To explain that even in that manner it (i.e., the self-awareness) does not exist, 
it is to be said:612 
[MA 6.73a:] By this alone, the experience of that [cognition] is not established.613 
[MABh:] [That is to say:] by this alone, the notion of “that [cognition] is perceived” is 
not established.614 
                                                 
phrag pa la zhon par mi nus shing / mes rang gi bdag nyid →mi← (D : mes P) sreg la / 
mig gis rang gi bdag nyid la lta ba ma yin no // de ni shes pa gzhan gyis ’dzin pa yang 
ma yin te / rang gi grub pa’i mtha’ dang ’gal ba’i phyir te / gal te rnam par rig pa gzhan 
zhig rnam par rig pa’i yul yin na rnam par rig pa tsam nyid nyams par ’gyur ro 
zhes ’byung ba’i phyir ro // de’i phyir de ltar de’i ’dzin pa rnam pa thams cad du yod 
pa ma yin la ma bzung ba la ni yod pa nyid med do / (D 271b7-272a3 : P 324a3ff.) 
611 MABh: / ’dir smras pa / gal te yang gzhan gzhan gyis ’dzin pa yod pa ni ma yin 
mod kyi / de lta na yang rang rig pa ni yod pa yin no // de’i phyir rang rig pa kho nas 
de ’dzin pa’i phyir yod pa nyid du ’gyur ro zhe na / (D 272a3: P 324a6ff.) 
612 MABh: de yang yod pa ma yin par bshad pa / (D 272a3 : P 324a7.) 
613 MABh: de nyid kyis de myong bar grub ma yin / (D 272a3 : P 324a7.) Cf. also MA 
6.73a: tenaiva tasyānubhavo na siddhaḥ / 
614 MABh: de nyid kyis de ’dzin to zhes bya ba ’di ni ma grub bo / (D 272a3-4 : P 
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1.3.1.4 An Introduction to Yogācāra’s Reasoning of the Self-awareness Using the 
Analogical Examples of Fire and the Like 
[MABh:] To this, having accepted the view of the Sautrāntika, someone (i.e., the 
Yogācāra615) , for the sake of a fully established self-awareness, claims that the fire, as 
it arises, does not discriminatively act toward itself and the vase and so forth, but 
simultaneously illuminates [them] and the sound [of a word] as well can make itself 
and the meaning [of the word] known; likewise, as the cognition arises, it can be 
indiscriminately and truly aware of its own nature and the object.  Therefore, there 
must be the self-awareness.616 
1.3.2 The Refutation of the Memory-driven Reasoning of the Self-awareness 
1.3.2.1 Introduction to the Memory-driven Reasoning of the Self-awareness 
1.3.2.2 The Explanation of 1.3.2 
1.3.2.3 The Explanation How Memory Arises without Self-awareness 
1.3.2.1 Introduction to the Memory-driven Reasoning of the Self-awareness 
1.3.2.1.1. The Explanation of the Memories of the Object and the Object-cognition 
                                                 
324a7ff.) 
615 Cf. MABhzkp, p. 347. 
616 MABh: / ’dir kha cig gis mdo sde pa’i phyogs khas blangs nas rang rig pa rab tu 
sgrub pa’i phyir / ji ltar me ni skyes pa nyid na rang gi bdag nyid dang bum pa la sogs 
pa dag gnyis su mi ’jug par cig car gsal bar byed la / sgras kyang rang gi bdag nyid 
dang don ston par byed pa de bzhin du / rnam par shes pa yang nye bar skye ba nyid 
→na← (D : ni P) gnyis su mi ’jug par rang gi bdag nyid dang / yul so sor yang dag par 
rig par byed pa yin no // de’i phyir rang rig pa zhes bya ba yod pa kho na yin no / (D 
272a4ff. : P 324a8-324b2.) 
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[MABh:] Those who do not accept [the view of the Sautrāntika], too, need to 
undoubtedly accept the self-awareness. Otherwise, in the later time, there would be no 
memory of the object in the form of “it is seen” and the memory of the experience of 
the object in the form of “I saw it”. 617 
1.3.2.1.2 The Explanation of the Premise of Memory  
[MABh:] Why [would there be no memory of the agent and the object]? Even if the 
memory is the agent of experience, the cognition would not be remembered if it is not 
experienced. If there is no self-awareness, there would be no experience by itself.618 
1.3.2.1.3 Proving the Self-awareness by Rejecting the Other-awareness 
1.3.2.1.3.1 The Explanation of the Infinite Regress in the Theory of Other-
awareness 
[MABh:] It is not correct that the [cognition] is experienced by another cognition. Why?  
If it is experienced by another cognition, there would be the absurd consequence of 
infinite regress.  To explain: if it is accepted that a cognition, which determines the 
blue color, is determined by the cognition which arises immediately after it, then, the 
cognition of blue-cognition would need another experiencer. For that [cognition of the 
                                                 
617 MABh: / gang zhig mi ’dod pa des kyang gdon mi za bar rang rig pa khas blang 
bar bya dgos te / gzhan du →na← (P : ma D) mthong ngo zhes dus phyis ’byung ba’i 
dran pas yul dran pa nyid dang / ngas mthong ngo snyam du yul gyi nyams su myong 
ba dran par mi ’gyur ro / (D 272a5ff. : P 324b2ff.) A different translation cf. Garfield 
2006: 203, ll. 34-37. 
618 MABh: / →de← (D : om. P) ci’i phyir zhe na / dran pa ni nyams su myong ba’i yul 
can yin na shes pa yang nyams su ma myong bas dran →pa← (D : pa pa P) yod par 
mi ’gyur ro // rang rig pa med pa’i phyir na re zhig de nyid kyis de nyams su myong ba 
yod pa ma yin no / (D 272a6ff. : P 324b3ff.) 
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cognition of the blue-cognition] too, there must be another [cognition].  As a result, 
the absurd consequence of the infinite regress arises.619 
1.3.2.1.3.2 The Explanation of the Failure of Perceiving Other Object in the 
Theory of Other-awareness 
[MABh:] Further, [it would follow that] the cognition would not determine other objects 
because every cognition in a continuum of cognition is the perceiver (yul can) of 
another cognition (i.e., the previous cognition) and every sentient being has one 
continuum of cognition [only]. The cognitions, which arise like a [needle] penetrating 
a hundred blue lotus petals, take place so quickly that they seem to happen 
simultaneously.620  Therefore, undoubtedly we need to accept the existence of self-
                                                 
619 MABh: / shes pa gzhan gyis kyang de myong bar mi rigs te / ci’i phyir zhe na / shes 
pa gzhan gyis nyams su myong na thug pa med par thal bar ’gyur ro // ’di ltar sngon 
po yongs su gcod par byed pa’i shes pa gcig de’i →mjug← (D : ’jug P) thogs su ’byung 
ba’i rnam par shes pas gcod par khas len na // sngon po’i shes →pa’i← (D : pas P) shes 
pa de la yang myong ba po gzhan yod par bya dgos shing / de la yang gzhan zhig ’gyur 
dgos pas thug pa med pa’i skyon du thal lo / (D 272a7ff. : P 324b4ff.) 
620 According to Jayānanda, this sentence is the response to the objection that if one 
person possesses only one continuum of cognition, how can there be the complex of 
cognitions in his experience, for instance, the complex of five sense perceptions when 
he sees the color and form of the actors in a play, listens to the music from the instrument, 
smells the odor from the camphor (ga pur), tastes the spiced betel leaves (so rtsi) in his 
mouth and feels his cloth at the same time.  And according to this sentence in MABh, 
which is a metaphor explaining a deluded visual perception as if seeing a hundred of 
petals of lotus being penetrated at once when a needle went through them speedily, the 
Yogācāra claims that in the same manner these five sense perceptions do not arise at the 
same time but successively.  The feeling of “they arise at the same time” is also 
nothing but a delusion because the five sense perceptions can also switch speedily. (Cf. 
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MABh D 192b5-193a3)  
However, Jayānanda’s explanation is firmly opposed by Tsong Kha Pa. He believes that 
such explanation is completely inappropriate (shin tu mi rigs) because if we follow such 
explanation, a viewpoint has to be presumed for the Yogācāra or the Sautrāntika to hold 
that different types of cognitions cannot arise simultaneously in one continuum of 
cognition, which is against Tsong Kha Pa’s understanding of the tenet of the Yogācāra 
or the Sautrāntika.  According to him, the Yogācāra or the Sautrāntika is supposed to 
accept that different types of cognitions can arise in one continuum of cognition 
simultaneously.  Tsong Kha Pa has presumed that one may cite the classic doctrine to 
argue that every sentient being has only one continuum of mind. (Cf. MABhzkp, p. 350.)  
To this, he suggests understanding this doctrine with the interpretation by Dharmakīrti 
who explains in PV 3.501cd: / de rnams rigs mthun pa nyid las // nus pa nges par ’gyur 
pa yin / (= tāsāṃ samānajātīye sāmarthyaniyamo bhavet. Literally, “These [perceptual 
and conceptual cognitions] can have a restriction of their capacity [only] in relation to 
[a cognition] of the same kind.”).  Accordingly, the doctrine in question can be 
explained as that there should be no synchronous arising of different cognitions of the 
same kind (samānajātīya), for instance, two different visual cognitions, but it is possible 
for different kinds of cognitions to arise synchronously in one continuum of cognition.  
Therefore, Tsong Kha Pa presumes there might be a mistake in the Sanskrit text for the 
sentence we discuss here. (Cf. MABhzkp, p. 350.)  For the same section, Yao seemed 
to misunderstand Tsong Kha Pa’s words and drew an exactly opposite conclusion that 
“Tsong kha pa thinks that neither the Sautrāntikas nor the Vijñānavādins in this text 
should use simultaneity as a proof of self-cognition since the very idea of simultaneity 
has been dismissed by Dharmakīrti.” (Yao 2005: 115.) 
Tsong Kha Pa’s argument may be tenable only if all his explanations on the view of the 
Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika can be limited within Dharmakīrti’s theory—it is highly 
possible according to my study in § 2.2.1, because some more verses from the 
Pratyakṣa chapter of PV are found to prove that Dharmakīrti accepts that different kinds 
of cognitions arise at the same time—for instance, he states, “Even if different kinds 
[of cognitions] arise simultaneously…” (PV 3.520ab: sakṛd vijātīyajātāv apy ekena 
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awareness so as to obviate the absurd consequence of the infinite regress.621 
                                                 
paṭīyasā /) and “Because the mental cognitions, which are with or without conceptual 
construction, exist simultaneously or they act swiftly, stupid person thinks that these 
two are the same.” (PV 3.133: manasor yugapadvṛtteḥ savikalpāvikalpayoḥ / vimūḍho 
laghuvṛtter vā tayor aikyaṃ vyavasyati //)—and he may reject the view that different 
cognitions, which are of the same kind, could arise at the same time—for instance, in 
PV 3.140 he says, “The eyes (i.e., the visual cognition), which are with certain 
resistance, [can] put firebrands and so on, which move quickly, as a rotating wheel.  It 
is not the [rotating wheel that makes up the faulty] eyes (i.e., the wrong visual cognition 
of the rotating wheel) by connecting [the visual cognitions of the separate firebrands].” 
(PV 3.140: śīghravṛtter alātāder anvayapratighātinī / cakrabhrāntiṃ dṛśā dhatte na 
dṛśāṃ ghaṭanena sā //)  The reason for us to presume that Tsong Kha Pa may consider 
Dharmakīrti only as the opponent of Candrakīrti in this section is that as a commentator 
of Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra, Tsong Kho Pa should not neglect that, 
according to Śāntarakṣita’s introduction to his opponent’s view, some Yogācāras and 
Sautrāntikas do hold the view as stated by Candrakīrti here, for instance, MAL: dkar 
po dag la sogs pa la / hes pa de ni rim ’byung ste // mgyogs par ’byung phyir blun po 
dag / cig car snyam du shes pa yin // (D 53b6ff.)  
Alternatively, if we do not follow Tsong Kha Pa, we will have an opponent of 
Candrakīrti in this section whose self-awareness theory is almost the same as that of 
Dharmakīrti except the theory of the one in question.  Then, we will have another 
question: who is this opponent?  We might presume that Candrakīrti might have access 
to Dharmakīrti’s theory through one of his students who misunderstood Dharmakīrti 
and gave the wrong information to Candrakīrti, but this assumption could hardly be 
testified by any material in our hands. 
621 MABh: / shes →pas← (D : pa P) yul gzhan yongs su →mi← (D : om. P) gcod par 
yang ’gyur te / rnam par shes pa’i rgyun lugs mtha’ dag shes pa gzhan gyi yul →can← 
(D : om. P) yin pa’i phyir dang / sems can rnams rnams par shes pa’i rgyud gcig yin 
pa’i phyir ro // rnam par shes pa ut+pala’i ’dab ma brgya ’bigs pa ltar rim gyis ’byung 
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1.3.2.1.3.3 The Conclusion of 1.3.2.1 
[MABh:] In the same manner, it would also be established that the memory “I saw it”, 
which is the perceiver of both [the object and its cognition], would arise in the later 
time.  If the nature of the cognition is not apprehended by self-awareness, the memory 
which is the perceiver of that (i.e., the object and the cognition622) would be impossible. 
Therefore, because the remembering cognition “I saw it” arises in the later time, it is 
inferred that there is an experiencing cognition [of the cognition], which produces the 
memory as the perceiver of both [the object and its cognition] in the later time and 
experiences the cognition’s own nature and the nature of the object.623 
1.3.2.2 The Explanation of 1.3.2 
1.3.2.2.1 The Refutation of the Ultimate Existence of Memory 
[MABh:] Therefore, with the memory in the later time, self-awareness is established.  
In this case, if it (i.e., the cognition) is experienced by itself, the other-dependent nature 
                                                 
ba rnams ’jug pa myur →bas← (D : ba P) cig car du ’jug pa lta bur mngon pa yin no // 
de’i phyir thug pa med pa’i skyon yongs su spang bar bya ba’i phyir gdon mi →za← (D : 
om. P) bar rang rig pa khas →blangs par← (D : blang bar P) bya dgos so / (D 272b2ff. : 
P 324b6ff.) 
622 Cf. ngas mthong ngo snyam du gnyi ga’i yul can gyi dran pa... (See n. 623.) 
623 MABh: / de →ltar← (D : lta P) na ni ngas mthong ngo snyam du gnyi ga’i yul can 
gyi dran pa dus phyis ’byung ba yang ’grub ste / shes pa’i rang bzhin rang rig pa ma 
→rtogs par← (D : gtogs pa la P) ni de’i yul can gyi dran pa de mi rigs so // de’i phyir 
ngas mthong ngo snyam du dus phyis dran pa’i shes pa skyes pa las gang las dus phyis 
gnyi ga’i yul can gyi dran pa skye →ba’i← (corr. : ba D, P) nyams su myong ba’i shes 
→pa← (P : pa’i D) rang gi bdag nyid dang yul gyi bdag nyid myong zhing skyes →par← 
(D : pa P) dpog par byed do / (D 272b4ff. : P 324b8ff.) 
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would also exist.  Thus, this is the response [by the opponent] to the question “how 
can you know the existence of that [other-dependent nature]?”  To explain that what 
[the opponent] replied above is incorrect, I stated that by this alone, the experience of 
that [cognition] is not established (i.e., MA 6.73a).624 
[MA 6.73bcd:] [Opponent:] [The experience can] be proved by the memory [which 
arises] in the later time. [Proponent:] This unproved [“memory”] which is being stated, 
[can] not be the proof for the sake of the establishment of the unproved [self-
awareness].625 
[MABh:] To this, if you state that [the self-awareness is proved by the memory626] in 
the light of the substantive establishment (i.e., in the light of ultimate reality)627, then, 
                                                 
624 MABh: / de’i phyir dus phyis kyi dran pa las rang nyams su myong ba grub pa yin 
la / rang nyams su myong ba yod na gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid yin pas de la ’di ni 
yod par gang gis shes par ’gyur (om. D : ba zhes par ’gyur ba P) zhes gang smras pa 
la / ’di nye bar bstan pa yin no zhes smras pa de yang rigs pa ma yin no zhes bstan 
→pa’i← (D : par P) phyir bshad pa / de nyid kyis de myong bar grub ma yin // (D 
272b5ff. : P 325a2ff.) 
625 MABh: gal te phyi dus dran pa las →grub← (D : ’grub P)  na // ma grub bsgrub 
par bya phyir brjod pa yi // ma grub ’di ni →sgrub← (D : bsgrub P) par byed pa min // 
(D 272b7 : P 325a4ff.) MA 6.73bcd: siddhaḥ smṛter uttarakālataś cet / 
asiddhasiddhyartham asiddham etan nirucyamānaṃ na hi sādhanāya // For two 
different translations cf. Padmakara 2002: 78 and Garfield 2006: 204.  The latter one 
is certainly unfaithful to the original text and yet becomes a basis of Garfield’s 
interpretation of this passage.  
626 Cf. MAṬ: / de skad du smra na ni zhes bya ba ni gal te phyi dus dran pa las ’grub 
na zhes brjod na’o / (D 193b6ff.) 
627 MAṬ: / ’on te rdzas su gyur pa don dam pa’i dran pa gang yin pa de… / (D 193b6.) 
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since nothing would be produced by itself or others [ultimately], there would be no 
memory at all and therefore, how can an unproven self-awareness be proved by an 
unproven memory?628 
1.3.2.2.2 The Memory Is an Inconclusive Reason Even in the Conventional 
Prospective 
Even if in the light of the conventional practice, it is also impossible for a memory to 
be the effect of the self-awareness.  Why?  Like the fire [to be inferred by smoke], 
when the self-awareness is proved by a certain cognition (i.e., the memory), [the self-
awareness] has to [previously] exist and therefore the [memory] can be identified as 
[its] effect arising later, like the smoke that arises from the fire. But now the self-
awareness is not yet established. Thus, how can there be a memory which is the effect 
of the self-awareness and possesses the indispensable causal relation with it?629 
1.3.2.2.3 The Memory Can Arise without Self-awareness 
For instance, we cannot infer a water-crystal or a fire-crystal by merely seeing water 
and fire, because even if they (i.e., two types of crystals) are absent, the water or the 
                                                 
628 MABh: de la gal te re zhig rdzas sgrub par byed pa yin pa’i dbang du byas nas de 
skad du smra na ni / de’i tshe bdag dang gzhan las skye ba med pa’i phyir rnam pa 
thams // cad du dran pa mi srid pas ji ltar ma grub pa’i dran pas ma grub pa’i rang rig 
pa →’grub← (D : sgrub P) par ’gyur / (D 272b7ff. : P 325a5ff.) 
629 MABh: / ’on te ’jig rten gyi tha snyad kyi dbang du yin →na← (D : te P) de lta na 
yang rang rig pa’i rgyu can →gyi← (P : gyis D) dran pa mi srid pa nyid do // →de← (D : 
om. P) ci’i phyir zhe na / gal te ’dir me bzhin du shes pa ’ga’ zhig gis rang rig pa ’grub 
par ’gyur na ni de yod pas du bas me ltar dus phyis ’byung ba’i dran pa’i sgo nas yod 
pa nyid du nges par ’gyur ba zhig na / rang rig pa de ni →da← (D : om. P) rung du yang 
ma grub pas / rang rig pa’i rgyu can rang rig pa med par mi ’byung ba’i dran pa ga la 
yod (om. D : de P) / (D 273a1ff. : P 325a6ff.) 
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fire can arise from the rain or the fire drill stick, respectively. In the same way in this 
case, it will be explained how the memory arises when there is no self-awareness. 
Therefore, there is no memory as an effect of self-awareness because of the absence of 
that [establishment of the self-awareness].630 
1.3.2.2.4 The Memory Is an Unproved Reason to Prove Self-awareness 
Accordingly, “for the sake of the establishment of the unproved [subject]” (i.e., MA 
6.73c1), namely, for the sake of the establishment of the self-awareness, the stated word 
(tshig) of “memory” is not yet established, namely, need to be established.  This case 
can be compared with the inferential sign of “being the object of visual sense” in the 
case of proving “sound is impermanent”.631 
1.3.2.2.5 The Refutation of the Real Causal Relation between the Memory-reason 
and the Cognition of Cognition to be Proved 
[MABh:] No matter how [you] examine [that proof of self-awareness],632 
                                                 
630 MABh: / ’di ltar chu tsam mthong ba las nor bu chu shel lam me tsam mthong ba 
las nor bu me shel yod pa nyid ni ma yin te / de dag med par yang char la sogs pa dang 
gtsub shing gtsubs pa la sogs pa las chu dang me dag ’byung ba’i phyir te / de bzhin 
du ’dir yang rang rig pa med par dran pa ji ltar ’byung ba de ltar →ston← (D : bstan P) 
par ’gyur ro // de’i phyir rang rig pa’i rgyu can gyi dran pa ni de med par med pas / (D 
273a2ff. : P 325a8ff.) 
631 MABh: / ma grub bsgrub par bya (om. D : ba’i P) phyir te // rang rig pa bsgrub 
par bya ba’i phyir dran pa’i tshig brjod pa’i ma grub pa ’di sgrub pa’i dgos pa can du 
ma grub ste / sgra mi rtag pa la mig gis →gzung← (D : bzung P) bya nyid bzhin no snyam 
du bsam pa yin no / (D 273a4ff. : P 325b2ff.) 
632 MABh: / →ji← (D : ci P) ste de ltar rnam par dpyod pa btang nas kyang / (D 293a5 : 
P 325b3.) 
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[MA 6.74:] granted that the self-awareness were proved, even so, it is not correct that 
someone who remembers has the memory in that manner (i.e., in accepting self-
awareness633), because [the memory and the experience remembered] are, [according 
to you, substantively] different, like [the memory] arising for the unknown cognition 
continuum (i.e., the mind stream of another person). This reason will settle the 
differences [between two cognitions in different persons and those in one person].634 
[MABh:] Even if the cognition can perceive its own nature and the object, it is not 
correct that the remembering cognition remembers them in the same manner, because 
[you] accept that the remembering cognition is [substantively] different from the 
cognition that experiences the object.  Just like the self-awareness of Maitreya’s 
cognition and the experience of [his] object cannot be remembered by Upagupta’s 
cognition because [he] did not previously experience [them].  Likewise, if they are 
different from each other like the cognitions that arise in the cognition continuum of an 
unknown person, the cognition, which belongs to one’s own cognition continuum and 
arises in the later time, will also not remember the cognition and the object because 
they were not [previously] experienced [by such cognition].635 
                                                 
633 Cf. MAṬ: / de ltar zhes bya ba ni rang rig khas blangs su zin kyang dran pa mi rigs 
te de’i rgyu mtshan ston pa ni / (D 194a7.) 
634 MABh: rang rig pa ni grub la rag mod kyi // de lta’ang dran pa’i dran pa rigs min 
te // gzhan phyir ma shes rgyud la skyes pa bzhin / gtan tshigs ’dis ni khyad par dag 
kyang ’joms // (D 293a5 : P 325b3ff.)  Cf. also MA 74: kāmaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhir 
astu smartuḥ smṛter naiva tathāpi yuktā / ajñānasantānajavat paratvād dhetur viśeṣān 
api caiṣa hanyāt // 
635 MABh: gal te yang shes pas rang gi bdag nyid dang yul rig par byed mod kyi / de 
lta na yang dran pa’i shes pas de dag dran pa ni mi rigs te / dran pa’i shes pa ni yul 
nyams su myong ba’i shes pa las gzhan nyid du khas blangs pa’i phyir ro // ’di ltar 
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[Opponent:] Now, when those [the cognition and its memory] are in the same cognition 
continuum, they have the nature of being cause and effect.  Therefore, the memory 
can arise.636 
[Proponent:] Such [memory] does not exist.  Why? [The reason has been stated as] 
“being [substantively] different (paratvād)”.  [To explain:] With this reason “being 
[substantively] different”, [we] can settle all differences [you proposed], such as “being 
in the same continuum of cognition” and “having the casual relation”.  If the moment, 
at which the memory arises, is later than the time of the [previous] experience, they (i.e., 
the memory and the experience) are [substantively] different [according to your theory].  
Therefore, just like the cognition that belongs to another person, we can say “[the 
memory] is not in the same continuum with the experiencing cognition” and “it does 
not have the causal relation [with the previous experience] too”. [In this case] the reason 
“being [substantively] different” can broadly refute [your argument].637 
                                                 
byams pa’i shes pa’i rang rig pa dang yul myong ba ni sngar nyams su →ma← (D : om. 
P) myong bas nyer sbas kyi shes pas dran pa ma yin pa de bzhin du ma shes pa’i rgyud 
→la skyes← (P : las shes D) pa ltar gzhan yin pa’i phyir na rang gi rgyud du gtogs pa’i 
rnam par shes →pa’i← (P : pa D) dus phyis ’byung bas kyang shes pa dang don dag 
nyams su ma myong ba’i phyir dran par mi ’gyur ro // (D 293a5ff. : P 325b4ff.) 
636 MABh: ci ste rgyud gcig tu gtogs pa rnams la rgyu dang ’bras bu’i dngos po gnas 
pa’i phyir / dran pa yod par ’gyur ro snyam du sems na / (D 293b1 : P 325b7.) 
637 MABh: de yang yod pa ma yin te / gang gi phyir gtan tshigs ’dis ni khyad par dag 
kyang ’joms / gzhan yin pa’i phyir zhes bya ba’i gtan tshigs gang yin pa ’dis ni rgyud 
gcig tu gtogs pa nyid dang / rgyu dang ’bras bu’i dngos po la sogs pa’i khyad par thams 
cad nye bar ’joms par byed do // dran pa’i shes pa’i skad cig nyams su myong ba’i dus 
phyis ’byung ba ni gzhan yin pa’i phyir / rgyud gzhan gyi shes pa bzhin du nyams su 
myong ba’i shes pa dang / rgyud gcig tu gtogs pa ma yin la / rgyu dang ’bras bu’i dngos 
→po← (D : por P) gnas pa yang ma yin no zhes bya ba la sogs pa gzhan yin pa’i phyir 
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1.3.2.3 The Explanation How Memory Arises without Self-awareness 
[MABh:] [Opponent:] According to you, how [does the memory happen]?  To 
explain:638 
[MA 6.75:] In my opinion, the one who is remembering this [object] is not different 
from the one who [previously] experienced the object.  From that, [we have] the 
memory “I saw it”.  And this [memory] depends on the worldly convention.639 
[MABh:] It was explained [in MA 6.74cd640] the remembering cognition does not exist 
differently from the object-experiencing cognition which experienced the object. 
Because [in my opinion] the memory is not [substantively] different [from the previous 
experience in one mind continuum], it is impossible for what has been apprehended by 
the [previous] experience not to be apprehended by the remembering cognition. 
Inasmuch as the memory has the object, what has been determined by the experiencing 
cognition is impossible not to be determined by the memory.  Accordingly, there 
would be the notion of “I saw”.  Further, this [notion] depends on the worldly 
                                                 
zhes bya ba’i gtan tshigs ’di nyid kyis rgya cher dgag par bya ba yin no / (D 293b1ff. : 
P 325b7ff.) 
638 MABh: / khyod kyi ltar na ji ltar zhe na / brjod par bya ste / (D 273b4 : P 326a3.) 
639 MABh: gang phyir gang gis yul myong →’gyur← (D : gyur P) de las // dran pa ’di 
gzhan nga la yod min pa // de phyir nga yis mthong snyam dran →’gyur← (D : gyur P) 
te // ’di yang ’jig rten tha snyad tshul lugs yin // (D 273b4 : P 326a3ff.)  Cf. also MA 
6.75: yenānubhūto viṣayas tato ’sya smartuḥ paratvaṃ na hi me ’sti yasmāt / tato mayā 
dṛṣṭam iti smṛtiḥ syād eṣā ca lokavyavahāranītiḥ // 
640 Cf MAṬ: / de ltar ni sngar bshad zin to zhes bya ba ni / gzhan phyir ma skyes rgyud 
las skyes pa bzhin // gtan tshigs ’dis ni khyad par dag kyang ’joms // zhes bya bas so / 
(D 195b3.) 
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convention but not on the [philosophical] analysis, because the worldly convention can 
bear the untruthfulness.641 
1.3.3 The Conclusion of the Refutation of Self-awareness 
[MABh:] Hence, it is to explain:642 
[MA 6.76:] Therefore, there would be no self-awareness at all.  How could your other-
dependent nature be perceived?  Further, the agent and both of the action and the 
object are not one thing.  It is not correct that it is perceived by itself.643 
[MABh:] As for the notion of “I know [it]”, if the “I” who is knowing is the nature of 
the object (las), the very object to be experienced, too, would be the agent and it would 
not be different from its action.  Therefore, there would be an absurd consequence that 
the agent, the action and the object are one thing.  Such an oneness of them has never 
                                                 
641 MABh: gang →gis← (D : gi P) yul myong ba →de← (D : ste P) yul nyams su myong 
ba’i shes pa de las dran pa’i shes pa gzhan nyid du ji ltar med pa de ltar →na← (D : ni 
P) sngar bshad zin to // gang gi phyir dran pa gzhan nyid yod pa ma yin pa de’i phyir / 
gang nyams su myong bas myong ba de dran pa’i shes pas myong ba ma yin pa ma yin 
pas dran pa yul dang ldan par ’byung la / nyams su myong ba’i shes pas yongs su 
→gcod← (D : bcad P) pa gang yin pa de dran pas yongs su ma bcad pa ma yin pas bdag 
gis mthong ngo zhes bya bar (om. D : yang P) ’gyur ro // ’di yang ’jig rten tshul lugs 
yin gyi shin tu dpyad par bya ba ni ma yin te / brdzun pa’i don can nyid kyis ’jig rten 
gyi tha snyad yin pa’i phyir ro / (D 273b4ff. : P 326a4ff.) 
642 MABh: / gang gi phyir de →lta← (D : ltar P) yin pa / (D 273b7 : P 326a7.) 
643 MABh: de’i phyir rang rig yod pa ma yin na // khyod →kyis← (D : kyi P) gzhan 
dbang gang gis ’dzin par ’gyur // byed po las dang bya ba gcig min pas // de nyid kyis 
de ’dzin par rigs ma yin // (D 273b7 : P 326a7ff.) Cf. also MA 6.76: tasmāt 
svasaṃvedanam asti naiva kenānyatantragrahaṇaṃ tava syāt / kartuś ca 
karmakriyayoś ca naikyaṃ tenaiva tasya grahaṇaṃ na yuktam // 
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been observed.  In the same manner, the person who cuts, the tree and the action of 
cutting are not one thing.  Thus, there would not be the self-awareness and it [the 
cognition] would not be perceived by itself.  It is stated in 
Āryalaṅkāvatāramahāyānasūtra that, as the sword cannot cut its own blade and the 
finger cannot touch its own fingertip, it is in the same manner how mind is related to 
the awareness of itself.644 
  
                                                 
644 MABh: bdag rig // par byed do zhes rig par bya bzhin pa’i bdag nyid las kyi dngos 
por ’gyur la rig par bya ba de nyid kyang byed pa po yin zhing de’i bya ba yang tha mi 
dad pa nyid yin pas byed pa po dang las dang bya ba gcig tu thal bar ’gyur na / ’di dag 
gcig pa nyid du ni ma mthong ngo // ’di ltar gcod pa po dang shing dang gcod pa’i bya 
ba gcig pa ni ma yin no // ’di las kyang rang rig pa yod pa ma yin pas de nyid kyis 
de ’dzin pa ma yin no // ’phags pa lang kar gshegs pa las kyang / ji ltar ral →gyi← (D : 
gris P) rang gi so // gcod par mi byed sor mo ni // rang la rag par mi byed ltar // rang 
rig sems kyang de bzhin no // zhes gsungs so / a (D 273b7ff. : P 326a8ff.) 
a The corresponding original text of this citation is found in LKt: / ji ltar ral gri rang 
rang so dang // ji ltar mdzub mo rang rtse la la // mi gcod reg par mi ’gyur ba // de 
bzhin sems kyis rang blta la’o / (D 179b4ff.) and for its Sanskrit text cf. LK 568: 
bsvadhārāṃb hi yathā khaḍgaṃ svāgraṃ vai aṅgulir yathā / na cchindate na spṛśate 
tathā cintaṃ svadarśane // (LK, p. 335.) 
b LK reads svadhāraṃ, but then this word would be read as a bahuvrīhi compound to 
the khaḍga and it does not make sense in the context here. Nanjio suggests the 
emendation according to the Tibetan and Chinese translation. (Cf. LK, p. 335, n. 8.) 
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Appendix V: A Comparison between Two Tables of Content of Pramāṇavārttika 
3.249-280 and Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.19d, 21- 27645 
PV 3.249-280 PVin 1.19d, 21- 27 
  PVin 1.19d The introduction to the 
instance of self-
awareness. 
3 Self-awareness 
3.1 The establishment of 
the definition of the [self-
awareness]. 
 
PV 3.249 (= 
PVin 1.21) 
PVin 1.21ab 
(= PV 
3.249ab) 
The establishment of the 
pakṣadharma of the proof 
to prove that the self-
awareness is free from 
conception. 
  PVin 1.21cd 
(= PV 
3.249cd) 
The summary of the 
establishment of that the 
self-awareness is free 
from conception. 
3.2 The establishment of 
the example of the [self-
awareness]. 
3.2.1 The refutation of the 
view that the happiness 
and so on are the interior 
materials. 
3.2.2 The refutation of the 
view that [the happiness 
and so on] are the external 
materials. 
3.2.1.1 The explanation  
[that the happiness and so 
on are the interior 
materials]. 
PV 3.250   
                                                 
645 Source from PVVgyal, pp. 15-17 and pp. 184-207, and PVingyal, pp. 142-179. 
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3.2.1.2 The refutation [of 
the view that the happiness 
and so on are the interior 
materials]. 
3.2.1.2.1 To establish that 
the happiness, which is the 
feelings of sense 
perceptions, is the object 
experienced by the self-
awareness. 
3.2.1.2.2 To establish the 
experience of the object. 
3.2.1.2.1.1 The general 
establishment of that [the 
happiness and so on] are 
the cognition. 
 
PV 3.251-
254 (v.251 = 
PVin 1.22) 
PVin 1.22 (=  
PV 3.251) 
The refutation of the view 
that happiness and so on 
are the interior materials 
(bem po). 
   
3.2.1.2.1.2 The refutation 
of the view that [the 
happiness and so on] are 
experienced by other 
experiencing factors. 
3.2.1.2.1.2.1 The 
refutation of the view that 
[the happiness and so on] 
are experienced by other 
experiencing factors when 
many cognitions do not act 
simultaneously. 
3.2.1.2.1.2.2 The 
refutation [of the view that 
the happiness and so on are 
experienced by other 
experiencing factors when 
many cognitions] act 
simultaneously. 
3.2.1.2.1.2.1.1 The 
PV 3.255   
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infeasibility of the view 
that the happiness and so 
on are experienced by a 
simultaneous sense 
perception.  
3.2.1.2.1.2.1.2 The 
infeasibility of the view 
that [the happiness and so 
on] are experienced by a 
subsequent mental 
perception. 
PV 3.256   
3.2.1.2.1.2.1.3.2 The 
infeasibility of the view 
that [the object and the 
happiness] are 
simultaneously perceived 
[by the sense perception]. 
3.2.1.2.1.2.1.3.2.1 The 
absurd consequence [in the 
view that the object and 
the happiness are 
simultaneously perceived 
by the sense perception]. 
PV 3.257-
259a 
  
3.2.1.2.1.2.1.3.2.2 The 
refutation of the rejection 
of 3.2.1.2.1.2.1.3.2.1. 
PV 
3.259bcd 
  
3.2.1.2.1.2.1.3.3 The 
infeasibility of the view 
that merely the happiness 
is perceived. 
PV 3.260-
261b 
  
3.2.1.2.1.2.1.3.4 The 
contradiction in relation to 
the perceiving of the 
happiness if the object 
alone is perceived. 
PV 3.261cd   
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3.2.1.2.1.2.2 The 
refutation [of the view that 
the happiness and so on are 
experienced by other 
experiencing factors as 
many cognitions] act 
simultaneously. 
3.2.1.2.1.2.2.1 The absurd 
consequence [in the view 
stated in 3.2.1.2.1.2.2]. 
PV 3.262   
3.2.1.2.1.2.2.2 The 
refutation of the rejection 
[to 3.2.1.2.1.2.2.1]. 
PV 3.263-
265 
  
3.2.1.2.2 To establish the 
experience of the object. 
PV 3.266-
267 
  
3.2.2 The refutation of the 
view that [the happiness 
and so on] are the external 
materials. 
3.2.2.1 The refutation of 
the view that the happiness 
and so on are the external 
objects. 
3.2.2.2 To establish that 
[the happiness and so on] 
are in the nature of 
consciousness. 
3.2.2.1.1 The refutation [of 
the view that the happiness 
and so on are the external 
materials] by the previous 
reasoning. 
PV 3.268   
3.2.2.1.2 The refutation [of 
the view that the happiness 
and so on are the external 
material] by other 
PV 3.269-
270 (v. 
270ab ≈ 
PVin 1.23 (≈ 
PV 3.270ab) 
The establishment of the 
view that happiness and 
so on are interior. 
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reasoning. 
3.2.2.1.2.1 The refutation 
[of the view that the 
happiness and so on are the 
external materials] by an 
inferential reason. 
PVin 1.23) 
3.2.2.1.2.2 The refutation 
of the rejection of 
3.2.2.1.2.1. 
PV 3.271-
273 
  
3.2.2.2 To establish that 
[the happiness and so on] 
are in the nature of 
consciousness. 
3.2.2.2.1 The summary of 
the view that [the 
happiness and so on] are 
established as the 
consciousness. 
PV 3.274 (≈ 
PVin 
1.24ab) 
PVin 1.24ab 
(≈ PV 3.274) 
The establishment of the 
view that the happiness is 
the consciousness. 
3.2.2.2.2 The refutation of 
the rejection of 3.2.2.2.1. 
3.2.2.2.2.1 The refutation 
of the view that the 
experience and the 
cognition are substantively 
different. 
PV 3.275-
276 (v. 275 
≈ PVin 
1.24cd) 
PVin 1.24cd 
(≈ PV 3.275) 
The establishment of that 
the experience and the 
cognition are 
substantively identical. 
3.2.2.2.2.2 The refutation 
of the view that [the 
experience and the 
cognition] are 
substantively different, but 
they are not distinguished 
because they are mixed 
together. 
PV 3.277-
279 (v. 277 
= PVin 1.25; 
v. 278 = 
PVin 1.26; v. 
279 = PVin 
1.27) 
PVin 1.25-
27 
(v. 1.25 = 
PV 3.277; v. 
1.26 = PV 
3.278; v. 27  
= PV 3.279) 
The summary of the 
establishment of the view 
that the happiness and so 
on are the nature of 
interior experience. 
3.2.2.2.2.3 The refutation 
of the view that [the 
difference between the 
PV 3.280   
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experience and the 
cognition] is similar to that 
between the consciousness 
(sems) and the mental 
factor (sems byung). 
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Appendix VI: An Annotated Translation of the Beginning Section of 
Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya 3.425 
Outlines 
1 The Necessity of Proving Self-awareness by the Reason Used to Prove That Cognition 
Has Two Forms 
1.1 The Objection 
1.2 Prajñākaragupta’s Response to 1.1 by the Explanation of prāyas in PVA 3.425 
2 The Argument about the Example of Reflexivity 
2.1 The Objections to the Existence of the Example of Reflexivity 
2.2 Proposing Lamp as the Example of Reflexivity 
2.3 The Objection to the Lamp as the Example of Reflexivity 
2.3.1 Lamp Does Not Need another Illuminator 
2.3.2 The Counter-example: Sense Faculty 
2.3.3 The Self Cannot Be Used for the Example of Reflexivity 
2.3.3.1 Proposing the Self for the Example of Reflexivity 
2.3.3.2 The Rejection of 2.3.3.1 
2.3.3.2.1 The Self Cannot Play Different Roles in One Single Action 
2.3.3.2.2 One Cannot Use the Self as an Example When One Does Not Accept It 
2.4 Prajñākaragupta’s Response to the Objections to the reflexivity 
2.4.1 Only Cognition Exists in Reality 
2.4.2 The Interpretation of the Perceiving by Itself 
2.4.3 Sense Faculty Is Not Qualified as a Counter-example 
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2.4.4 Proving That Pleasure and so on Are Experienced by Itself 
2.4.4.1 The Statement of Proof 
2.4.4.2 The Refutation of that Pleasure Can Be Experienced by the Self 
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PV 3.425: dvairūpyasādhanenāpi prāyaḥ siddhaṃ svavedanam /  
         svarūpabhūtābhāsasya tadā saṃvedanekṣaṇāt // 
1 The Necessity of Proving Self-awareness by the Reason Used to Prove That 
Cognition Has Two Forms 
1.1 The Objection 
nanu sarveṇaiva →dvairūpyasādhanena←646 svasamvedanaṃ prasiddham / kim ucyate 
prāya iti / 
[Opponent:] By the proof of the two forms, the self-awareness was completely 
established, wasn’t it? 647  [If so, then] why is “prāyas” stated [in the verse]? 
1.2 Prajñākaragupta’s Response to 1.1 by the Explanation of prāyas in PVA 3.425 
naitad asti / mukhyato →dvairūpyasādhanena←648 dvairūpyaprasiddhiḥ / ānuṣaṅgikī 
                                                 
646 Sāṅkṛityāyana transcripts this phrase as dvairūpyasādhane na (PVA1, p. 112, l. 28; 
PVA2, p. 426, l. 21), but PVAt reads / gal te tshul gnyis sgrub par byed pas rang rig 
pa rab tu grub pa ma yin nam / (D 90b1 : P 106a6ff.) and this makes sense to the current 
argument. 
647 In PV 3.349cd and 370cd, Dharmakīrti has stated: “Because the existence of the 
object has the nature of that [cognition], the self-awareness too is considered as the 
awareness of the object.”(PV 3.349cd: arthasthites tadātmatvāt svavid apy arthavin 
matā /) “If there is the apprehension (i.e., the recollection) of the object in the past, 
having two forms and the self-awareness are established.” (PV 3.370cd: atītārthagrahe 
siddhe dvirūpatvātmavedane /) And this may be the reason why Prajñākaragupta begins 
his commentary with such a hypothetical question. 
648  (≈ dvairūpyasādhanena) PVAms : dvairūpyasādhane PVA1 and 
PVA2. Cf. PVAt: tshul gnyis sgrub par byed pas (= dvairūpyasādhanena) (D 90b1 : P 
106a7ff.). Cf. also J: sgrub par byed pas (= sādhanena) zhes bya ba ni grub bas so / (D 
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punaḥ svasamvedanatāpi yataḥ svarūpabhūta ābhāsas tadā pratīyate / na ca 
svasamvedanād anyataḥ pratītiḥ / 
[Proponent:] This is not the case. By the proof of [the cognition] having two forms, the 
[cognition] having two forms is principally established. On the other hand, [the 
cognition] having self-awareness is also [established] inasmuch as it is related (i.e., 
implied), because the appearance [of the object], which is the own nature [of the 
cognition], is apprehended at that time. And the cognition does not [arise] from 
anything else than self-awareness. 
2 The Argument about the Example of Reflexivity 
2.1 The Objections to the Existence of the Example of Reflexivity 
649nanu svasamvedanam ity ātmano grāhakaṃ / tataś ca tad eva grāhyaṃ grāhakañ 
ceti / na caivamātmakatāyāṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ kaścid asti yena tataḥ siddhiḥ / 
[Opponent:] Indeed, self-awareness means the perceiver of oneself and that [self-
awareness] is therefore the perceived [object] and the perceiver [at the same time]. But 
there is no example whatsoever for something having such nature (evamātmakatā) (i.e., 
both perceiver and perceived), so that [self-awareness could be] established from it. 
2.2 Proposing Lamp as the Example of Reflexivity 
pradīpādivat prakāśyaprakāśakabhāva iti cet / 
                                                 
194a2 : P 224a7.) 
649 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 64: naitad asti tvayaikaṃ grāhyaṃ grāhakam iṣyate / 
                      na caikasyaivam ātmatve dṛṣṭāntaḥ kaścid asti // 
“It is not true that the perceived [object] and the perceiver are accepted by you as one 
thing. There is no example in regard to the nature of one [thing] having such nature.” 
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[Proponent:] Like the lamp and the like, [something can] be [both] the illuminated and 
the illuminator. 
2.3 The Objection to the Lamp as the Example of Reflexivity 
2.3.1 Lamp Does Not Need another Illuminator 
650→na←651 / pradīpādīnām aparaprakāśakanirapekṣatvāt prakāśyarūpatā nāsty eva / 
kutaḥ prakāśyaprakāśakatayā dṛṣṭāntatā / 
[Kumārila652:] [It is] not [correct]. Because the lamp and the like do not depend on a 
different illuminator, they do not have the nature of being illuminated at all. How can 
they (i.e., the lamp and the like) be an example by having [the nature of] the illuminated 
and the illuminator [at the same time]? 
2.3.2 The Counter-example: Sense Faculty 
                                                 
650 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 65: agnyādayo ghaṭādīnāṃ prasiddhā ye prakāśakāḥ / 
                      na te prkāśyarūpā hi prakāśasyānapekṣaṇāt //  
“The fire and the like, which are well known as the illuminators of the vase and so on, 
do not have the nature of being the illuminated for indeed [they do] not depend on 
illuminator [to illuminate them].” 
651 na PVA1, PVA2 : nanu Prms. 
652  This passage can be considered as an introduction to the argument by Bhaṭṭa 
Mīmāṃsaka because it has been shown by footnotes related to the passage that many 
parallel passages Kumarīla Bhaṭṭa’s Ślokavārtika are found corresponding to 
Prajñākaragupta’s opponent’s opinions.  Thus, I name the opponent Buddhist and the 
proponent Kumārila in this passage. 
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653grāhyatā tu yadā teṣāṃ →tadākṣaṃ grāhakaṃ←654 bhavet /  
buddhyakṣayor na ca svātmavedanaṃ niścitaṃ dvayoḥ // 1084 // 
655tasmāt svasamvedanan nāma nāsty eva / 
On the other hand, when they (i.e., the form and the like656) are perceived, the sense 
faculty would become the perceiver.657 Neither for the cognition nor for the sense 
faculty is the awareness by its own nature (svātmavedanaṃ) ascertained. (1084) 
Therefore, the so-called self-awareness does not exist at all. 
                                                 
653 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 66: grāhyatvaṃ tu yadā teṣāṃ tadākṣaṃ grāhakaṃ matam /  
                     akṣagrahaṇavelāyāṃ grāhikā dhīr bhaviṣyati //  
“On the other hand, when they are perceived, the sense faculty is accepted as the 
perceiver. When the sense faculty is perceived, the cognition would be the perceiver [of 
the sense faculty].” 
654  (= tadākṣaṃ grāhakaṃ) PVAms : tadākṣagrāhakaṃ PVA2 : 
tadāpy agrāhakaṃ PVA1. Cf. also ŚV Śūnyavāda 66ab (see n. 653). 
655 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 67ab: tasyāṃ tu gṛhyamāṇāyām anyā dhīr grāhikeṣyate / 
“But when this [cognition] is being perceived, another cognition is admitted as [its] 
perceiver.” 
The opinion proposed in Śūnyavāda 66-67ab is reiterated in Śūnyavāda 186-187ab: sati 
prakāśakatve ’pi vyavasthā dṛṣyate yathā / rūpādau cakṣurādīnāṃ tathātrāpi 
bhaviṣyati // prākāśakatvaṃ bāhye ’rthe śaktyabhāvāt tu nātmani / 
656 Cf. J: / gsal bar bya ba nyid →yin par← (D : yin yang P) gzung ba nyid yin par bstan 
pa ni gang tshe de dag (= yadā teṣāṃ) ces bya ba’o / (D 194a4 : P 224b2.) 
657 Cf. PVAt: / gang tshe de dag gzung yin pa // de tshe dbang po ’dzin byed ’gyur / (D 
90b4 : P 106b3.) 
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2.3.3 The Self Cannot Be Used for the Example of Reflexivity 
2.3.3.1 Proposing the Self for the Example of Reflexivity 
658nanu cātmā grāhakarūpo grāhyaś cetīṣyate bhavadbhiḥ 
[Buddhist:] However, don’t you accept that the Self has the nature of the perceiver and 
it is the perceived [object]?659 
2.3.3.2 The Rejection of 2.3.3.1 
2.3.3.2.1 The Self Cannot Play Different Roles in One Single Action 
tad apy asat / yataḥ / 
660dharmabhedena tatrāpi śakyā grāhyagrāhakarūpatā /  
                                                 
658 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 67cd: nanv ātmā grāhako grāhyo bhavatābhyupagamyte / 
“[Yogācāra:] You do accept the Self as both the perceiver and the perceived, don’t you?” 
659 Cf. ŚV Ātmavāda 142: śāntāyāṃ vācyaśaktāyām ātmā kena prakāśyate / ātmanaiva 
prakāśyo ’yam ātmā jyotir itīritam // (ŚVN, p. 513) (“It being asked—‘(if the existence 
of the Soul be indicated solely by Vedic Injunctions and texts), when the Word ceases 
to indicate the Soul, by what is it manifested?’—the reply is given by the text—It is 
self-luminous, meaning that The Soul is manifested by Itself.” (Jhā 1909: 407.) 
660 ŚV Śūnyavāda 68: kathaṃcid dharmarūpeṇa bhinnatvāt pratyayasya tat / 
                   grāhakatvaṃ bhavet tatra grāhyaṃ dravyādi cātmanaḥ // 
  ŚV Śūnyavāda 69: yas tu nātyantabhedo ’tra kva vāsāv iṣyate mayā / 
                   pratyāsattinimittā tu pratyagātmapravartitā // 
“Because of the state of being different by the nature of the property (of the Self), the 
Self, which is [in the nature] of consciousness a, [can] somehow be the perceiver and in 
the other case, [the Self] is the perceived [object], e.g. as a substance and so on.” 
“To that [the opponent may claim that] there is no absolute difference [between these 
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grāhyatvaṃ dravyarūpeṇa grāhakatvaṃ tato ’nyathā // 1085 // 
dravyāntarāsādhāraṇenātmatvena grāhakatā dravyatvena tu sādhāraṇena grāhyateti 
yuktam / bhavatas tu sarvam etad asamañjasam /  
[Kumārila:] It is also untrue, because 
in this case [regarding the Self] too, the state of having the nature of the perceived and 
the perceiver is possible by the difference of properties.  
[Namely,] the state of being perceived is [effected] by the nature of the substance [and] 
the state of being the perceiver is [effected] in a different manner from that [of being a 
substance, i.e., the nature of apprehension661]. (1085) 
It is correct that the state of being the perceiver is [effected] by being the Self which is 
                                                 
two states of Self], [we reply:] where do I agree with [such] idea?  The individual Self 
is established by the cause of extreme proximity.” b 
It is observed that a similar argument is found in NK. Cf. NK, p. 91. For English 
translation cf. Jhā 1982: 201. 
a Cf. ŚVT: pratyayasya tat iti bodharūpatām āha / (p. 257, ll. 14-15.) 
b Cf. ŚVT: atyantabhedas tu ghaṭatajjñānayor asmābhir naiveṣṭa ity āha / yas tv ity 
arddhena / pratyāsattilakṣaṇena sambandhenātmasambandhino 
bodharūpasyātmasambandhinyām eva dravyarūpatāyāṃ pravartitety āha / 
pratyāsattīty arddhena / kadācid ātmasambandhinī bodharūpatāsya viṣayaḥ / tatra 
ghaṭādayo bodhyāḥ / kadācit pratyāsattilakṣaṇena sambandhenātmagatadrayarūpatā 
viṣayaḥ / tadātmaivātmano bodhya ity ucyate / tatrāpi na grāhyagrāhakayor aikyam ity 
arthaḥ // (p. 257, ll. 16-20.) 
661 Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 68 (see n. 660).  The different manner mentioned here might 
refter to “by that [nature] of the apprehension” (pratyayasya tat) as stated in ŚV 
Śūnyavāda 68b, which is interpreted as bodharūpatām by Umbeka Bhaṭṭa. Cf. ŚVT, p. 
257, ll. 14-15. 
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not common to other substances, but the state of being perceived is [effected] by being 
a substance, which is common [to other substances]. However, for you (i.e., the 
Buddhist662), this [view] is all incorrect.663 
2.3.3.2.2 One Cannot Use the Self as an Example When One Does Not Accept It 
na ca paraprasiddhimātrād eva dṛṣṭāntaḥ / svapratipattāv upāyatvābhāvāt / 
Further, the example [, such as the Self, can] not be [substantiated] only because it is 
established for the opponent [in a debate], because it (i.e., such an example) [can] not 
be the means in [proving one’s] own assertion. 
2.4 Prajñākaragupta’s Response to the Objections to Reflexivity 
2.4.1 Only Cognition Exists in Reality 
tad etad asat / 
grāhyagrāhakabhāvo hi naivāsti paramārthataḥ / 1086ab 
[Proponent:] This is untrue  
because in ultimate reality, the state of being the perceived and the perceiver does not 
exist at all. (1086ab) 
2.4.2 The Interpretation of the Perceiving by Itself 
aparapratyayaṃ rūpam atadvyāvṛttitas tathā // 1086cd // 
yatra hi parasya prakāśakatvaṃ na pratīyate tad evātmānaṃ prakāśayatīti 
vyapadiśyate / paraprakāśyavyāvṛttatvāt / yathā ca pratibhāsamāne dīpādau 664 na 
                                                 
662 Cf. Y: khyed →la ni← (P : lan D) (= bhavatas) sangs rgyas ba’i cha la ni’o / (D 
310a2 : P 412b8.) 
663 Cf. PVAt: … khyed kyis ’dod pa ma yin nam zhe na / (D 90b5: P 106b4.) 
664 In PVA1 (p. 113, l. 19), Sāṅkṛtyāyana has shown his hesitation in reading this word 
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parasya prakāśakatā tathā pratipāditam / ata eva pradīpasya dṛṣṭāntatā / 
The nature of not being perceived by anything else665 is so because of the exclusion of 
non-that (i.e., not being perceived by itself). (1086cd) 
The very case, in which the state of being the illuminator of something else is indeed 
not apprehended, is designated as illuminating itself, because it is excluded from [being] 
illuminated by another. 
And just as there is no other illuminator when the lamp and so forth are manifest (or 
appear), in the same manner it has been explained [that the lamp and so on can be self-
illuminator]. And precisely because of this, the lamp becomes the example [in proving 
the self-awareness]. 
2.4.3 Sense Faculty Is Not Qualified as a Counter-example 
cakṣuṣi vyāpṛte ’py arthas tāmisre na pratīyate /  
                                                 
as rūpa or dīpa, but he made his decision in favor of dīpa in his second edition. (Cf. 
PVA2 (p. 427, l. 6.) Although Prms 214b3 reads rūpa too, , and 
PVAt also testifies such reading (/ ’di ltar →gzugs← (P : gzungs D) la sogs pa snang ba 
la gsal bar byed pa gzhan med pa de ltar yang bstanzin to / PVAt: D 91a1: P 106b8ff.), 
I follow PVA2 to read dīpa because only this reading is comprehensible in the light of 
current context. 
665 The compound aparapratyaya may be translated as “not dependent on others” (cf. 
Edgerton 1953, p. 44). For instance, In MK 18.9 aparapratyaya is considered as a 
condition, which is translated, by Siderits and Katsura, as “not to be attained by means 
of another” (cf. Siderits_Katsura 2013: 102). However, in this case, I follow Tibetan 
translation gzhan gyis rtogs min (PVAt D 90b7), in which pratyaya is considered as an 
apprehension (rtogs pa).  This translation can be supported by the word prakāśakatva 
in the following commentary and the pratyaya appearing in the next verse, PVA v. 1807, 
in which pratyaya is again translated as “rtogs pa (apprehension)”. (Cf. PVAt D 91a1.) 
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pradīpasaṃnidhes tasya pratyayāt tatprakāśyatā // 1087 //  
dīpādayo naivam iti tataḥ svātmaprakāśakāḥ /  
na cākṣaṃ grāhakaṃ tatra svarūpeṇa prakāśanāt // 1088 //  
Even when visual sense faculty is active, [its] object is not apprehended in the darkness.  
The state of being illuminated for an [object] is due to the apprehension of that [object] 
which is near a lamp. (1087) 
The lamp and so on are not so [and] therefore they are the illuminators of themselves. 
And it is not the case that the sense faculty is not the perceiver of that [lamp666] because 
it is manifested by its own nature. (1088) 
2.4.4 Proving That Pleasure and so on Are Experienced by Itself 
2.4.4.1 The Statement of Proof 
sukhādayo ’pi naivāmī parasamvedanodayāḥ /  
ātmanā tu sukhādīnāṃ grāhyatve bāhyatā bhavet // 1089 //  
Pleasure and so forth too are definitely not those [things] accomplished by a different 
awareness.  But if the pleasure and so forth were perceived by the Self, they would 
become the external [objects]. (1089) 
2.4.4.2 The Refutation of that Pleasure Can Be Experienced by the Self 
samavāyasamāveśāt tad eva syāt svavedanam /  
samavāyapramāṇaṃ ca nety etat pratipāditam // 1090 // 
[If you argue that the pleasure and so forth would not appear as external object667 ] 
because they reside [in the Self] by [relation of] inherence, [then it would follow that] 
                                                 
666 Cf. Y: / →de la← (corr. : de D, P) zhes bya ba ni sgron ma la’o / (D 310a3: P 431a1.) 
667 Cf. Y: / ’phrod pa ’du bas bsdus pa’i dbang gis bde ba la sogs pa phyi rol ma yin 
pa nyid du snang ngo zhe na / (D310a4.) 
353 
 
the very that [Self] would be the self-awareness [because the alleged “connection by 
inherence” is due to things which are not established as independent of one another]668. 
Further, it has been explained that there is no means of knowledge for the inherence.669 
(1090) 
                                                 
668 Cf. Y: / de’i tshede nyid rang gi rig pa nyid du ’gyur ro // so sor ma grub pa dag 
las ’phrod pa ’du ba zhes brjod pa yin te / bum pa dang snam bu dag bzhin no / (D 
310a4ff.)  For the definition of inherence in PDhS see n. 360.  Biswanarayan (1993: 
149-150) mentioned that being different from the other relations, “such as saṃyoga 
(contact), svarūpa (self-linking), tādātmya (essential identity), abhāva sambandha 
(absential relation), vācyavācaka (denoting-denotor-hood) and paryāpti (the relation of 
completion)”, the relation of inseparable inherence (samavāya) has a characteristic that 
in such a relation “neither independent existence of the two is possible.” 
669 Prajñākaragupta did not indicate where the refutation of samavāya has been stated; 
neither did Jayanta and Yamāri.  In PV 2.69 Dharmakīrti has stated, etena samavāyaś 
ca samavāyi ca kāraṇam / vyavasthitatvaṃ jātyāder nirastam anapāśrayāt / (For 
Franco’s translation cf. Franco 1997: 317.) I assume that this is what Prajñākaragupta 
referred to.  
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